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HINTON'S

THEOLOGICAL WORKS

IN SIX VOLUMES.

THE

THEOLOGICAL WORKS

OF THE REV.

JOHN HOWARD HINTON, M.A.

In Six Volumes.

VOLUME III.

SYSTEMATIC AND CONTROVERSIAL DIVINITY.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE present Volume consists mainly of my work on the Natural Immortality of Man, entitled ATHANASIA.

In passing this work through the press, I have availed myself of the opportunity which the publication of this edition of my Theological Works affords me entirely to re-arrange its contents.

At the close of Athanasia as it originally stood was a chapter entitled "The Case directly Stated;" a chapter containing a summary of the positive evidence in support of the doctrine of Man's Natural Immortality: this chapter I have now, I think with obvious advantage, brought forward, and placed at the commencement of the Volume.

In the further arrangement of its contents, I have placed the various productions of my pen in relation to the doctrine of Man's Natural Immortality in the order in which they were written; aiming hereby at a twofold advantage—one for myself, in a more simple exhibition of the course of my own thoughts on the subject; and one for my readers, in the more facile apprehension of my course of thought by others.

My first effort in relation to this subject was a review of the Rev. H. H. Dobney's Notes on Future Punishment, an article inserted in the *Eclectic Review* for August, 1845. In Athanasia, pp. 141 *seq.*, this was reprinted; and it now constitutes the second portion of this Volume.

My second publication on the subject was a pamphlet under the following title: "Who will Live for Ever? An Examination of Luke xx. 36." This also was reprinted in Athanasia, pp. 421 *seq.;* and it now constitutes the third portion of this Volume.

To this pamphlet, during the preparation of Athanasia and before its publication, there appeared two replies; one by the Rev. E. White, and one by the Rev. W. Morris. As an Appendix to Athanasia I published some remarks on these, and I now place these remarks in immediate sequence to the pamphlet to which they refer.

The work now concludes with Athanasia proper, or the Four Books on Immortality.

In relation to the work itself, I am constrained to say that neither the reflection of fifteen years—it was published in 1849—nor the careful re-examination of the present year, has induced any change of my opinion.

The minor pieces in this Volume are chiefly controversial: Strictures on some Passages in the Rev. J. B. Brown's Divine Life in Man, published in 1860; Strictures on some Passages in the Rev. J. H. Godwin's Congregational Lecture, published in 1862; and Remarks on Infant Baptism, in Reply to the "Explanatory Notes" of the Rev. T. Groser.

To these, in order to complete the Volume, has been added a small piece published under the title of "A Fragment," and treating of the Support of the Gospel Ministry.

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ATHANASIA:

OR THE

NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF MAN.

PREFACE.

THE work now presented to the public consists of a review of several publications which have issued from the press within the last fifteen years, so far as they affect and impugn the doctrine of Man's Natural Immortality. All these productions treat of Future Punishment, but I have designedly avoided that question, and every topic directly relating to it; and I trust I have not by such a course done any injustice, either to the authors whose writings I have handled, or to the truth.

The doctrines of Immortality and of Future Punishment are indeed connected, and in such manner connected that the latter cannot be thoroughly discussed without involving the former; but they are, at the same time, sufficiently distinct to allow of the investigation of the former apart from the latter. Such a method is, in fact, the most advantageous. The question of Man's Immortality can be most satisfactorily determined when examined by itself. More than this; it ought in fairness to be determined before the subject of Future Punishment is entered on. The conception of endless suffering is apt to agitate the feelings too strongly to allow a calm exercise of the judgment; and there is reason to think that some who have denied the natural immortality of man have been led to do so in part, either because the admission of it threatened to bring the eternity of future misery in its train, or because the denial of it seemed to afford a more satisfactory ground than could otherwise be taken for resistance to so dreaded a conclusion. But an argument ought not in any case to be decided by the feelings. Every question relating to truth should be decided by its appropriate evidence. Let the question of Man's Immortality therefore be so; and then, with the result of the inquiry in our hands, we shall best advance to the investigation of any other doctrine to the discussion of which it may be tributary.

I have written because I have read, and because I wished to test the force of reasonings which opposed my long-cherished opinions. I publish, because I hope it may be useful to others to be acquainted with the course and issue of my thoughts; but if in this hope I should be disappointed, I shall have the satisfaction of bearing, what I trust God who knows it to be such will accept, a single-hearted testimony to that which I believe to be His truth.

The course I have pursued in the composition of this work is, I am aware, open to animadversion. No one will read it without perceiving that he is led more than once over the same ground. He will naturally say, Surely this repetition might have been avoided, and the sentiments of the several writers on the same topic might have been collected and disposed of at once. There are reasons, however, for the course I have preferred. The five writers I have noticed, although maintaining a common conclusion, do not maintain it by the same arguments. It is by no means clear that any one of them was acquainted with the sentiments of the other four, so that they are not actuated by any impulse of mutual harmony or support. If any one of them really was acquainted with the sentiments of all the rest, Mr. White has the strongest claim to such a distinction; but he, instead of supporting his coadjutors in the general issue, bases his whole argument on a theory of life, death, and immortality, which subverts their fabric from its foundation. Amidst so many and such irreconcilable differences, I found no course practicable but a separate examination of the respective works; and, if perhaps an abler hand might have overcome the difficulty, I must beg the reader to accept as it is my less perfect endeavour. It is possible, however, that the course I have taken as the easiest may be found to be also the best; the best, at least—that is, the most satisfactory—for the studious and reflecting reader, whose habit of patient inquiry requires the field of controversy to be thoroughly, and step by step, explored. It is for such readers chiefly that I have written.

The works on which I have animadverted are the following:—

1. A small anonymous work "by a Clergyman of the Church of England," entitled "Christ our Life."

2. "Notes of Lectures on Future Punishment," and the

enlarged edition of the same work entitled "The Scripture Doctrine of Future Punishment," by the Rev. H. H. Dobney, of Maidstone. As in his second edition this author takes an extended notice of the article on his "Notes" in the "Eclectic Review" for August, 1845, and as it has become generally known that that article was written by me, I have replied at some length to the animadversions made upon it. I have also reprinted the article from the "Eclectic" as now part and parcel of this controversy, in the order of its date, in the early part of the present volume.

3. "Life in Christ," an octavo volume by the Rev. Edward White, of Hereford.

4. "An Inquiry: Are the Wicked Immortal? In Six Sermons, by George Storrs."

5. "Thoughts on the Popular Opinion of Eternal Punishment being synonymous with Eternal Torment." This tract is anonymous, but is stated to be the substance of Five Lectures delivered at Bristol.

I have noticed all these publications because they all fell into my hands, and all became mixed up with the course of reading and reflection through which I have gone. This statement will suggest a reason why I have not adverted to any other works on the same subject; it will probably be admitted, however, that, for a single combatant, I have taken upon myself to encounter adversaries sufficiently numerous.

I feel no inclination to complain of the authors whose works I have reviewed, for having done what may be adapted to disturb in any measure the popular belief. The search for truth is open to all; and mankind have no greater benefactors than those who, with sufficient wisdom on the one hand and sufficient courage on the other, endeavour to rectify deeply-rooted and prevalent mistakes.

In addition to these general considerations, however, which adequately vindicate the writers in question, I feel the influence of a personal one, which awakens towards them in me a somewhat peculiar sympathy. In the early period of my life and ministry I occupied a position similar to theirs. In my first production, Theology, and afterwards more fully in my treatise on the Work of the Holy Spirit, I endeavoured to grapple with what I then thought, and still think, popular theological errors, and placed myself in the ranks of those

(little at that time imagining how numerous a class they were) who had striven to exhibit a more intelligible Gospel. Conscious that I had thought out my views, if not conclusively at least with strenuous honesty, I threw them before the world in the hope that, if they did not gain concurrence, they would elicit an answer, were it only for the sake of helping a young man and minister to think more justly. No one, however, did me this act of charity, nor am I aware that the line of argument I pursued has been fairly tested by an opponent to this day. Having contended not for victory but for truth, I have often regretted this, and I still regret it. Unworthy as my little volumes may be, they will yet stand here and there on the shelves of theological libraries; and I would much rather that the few students who may hereafter read them, should have been able to place side by side with them all that the advocates of contending views might have found to say in opposition to them.

On this ground, as I have already hinted, I sympathize in a lively manner with the authors whose works I have here noticed, and especially with those of them with whom I have the pleasure of a personal acquaintance. As aspiring to become theological reformers I can thoroughly enter into their feelings, and I find pleasure in ascribing to them none but the purest and the noblest. They have doubtless meant well, to God, to man, and to truth; and, in the approbation of God and their own hearts at least, they will find their reward.

On the same ground also, in part, have I written. It is, indeed, due to truth that the arguments which these writers have adduced should be examined; but it is also due to themselves that their own efforts to think rightly should be aided by the thoughts of others, and in this light I request them to accept the remarks contained in the volume now presented to them. As a sincerely-attached Christian and ministerial brother, I have but attempted to do for them what I have often, though vainly, wished some one would do for me.

Principally, however, I present this volume as an offering of a devoted heart to God and to his cause. May He mercifully accept and bless it, for his name's sake! Amen.

LONDON, *November* 27, 1848.

ATHANASIA.

THE CASE DIRECTLY STATED.

To say that man is immortal is to use language which conveys no definite idea, because the word immortal has not, until the speaker explains the sense in which he uses it, any definite meaning; it is necessary therefore for me to begin by stating what I now intend by immortality. In order to do this in the most lucid manner, I shall first set down some uses of this term which I have *not* now in my view.

Negatively, then, I mean by immortality—

1. Not future happiness.
2. Not moral purity.
3. Not eternity.
4. Not endless existence.

Next positively: I mean by immortality an adaptation to endless existence, but of a qualified kind.

1. Not self-derived, or independent.
2. Not inferring necessary endless existence, or indestructibility.
3. Not ensuring actual endless existence.
4. But *natural:* that is, arising out of the attributes of man's nature as created, and issuing in endless existence unless prevented by some preternatural cause.

When, therefore, I say that man is immortal, I mean that he is by his nature adapted to endless existence, and that he will exist without end unless the course of his nature be interfered with by a superior power.

This doctrine supposes a comparison, although unexpressed, between the two parts of which man's nature consists, the body and the soul. In his body man is mortal: that is, his body has in itself seeds of decay and corruption, and of itself, or according to its nature, it will die; or, more strictly, the organic functions the performance of which constitutes its living condition will cease. In his soul man is immortal, or

more expressively, not-mortal; that is, his soul does not contain within itself seeds of decay and corruption, or any element by whose power its consciousness, which by analogy may be said to constitute its living condition, shall be brought to an end. In this concealed comparison between the component parts of man the term immortality (which is derived from the Latin) originates; so that it might be literally given in English *non-liability to death*, or by a word still more strictly expressive, *incorruptibility*.

The doctrine which has now been laid down has been thought by some authors of great distinction to be discoverable and demonstrable by unaided reason; others have been of a contrary, and, I think, of a more just opinion. Some steps towards it, however, may be taken with facility and confidence.

The difference above stated between the body and the soul (which is involved in the immateriality of the soul, and which I may assume without proof), leads to the conclusion that the soul *need not* die with the body; while various phases of human consciousness and experience warrant the inference that it *does not*. So much is certain, that for man there is life after death. How long this coming life will last is a problem to the solution of which Reason need not blush to own herself incompetent, since, unaided by revelation, she is not in possession of any elements by which it can be determined. It may be said, however, that to future existence the eye of reason sees no end, and that the considerations which render a future existence sure also render an endless existence probable; nevertheless there may be an end to it, not merely by some preternatural cause, but by a natural term originally fixed by the Author of our being.

The question before us, therefore, reduced to its simplest form, is, whether the Creator has or has not assigned any natural term (death being admitted not to be such) to the conscious being of man.

I. In order to determine this question, I inquire in the first place into the existence and prevalence of these opinions respectively among mankind.

Of the existence of the former of these opinions I do not know that there is any trace in the entire history of human speculation. That man's conscious being terminates at death has been held to a certain extent, but this is not our point.

What we ask is, whether at any time, or by any persons, it has been believed that, besides and after death (beyond which we assume human existence to continue), a natural limit is fixed to man's conscious being? If there be any evidence to warrant an affirmative answer to this question I have only to request its production.

On the other hand, that a belief of man's adaptation to endless being, and of his actual endless being, has from the earliest times existed in the world is a matter of notoriety. I am aware that such a belief has not prevailed universally: some in every age known to us have doubted or denied it; superstition, error, and abuse have been connected with it; but we are acquainted with no period in which it has not been a large and influential element of human faith, alike in nations civilized and rude.

Now it behoves us to account for this fact. I lay hold on it as an evidence of the truth of the opinion believed, and of the original descent of that truth from heaven. Man unaided could not have ascertained it: how then came he to know it, unless it had been the matter of a primæval revelation?

Those who may not concur in this explanation have to assign some other cause for the phenomenon described. It has been represented as a fiction of philosophy, the offspring of pride, the suggestion of the devil; proposed solutions of the great problem which will hereafter be investigated.

I am not obliged to confine myself, however, to the statement that the belief of man's destiny to endless existence has prevailed generally in the world; I am able to add to this affirmation one still more important, namely, that the same belief prevailed specifically in the Israelitish nation. I say that this statement is more important than the former, because Israel was separated from the rest of the nations in order to become the depository of the truth of God, and to preserve as in an ark the doctrines of both natural and revealed religion from the advancing deluge of ignorance and corruption. The belief of an opinion among such a people will more strongly infer the truth of the opinion believed.

The earlier periods of Israelitish history, in consequence of their high antiquity, derive no illustration from contemporaneous writers, but for some time antecedent to the great advent the interior condition of the Jewish community becomes familiarly known to us; and no doubt exists as to the

fact, that, on the appearance of the long-expected Messiah, the doctrine of man's natural immortality was the prevailing faith of the nation. Hence we derive a twofold argument for its truth: first, that if it were not true it is peculiarly difficult to account for its prevalence *there;* and, secondly, that if it were false, it is equally difficult to explain our Lord's conduct in not rectifying the mistake.

In relation to the former branch of this argument, it may be alleged with some justice that not every opinion current among the Jews at the coming of Christ was true, as indeed the number of errors which he himself pointed out sufficiently attests. Yet it may be observed, that nowhere in the world was there so little error, and so much truth, as in the land of Judea; and that the principal Jewish errors did not so much relate to topics of a general kind, as to the character and bearings of that ceremonial and typical system under which for so many ages they had lived.

If, however, not all that was believed when Christ came was true, the period of his residence on earth is one to which we are entitled to look with large expectations. He came from heaven to teach, and may well be supposed to have made a point, as his discourses show that he did, of correcting erroneous notions on subjects of great importance. Yet we never find him indicating the existence of any error on this subject. He accepted the creed of the people in this respect substantially as it was. By his silence, if he had been silent, he would have sanctioned and practically taught it. But he was not silent. When by the machinations of his adversaries forced into an existing controversy on this point between rival sects, he rectified some sensual misconceptions of the doctrine, but he said nothing to call into question its truth.

Still further: that which was the faith of the Jews in the age of Christ, was in all probability the faith of their progenitors in every age. For whence could they have derived it? Not from invention, not from recent revelation, but only from tradition. It had come down to them from "the fathers." This was a course of things not only natural but inevitable. Under the known circumstances of the case, there is every reason to suppose that the opinions of the Jews at the Christian era on this point were those of David and the prophets, of Moses and of Abraham.

The decision of the question before us might safely be suspended on the statement now made. Can an opinion of human destiny be admitted as true which is not known ever to have had an existence among men? Or can an opinion of human destiny be rejected as false, which, although reason could not have ascertained it, has all but universally prevailed, has established itself in the focus of celestial light, and has stood unrebuked in the presence of the Great Teacher sent from God?

II. I inquire in the second place into the manner in which the opinions we are examining are respectively referred to in the Holy Scriptures.

As we found no trace of the former of the two opinions in the history of the world, so neither shall we find any in the records of revelation.

To the living condition of the human body a natural term is evidently prescribed by its original constitution, and in consequence of our first parent's forfeiture by transgression of access to the tree of life, man actually returns to the dust from whence he was taken; but this is admitted not to be the end of man, who dies, yet lives. Now the question is, whether the Scripture in any manner intimates that to man's being a natural period is assigned?

No passage of such import has been adduced, and I do not believe that such a passage exists.

The total absence of such passages from the Oracles of God is, in the case before us, a positive argument of no small strength. For if it be true that man's conscious being has a natural period, it is a fact so important as to entitle us to expect some recognition of it in the Bible, more especially as it would seem to be among facts not ascertainable by unaided reason, and opposed rather than otherwise by its most enlightened deductions. It needed to be revealed as else unknowable; and if it had been revealed, it would surely be found somewhere, expressed or implied, among the copious phraseology of the Scriptures.

And if the absence of all scriptural evidence in favour of the opinion that a natural term is prescribed to the conscious being of man leads to the conclusion that it is *not* founded in truth, the same fact supplies strong ground for believing that the contrary opinion is so. For there is no third issue. We have but one alternative. Either there is a natural limit to

man's conscious being, or there is not. If no proof can be adduced that there is, this itself constitutes a strong argument that there is not, such a limit. The silence of Scripture on the one side almost supersedes the necessity of its teaching on the other.

In reference to the actual teaching of the Scriptures, I am quite willing to admit that man's natural immortality is not dogmatically, that is doctrinally, taught in them, or propounded as a point of truth for the purpose of instruction. I hold this, however, to be nothing to the disadvantage of my argument; since, with the single great exception of the doctrines peculiarly evangelical as expounded in the New Testament, doctrinal statements are extremely rare throughout the inspired volume. If the absence of them in relation to human immortality is to be held conclusive against it, not a few other sentiments of the most important class must also be rejected.

We greatly err if we suppose that every truth undiscoverable by reason is to be found in a doctrinal form in the Bible. Such an opinion would seem to rest on the idea that the Bible is the *whole* of revelation, which it obviously is not. A moment's reflection will make this evident. No part of the Bible can be supposed to have been written earlier than the time of Moses, who lived nearly two thousand five hundred years distant from the era of the creation. During all this extended period, however, God had been in communication with men, or, in other words, revelation had been in progress; it having commenced in the garden of Eden at the latest, if not, as is more probable, at an earlier moment, and continued in divers manners until God appeared in the burning bush. Now of that which was taught to our race in this long interval Moses gives us no regular or complete account; it may be said, indeed, that he gives us no didactic account of it at all, his writings being wholly historical, truth transpiring exclusively through narrative, and the narrative itself being not merely concise but fragmentary. What was really believed during the primitive ages we have in all cases to gather from indirect references; and we shall find all we can properly expect concerning any truth of this class, if we find such language employed as, without expressly stating it, shall imply the fact that it was known.

It is reasonable to expect, also, that the language of Scrip-

ture shall harmonize with, as it must necessarily be modified by, the existing sentiments of mankind, so far as they were consistent with truth. If varying opinions respecting the future life had been current in the world, the one representing it as subject to a natural termination and the other as of duration naturally endless, there would have been a reason why the future life, when spoken of by inspired persons, should have been spoken of in qualifying and descriptive terms; in other words, there would have been a reason why the Scriptures should have contained express intimations, not of a future life only, but of an endless future life, or of a natural immortality; but, since this was not the case, since, in fact, no one ever imagined any other life after death than an endless one, no reason for the use of such descriptive and qualifying terms existed. On the contrary, it would in all cases be sufficient, and most natural, to speak simply of the life to come, seeing that the phrase must be universally understood of life without natural termination. In this view of the scriptural phraseology, every passage which implies a future life may be regarded as a testimony to the doctrine of man's natural immortality. Now such passages are numerous far beyond the power of citation, and they pervade the entire volume of Holy Writ.

Of actual quotations from the sacred records I shall adduce but few; selecting these, however, from portions of the Bible characteristically different, and declaring my conviction that they are examples of just such references to the subject as we have a right to expect.

(1.) Gen. i. 29. "And the Lord God said, Let us make man in our image, in our likeness."

That such phraseology indicates some high prerogative cannot be doubted. It is clear from the narrative that this includes dominion over the creatures; it may be deemed certain from the words of the apostle (Col. iii. 10) that it includes holiness; and, as a rational nature is necessary to these, we can scarcely err in comprehending this likewise. But it is difficult to stop here. The words imply in the strongest, and to my mind in an irresistible manner, man's resemblance to his Maker, as far as a creature may resemble him, in the attribute of natural immortality.

(2.) Ex. iii. 6. "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob."

It will be in the recollection of the reader, that our Lord makes use of these words in his reply to the Sadducees, when they endeavoured to "entangle him in his talk." "But that the dead are raised," said he, "even Moses showed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob: for the Lord is not the God of the dead, but of the living," Luke xx. 37, 38. Now, although first used, perhaps, for the purpose of argument by the Great Teacher, and certainly then overlooked by both the parties on whose controversy it so directly bore, this passage must have possessed equal value as an argument in every age. The proof it supplied must have been as strong in the time of Moses as in that of Christ.

The question consequently becomes important to us, What do these words prove? And what did Christ intend to prove by them?

On the face of the context the question of the Sadducees appears to have related to the resurrection of the dead, but a fuller consideration of the narrative leads to the conclusion that it really related to a future life, life after death. Our Lord's reasoning then is:—Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, although dead, must be living, because God is declared to be their God, and because "he is not the God of the dead." Now what is the case with them is the case with all, "for all live unto him."

Thus our Lord demonstrated the fact of a future life for man, which the Sadducees denied. His reply to them, however, did not consist wholly of this reference to the Pentateuch. He had already spoken of "that world" in which marriage has no place, and in which existence is without end because "they cannot die any more;" and in this manner, while he proved a future existence he asserted an endless one, thus expressing the complete idea then currently held on the subject. Now, as I have before observed, the current idea of future life in the time of our Lord was, beyond question, the current idea of it in the time of Moses. The declaration "I am the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob," must have supplied as competent evidence of a future life to the Israelites in Egypt as to the Jews in Palestine; and both alike, we have reason to believe, regarded the future life as without natural termination.

I may add that the expression quoted by our Lord is not

a solitary one, but one of a large class, and of a class extensively in use before the time of Moses. God represented himself to Isaac as the God of his father Abraham, and to Jacob as the God of his fathers, Abraham and Isaac; and every instance of this phraseology carries with it the same argumentative power.

(3.) Psalm viii. 5. "For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honour."

I am quite aware that the principal reference of this psalm (for I take the apostle's use of it in Heb. ii. as an accommodation), is to man's dominion over the creatures; but there seems a significant power in the phrase "a little lower than the angels," which this idea does not exhaust. When man is said to be so created as to be *but "a little* lower" than these celestial spirits, it is not unreasonable to believe that a capability of endless being is among the prerogatives in which he is "equal unto the angels."

(4.) Eccles. iii. 21. "Who knoweth the spirit of a man which goeth upwards, and the spirit of a beast which goeth downwards to the earth?"

This passage is generally admitted to be a direct affirmation of the separate existence of the human soul after death; and although it does not expressly assert its aptitude to endless existence, yet on the supposition, which we have every reason to believe was a fact, that the idea entertained of future existence was that it was naturally endless, the phraseology would be fitly expressive of it.

(5.) Luke xx. 36. "Neither can they die any more."

This is nothing short of an express declaration of the deathlessness of the future life, drawn from the lips of our Lord by an artful interrogation, which made him a party to the controversy between the Pharisees and the Sadducees in relation to it.*

(6.) 2 Tim. i. 10. "Who hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel."

The apostle thus teaches us that God's merciful dispensation towards mankind, which is here (as elsewhere) called "the Gospel," and of which the Lord Jesus Christ was both

* See Who will Live for Ever?

Priest and Prophet, throws a flood of light on human destiny, and makes more clear than ever it had been the prospect of an endless life. This statement evidently implies that endless life had always been the prospect of mankind, although antecedently not so clearly revealed.

The sum of the scriptural branch of our inquiry is, that the Bible affords no countenance whatever to the opinion that man's being has a natural limit; that the deathlessness of the life to come is, at least on one occasion (thanks to Jewish malignity) expressly asserted; that it is in other passages necessarily implied; and that every reference to a future existence may justly be interpreted of an endless one.

Apart, however, from the verbal testimony of Scripture to the natural immortality of man, a proof of the doctrine may be deduced from a fact with which the Divine Oracles make us acquainted; I refer to the great and all-important fact in the evangelical system, that the divine and the human natures are combined in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ. I shall not here notice any question which may be raised as to the fact itself, but shall take it for granted by the readers of this volume that the Redeemer is God incarnate.

Now this fact surely contains decisive instruction respecting the nature of man. It is only on the basis of a certain degree of similarity and congruity between the human and divine natures, that it is possible to conceive of their amalgamation as the constituent parts of one being; and it is difficult to make any enumeration of the particulars in which such resemblance must be supposed to exist, without including in it natural immortality, or an adaptation to existence without any natural limit. For if there be a natural limit to the existence of the human being, that will arrive as certainly in the person of Jesus Christ as in that of any other individual of mankind; yet how can such an occurrence in his case be supposed? It could amount to no less than a dissolution of the person of the incarnate Saviour himself, by the extinction of one of its two great constituents. Such an issue must surely be pronounced both incredible and impossible. In other words, it is inconceivable that divine wisdom should have framed the person of the Redeemer by combining in it two elements of unequal duration; elements of which the one should exist for ever, while the other should arrive at a natural period of extinction. Had not the human nature

been adapted to endless being, it would never have been inwrought into the structure of the Son of God.

If it should occur to the reader as an objection to this reasoning that the nature thus wonderfully blended with the divinity was liable to death, let him simply call to mind the difference between death and extinction. Death is not the cessation of human existence, but merely a change in its mode; and it is a change in the mode of human existence touching only the organic functions, and not at all affecting consciousness or mental activity. There was nothing, therefore, in man's liability to death which could raise a difficulty in the way of the incarnation of the Deity.

The result of the inquiry which has now been instituted is in both its branches one and the same. It leads us to the conclusion that God made man to exist for ever.

Having thus briefly, but I hope distinctly, exhibited the grounds on which I maintain this doctrine, I shall now proceed to an examination of the errors entertained by the several opponents of it whom I have named.

A REVIEW

OF

NOTES OF LECTURES ON FUTURE PUNISHMENT,

BY THE REV. H. H. DOBNEY.

In this small and unpretending volume Mr. Dobney treats one of the most important subjects of theological inquiry, and it affords us pleasure to speak of it generally in terms of commendation. The lectures are seven in number, and relate to "the Scripture doctrine of future punishment" as a whole, and in its several parts. In the sixth and seventh lectures the question of the duration of future punishment is taken up; and the desire we have to notice somewhat at large the views which the author has expressed in relation to it, induces us to pass over the earlier portions of the volume without further remark. We shall observe only that the discussion suffers throughout, as, in our judgment, the portion we have specified does particularly, by his having published merely the notes of his lectures. We are not sure that we should have recommended him to write them for the press at the whole length at which they were delivered; but we think a middle course would have been desirable, more especially as preventing that sense of meagreness and inadequacy which now inevitably rests upon the mind of a thoughtful reader, in an argument on so important a subject.

We proceed, then, at once to the topic we have indicated, the duration of future punishment. Our author holds that it is limited, and not strictly everlasting. As the ground on which he rests this opinion is peculiar, we propose to subject it to a cursory examination.

The state of the question is this. Mr. Dobney admits that "Scripture usage compels us to understand the terms of

duration when they are applied to the future state in their widest sense," but he qualifies this admission by the following remark: "That, even when these words are used in their extremest sense, they do not teach that the object to which they relate must therefore endure for ever; their force being this, and no more than this, that what is predicated shall continue so long as the object of which it is predicated shall continue;" pp. 75, 76. His conclusion consequently is, that, according to the Scriptures, the wicked will suffer punishment as long as they exist; but that, if any question has place concerning the duration of their existence, the decision of it will involve that of the duration of their punishment. On this ground, which we do not contest with him, he proceeds to raise the question whether wicked men are immortal, and he expresses his opinion that they are not. He holds that "immortality is the princely gift of Christ to his faithful followers" only, p. 72. He thinks, however, that all mankind will have a future existence; and that the wicked, after rising from the grave, will live in another state for a long, and even an "awful" period, p. 80. The sum of his opinion is, that the future existence of the wicked, and consequently their punishment, will at some period be terminated by their extinction.

Without laying any stress on a remark which, however, our author's mode of expressing himself naturally suggests, —namely, that he is very imperfectly satisfied of the truth of his theory, we shall endeavour candidly to examine the foundation on which he has placed it.

His mode of proof consists of two parts. He attempts to show, first, that nothing in the Scriptures (for, with him, we hold reason to be out of the question) proves the immortality of man, if the terms applied to the future state do not; and next, that these terms support the doctrine of the limited existence of the wicked. (Pp. 70–72.)

We take up in the first instance the latter portion of his argument.

To make good his position that the terms applied in Scripture to the future state support the doctrine of the limited existence of the wicked, Mr. Dobney adduces two classes of passages in which the future state of the righteous and the wicked is spoken of; the state of the righteous by the term *life*, ζωή, and the state of the wicked by the terms

death, θανάτος, *destruction*, ἀπώλεια, and *corruption*, φθορὰ, pp. 70, 71, and he conceives that life and death, in the literal and strict meaning of these terms—that is, existence and the cessation of existence—are the things intended in them. He is aware, as he states (p. 71), that in these passages the terms life and death are commonly understood in a metaphorical sense, as denoting happiness and misery respectively; but this he thinks is taking "an unwarrantable liberty" with them (p. 72). He thus raises a question of biblical interpretation which must be carefully entered on.

Without noticing the author's somewhat uncalled for imputation on the *motives* of the commentators who differ from him, we admit at once that the terms in question, like all other terms in human language, are to be understood in their literal sense unless cause can be shown for otherwise interpreting them. We admit, consequently, that the burden of proof lies with ourselves.

We need not, however, adduce instances to show that the terms life and death are sometimes used to denote happiness and misery; since this is frankly admitted by Mr. Dobney (p. 71). We may proceed at once, consequently, to the words as employed in the passages adduced. In this inquiry we are sorry to be deprived of Mr. Dobney's assistance; since he states himself (p. 72) to have been compelled (by what cause does not appear, but probably by the necessity of brevity) to waive entirely this part of the investigation. It is, however, essential to a settlement of the question he has raised.

Taking, in the first instance, the passages which express the future state of the righteous by the term life, the question before us is whether in them this term can be satisfactorily understood as meaning existence merely. Now, when we consider that what is thus spoken of under the term life is the subject of divine promise, "the gift of God" through Christ Jesus, the result of his death, and the reward of faith in his name, it is to us, we confess, in the highest degree unsatisfactory to understand the term used of existence merely. Some inestimable blessing must be here intended. Mere existence, however, is not necessarily or in itself a blessing. Whether it be a benefit at all, or the contrary, depends wholly on the kind of existence, and the manner in which it is employed. It may be conceived of either as void of good, or as full of misery. Mr. Dobney holds it to be

conferred for a very long period upon the wicked. We conclude, therefore, that the connexion demands some other meaning for the word "life" in these passages than existence merely; and, as happiness is an idea very much to the point, and consistent with the usage of the term, we, in agreement with the great majority of scriptural commentators, adopt this as the meaning of it.

In bar of this conclusion two things may be alleged.

It may be said that the term "life" in these passages expresses, not the whole, but only a part of the future condition of the righteous, namely, the fact of their immortality, leaving the manner of their existence to be learned from other portions of Scripture. It does not appear to us, however, that such a view is consistent with the absolute and emphatic manner in which the term life is in this connexion habitually employed. A single example will suffice. Take for instance, the language of the apostle, Rom. v. 21, "That, as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord." In truth, the phrase "eternal life" is continually used in the New Testament in a manner which, to our mind, demonstrates that it is employed to represent the whole of the future felicity resulting to man through the work of Christ and faith in his name. And if it be admitted that this result must be more than existence, the necessity seems to follow of attributing some other idea than that of existence merely to the phrase.

It may be said further that, although the term life as descriptive of the future state of the righteous no doubt means happiness, it means existence also, and conveys the compound idea of a happy existence. This, however, is saying that a word has two meanings in one and the same case, and that it is at the same instant to be understood both literally and metaphorically; which seems to us to be altogether inadmissible. We can understand how it may be necessary to interpret a word literally in one case and metaphorically in another; but what warrant there can be for interpreting a word in both ways at once is to us unintelligible. It is not until we have ascertained that the literal meaning of a term will not serve, that we have any liberty to annex a metaphorical meaning to it at all; and how after this can the literal meaning be retained? The term life cannot justly

be made to convey the compound idea happy existence. It may mean either existence or happiness, as taken either literally or figuratively; but the taking it to mean one determines that it does not in that case mean the other. Besides, if life means happy existence, death may mean miserable existence; a supposition entirely fatal to Mr. Dobney's argument.

We return to the conclusion, therefore, that the term life, when used descriptively of the future state of the righteous, does not denote existence but happiness exclusively.

We do not know that it is necessary to strengthen this conclusion by collateral evidence. It may be observed, however, that the future state of the righteous is represented in Scripture not exclusively by the term life, but by other terms also. These terms, whether more brief or more extended, are uniformly descriptive of happiness in various forms—of holiness, of communion with God, of the presence of Christ, of honour, of freedom from suffering, and other kindred ideas. These are evidently the counterpart of the word life; the several elements which go to make up that state of happiness most felicitously and emphatically expressed by the single term ζωή. Nowhere among these diversified descriptions do phrases occur tending to show that existence itself is one of these elements; yet, if this were a part of "the gift of God," so important a particular might be expected to appear, if not always, yet on some other occasion than in the use of the term life, which is so obviously generic and inclusive of the whole.*

We proceed now to notice the terms by which the Scriptures represent the future state of the wicked, and to inquire whether they can be satisfactorily understood in their literal meaning.

In some of the passages quoted by Mr. Dobney under this head, the term life with a negative is employed, as in John iii. 36, "He that believeth not on the Son of God shall *not see life*." These cases are decided by what has already been said. If the promise of life to a believer does not relate to

* An apparent exception to this remark occurs in Rom. ii. 6, where the apostle speaks of those who "seek for glory, honour, and immortality." The position of the word immortality at the close of the sentence requires it to be regarded, after the Greek idiom, as an adjective; so giving to the whole phrase the idea of "immortal glory and honour."

existence, neither does the threatening that unbelievers "shall not see life."

With respect to the positive terms, death, destruction, perdition, corruption, which are used interchangeably for the same purpose, some observations may be made before we try the experiment of the literal meaning upon them.

In the first place, if what has been laid down in reference to the meaning of the term life be accordant with truth, the opinion that the word death in the evangelical threatening means the cessation of existence derives no support from analogy. It must now stand insulated and alone; and it thus assumes an aspect of the greater improbability.

Nor is this all. For, in the second place, a strong argument from analogy arises against it. It is in the highest degree probable—it might be laid down as certain—that in the connexion before us the terms life and death are strictly antithetic, and that they are consequently of homogeneous interpretation. If one is to be taken literally so is the other, and *vice versâ*. Hence, therefore, in ascertaining the true meaning of one we obtain a rule for the interpretation of the other; and we may proceed accordingly to say that, since in the descriptions of the future state life means not existence but happiness, death means not cessation of existence but misery. It would be an incongruity of the most inadmissible kind to take, in such passages as these, the one term as a metaphor, and the other in a literal acceptation.

Let us, however, look more closely at the passages now before us, and make trial of the literal meaning of the terms employed in them.

Our author's affirmation is that the words perdition, corruption, death, destruction, &c., used in God's threatenings against the ungodly, denote cessation of being.

To this it is obvious to object, that cessation of being is not necessarily, or in all cases, an evil. If all opportunity has been lost of rendering existence happy, and more especially if a course has been pursued which ensures irrecoverable misery, the cessation of existence, so far from being a calamity, is the greatest relief and benefit which in the circumstances is possible. These, however, are precisely the circumstances of ungodly men. So that God is, by our author's opinion, brought forward in the majesty of his wrath, to denounce against ungodly men as a terrific punish-

ment what actually is to them the greatest possible good. Mr. Dobney himself, indeed, must clearly regard the extinction of the wicked in the light of a kindness, since he evidently looks upon it with complacency, as assigning a limit to suffering otherwise without end, and as mitigating the too awful doctrine of endless punishment.

It does not appear to us, therefore, that cessation of being could justly be held to constitute the punishment of sin, even if it were supposed that this would be effected by some grand and awful judicial transaction, so as to give it the form and aspect of punishment; but still less satisfactorily can this be held to be the case, if, as our author supposes, no such judicial consummation will take place, but, on the contrary, the cessation of being will occur as a natural and unperceived result of the withdrawment of that divine energy by which life is universally sustained (pp. 62, 63). This supposition goes to make the future and final death of the criminal portion of mankind easy beyond all possibility of belief.

It is the more difficult to conceive that the wrath of God against sinners, when announced under terms literally denoting death, means only the cessation of being, because it is announced also under other terms not reducible to this idea. Thus in Romans ii. 8, 9, we have "indignation and anguish, tribulation and wrath;" and in various passages other terms expressive not of extinction but of continuous suffering.

On general grounds, therefore, we are constrained to conclude that the terms representing the future state of the wicked under the general idea of death are to be understood metaphorically, and as signifying not cessation of being but misery.

To this it may be added, that in several of the passages quoted by the author there occurs sufficient internal evidence of the metaphorical use of the terms in question. To take for an example Rom. ix. 22, 23: "What if God, willing to show his wrath and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy whom he had before prepared unto glory." Here it is obvious to observe that the term antithetic to destruction is glory, a term which conveys an idea of happiness exclusively, and goes to require a metaphorical interpretation of the corresponding term destruction.

A similar observation may be made concerning the words of the apostle in 2 Thess. i. 9; where he speaks of those "who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power." If by destruction a cessation of being had been here intended, the apostle would naturally have closed with that word. With this meaning, what can be intended by "destruction (cessation of being) from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power"? The language is not only redundant but unintelligible. It seems obvious that the destruction specified is a punitive banishment from the presence of the Lord Jesus, and exclusion from those displays of his glory which will constitute so large a portion of the blessedness of his saints.

Another passage to which the same remark is clearly applicable is Rev. xx. 14, "This is the second death." Of this phrase it is enough to say that its interpretation is guided by a symbol—the lake of fire—which as interpreted by John himself (see ver. 10), denotes a state of torment, and not an extinction of being. Similar observations might be made in reference to other passages.

As a further evidence that the term destruction when used descriptively of the future state of the wicked cannot be understood of extinction of being, we may notice the annexation to it of the epithet "everlasting," as in 2 Thess. i. 9. Considered as extinction of being destruction must be held to be a summary act. In what sense can it be said to be everlasting? It is in itself a final as well as a momentary act; and the term everlasting as connected with it is either redundant or unintelligible. Does it not seem clear that the apostle, in speaking of "*everlasting* destruction," means to describe something which has continuance—as a state of suffering; and not the act of a moment—like extinction of being?

Under the influence of these and similar considerations, it seems to us impossible to interpret the words death, &c., in the evangelical threatening otherwise than metaphorically.

We may now observe that, upon the point under consideration, our author is by no means consistent. He thus expresses himself:—

"The inspired declarations amount to this:—The wicked will rise again—will live in another state, to which terms of awful duration

are applied—the strongest expressions which could be employed; and which unquestionably show that the whole period of future existence will be passed in undergoing the penal consequences of unrepented and unpardoned sin." P. 80.

The "inspired declarations" of which Mr. Dobney thus states the "amount," are those which denounce "everlasting destruction" against the ungodly; and he has told us that destruction is here to be understood of a cessation of being. In the passage above cited, however, it is plain that he himself understands it of a state of suffering, or of "undergoing the penal consequences of unrepented and unpardoned sin." In this we agree with him, but he is we conceive at direct variance with himself.

We do not, indeed, see how, if we are to understand the term destruction (with the other terms now in question) of cessation of being, there can be any penal consequences of sin to be endured, apart from the cessation of being itself. "The wages of sin," the apostle tells us, "is death." Cessation of being, consequently, is on the author's hypothesis itself the punishment—that is, the whole punishment—of sin. There are, therefore, no other penal consequences of it to be endured. Yet he intimates that there are, and that they will occupy a period of awfully-extended duration. Can these conflicting statements be reconciled?

Again; if cessation of being be the intended punishment of sin, its infliction would naturally take place when the time of punishment arrives, that is, immediately after the general judgment. Undoubtedly the punishment of sin, whatever it may be, will take place at that period, which is evidently the period of universal retribution, both for the righteous and the wicked. There is, indeed, no object of subsequent existence, but the accomplishment of this only remaining part of the divine dispensations towards mankind. Yet, according to Mr. Dobney, the punishment of sin—or cessation of being—is not to be inflicted when the hour of judgment arrives, but is to be postponed for a period of great length.

In truth, it is perfectly clear that the author does not consider cessation of being as the whole punishment of sin, or as more than a very subordinate part of it, since he speaks of penal consequences of sin endured through a period of awful duration. Of this awful duration of suffering the cessation of being cannot be more than the terminating point; it may

be deemed a most grateful and felicitous exit for the long agonized sufferer. Yet he will have the cessation of being to be the only meaning in which we shall understand those terms,—death, destruction, perdition, corruption,—by which in the Scriptures the punishment of sin is emphatically expressed!

If on his part it should be said that those terms do not mean cessation of being exclusively, but misery during a certain period and extinction afterwards, we must repeat our objection to this confounding of the literal with the metaphorical use. We cannot accept words in two senses at once. The words in question may mean either cessation of existence or misery; but not both at the same time.

The general result of this brief examination is, that terms literally expressing the continuance and cessation of being—life and death—when employed in the Scriptures to represent what awaits the righteous and the wicked hereafter, are justly held to be used metaphorically, and, that they denote states of happiness and misery respectively. This being the case, the use of these terms cannot teach us anything respecting the duration of the existence of either the wicked or the righteous; and it cannot consequently afford any sanction to our author's opinion of the limited existence of the wicked.

We now turn to the other part of his argument, and proceed to inquire whether, since the terms used in relation to the future state teach us nothing concerning the immortality of the race, any information is afforded on this important topic elsewhere.

With Mr. Dobney we do not hold the necessary immortality of the soul. With him also we do not hold human reason competent to prove anything on this point. We hold, however, the actual immortality of the soul; and regard immortality as an attribute originally conferred on man, in congruity with his rank as a rational being, and with the designs of God respecting him.

In order to adduce scriptural proof of this sentiment, we quote the declaration of the apostle, 2 Tim. i. 10, that Christ "hath vanquished death, and brought life and immortality to light;" and we hold this quotation to be amply sufficient for our purpose. Christ is here said to have "brought to light," or to have fully and authoritatively revealed, "life and immortality,"—that is, the fact of a future and immortal

existence for mankind. We say *for mankind*, meaning the whole human race, in opposition to the restriction held by the author, for the following reasons. First, because no distinction is made by the apostle, and his language must consequently be taken universally. To introduce a distinction of which he has given no intimation, would be totally unauthorized and unwarrantable. Secondly, because the entire structure of the passage forbids restriction. The life which Christ is said to have brought to light stands in direct contrast with death, and must be regarded as co-extensive with it. As death occurs to all, so the life and immortality belong to all. Besides, if the immortality be denied to any portion of mankind so also must the life, for they obviously go together. It would do strange violence to this text to make it teach temporary existence for all and immortal existence for a part. But, as Mr. Dobney admits, all are to live hereafter; consequently all will be immortal. In truth, however, although the terms are two the thing intended is one and indivisible. Life and immortality is only a Greek phrase for immortal life. It is an immortal existence which Christ has revealed; and this immortal existence is the only future existence for man of which anything is made known to us. It follows therefore that all existence in a future state will be immortal, and that the idea of a limited existence for any part of mankind is not merely unsupported, but contradicted, by the language of the apostle.

What arguments our author may be able to adduce in support of a different conclusion when he shall speak more at large, it is not for us to say. We can remark only on that which appears in the work before us. And here two of his views demand notice.

He regards immortality as "the princely gift of Christ to his followers," p. 72.

But this is inconsistent with the passage just quoted. Christ is there said to have *brought to light* life and immortality. Now to bring to light is not to bring into existence, or in any sense to bring to pass. It is to make known, either absolutely or in a manner more full and authoritative than before. The entire sense of the phrase must be confined to the idea of discovery, and it implies the previous existence of the thing discovered. The import of the passage seems to us to be, that Christ authoritatively made known the fact

that an immortal existence was the divinely-appointed destiny of man.

It seems to us also that this idea is incongruous with the general tenor of evangelical truth. Such effects of the intervention of Christ on our behalf as result from faith in his name are, we conceive, of a moral rather than a physical nature; effects on our character and state rather than modifications of our natural properties. If a sinner believes in Christ he obtains pardon, and privilege, and glorious hope; while his faith purifies his heart, regulates his life, and prepares him for heaven. But, according to our author, when a sinner believes in Christ a physical change also takes place upon him. Up to that moment he was mortal, thenceforth he is immortal. As he came out of the hands of his Maker he was the heir of a limited existence; the moment he falls into the hands of the Redeemer his being expands into eternity, and he is at once a creature of far vaster destinies. He is not only a being on whose condition of guilt and misery Christ makes a most blessed change; but one whose physical qualities are transformed by him. This is not so much an act of redeeming mercy as of creating power; and the idea is, we think, utterly alien from the evangelical system, and unsupported by Scripture. Of course, the numerous declarations that Christ bestows on believers "eternal life" are nothing to the purpose unless the term life is to be literally understood, which we have endeavoured above to disprove.

Further, Mr. Dobney infers the limited existence of the wicked from the fact that God has threatened them with death.

On this we observe, first, that there can be no force in this argument unless the term death is to be understood in its literal acceptation, as denoting cessation of being. If, as we have endeavoured to show, it is to be understood metaphorically as denoting misery, it has no bearing on the subject before us.

We observe, secondly, that, if the threatening be, as our author requires, understood literally, then the threatening itself implies the immortality denied. The denunciation in this case is, that if men live and die in sin they shall cease to exist; which clearly implies that if they did not live and die in sin they would not cease to exist—in other words,

that they are in their nature immortal. If in the progress of their own existence they would arrive at a natural termination of it, the threat to put an end to it would be of trivial meaning. All the force of such a threat lies in the idea of cutting off an immortality which would be otherwise enjoyed. Either way, therefore, the argument fails, and the conclusion consequently stands that immortality is an attribute of the whole race, or of man as man.

Some considerations may now be added tending to show the utter improbability of the restriction of immortality to a portion of the human race, as contended for by our author.

1. If the existence of man were in any instance to terminate, the natural period for such a change would seem to be that at which the dissolution of the body takes place. Yet Mr. Dobney does not take this position. He affirms that the wicked will be raised from the grave, and exist in the future state for a very lengthened period. If we now ask when will they cease to exist, we do not see any natural period which can be assigned for this occurrence. They are launched into a state of being which, unlike the present life, has no tendencies to decay, and put into possession of a body which contains no germs of dissolution. They have entered on a life which has no natural term, and of which all the apparent probabilities are that it will continue for ever.

If the future existence of any portion of mankind is to come to an end, and more especially of so large and important a portion of mankind as our author's scheme comprehends, it would have been reasonable to suppose that some distinct announcement of so grand a fact should be found in the inspired volume. The terms under discussion are the only evidence on this point to which he makes any reference; but these, of course, cannot be adduced in proof while their meaning is undetermined. Whether there be any other passages by which he conceives his view may be sustained we cannot say, but, from his silence on this point we presume not. Now this is not after the manner of the sacred writers, or of the divine Author of revelation. The great outlines of man's destiny are otherwise marked out with eminent clearness; and it would not be without a painful feeling of inconsistency that we could yield to Mr. Dobney's call to believe, either that the natural extinction of so large a portion of mankind, or one of the two leading issues of the

general judgment, stands forth nowhere revealed in Holy Writ.

It may be proper before dismissing the subject, to look at the end which our author's scheme may be supposed to serve, and the attitude in which it places the evangelical system.

It is of course to be understood that Mr. Dobney regards his scheme as materially mitigating the confessedly awful doctrine of future punishment as strictly everlasting, and as presenting a view more easy to be reconciled with the scriptural representations of the character of God. On this subject the following remarks suggest themselves.

Although a limited punishment is undoubtedly widely different from an eternal one, such a punishment as he suggests is scarcely less difficult of reconciliation with the divine goodness than an everlasting one, for he maintains that the wicked will endure as much intensity of suffering as is supposed by theologians of any class; and the unknown period through which he admits their sufferings will extend he stretches to a length sufficient to justify the use of the word eternal, as applied to it in the Scriptures. He himself calls this duration "awful;" he states that suffering will occupy the entire existence of the parties subjected to it, and he raises a most urgent plea with sinners on the ground of this terrific prospect. He holds, moreover, that this does not exhaust the vials of wrath, but that the threatening comprehends the final extinction of being, which, considered as a punitive act and as constituting a large part of the wrath against sin, must be held to be an awful calamity. Now, upon the very same principle on which it is held that the goodness of God renders the doctrine of eternal punishment incredible, it may be affirmed that it renders such a doctrine of limited punishment incredible too. To the question how is it reconcilable with God's love that he should subject many millions of creatures to intense suffering for many millions of years and slay them at last, it seems to us that no other answer can be returned than this, that it is an awful and unfathomable mystery. And this answer may be returned to the same question when it is framed on the doctrine of eternal punishment. To whatever extent the two schemes may differ, so far as relates to the difficulty of harmonizing them with the revealed goodness of God they are one and the same.

If, however, it is conceived by any persons that the notion of a limited though prolonged infliction of suffering on the ungodly does materially diminish the awfulness of their doom as represented by the doctrine of eternal punishment, it should be observed that the value of the soul and of salvation must be diminished in an equal degree. Eternity is the source from which some of the most solemn and weighty considerations are drawn in relation to religious concerns. Attend to the interests of the soul, *for it will live for ever;* prepare for the life to come, *for it will be everlasting;* flee from the wrath of God, *for it will never end;*—these are instances of the manner in which the element of eternity mingles itself with religious thoughts and exhortations. If its withdrawment from them is conceived so greatly to lessen the awfulness of an impenitent sinner's doom that it may be contemplated calmly by a good man, is it not manifest that the same process may justify the apathy of a bad one? If its power to harrow up the soul of the former be lost, how is it to retain its adaptation to awaken the conscience of the latter?

Another view of this subject may be taken. The salvation of the soul is the object and result of the redemption which is in Christ Jesus. The expiatory offering of the Son of God is a mystery at least as great as any involved in the doctrine of eternal punishment; and the awe which a serious contemplation of it is adapted to produce passes into actual pain, unless we take some grand and awful view of the object which was to be effected by it. To think of the eternal Father slaying his well-beloved Son *for any purpose* is amazing; but to think of his doing so for a slight one is altogether appalling and impossible. The immortality of the soul stands in the fullest harmony with the vastness of the price that was paid for its redemption, and the eternity of future punishment with the infinite costliness of the ransom. It would afford a devout heart little satisfaction to adopt a view which would represent the Most Blessed as tender to his rebellious creatures, at the cost of representing him as cruel to his Son.

The sum of the remarks which we have made is, that we see neither scriptural warrant for the view which our author has brought forward, nor evangelical congruity in it. We record our conviction that according to the Scriptures all

men are immortal. Mr. Dobney himself admits that, if all men are immortal, the future punishment of the wicked is eternal. That it is so we entertain no doubt; and most earnestly do we desire that the regard paid to this awful truth, by those who impart religious instruction on the one hand and by those who receive it on the other, may be as prompt and serious as its incalculable importance demands.

WHO WILL LIVE FOR EVER?

AN EXAMINATION OF LUKE xx. 36.

WITH NOTES.

WHO WILL LIVE FOR EVER?

WITHIN the last ten or twelve years several publications have appeared, of widely different character and pretensions indeed, but having a general agreement in this, that the authors of them call in question the usually-received doctrine of man's proper immortality,* and inculcate in its stead the sentiment that immortality is the gift of Christ to his people.

During a recent careful perusal of these works, a text of Scripture has presented itself to my mind, which, notwithstanding its obvious applicability to the subject, has not, so far as I can find, been cited in either of them. I may therefore, perhaps, be permitted, without at present entering any further into the controversy, to propose a few thoughts respecting it.

The text to which I refer occurs in Luke xx. 36, and consists of these words:—

"NEITHER CAN THEY DIE ANY MORE."

As this text, however, is part of an extended passage, it will be proper in the outset to exhibit it in its connexion. The whole is as follows:—

Luke xx. 27–38.

"27 Then came to him certain of the Sadducees, which deny that there is any resurrection; and they asked him,

"28 Saying, Master, Moses wrote unto us, If any man's brother die, having a wife, and he die without children, that his brother should take his wife, and raise up seed unto his brother.

"29 There were therefore seven brethren: and the first took a wife, and died without children.

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* See Note A.

"30 And the second took her to wife, and he died childless.
"31 And the third took her; and in like manner the seven also: and they left no children, and died.
"32 Last of all the woman died also.
"33 Therefore in the resurrection whose wife of them is she? for seven had her to wife.
"34 And Jesus answering said unto them, The children of this world marry, and are given in marriage:
"35 But they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage:
"36 Neither can they die any more: for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection.
"37 Now that the dead are raised, even Moses showed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.
"38 For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living: for all live unto him."*

I.

This was part of a systematic effort by the combined enemies of Christ, "to entangle him in his talk." Although they were in this respect animated by a common design, however, they held opinions both political and theological of great diversity, and they made their attack separately, each party with its favourite weapon.

The interrogatory framed by the Sadducees related, we are told, to "the resurrection." There is reason to doubt, however, whether this term conveys the whole case. It is true that the members of this sect did, as we are here informed, "deny that there was any resurrection;" but it is known also that they denied much more than this. From the testimony of Josephus it appears that, as a philosophical school, they were the materialists of that age and nation, not allowing the soul to be of a spiritual nature, or consequently to be capable of existence separate from the body. This is corroborated by the writer of the Acts of the Apostles, who informs us that they said, "There was no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit" (Acts xxiii. 8). With them, consequently, the doctrine of a resurrection was identical with that of a future existence. If there was a resurrection there

* Matthew and Mark relate the same occurrence, but with greater brevity, and with a few minor differences. Matt. xxii. 23–32. Mark xii. 18–27.

was of course a future life; and if there was a future life there must in their view be a resurrection, since, according to them, there could be no future life but in the body. The question framed by the Sadducees must therefore, in all propriety, be held to relate generally to the subject of a future life, rather than to the fact of the resurrection of the body. This view is not at all inconsistent with either the etymology or the use of the term ἀνάστασις, which, when it relates to a future state, is by our translators uniformly, but sometimes unhappily, rendered *resurrection.**

As the interrogatory of the Sadducees related generally to the doctrine of a future life, so it related in particular to a difficulty with which they conceived this doctrine to be hopelessly clogged. They had been accustomed to hear the Pharisees, who strongly maintained it, allow the indulgence of the sensual appetites to be a part of it, and they had often pleased themselves with the confusion to which they had put their rivals for popular favour by means of their ingeniously constructed hypothetical case. In the instance of our Lord they doubtless expected a similar triumph.

The divine Teacher took the question just as the Sadducees put it, and framed his answer in the directest manner. Beginning with a concession that "the children of this world" did "marry and were given in marriage," he proceeded to assert that in "that world" nothing of the kind took place; and he immediately assigned the reason why, namely, that the inhabitants of that world did not—could not—die. The bearing of this reason is obvious. Marriage is designed to perpetuate the human race, a purpose for which it is rendered necessary by man's liability to death; in a state, consequently, in which none could die, a condition the sole object of which was to repair the ravages of death would be both a redundance and an incongruity.

By this natural and simple view of the passage, I am led to consider our Lord's words, "NEITHER CAN THEY DIE ANY MORE," as exhibiting an essential feature of the future life of mankind, namely, its deathless† character. To my mind

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* See Dwight's Theology, Disc. clxvi.; also Campbell on the Gospels, Macknight's Harmony, Hammond's Paraphrase, and Heinsii Exercitationes Sacræ, on Matthew xxii. 23, *et seq.*

† See Note B.

they constitute a direct and positive assertion of the immortality of the human race.

I am, of course, aware of the objection (I believe there is only one) which will be made to this conclusion, "Our Lord," it will be said, "is speaking of the righteous only. Look at the terms he employs. Is it possible you can understand these of the wicked?" I must endeavour to meet this objection.

II.

1. In order to do this, in the first place, I look more narrowly to the question which was addressed by the Sadducees to our Lord.

This may be viewed in two aspects; the first relating to the basis on which it was raised, and the second to the form in which it was presented.

As to the former, we are told that the Sadducees denied "that there was any future life,"* ver. 23. Their scepticism on this point, then, was universal. They denied not merely a partial future life, such as an exclusively happy one, which might belong to the Jews only, or to the righteous only, if this had been then imagined; but they denied that there was ANY future life. Their infidelity, therefore (as is well known, indeed, from other evidence also), affected the doctrine of a future life in its widest aspect, and the question they raised upon it would naturally be of a bearing equally wide.

If we examine the particular form which their interrogatory assumed, we shall find it to agree with this expectation. Upon a hypothetical case of a woman having, under a statute of Moses, become the wife of seven brothers in succession, they proposed this query: "In the future life whose wife shall she be?" This question, it is evident, contemplated none of the distinctions existing among mankind, whether national or religious. It was raised out of circumstances incident to general society. Neither was it customary for just persons only to marry, nor were just persons only, when married, under the operation of the Mosaic statute. This extended to all Jews; and the Jews as a nation represented,

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* I shall now use the freedom of habitually employing the phrase *future life* instead of the word *resurrection*.

with no variation germane to our argument, the condition of the world.

Now the scope of a question is strong presumptive evidence of the scope of the answer. It is fair to assume that, generally speaking, a person of ordinary courtesy, if he answers a question at all, answers it in the sense in which it was put to him; and that indeed he always does so, with the exception of peculiar cases in which he may have a reason for doing otherwise, which reason is for the most part likely to appear, or be discoverable. I infer, then, that our Lord in this instance answered the question put to him in the sense in which it was put; and that, consequently, his answer related, as the question did, not to the righteous only but to mankind at large.

Can anything be said to invalidate this inference? Is there any amount or kind of evidence to show that in his own mind Christ altered the scope of the question before he answered it? Is there any apparent or any conceivable reason why he should have done so; or why he should not have answered it in the sense in which it was put? I reply to all these interrogations in the negative.

I may do more than this. I may assert that, under the circumstances, there were the strongest reasons why the Lord *should* answer the question in the sense in which it was put to him. By what other method could he expect to put to shame, or even to silence, the shrewd men who were bent on ensnaring him? Would they not have taken immediate advantage of any semblance of evasion, and have triumphantly retorted—"Ah! you cannot answer the question as we put it to you"?

2. Let us now look more particularly at the answer returned by our Lord to the question proposed to him.

We may begin by remarking how consistently with the view now taken it opens. "The children of this world marry." Here is no restriction. The phrase used is one which, in this connexion, no party would think of confining either to the righteous or the wicked. It obviously denotes simply the inhabitants of this world, without distinction of any kind. All "marry and are given in marriage."

The meaning of this phrase, then, naturally settles that of the contrasted phrase, "they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world." The antithesis determines this to mean the inhabitants of the world to come.

Notice also the complete solution of the Sadducean difficulty supplied by our Lord's words thus understood. If he meant to speak of all mankind, his declaration that marriage had no existence in the future world removed altogether the alleged source of perplexity presented to him.

The subsequent silence of the Sadducees proves them to have understood the answer as applying to the entire breadth of their question. Had Christ left himself open to retort, both the known acuteness of his adversaries, and the special character of the effort to entangle him which was in progress at the moment, leave no room to doubt that they would have turned upon him in some such manner as this: "You have told us how it would be if the parties were righteous; *tell us how it would be if they were wicked.*"

A confirmation of the view I am advocating may be derived from our Lord's words in the 38th verse:—

"37 Now that the dead are raised even Moses showed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.

"38 For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living: *for all live unto him.*"

"ALL live unto him." To whom does this word "*all*" apply? The commentators generally, having assumed that the future life our Lord speaks of is exclusively a happy one, are led of necessity to interpret this phrase of the *spiritual children* of Abraham. I maintain, however, that there is no ground for this assumption. The language employed by our Lord is as remote as possible from any semblance of restriction. The proposition he puts forward is, "that THE DEAD are raised," or rather "that the dead still exist." In what more general terms could he have spoken?

It is held, indeed, that the nature of his proof is restrictive; since to be a God to a person is to hold a relation to him necessarily spiritual and gracious. But I deny this altogether. No doubt the phrase may be understood in that sense; but it may be understood also in a carnal sense. And in a carnal sense it must have been used to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, since it was used respecting the *entire posterity* of Abraham in this line. If, indeed, the covenant relation was confined to the godly part of this posterity, by what title did the remainder inherit Canaan? I affirm, therefore, that the covenant relation intended by our Lord, if he

referred to any at all, was the carnal relation which God established between himself and Abraham, with his posterity traced through Isaac and Jacob. In this view his argument must apply, at the least, to the whole Jewish nation; and in them we have a mixture of the righteous and the wicked, sufficient to defy all further attempts to restrict his words to either of these classes alone.

I am disposed, however, to go further than this, and to maintain that God's *covenant* relation to Abraham was only accidentally in our Lord's contemplation. It appears to me that he cited the case principally as one in which God was declared to hold *a relation* to men not then living in "this world;" and that, although this case was pre-eminently adapted to his Jewish and Sadducean auditory (an obvious and very sufficient reason for the selection of it), any other case of a substantially similar kind would have been equally conclusive. For, although it is quite true that the relation which God held to Abraham was one of favour, it is not in this point that its force in the present argument lies. Any kind of relation on God's part to a dead man is as direct and complete a demonstration of his existence as any other; one of anger is quite as conclusive as one of love. Putting aside, then, the mere accident of the benignant character of God's relation to Abraham, our Lord's argument is strictly this: "You say dead men do not exist; yet in your own Scriptures God is declared to hold a relation to men now dead. God, however, does not hold a relation to non-existent men, therefore these men still exist." Hence the conclusion naturally follows, that all men exist after death, inasmuch as there are relations of some kind which God is declared to hold to all men, though dead.

Archbishop Whately observes that Christ selected persons who had died "the common death" of men, in order to secure the universal application of his argument; "so that if *they* were spoken of as still living in another state, the like might be inferred of ALL men."*

Now, if this part of our Lord's reply to the Sadducees related to all mankind, is it not certain that the former part of it must have done so too? The "all" who live unto God, are plainly those who "cannot die any more."

* Scripture Revelations of a Future State, p. 21.

III.

I will now examine the phrases which are apparently in favour of restricting our Lord's answer to the righteous.

1. The first of these occurs in the 35th verse: "They which shall *be accounted worthy to obtain* that world." This seems to be said as though the "world" intended were a happy one, and as though admission to it were a matter of peculiarity and favour.

The passage in the original is as follows:—Οἱ δὲ καταξιωθέντες τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐκείνου τυχεῖν.

The stress here lies upon two terms, *to obtain*, and *to be accounted worthy*.

The English word *to obtain* undoubtedly implies an idea of personal effort or desert; but it is in this respect a bad representative of the Greek term τυγχάνω. Even the Latin *obtineo* is less objectionable than the English *obtain*, inasmuch as one of the meanings assigned to it is *to have or possess*. Τυγχάνω is best rendered, however, by the Latin verb *nancisor*, which means, "*to get, receive, or obtain, especially by accident, or without exertion or previous intention.*" Τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐκείνου τυχεῖν, therefore, cannot be more fitly rendered than by the English phrase, "to *enter on* that world."

The principal stress, however, here lies upon the word καταξιόω, *to account worthy*. That the reader may have the whole question before him, I will exhibit all the passages in which καταξιόω, and its kindred word ἀξιόω, occur in the New Testament.

The places in which καταξιόω is employed are only four. The first is now under consideration, and the other three are as follows:—

Luke xxi. 36. "Watch ye, therefore, and pray always, that ye *may be accounted worthy* to escape all these things that shall come to pass, and to stand before the Son of man."

Acts v. 41. "And they departed from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they *were counted worthy* to suffer shame for his name."

2 Thess. i. 5. "That ye *may be counted worthy* of the kingdom of God."

The kindred term ἀξιόω is used in the following instances:—

Luke vii. 7. "Wherefore neither *thought I myself worthy* to come unto thee."

Acts xv. 38. "But Paul *thought not good* to take him with them."

Acts xxviii. 22. "But *we desire* to hear of thee what thou thinkest."

2 Thess. i. 11. "That our God would *count you worthy* of this calling."

1 Tim. v. 17. "Let the elders that rule well *be counted worthy* of double honour."

Heb. iii. 3. "For this man *was counted worthy* of more glory than Moses."

Heb. x. 29. "Of how much sorer punishment shall he *be thought worthy*."

The critical reader (for to such I must address myself on a question of criticism) will observe that both these verbs, ἀξιόω and καταξιόω, are used sometimes in the active and sometimes in the passive voice. To them both when used in the *passive* voice, Schleusner, in his Lexicon, attaches the following meanings:—

"ἀξιοῦσθαι τινος, *is dicitur qui aliquid consequitur et habet, et aliqua re afficitur, in utramque partem.*"

"καταξιοῦσθαι, *nancisi aliquid, consequi, obtinere; idem quod* τυγχάνειν."

"He is said to BE COUNTED WORTHY OF anything who *obtains* or *possesses* it, or is *affected by* it in any way."

"TO BE COUNTED WORTHY, *to get, to attain, to obtain;* the same as τυγχάνειν." Now τυγχάνειν is the very word which is employed in the verse under consideration, and somewhat unhappily rendered *to obtain.*

If the reader will try the meaning thus given in the several passages, he will be able to estimate for himself its applicability and value.

Heb. x. 29. "How much sorer punishment *shall he suffer*."

Heb. iii. 3. "For this man *received* more glory than Moses."

1 Tim. v. 17. "Let the elders that rule well *receive* double honour."

2 Thess. i. 5. "That ye may *enter* the kingdom of God."

In all these passages the idea of possession is obviously required, and if it is not conveyed by ἀξιόω and καταξιόω, it is not expressed at all.

In some cases the expression seems to be repeated, so that one or other of the words employed must be considered as redundant. So in the following passages:—

Acts v. 41. "Rejoicing that they *suffered* shame," &c.

Luke xxi. 36. "That ye *may escape* from all these things that shall come to pass."

And in like manner in the passage before us. "They who *shall enter on* that world."

Such redundancy of expression is not without example in the Greek writers, and one instance of it is cited by Schleusner, under the word καταξιόω.

The same view is taken by Castalio, in whose translation the words are thus rendered—"*quibus vitam illam assequi contigit:* those to whom it has occurred to enter on that life." This is merely a Latin form of expression for, "those who have entered on that life."

For my own part, I profess myself content to follow the critical guidance of the eminent scholars I have quoted, and the passage consequently presents no difficulty at this point to me. But supposing some degree of difficulty yet to remain as to the use of the term καταξιόω, must not the sense in which it is used be held, according to all laws of sound criticism, determinable by the exigency of the passage, and the general considerations which decide its meaning?

2. I pass on now to some other phrases. In the 36th verse we are told that those who have entered on that world "*are equal unto the angels, and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection;*" terms which it may be thought hard to apply to any but the righteous. I will notice them in their order.

"*Equal unto the angels:* ἰσάγγελοι." This word would be better rendered, according to all authorities, "similar to angels;" or, as it is happily phrased by Mr. Isaac Taylor, "on a par with angels."* The point of similarity intended by its use is always to be suggested and determined by the connexion. In this case it is only that they will "neither marry nor be given in marriage," since "they cannot die any more;" and it involves no inconsistency to say that even wicked men will, in the future world, resemble angels in *these* respects. Our Lord's words convey nothing more.

The expression is varied a little by Matthew, who says, that in the future life, men "are as the *angels of God in heaven.*" This phrase, of course, defines the holy angels; but it does not entail the idea of a resemblance to them in their holiness. The similarity is confined to the points already indicated.

"*The children of God:* υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ." There is no doubt

* Saturday Evening—Endless Life.

that this phrase is often used in the New Testament to denote a state of spiritual privilege, and that by association it more naturally conveys to us this idea than any other. The thoughtful, however, will be aware of the danger which lurks in such associations. Every reader will recollect the occasion upon which Paul employed the equivalent phrase, "the offspring of God" (Acts xvii. 28), to express our natural relation to God as our Creator. The critics generally concur in assigning to the terms "children of God," as here used, the general idea of *similarity*, and in limiting the similarity intended to the single point mentioned, namely, exemption from death. "Neither can they die any more," being in this respect similar to God.

"*Children of the resurrection: τῆς ἀναστάσεως υἱοί.*" If this phrase be taken as it is, it cannot be made to mean more than "persons raised from the dead;" the sense in which the critics generally take it. Or if, in accordance with observations already made, I render it "children of the future life,"* the result is the same; it means "persons who have entered on the future life." In a word, the phrase is a Hebraism, and merely states a fact in a Hebrew form of expression. It denotes nothing of character. It is as applicable to the wicked as to the righteous.

These remarks seem to me to warrant the conclusion, that there is not in the phrases which apparently favour a limited construction of our Lord's words anything irreconcilable with their universal application.

IV.

Let it be supposed, however, that our Lord did refer to the righteous only; and let us see how his answer will appear upon this hypothesis.

1. In this case, either it is an answer to a question which was not put to him, or the question of the Sadducees must also be held to refer to the righteous only. Is there any ground on which the demonstration of this can be attempted? So far as I have seen, all parties allow the unrestricted reference of the interrogatory.

2. In this case our Lord's words would seem to imply

* Υἱοὶ τῆς ἀναβιώσιως. *Heinsius.*

that there is no future existence for any but the righteous; since his speaking of them peculiarly as living after death may fairly be held to exclude others. We know, however, that this is contrary to the truth. See John v. 28, 29.

Dr. Campbell, indeed, remarks, in his note on this place, that "our Lord, agreeably to the Jewish style of that period, calls that only *the resurrection* which is a resurrection to glory." This, however, is assuming what requires proof. None of the words used by our Lord establish this, while the whole context supplies the strongest reasons for a contrary opinion. The reference to the usual "Jewish style of that period" is altogether unwarranted and deceptive, if, as appears, the Rabbinical writers are intended. Mr. Dodwell himself, whose extensive learning has been always admitted even by those who have most zealously argued against his doctrine, speaks explicitly on this subject in the following terms:—"If I had thought Rabbinical testimonies satisfactory for proving opinions received among the Jews of the apostolical age, more might have been said from them for disproving the tradition of the doctrine of the natural immortality of human souls. . . . But I confess I have not that opinion of Rabbinical traditions as to take them for competent proofs of the opinions of their ancestors of the apostles' age, without better corroborating proof that such opinions were then received."* What the current doctrine of the Pharisees in that age was appears from the words of Paul before Felix: "And have hope toward God, *which they themselves also allow*, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and of the unjust." Acts xxiv. 15.

Mr. White† indulges in an assumption similar to Dr. Campbell's, when he says, "In this passage the resurrection of the dead is spoken of as the peculiar privilege of the righteous." He adduces no proof, but merely observes that "the same apparent restriction of the resurrection occurs in" some other passages which he cites. This may be true. But I suppose it is not to be held that such restriction exists unless there is something in the particular case to demonstrate it. In the passage now before us there is nothing of this kind beyond a slight appearance, dissipated on examination.

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* Dodwell's Epistolary Discourse, pp. xlii. xlv. † Life in Christ, p. 260.

3. If it be the righteous only of whom our Lord speaks, it will apparently follow that in the world to come, if all exist, the righteous only will be incapable of marriage. On this view of the passage it is clearly of the righteous alone that our Lord asserts this incapacity; and his asserting it of them in particular affords room for an inference that a similar disqualification will not extend to the rest of mankind. Revolting as this idea may appear, Mr. White might seem to be prepared for it, since he holds that in the resurrection the wicked will be "*still flesh and blood.*"* Would the advocates of this view generally like to allow that, while the righteous cannot marry hereafter, the wicked may?

4. If our Lord's answer be confined to the righteous, the real difficulty suggested by the Sadducees receives no solution at all. They wanted to know what, in the future world, was to be done with a woman who had been the wife successively of seven men in this. It was no solution of this problem to say that in that world the *righteous* did not marry; since it was plainly possible, and even probable, that some or the whole of this party might have been unrighteous. To suppose that Christ satisfied himself with an answer of this kind, would be to suppose that he palpably evaded a question to which he was called upon to reply. Is it credible that the Sadducees would have been "put to silence" by such an answer, or that the bystanders would have applauded it? Let what is written be duly pondered. "And when the multitude heard this they were astonished at his doctrine." Matt. xxii. 33. "Then certain of the Scribes answering, said, Master, thou hast well said: and after that they (the Sadducees) durst not ask him any question at all." Luke xx. 39, 40.

These are in my mind objections of great weight, I may say decisive objections, against confining the application of our Lord's words to the righteous. If, however, no stress were to be laid on these objections, and if it were to be allowed that the words might relate to the righteous, I observe finally, that—

5. Nothing would be gained by the concession. For the question is whether the immortality here predicated is of a kind which can be regarded as belonging only to the right-

* Life in Christ, p. 260.

eous. Now immortality, in any sense in which it can be the gift of Christ to his people, must be preternatural; not a property of humanity as it came out of the hands of the Creator, but a property superadded to it by a gift of grace. It seems clear, however, that the passage before us relates exclusively to the natural properties of man. When our Lord teaches us that, in the world to come, human beings will not marry because they cannot die, he is surely speaking of what they are by nature, and not of what they are by grace. Can we be required to believe that, but for a gift of Christ to the saints, marriage would have had scope and congruity in heaven? What then in hell? Yet it is precisely such permanence of being as renders marriage incongruous that the text asserts, and nothing more: and, if *this* be not the gift of Christ, then there is nothing in the text for the sake of which it can be worth while to demand its application to the righteous alone. If it relates to natural properties exclusively, it may as well be allowed without objection to extend to the whole of mankind; an act of obvious justice indeed, since all natural properties are co-extensive with the nature to which they belong.

Upon a review of the entire case, I cannot but think that the application of our Lord's answer to the whole of mankind is sustained by cogent and conclusive proofs.*

V.

I revert, then, with unimpaired confidence, to my conclusion, that the words of our Lord, "NEITHER CAN THEY DIE ANY MORE," constitute a direct and positive declaration of the immortality of the human race. To this I may add that, as a scriptural declaration of this important fact, this passage is of especial value, inasmuch as it is peculiarly distinct, comprehensive, and emphatic. "If yet," says a distinguished writer, in maintaining "the proper immortality of human nature," and after adducing several other scriptural forms of expression—"If yet there were room for a form of affirmation which might seem to comprise all others, to grasp the very idea of endless existence, and to exclude ambiguity,

* See Note C.

we find it in our Lord's declaration concerning those who should be 'deemed worthy to obtain' part in the future life (Οὔτε γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν ἔτι δύνανται), 'They CANNOT DIE ANY MORE, being on a par with the angels.' The terms carry the idea of an abstract or of a physical impossibility of undergoing dissolution, or extinction: such are to be made heirs of *indestructible existence*."*

Now if all men be by nature immortal, the immortality of the righteous cannot in any peculiar sense† be said to be the gift of Christ to them. It is a possession which they inherit from the bounty of their Creator in common with the rest of the species; and whatever the life in Christ, or by Christ, announced in the Gospel may be—of which, while fully admitting its excellency and glory, it is not for me here to say anything—it must of necessity be looked for in some other quarter.‡

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* Saturday Evening, pp. 458, 459. Although Mr. Taylor has not *expressed*, he would doubtless *allow* the exception to his last assertion, that human, like all other created existence, is destructible by the act of God.

† I say not "in any peculiar sense," because there is a system of theology according to which the existence of the whole posterity of Adam results from the interposition of a Redeemer. In this sense it might be affirmed that life, both here and hereafter, is the gift of Christ to man. Such a sentiment, however, would evidently have no relation to the present discussion.

‡ See Note D.

NOTES.

NOTE A.

Much confusion of thought and waste of words have arisen from the want of a clear definition of the term immortality. Mr. Dobney* takes it in the sense of *never-ending existence*. I am not satisfied, however, with this view of the matter. Immortality is strictly the opposite of mortality—another form of the supposable word *non-mortality*. Now mortality is not *existence* of any kind, nor, consequently, can immortality be so; but as mortality is *liability to death*, so *non-liability to death* must be the proper definition of immortality. Now non-liability to death may be—

1. Absolute, as belonging to the Creator only. 2. Dependent, as belonging to beings created.

Further, the causes tending to death may be either (1) internal or (2) external. And thus dependent immortality may be of two kinds: 1, non-liability to death, whether from causes internal or external; 2, non-liability to death from internal causes alone.

The latter of these two is the proper or natural immortality of any created being. It means that the creature to whom it belongs will exist for ever according to the capacities and tendencies conferred on it by the Creator, and on the supposition that these be uninterruptedly carried out; leaving, of course, the possibility of its existence being cut off by any competent external cause, such as the act of God. Now this, as I understand it, and as I suppose it is generally understood, this and no more is the immortality pertaining to man.

I am quite aware that man is in point of fact liable to death, in other words that he is mortal. But man is at the same time both mortal and immortal, although not, of course, in the same sense. Man is mortal, and the death to which he is liable falls upon his body; man is immortal, and the immortality he possesses attaches to his soul.

That the view above given of man's immortality is no novelty, may sufficiently appear by the following brief extract from Clarke's Letter to Dodwell, which expresses the sentiment generally held a hundred and fifty years ago:—"When we speak of the soul as created naturally immortal, we mean that it is by the divine pleasure created such a substance as, not having in itself any composition or other particles

* Future Punishment, p. 84.

of corruption, will naturally, or of itself, continue for ever; that is, will not, by any natural decay or by any power of nature, be dissolved or destroyed; but yet nevertheless depends continually upon God, who has power to destroy or to annihilate it if he should think fit."

I beg the reader's attention to another quotation also, which plainly shows that the same doctrine which is held now, and was held a century and a half ago, was the current doctrine of the primitive churches within half a century from the days of the apostles. The passage is from Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, and is particularly pointed to by Mr. White, although with a different view. I introduce it by merely remarking that Justin acquaints Trypho with his conversion from Platonism to Christianity by relating to him a conversation which he had held, or feigns himself to have held, with an old man whom he met on the sea-shore. After showing that the Platonic philosophers knew nothing truly of God, the aged Christian—for he has no name—proceeds to say that they knew as little of the soul; and then the dialogue thus proceeds:—*

Christian. "Nor can it (the soul) be said to be immortal; for, if it is immortal, it must also be uncreated."

Justin. "Some of the Platonists are of opinion that it is both uncreated and immortal."

Christian. "Do you believe that the world is uncreated?"

Justin. "There are some that say it is, but I am not of their way of thinking."

Christian. "You are right. For what reason can there be to think that a solid, hard, and compounded body, that is changed and decays, and is renewed again every day, should exist without any cause for its existence? But, if the *world* was created, it must follow that *souls* were created also, and that there was a time when they were not; for they were created for the sake of men and other living creatures, even if you should say that they were created separately, and without their own bodies."

Justin. "This has the appearance of truth."

Christian. "Therefore they are not immortal."

Justin. "No, they are not; seeing it is evident that the world was created."

Christian. "However, I affirm that no soul perishes entirely, or is annihilated,† for that would really be good and joyful news to the wicked. What then? Why, that the souls of the righteous are reserved in a place of happiness, and those of the wicked and unjust in a place of misery and torment, in expectation of the great day of judgment. So that those who shall be judged worthy to appear before God shall not die any more; but these shall be punished so long as it shall please God to suffer them to exist, and to punish them."

It is plain from this extract that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul denied by the nameless instructor of Justin in Christianity

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* I quote from Bickersteth's Christian Fathers, pp. 152, 153.

† Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀποθνήσκειν φημὶ πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς ἐγώ. More correctly rendered thus: "But yet I do not affirm that all souls die."

was not the doctrine now held (as stated above), but the doctrine of an absolute and underived immortality, or, as Mr. White well expresses it, a "natural eternity," which it is well known some of the Platonists believed to belong to the human soul. This doctrine, it appears, was not held by Christian professors then, nor am I informed that it either is so now or ever has been so. The doctrine of immortality as held now was held anciently, and was both taught to Justin and embraced by him as a part of Christian truth, namely, that no human soul ceases to exist unless by the act of God. For such I take to be the clear and indisputable meaning of the last sentence in the passage I have quoted; "Those who shall be judged worthy to appear before God shall not die any more; but these [the wicked and unjust] shall be punished so long as it shall please God to suffer them to exist, and to punish them."* According to this sentiment, no cause for the termination of man's future life exists within himself, which is precisely the thing intended by man's natural immortality.

In the passage of Mr. White's volume to which I have here referred, he pleases himself with the reflection that the ancient Christian writer Arnobius argues at great length on the principles laid down by him. He refers, no doubt, after Dodwell, to the second of Arnobius's Eight Books *Adversus Gentes;* a passage which, I must confess, I have read without deriving any conviction, or much light. Upon consulting Enfield's Compendium of Brucker's History of Philosophy, I find the following character given of Arnobius:—"It is in vain to search for accurate reasoning in the writings of this father, whose education, talents, and principles led him to excel in eloquence rather than in philosophy." And Mr. Dodwell speaks thus of him:—"Arnobius has his paradoxes on this subject, for which he himself alone is responsible. And his case is the more excusable, considering that he was but a catechumen when he wrote his book, and was not thoroughly instructed in the Christian doctrine."—*Epistolary Discourse*, p. 66.

NOTE B.

It has been strongly but erroneously asserted, that the primary idea expressed by the term *death* is the *cessation of being*. This word, like its correlative *life*, is applicable in the first instance to organized substances as opposed to substances unorganized, whether such organized substances be vegetable or animal. So we speak of a living or a dead tree, a living or a dead horse, a living or a dead man. In all such cases *life* is a term denoting, not being, but a condition of being, or the condition in which the organic functions are carried on; and *death* is a name for the opposite condition, or that in which the organic functions have ceased—it is familiarly used for the transition from the former condition into the latter. A dead tree is one in which the functions of the vegetable organization are no longer performed, but the tree has not ceased to exist, otherwise the very phrase a dead tree would be contradictory and absurd. So a dead

* Αἱ δὲ κολάζονται ἔστ' ἂν αὐτὰς καὶ εἶναι καὶ κολάζισθαι ὁ Θεὸς θέλῃ.

horse and a dead man are a horse and a man in whom the functions of the animal organization are no longer performed; but the horse and the man still exist, else are these phrases also contradictory and absurd. In truth, not anything has ceased to be. For a time even the respective organizations remain perfect. Nothing has occurred but the stoppage of certain organic functions, entailing a change in the condition or mode of existence of the being concerned. This is death. And this is the primary idea of the word death, from which all others are by analogy derived. In the case of man the cessation of the animal functions terminates his connexion with this world, because it reduces him to a mode of existence to which this world is not adapted; but it involves no cessation of existence in either the body or the soul.

NOTE C.

Mr. White* notices this discourse of our Lord in the following terms:—"When summoned to refute the Sadducean maxim of 'no future life, neither angel, nor spirit,' he did not ground his argument, as the Pharisees would have done, or a modern divine, upon the immortality of the soul; he did not suggest to them the natural consequences of that doctrine in respect to the wicked, but he fetched his overwhelming reply in favour of a future eternal existence from a consideration of what was involved in the relationship of *a God*,—a relationship borne exclusively as an act of peculiar grace to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and their spiritual children, and involving a resurrection of their bodies. He thus, on a most important occasion, purposely omitted to teach the doctrine of the universal immortality of souls and the consequences that flow from it, in a manner which seems to mark his reprobation of the tenet."

On this passage I make the following observations:—

1. Mr. White, in quoting "the Sadducean maxim" in the terms "*no future life*, neither angel, nor spirit," has adopted a deviation from the English version without giving his readers any intimation of it. The passage referred to is Acts xxiii. 8, where the Sadducees are stated to hold "that there is *no resurrection*, neither angel, nor spirit." Of course I do not notice this alteration because I disapprove it. All I mean to say is, that I think Mr. White should have pointed it out to the reader, and not have used the inverted commas as though it was a regular quotation from the English Bible.

2. Mr. White is not consistent with himself. If I should venture to congratulate myself on his agreement with me in adopting the phrase *future life* instead of *resurrection*, I should be embarrassed on finding that, in his other references to the same passage (pp. 30, 260), he uses, not the term *future life*, but *resurrection*.† I might now in perplexity ask, What does Mr. White conceive the real idea of the place to be? And which of the terms does he mean to adopt? Will

* Life in Christ, p. 122.

† "The point to be proved was *not* the existence of the soul after death in a separate state, but a resurrection of the body." P. 31.

he take sometimes the one and sometimes the other, as may suit his purpose?

3. It is singular enough that in all these passages the phrase actually employed by him is necessary to the argument in each. If an exchange were made, and *future life* placed in pages 30 and 260 and *resurrection* in page 122, there would be no basis for argument in either.

4. Mr. White incorrectly states that our Lord was "summoned to refute the Sadducean maxim of 'no future life.'" The Sadducees required him to remove a difficulty attaching in their view to the received doctrine of a future life; and this he did in the most direct manner, by declaring the fact and the ground of the non-existence in the world to come of marriage, the source of their difficulty. He had then done *all* that was required of him; but he took the opportunity thus afforded to communicate further instruction. Hence he referred to the phrase, "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," as demonstrating by implication that there is a future life, since God "is not a God of the dead, but of the living." He then went on to extend this important truth far beyond the limit assigned to it by Mr. White (who confines it to "the *spiritual children* of Abraham," and thus excludes from it the greater part of the Jews themselves), by inferring that "all live unto him." Let us now add to this the declaration which had issued from his lips but a moment before,—"Neither can they die any more"—(a sentence the omission of which under the circumstances cannot but be deemed eminently singular)—and then let us compare the whole with Mr. White's assertion, that Christ, on this "most important occasion, *purposely omitted* to teach the universal immortality of souls, and the consequences which flow from it, *in a manner which seems to mark his reprobation of the tenet.*" I have read several wonderful passages in this controversy, but this has struck me with amazement.

NOTE D.

Mr. White recommends those who would become better acquainted with the subject on which he has written to read the Dodwellian Controversy. I cannot but express my surprise at this recommendation.

Henry Dodwell, A.M., was Camden Professor of History in the University of Oxford at the era of the Revolution, and one of the adherents of the non-juring clergy. Having written a Discourse on Marriage, in which he cursorily impugned the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul, he received two letters from "an excellent person" to which he thought it right to make a public reply. This reply is entitled, "An Epistolary Discourse, proving from the Scriptures and the First Fathers that the Soul is a principle naturally mortal; but immortalized actually by the pleasure of God, to punishment or to reward, by its union with the Divine Baptismal Spirit. Wherein is proved that none have the power of giving this Divine Immortalizing Spirit since the Apostles, but only the Bishops." The

work was published in London in the year 1706, and is the work which gave rise to the somewhat eager controversy which ensued.

As Mr. Dodwell writes in defence of statements he had already made, he enters at once *in medias res*, and holds himself excused from any orderly or connected exhibition of his views. They are to be collected consequently from occasional passages, in combining and harmonizing which it is difficult to be certain that justice is done either to the author or to his sentiments; but I hope I shall do him no real injustice in the following remarks.

1. In relation to the natural immortality of the soul, properly so called, he absolutely raises no question at all. In the sense in which it was then defined by the Rev. (afterwards Dr.) Samuel Clarke, he *admits its truth;* and then he turns himself to discuss under the name of immortality the subject of future happiness, because, as he says, nothing short of immortal happiness is worthy of being called immortality at all. The result is that he does not reason strictly on either subject, but shifts continually from the one to the other, to the extreme confusion both of himself and his readers.

2. Respecting the mixed kind of immortality concerning which he writes, the principal features of his theory are these:—That, since the fall, it is the natural lot of man to die, both body and soul; that since the advent of Christ (not before) men may acquire immortality by possessing themselves of the Spirit of Christ; that those who refuse to do this will be held guilty of a great sin; that they will not be allowed the general benefit of annihilation, but will be immortalized by the act of God in order that their punishment may be eternal; and that, as all mankind must appear at the last judgment, the souls of those who have not heard the Gospel will eke out their existence until that period, and no longer.

3. It is supplementary to this theory that the Spirit of Christ can be communicated no otherwise than by baptism, and this only by bishops, or persons duly authorized by them; and that for the benefit of those who lived and died before baptism was instituted, Christ and his apostles went, and both preached the Gospel and administered baptism in Hades, to "the spirits in prison."

4. Mr. Dodwell's ideas of the nature of man are so peculiar that I must convey them in his own language:—"The mortal body had a mortal soul joined to it, which, together with it, made up the choical man. The πνοὴ, or *flatus*, was preternatural, as designed to fit him for a supernatural state of happiness. This was to cause the ἐπιστροφὴ or conversion of the soul to that supernatural principle of the Divine Spirit, by union with which he was to hope for immortality. It was also to enable him for the καταλῆψις, by which the union was to be begun, as being itself συγγενὴς to the spirit with which the union was designed. And in the meantime, being itself also of a nature divine in an inferior sense, itself was immortal also, and communicated a derivative immortality to the lower soul so long as the union with the soul was continued, but left it capable of the actual mortality which was natural to it whenever it should leave it. This might be the case at the day of judgment, that the soul, being deserted by the lower spirit, might relapse to the mortality that was natural to it when it had now no body to support it. This is a clear account how

this πνοὴ, as distinct from the πνεῦμα, might put mankind in that middle state between mortality and immortality which the Fathers suppose, to be determined to either by the event of his own free will." Pp. 300, 301.

If my reader should have derived little information from this passage, I can offer him but two consolations: the first is, that Mr. Dodwell *says* it is "*a clear account*" of his views; and the second, that it is the least obscure, and indeed the only connected account of them I have found anywhere in his book.

To return now to Mr. White, I confess that I have found in the views advocated by Mr. Dodwell so very small an amount of resemblance to those maintained by him that I have been surprised at his reference to this controversy. As to his assertion that Dodwell made good his interpretation of the Fathers "against many vehement adversaries,"* I must take leave to differ from him. I have now read Dodwell's Epistolary Discourse, the Answers to Dodwell by Clarke, Chishull, Milles, Turner, and Coward, with Dodwell's Preliminary Defence, and Pitts's Vindication of Dodwell—all the works I can find in the British Museum relating to the controversy—and I am satisfied that Dodwell has made miserable havoc of the Fathers, turning passages promiscuously to his purpose, without any attempt to discriminate whether the writers were referring to the Platonic notion of absolute immortality on the one hand, or to future happiness on the other. That he was an eminently learned man is beyond question, and no doubt he was also a well-meaning one; but learning and good intentions are not absolute pledges of wisdom.

ADDITIONAL NOTE.

As this sheet is passing through the press, I have met with two things pertinent to my subject.

1. A critical authority in support of Schleusner's view of the meaning of καταξιόω. Scapula, in his Lexicon, quotes from Suidas the following words:—"*In voce passiva . . . significat dignus judicor, aut* SUM QUI," &c., of which meaning Luke xx. 35, and xxi. 36, are given by Suidas as instances. In plain English, the Greek phrase *to be accounted worthy* of a thing, means no more than *to be the person* who possesses it.

2. An example, as it appears to me, of the manner in which our Lord's words were understood in the early period of the church.

Bloomfield, on the words Οὔτε γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν ἔτι δύνανται ("neither can they die any more"), quotes from Artemidorus the following similar expression—ἀθάνατοι γὰρ . . . οἱ ἀποθανόντες, ἐπεὶ μήκετι τεθνήξοντες ("for those who die are immortal, since they will not die any more"). Having verified this quotation I have found it to be correctly given, and to be detached from the connexion without violence. Now this sentiment, that "those who die are immortal since they will not die any more," must be ascribed to one of two

* Life in Christ, Dedication, p. vii.

sources; either to the schools of pagan philosophy on the one hand, or to the dissemination of Christian doctrine on the other. To the latter supposition there attaches no circumstantial difficulty. Artemidorus was a Greek sophist who flourished in the middle of the second century, under the immediate patronage of that distinguished lover of learning and goodness, the Emperor Antoninus Pius, and contemporaneously with the celebrated Christian writer, Justin Martyr. Now it is well known that at this period the sentiments of the Christian teachers, which from the first (see Acts xix. 18 *et seq.*) had attracted the attention of leading sophists of the age, had extensively leavened the current philosophy. It is by no means impossible, therefore, that Artemidorus, a man of learning, although not, so far as is known, a Christian, might, in the words quoted, be reflecting a portion of the Christian wisdom as then propagated in the world. The question which remains, then, is this: From which source, the pagan or the Christian, is it the more probable that the sentiment was drawn—"Those who die are immortal since they will not die any more"? I have not space to discuss, or even to enumerate, the difficulties which, in my view, embarrass an attempt to refer this language to a pagan origin. I cannot do less than regard it as a remote and unconscious quotation of our Lord's words, to which they bear so near and striking a resemblance—"Neither can they die any more." And if it be so, it is, as I observed at the outset, an example of the sense in which they were in that early age, at least by some persons, understood. In this view two things are to be noted in it: first, that the property of not dying any more is extended to all who die, that is, necessarily to mankind at large; secondly, that from this as a premiss the immortality of the race is inferred: "Those who die are immortal since they will not die any more."

A REJOINDER

TO THE

REV. EDWARD WHITE.

A REPLY* to the preceding publication having been published by Mr. White, I rejoin in the following pages. As he has, by a somewhat unusual and inconvenient course, adopted the title of my pamphlet as the title of his own, I shall find it necessary to speak of mine by its secondary title, as an Examination of Luke xx. 36.

Mr. White commences his pamphlet by exhibiting in a condensed form the course of my argument, and he does this in a spirit of courtesy which I am bound to acknowledge. I should fulfil this duty with the greater pleasure, however, if there were not, unhappily, one point in which I think he has given me occasion for just complaint. He says (p. 5) that I have "cited with approbation" the following language of Mr. Isaac Taylor:—"The terms ['neither can they die any more,'] carry the idea of an abstract, or of a physical impossibility of undergoing dissolution, or extinction. Such are to be made heirs of *indestructible* existence."

If the reader will take the trouble to look to p. 51 of this Volume, where this quotation occurs, he will find appended to it the following foot-note:—"Although Mr. Taylor has not *expressed*, he would doubtless *allow* the exception to his last assertion, that human, like all other created existence, is destructible by the act of God." And I submit it to his judgment, whether the effect of this note is not at

* Who will Live for Ever? A Reply to the Rev. John Howard Hinton's Criticism on Luke xx. 36. With an Appendix, on the signification of the terms Life and Death. By Edward White.

once to qualify the approbation with which I have cited Mr. Taylor's language, and to define the sense of it to which my approbation is limited? Such, I can most sincerely say, was the intention of the note, and such I think now is its proper force and effect. That my views are not, without such qualification, expressed by the passage quoted, is clear beyond dispute from several express statements in the course of my pamphlet. Now I think it was not fair in Mr. White to try to fasten upon me a sentiment which I have made it plain to all my readers, and consequently to himself, that I do not hold.

If Mr. White were a crafty adversary, and one whose character did not forbid the ascription to him of the too customary arts of controversy, I might without probable injustice go further than this, and describe the misrepresentation as an intentional effort to damage my position. For it is evidently one thing to affirm that man is naturally adapted to endless being, although liable to extinction by God who made him; and quite another to affirm that man is characterized by indestructibility. The latter of these two opinions is undoubtedly the most difficult to be maintained, and the most easy to be refuted. It is exactly the opinion which my opponents in this controversy might wish me to hold, as it is that against which, and against which alone, a great part of their artillery bears. An avowed desire to fix it on me might indeed be taken as tantamount to a confession that, unless as chargeable with this opinion, they know they have no chance against me.

Once more, then, let me say distinctly that I do not hold that man is naturally indestructible. What I affirm is that man is naturally *incorruptible*, and thus adapted to endless being.

The Reply put forward by Mr. White consists of three parts, which I shall notice in their order.

I.

I assumed that the question proposed by the Sadducees related to mankind indiscriminately, without distinction of righteous or wicked, and hence raised a presumptive argument for an equally wide bearing of our Lord's reply. Mr. White, "conceding for a moment" this latitude of the

question, thinks this "not a sufficient warrant for assuming that our Lord's reply *must have been* of a bearing equally wide," p. 7. To this I answer that I have not attempted to deduce any such conclusion from the premises. I made them the basis of a *presumption* merely; that is, of a conclusion not certain but probable, and liable to be set aside if reason could be shown against it. To this Mr. White has offered no objection. That our Lord, as he asserts, did not on all occasions give to questions put to him a direct and simple answer is doubtless true; and it is consequently true that his reply to the Sadducees "*might* have had a restricted reference," although their inquiry had not. This harmonizes perfectly with my own language.

I only ask a reason—I did in the Examination ask one—why a restricted reference of the answer should here be supposed. I repeat the very terms of my demand:—"Is there any amount or kind of evidence to show that Christ in his own mind altered the scope of the question before he answered it?" Mr. White has not adduced a particle; and he evidently believes that none exists, for he goes on to maintain that the *question* of the Sadducees was itself restricted, and that our Lord did answer it in the sense in which they put it. Under this head, therefore, there is no serious thrust. It is a mere flourish of swords, a preliminary dialectical entertainment, an effort on the part of Mr. White to show how near he can come to demonstrating what he does not believe to be a fact.

In the conclusion of this section, however, Mr. White admits (what, indeed, is too obvious to be denied) that if the question of the Sadducees had been general, a restricted answer by our Lord would have "settled" only "the case of the righteous;" a difficulty which he escapes to his own satisfaction in the following manner:—

> "The case of the just being settled," says he, "we may safely presume that the Sadducees, at least, would not have thought it worth while to press the further ingenious objection derived from the half-ludicrous half-profane question as to marriages in hell," p. 8.

The "objection" which Mr. White thus notices is to be found in the Examination, p. 19, in the following words:—"If it be the righteous only of whom our Lord speaks, it will apparently follow that in the world to come, if all exist, the righteous only will be incapable of marriage." Mr. White

thinks this objection "half-ludicrous" and "half-profane;" he admits it, however, to be "ingenious," and I have my suspicions that he would not have launched such hard words against it unless he had felt it to be just. What he says in reply to it is that he "presumes that the Sadducees, at least, would not have thought it worth while to press it;" especially (as he adds in page 9) since "neither our Lord nor the Pharisees were in the habit of teaching that there would be marriages in the bottomless pit." If it were to be granted, however, that the Sadducees "would not have *thought it worth while*" to press the objection stated (which is quite a gratuitous, and a very improbable assumption), it would not follow from hence that it is destitute of force and truth, or that Mr. White is justified in treating it with neglect. This is nothing else than suffering a verdict against himself to go by default.

Not all controversialists, however, have been so much favoured as Mr. White. Without the spirit to defend himself, he has had the good fortune to find a champion in Mr. Morris, who in his Reply to my pamphlet, has volunteered a tilt with me on behalf of his companion in arms. I extract the whole passage. Having recited the objection he says:—

"On this I remark that we are made acquainted with only two states of embodied human existence, 'that which is *natural*,' and 'that which is spiritual:' secondly, the very idea of 'flesh and blood' is excluded by the application of the word 'spiritual' to the raised saints of God: but, thirdly, the phrase 'flesh and blood' is used by the apostle in its physical meaning, and as equivalent to the above contrasted term, 'natural.' Now it is self-evident that the wicked will not be raised *spiritual;* and it is most evident that they will be raised *natural;* and if natural, then of necessity 'flesh and blood.' But it would be ungenerous to suppose of any intelligent and reflective Christian, that because on the above grounds he holds that in the resurrection the wicked will 'still be flesh and blood,' that he could *therefore even seem* to be prepared for the *revolting* idea that the wicked could be capable of marriage in the resurrection of damnation, and in 'the lake of fire,' and in the inconceivable agonies of 'the second death.'" Christ and the Sadducees, p. 31.

The closing sentence of this extract refers to the following passage in my pamphlet:—"Revolting as this idea may appear, Mr. White might seem to be prepared for it, since he holds that in the resurrection the wicked will be still '*flesh and blood*,'" p. 19.

I honour Mr. Morris's regard for Mr. White as "an intelligent and reflective Christian," and I should sincerely regret to have acted towards him an "ungenerous" part. The first question in an argument, however, is not generosity but justice; and I cannot understand this appeal of Mr. Morris's to my generosity as implying less than that the justice of the case is acknowledged to be on my side. If this be his meaning, I assure him that I am quite willing to be generous, and not to push my success to an inconvenient extreme.

Somewhat to my surprise, however, Mr. Morris takes the same ground as Mr. White, and attempts to make it argumentatively good. In common with his friend, he insists that the raised wicked will be "flesh and blood." I ask him, then, how he repels from himself the same inference that the wicked will be capable of marriage? He answers that the idea is "revolting." It is so, but still it may be correctly inferred from the premises. But it would be impossible, he says, to think of marriage "in the resurrection of damnation, and in 'the lake of fire,' and in the inconceivable agonies of 'the second death!'" It is true that these would be awful circumstances for a connubial union; but the question relates not to actual marriage, but to *capacity* for marriage, which is clearly not dependent on degrees of pleasure or of pain. All that Mr. Morris has said, therefore, still leaves it to be inferred that, if the wicked are raised in "flesh and blood," no incapacity of marriage will attach to them. Such an issue, indeed, would suppose a condition of the human body the conception of which is altogether destitute of either warrant or possibility.

There is no escape from this conclusion for my combined opponents, but in the reconsideration of their position that the wicked are raised in "flesh and blood." They err, I think, in confining the apostle's argument in 1 Cor. xv. to the saints. In my judgment, every human body raised from the dead will be a spiritual body, characterized by an incapacity for sensual action and enjoyment of every kind. I must not here pursue this topic at greater length. I will however warn Mr. Morris that he cannot expect to make *much* progress in this, or any other difficult inquiry, if he suffers himself to argue in this manner:—"It is SELF-EVIDENT that the wicked will not be raised spiritual."

II.

Mr. White opens his second section in the following terms:—

"I venture to affirm, with some confidence, notwithstanding Mr. Hinton's extraordinary statement that 'all parties allow the unrestricted reference to the interrogatory,' that it is the popular and the correct impression that the Sadducees *in their inquiry* contemplated the righteous exclusively," p. 9.

The author is here unjust in ascribing to me the assertion that "all parties allow the unrestricted reference of the interrogatory." My language was:—"*So far as I have seen*, all parties allow the unrestricted reference of the interrogatory." This I re-assert. And, so far as a judgment can be formed from his Reply, Mr. White is in the same condition with myself; for he does not name a single commentator or writer who attributes a restricted reference to the question. He says, however, that this is "the popular impression" and the "correct" one. He thus fairly meets the challenge which I threw out in the Examination, and I will weigh his proofs. His first argument is in the form following:—

"If we are to regard 'the basis on which the question was raised,' it is fair to presume that the inquiry was 'of a bearing equally wide,' not with their own [the Sadducees] universal scepticism as to a future state, but with the known peculiar doctrine of their opponents, the Pharisees," p. 9.

This modification of my ground is reasonable, and I grant it. But what then was "the known peculiar doctrine of the Pharisees"? Clearly "that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust," Acts xxiv. 15: whence it may be inferred that the question of the Sadducees had a bearing as wide as this doctrine. Mr. White, however, expresses himself as follows:—

"Assuredly, neither our Lord nor the Pharisees were in the habit of teaching that there would be marriages in the bottomless pit, and hence it is difficult to conceive of any reason which could have induced the Sadducees to encumber their argument with a profane absurdity, which both Christ and the Pharisees would at once have rejected as forming no part of their tenets. But it is conceivable that believers in a future life might have held the doctrine of the continuance of sexes in the world of happiness, as is evident from the history of the early Millenarians, and from the Mohammedan belief in the *houris* of Paradise. And it seems to be more than probable that the

Pharisees actually partook of this opinion, otherwise the answer of Christ that the distinction of sexes should be abolished would not have struck the people as an astonishing doctrine, nor for the first time have completely silenced the Sadducees," p. 9.

The critical and most important phrase in this extract is this—"the doctrine of the continuance of sexes in the world of happiness;" and I am not certain in what sense it ought to be understood. There are two meanings of which it is capable: the one, that sexes are continued in the world of happiness *alone;* the other, that sexes are continued in the world of happiness in common with the world of misery. Of this latter idea, indeed, the first sentence in the passage might seem to afford an express denial, were it not that the author has in it carefully said, not that "in the bottomless pit" there are *no sexes*, but *no "marriages."* Yet, if the author was contemplating the universal continuance of sexes in the world to come, it is difficult to assign a reason for his cautious phraseology, and timid induction of evidence. Are there not many historical proofs that such an opinion anciently and widely existed? I lean to the conclusion, therefore, that Mr. White intends to speak of "the continuance of sexes in the world of happiness" *exclusively;* and I do this with the stronger persuasion of correctness, because it is in this sense only that his assertion can sustain the argument he builds upon it. He *must*, I think, be taken to argue that the question of the Sadducees related *only* to the righteous, because the Pharisees believed sexual distinctions hereafter to belong *only* to the righteous.

Let us now see how he fixes the belief of this doctrine on the Pharisees. His proofs are these.

1. It is "conceivable that believers in a future life might have held" it; and consequently the Pharisees, who did believe in a future life, might have held it.

2. The early Millenarians and the Mohammedans did hold it. This allegation, however, demands proof; and if it were substantiated, it could throw no light on the opinions of the Jews.

3. It "seems to be more than probable that the Pharisees actually partook of" it.

And this is all the approach he makes to what he himself requires as the basis of the Sadducean question, "the *known* peculiar doctrine of the Pharisees"!

Mr. White, however, assigns a reason for this "more than probable" belief of the Pharisees. If they had not held it, says he, "the answer of Christ that the distinction of sexes should be abolished would not have struck the people as an astonishing doctrine, nor for the first time have completely silenced the Sadducees." This is a *non sequitur*. The answer of Christ would have equally astonished the people, and silenced the Sadducees, if they had understood him to announce the abolition of sexual distinctions universally—not "in the world of happiness" *alone*, but in the future world altogether. So far as the reception of our Lord's answer goes, consequently, it affords no shadow of evidence that the Pharisees held "the doctrine of the continuance of sexes in the world of happiness" exclusively: and this being all the proof Mr. White adduces, the entire notion of their holding it falls to the ground.

I do not, indeed, know that there is any evidence of such a notion having ever been held by man. Mr. White, it is true, cites the early Millenarians and the Mohammedans as examples of it, but I must think incorrectly. The "Mohammedan belief in the *houris* of Paradise," proves nothing but that the *gratification* of the sexual appetite was held out as among the rewards of the faithful; and it implies rather the existence of a similar passion *ungratified* as an ingredient in the sufferings of the infidel: an idea with which every passage in the Koran relating to the subject (although no express mention is made of it) perfectly harmonizes. What proof "the history of the early Millenarians" affords, Mr. White has not specified.

Before dismissing this notion I may add that I am utterly at a loss to see what ground, of either reason or Scripture, can ever have been laid for ascribing so singular a physical difference to the future bodies of the righteous and the wicked. That the sexual distinction should be supposed in the next world to continue among the righteous and to be abolished among the wicked, appears to me to be, not merely an unwarranted, but a grotesque imagination. It had surely been more easy to have imagined the contrary.

I beg the reader now to observe that I have brought before him the principal evidence adduced by Mr. White in support of the opinion "that the Sadducees, in their inquiry, contemplated the righteous exclusively." He demands that

their question should correspond with "the known peculiar doctrine of their opponents," and this I grant him; but he asserts this doctrine to have been "the continuance of sexes in the world of happiness" exclusively, and this he utterly fails to establish. His case consequently breaks down.

He proceeds thus:—

"It is of no avail to allege that of the seven brethren some may have been unrighteous persons, for they may all with equal probability have been hypothetically good," p. 9.

Undoubtedly; and this hypothetical goodness would have told upon me, if I had attempted to maintain that the brethren were actually, or must have been, unrighteous. All I have said, however, is that some, or all of them, *may have been so;* and this is enough for my purpose, since, if Christ's answer is confined to the righteous and some of the persons referred to *may have been* unrighteous, it plainly does not include all the elements of the question. It is Mr. White who should prove, if he can, that all the seven were actually righteous.

With great good will towards this object, indeed, he says,—

"The narrative of the Sadducees bears evidence on its very face that the brethren intended were all supposed to be righteous inheritors of glory," p. 10.

The very obvious evidence thus referred to is found by the author in the peculiarly "religious" character of the act, when a brother fulfilled the precept which required him, under certain circumstances, to marry a deceased brother's wife. It must, however, be at least as obvious, that this is introduced into the hypothetical narrative of the Sadducees, not as illustrative of personal character, but as constituting the very substance of their case. Had the brothers been actually bad men, they must have been spoken of as fulfilling that precept, for only so could the difficulty be exhibited by which our Lord was to be entangled. Mr. White contents himself with saying in conclusion,—

"The fact that these seven brethren religiously acted upon the precept of Moses, is evidence *so far* that the Sadducees did not contemplate the hypothetical perdition of any of them," p. 10.

But even this, although much less than he sets out with, is inadmissible. The act of obedience to the precept is no

evidence of character at all. The Sadducees framed their question indifferently, without using any means whatever to characterize the parties supposed in it, whether good or bad.

In noticing my critical remarks, Mr. White thinks my treatment of the verb *ἀξιόω, to be accounted worthy*, "a signal failure." I beg that his reason—his only assigned reason—for this may have due weight. "For it is notorious," says he, "that the *most obvious* rendering of the verb, and of the whole phrase, does involve the notion of peculiar personal qualification," p. 11. And this is all, absolutely all, that he has to say on the interpretation of *ἀξιόω*! In reply I have only to observe that I object to his canon of criticism. I challenge him to prove that *obviousness* is a decisive criterion of meanings, and that "the most obvious" renderings of Greek words are always the most just. If this be not so, as every scholar knows it is not, his argument is utterly void.

Mr. White glories in the long list of critics who support the common rendering; yet he would be one of the first to exercise an independent judgment, even if every critic who ever wrote was against him. No one knows better than he that the usage of a language has more authority than all the lexicons, and that it constitutes a standard by which every reader may try all the commentators. It would not have deterred me from forming a judgment for myself, if not a single lexicographer had supported me; but even admitting the highest value that can be assigned to critical authority, while I acknowledge that the corps generally are opposed to me, I aver that I have no reason to be ashamed while I am in company with Castalio and Schleusner, with Suidas and Scapula.

Let me here be allowed to ask Mr. White why he will do himself so much injury as he must suffer from such a remark as this?

"Schleusner, who seems to have *shared in the author's desire* to discover the immortality of mankind in the passage before us," p. 11.

I am sure that, when he is not piqued and displeased, he will admit that both Schleusner's "desire" and mine is as sincere as his own to discover, here and everywhere else, not what we wish but what is true.

On the expression "They are equal unto the angels," Mr. White notices my observation that, the only point of simil-

arity being undying existence, there is no incongruity in predicating of *wicked* men similarity to *holy* angels; and he thinks he makes a hit when he says,—

"To have said, then, that they would be equal to the *devils* would have answered, in the author's opinion, quite as well the purpose of our Lord's discourse," p. 11.

No doubt of it. But what then? Is Mr. White displeased that our Lord had not complacency enough in evil spirits to give them the preference in his illustration?

"I cannot but think, however," he goes on to say, "that, the main difficulty presented by our excellent opponent on the universal reference of the *question* being removed, he would readily admit that this expression might exceedingly well be understood with a restriction to the saints," p. 11.

I have fully admitted that this, and all the clauses, may not only "exceedingly well," but most naturally, be understood "with a restriction to the saints." What I have attempted, and all that is requisite to my purpose as endeavouring to remove an apparent objection, is to show that they *may be* understood otherwise, and that a restriction to the saints is *not necessary*. That such restriction *is* necessary is what Mr. White should have affirmed, but he has not ventured upon it.

"Thus, likewise," he adds, "it is to be presumed that most readers of the New Testament would not be disposed to deny, that the 'children of God and the children of the resurrection' are in all probability the pious alone," p. 12.

To this I have only to rejoin, that every considerate reader of the New Testament will be ready to weigh such reasons as any particular passage may present for modifying the ordinary meaning of these, or of any other terms. As to the phrase "children of God," Mr. White seems to have discovered a mysterious distinction between γένος and υἱὸς, as though there was something particularly gracious in the latter word; *υἱοὶ Θεοῦ* being, as he says, "an appellation which the *usus loquendi* of the Scriptures never elsewhere permits to the wicked," p. 12. It may be permitted *here*, however, notwithstanding. The term *υἱὸς* is in the Scriptures as freely applied to the wicked as to the righteous; which shows that there is no idea in it differing, to the author's purpose, from that of γένος. If his citation of Rom. viii. 23—"Waiting for the adoption, the redemption of the

body"—proves anything in relation to our subject, it proves that the resurrection of the body will be confined to the saints, which is false. There is no reason, however, to suppose that the passage refers to the resurrection; the word employed, ἀπολύτρωσις, *redemption*, denotes rather deliverance from the evils of our corporeal condition.

In the Examination I raised an argument for the unrestricted application of the former part of our Lord's answer to the Sadducees from the demonstrably unrestricted application of the latter part of it. Mr. White says that he is "prepared to defend the restricted reference of this" part also of our Lord's reply, but he declines entering on the argument, and concedes to me "for the present" whatever advantage I may obtain from his silence.

"The proposition that *all* the dead are raised," says he, "does not assuredly carry with it an assertion that they will all live for ever," p. 12.

This is quite true, but it is nothing, either against me or in his own favour; for neither have I made any such statement, nor am I required by the course of my argument to make it. I think, as Mr. White also evidently does, that our Lord's answer is, as a whole, congruous in its parts, and referring throughout to the same persons. Hence, I take those who "live unto God" to be the same as those who "cannot die any more;" and as *all* the dead live unto God, so are all in possession of deathless existence.

"On the whole, therefore," says the author, "there appears to be abundant reason to reject the author's proposed application of the sentence, 'neither can they die any more,' to universal mankind. Our Lord's reference was exclusively to the saved," p. 12.

Mr. White here favours us with nothing beyond assertion, and this must go for what it is worth. If he has really found "abundant reason" to reject my proposed application of the sentence, "neither can they die any more," it must be admitted that he has been fortunate enough to find it after a a very superficial and slender search. He forewarns his readers, indeed (p. 7), that it was not his intention "to advert in the way of rejoinder to *all* the particulars of Mr. Hinton's pamphlet;" it was his duty, however, to test the validity of every argument bearing on the point at issue: a duty of the full discharge of which he has, in my opinion, come materially short. Upon this point I request nothing

more than that Mr. White's readers will, after the perusal of his Reply, once more peruse the Examination. If they do not then feel that there is much left unanswered I shall be greatly mistaken.

III.

In the third part of his Reply the author takes a bold step, and makes the "extraordinary assertion" that the words under consideration "convey the amazing truth of the eternal duration of the existence of the righteous in a manner which seems clearly to intimate that such eternal duration is their peculiar inheritance," p. 13. If this be so, it would seem that a new light must have broken in upon him since the publication of his volume, Life in Christ, in which among the great number of passages introduced this has no place. But better late than never. What is the proof? This, that the words teach the endless existence of the righteous, "in a manner which leads us to conclude that the wicked both 'can' and will 'die.'"

The reader will scarcely believe, perhaps, that this sentence constitutes the introduction to a mere *argumentum ad hominem*, a charge of inconsistency against me, and an endeavour to wrest from me a certain concession. The extract is long, but I give it entire.

"It is to be remarked that Mr. Hinton's argument is founded upon a literal interpretation of this term. It pleases him to understand the word *die* in this place in the sense put upon it by Mr. Isaac Taylor, the sense of '*extinction;*' because, when thus understood, the passage, if applicable to the whole human race, will convey the assertion of their common immortality. He says elsewhere in the Notes of the pamphlet, 'It has been strongly but erroneously asserted that the primary idea expressed by the term *death* is *cessation of being.*' Then why does Mr. Hinton interpret the term *die* in this erroneous sense? He clearly does so, for the addition of a negative does not alter the signification of a verb. He takes 'cannot die' to mean 'cannot *cease to be.*' In every other instance we who have defended the doctrine of Life in Christ are forbidden to adopt this selfsame interpretation—as for example, in the text, 'If ye live after the flesh ye shall die;' but the 'exigency' of the popular argument appears to demand it in Luke xx. 37, and we are required to be silent. Will Mr. Hinton, to adopt a phrase of his own, 'take sometimes the one interpretation and sometimes the other, as may suit his purpose'? I must earnestly protest against this inconsistency, or else claim the authority of the tract-writer for the adoption of the sense of *cessation of being* in the passages in which *death* is held forth, in conjunction with torment by fire, as a threatening to the wicked."

This is nothing more than an effort to claim my authority for the adoption of a certain sense of the term death, when employed for the future reward of the wicked; this sense of death having had much stress laid upon it by several writers advocating the same general views as the author himself.

The sense of death for which he contends, and which he will, if possible, constrain me to sanction, is *cessation of being.*

1. Now, in the first place, it deserves to be remarked that Mr. White himself does not understand the term in this sense. In his work, Life in Christ, p. 25, he states expressly, that "the true scriptural idea of death" is the separation of the soul from the body, without implying anything concerning the subsequent condition of either,—that is, admitting of the subsequent active existence of both. He is, therefore, for a controversial purpose, advocating a meaning for a word which he does not believe to be the true one.

2. In the second place, I have never made any objection to the word death being taken, either by himself or his friends, in the sense of cessation of being in any case in which they can show sufficient reasons for it. That I have objected to their taking it in this sense—not, as alleged by Mr. White (referring to the article in the *Eclectic*), "in *every other* instance," but in some instances, is true; but this has been, not through any repugnance to the meaning itself, but for reasons given and assigned. That I use death in a given sense in one passage does not bind me to approve its use in the same sense in every other. Each case must be judged of by its own merits. Let my arguments against the use of death in the sense of extinction in the passages referred to be answered, and then the way will be properly cleared.

3. Thirdly, It is perfectly immaterial whether my argument is or is not "founded upon a literal interpretation" of the term death. I do, indeed, in the sentence "Neither can they die any more," understand death in the sense of extinction, but the force of my argument does not in any degree depend upon this being the "literal interpretation" of it. Let it be allowed to be a secondary meaning (as indeed it is) and not the primary one, and everything I have said remains the same.

4. Fourthly, When Mr. White asks—"Then why does Mr. Hinton interpret the term die in this erroneous sense?"

he is guilty of a gross inadvertency. The passage which he quotes from me as the ground of this question, is this :—"It has been strongly but erroneously asserted that the primary idea expressed by the term death is cessation of being." Here I have not affirmed that cessation of being is an "erroneous sense" of death, but that it is erroneous to regard it as the primary sense. My words, therefore, lay no foundation at all for the question the author has raised upon them.

5. Fifthly, Mr. White's insinuation of unworthy motives can do harm to none but himself. In one case, indeed, he covers himself by retorting upon me a phrase which I have applied to him, as though I had fallen into a similar impropriety. "Will Mr. Hinton," says he, "to adopt *a phrase of his own*, 'take sometimes the one interpretation and sometimes the other, as may suit his purpose'?" I hope the impression which these words of mine have made upon Mr. White has been as salutary as it has evidently been painful. He will very well recollect, and the reader will clearly see if he will refer to the Examination, Appendix, Note C, that in the case to which they refer two different senses were, in different parts of his work, attached to *the same* scriptural expression and context. He has found nothing of this kind to charge upon me. If I take sometimes one interpretation and sometimes another, it is not of the same passage but of different passages, and not "as may suit my purpose," but for reasons which I enable every reader to weigh for himself.

Mr. White's soreness manifests itself again when he says—

"It pleases him (Mr. H.) to understand the word *die* in this place in the sense put upon it by Mr. Isaac Taylor, the sense of extinction, *because*, when thus understood, the passage, if applicable to the whole human race, will convey the assertion of their common immortality."

Why, let me ask, should the name of Mr. Isaac Taylor have been here introduced, when the very same meaning, extinction, is assigned to death by Mr. Dobney, Mr. Storrs, and by all the writers on their side except Mr. White himself? And why, when its use has such undeniable sanction, should Mr. White impute it to me that I adopted it *because* it would answer my purpose in controversy? Suppose I were to pursue a similar course, and to ascribe the earnestness with which he and his friends contend that death in the literal sense is the wages of sin to an invincible aversion to

the doctrine of endless suffering, what spirit would it show on my part? What impression would it produce on them? Or what aid would it render to the discussion?

6. Lastly, if the point contended for were conceded, and I were to grant that death, as threatened to the wicked, is extinction, the controversy would be not a step nearer to its conclusion. That which is wanted to determine in the negative the question of man's natural immortality is the demonstration, not of a *penal*, but of a *natural* termination of his conscious being. That man will be *put out* of being as the penalty of sin, even if it be a truth, is no proof whatever that he was not by nature adapted and designed for endless existence.

To his Reply Mr. White has added an Appendix of six pages, "on the signification," as the titlepage informs us, "of the terms life and death." On examination, however, the Appendix proves to be nothing more than a reproduction in a brief form of an argument largely developed in the general controversy, with a kind of *Io triumphe* that it has not been "encountered," and an almost personal challenge to me to reply to it. My answer to this Appendix will be found in a later part of the present Volume—"On the argument as conducted by the Rev. E. White."

A REJOINDER

TO THE

REV. WILLIAM MORRIS.

THE REV. W. MORRIS, of Plymouth, having published a reply to my pamphlet, entitled "Christ and the Sadducees, or the true meaning of Luke xx. 36 vindicated, in a series of Strictures on a recent pamphlet by John Howard Hinton, M.A.," I offer to the reader the following remarks upon it.

What ensnaring guides are commentators! On Luke xx. 34–36, I find Doddridge saying—"The children of this world do indeed marry and are given in marriage, according to the wise provision which God has made by that institution for repairing the waste of mortality by the production of new generations." And again—"When they shall rise they neither marry nor are given in marriage, for they can die no more, and therefore the rise of new generations is no longer necessary." To the same effect Macknight:—"The nature of the life obtained in the future state makes marriage altogether superfluous, because in the world to come men being spiritual and immortal, like the angels, there is no need of procreation to propagate or continue the kind." And so also Matthew Henry:—"They *cannot die any more;* and this comes in as a reason why they do not marry. In this dying world there must be marriage in order to the filling up of the vacancies made by death; but where there are no burials there is no need of weddings."

In a too thoughtless reliance upon such guides I have said in my pamphlet the same thing, namely, that Christ assigned the fact that men hereafter could not die as a reason why there would be no marriage. "The bearing of this reason," I have added, "is obvious. Marriage is designed to perpetuate

the human race, a purpose for which it is rendered necessary by man's liability to death; in a state, consequently, in which none could die, a condition the sole object of which was to repair the ravages of death would be both a redundance and an incongruity," p. 6.

I confess I took it for granted that in this matter I was right, because I found myself to be of the universal opinion. Least of all in this controversy did I imagine myself vulnerable here. And this pleasing idea was confirmed by my friend Mr. White, who in his reply takes no objection to this statement, but makes it his own. He says that the words, "Neither can they die any more," were introduced by our Lord "to account for the fact that, in the world of bliss, the system of marriage will be dispensed with. The inhabitants being immortal, there is no necessity of supplying a void made by the ravages of death, as is the case on earth." Reply, p. 12.

Mr. Morris, however, shows us all to be in the wrong, by a simple reference to Gen. iii. 28 and 21–24. He is clearly right in his statement that marriage was an institution of God for the solace of man, and for the multiplication of mankind, in a condition not characterized by either sin or death. I frankly acknowledge my error and my thoughtlessness. Doubtless, as marriage had once a use in a deathless condition of man, so, unless prevented by some other cause, it *might* have again.

I am happy in feeling, however, that this correction does no injury to my general argument. I have only to say that the declaration, "Neither can they die any more," instead of constituting (as before alleged) a reason for the absence of marriage, is introduced for the purpose of asserting the deathless existence of the parties to whom it refers, and everything else stands as before. All that remains is that my two antagonists appear the one directly contradicting the other, and so involved in "a pretty little quarrel" between themselves.

Mr. Morris concludes his book with a stroke which, if it had been as effective as it is clever, would have precluded the necessity of all else that he has written.

"I will now return," says he, "to Mr. Hinton's question, 'Who will live for ever?' And having borne it to the feet of Jesus, I have received an infallible response," p. 31.

The whole of this marvel is that Mr. Morris has found in one of our Lord's discourses (John vi. 58) the words "shall live for ever;" and he quotes that passage as an answer to my question, thus:—"*He that eateth of this bread* SHALL LIVE FOR EVER."

Now, whether this is or is not an answer to my question, must be determined by the answer to another question, namely, whether the phrase to "live for ever" is used in both cases in the same sense. If I speak of living for ever in one sense and the Scripture quoted speaks of it in another, no real answer to my question can be supplied by it. Now, not only is this the fact, but Mr. Morris knew it to be the fact, as the 4th page of his pamphlet clearly proves. "It should here be observed," says he, "that the future life which he [Mr. Hinton] ascribes to man is a life as independent of resurrection as it is superior to death. . . . I am not aware that *this* is the immortality revealed in the Scriptures." Why then did he bring a text of Scripture in reply to me? This is either inexcusable thoughtlessness, or it is so playing with words as to trifle with truth. Poorly does it sustain the pretension which, under the circumstances, must be deemed rather sanctimonious than devout, of "having borne" the question "to the feet of Jesus."

In another place Mr. Morris aims at my conclusion a different blow, which, if it might be regarded as successful, would also supersede the necessity of any further argumentation.

"It was morally impossible," says he, "that the Son of God should have affirmed of the wicked that, when they had once died, they were incapable of dying any more. For he himself has declared that they shall come forth to the 'resurrection of damnation,' and we know that the result of this will be the infliction of 'the second death' in the 'lake of fire;' and that that infliction will take effect on all who are 'not found written in the book of life.' But our Lord has promised, saying—'To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life which is in the midst of the paradise of God;' and he 'shall not be hurt of the second death,'" p. 23.*

Here the author starts off from the passage before him, and, launching forth into a large question which is elsewhere under discussion, quietly assumes the whole of it. "WE

* This argument is substantially, and almost verbally, repeated at the foot of page 29.

KNOW," says he, "that 'the second death' will be the extinction of the wicked; and *therefore* it is 'morally impossible' that Christ should have said they cannot die a second time." Suppose now that I were to say—I KNOW that no man is to die a second time, and *therefore* it is "morally impossible" that the second death should mean the extinction of the wicked; would not this be an argument equally legitimate, and equally conclusive?

I shall now exhibit the method in which the author specifically combats my main position.

After an extended and somewhat elaborate statement of the subject in his own way, he thinks he shuts me up to the following dilemma:—

"1. As men of ordinary understanding, the Pharisees were incapable of holding the doctrine of a future life apart from the fact of the resurrection of the body, and at the same time of allowing 'the indulgence of the sensual appetites' to be a part of that same 'future life.'

"2. The Sadducees were mentally incapable of conceiving that any hypothetical question relating to the laws of marriage could hopelessly clog, or in any unfavourable sense affect, the doctrine of a future life from which the sensuous nature of man was excluded by the dissolution of the body.

"3. It was an absolute and eternal impossibility with our Lord ever to have conceived such an answer as our author has described, and on which he has reasoned," p. 15.

These great guns fire heavy shot, and will undoubtedly do terrible execution *if they hit the mark.* Let us examine this question.

True as these propositions are in themselves, their intended bearing on me arises wholly out of a supposition that *I have grafted sensual appetites on a disembodied life.* This piece of thoughtless absurdity the author repeatedly imputes to me, and upon the assumed correctness of this imputation his reasoning exclusively rests. If it be true, I have been guilty of folly even to infatuation, and I deserve to be laughed out of the field of controversy for ever; but I ask a candid audience before verdict is given against me.

The author prepares for this attack from the commencement of his pamphlet, in the following observations:—

"According to the established meaning of terms, to live is to exist. The terms life and existence are equivalent. They are thus regarded by our author. Perpetual intelligent existence, apart from moral and experimental considerations, he holds to be the meaning of the words 'live for ever.' This he holds to be their meaning in the Scriptures," p. 1.

Observing only in passing that to live is not simply to exist, but to exist in a certain manner, I am quite willing to admit that "perpetual intelligent [or conscious] existence" is the sense in which I used the words "live for ever" in the title of my pamphlet; but I certainly do not hold, and I have never given any reason for its being supposed that I hold, this "to be *their meaning*," that is, their *only* meaning, "*in the Scriptures*." Mr. Morris has produced no proof of this, and I feel confident that he cannot produce any. He seems to have assumed, without sufficient reflection, that there is only one sense in which the word life is to be understood in the Scriptures, and thence to have concluded that the sense which is evident in my question must be universally attached by me to it. He will readily allow, however, on second thought (or if he doubt, I refer him to Mr. Dobney for satisfaction), that in the Scriptures life may be and is used in several senses, of which intelligent or conscious existence may be held to be one without extinguishing the rest.

Having thus erroneously got the idea that I hold "perpetual intelligent existence" to be *the* scriptural meaning of living for ever, the author advances another step in p. 4, by observing that the future life which I ascribe to man, is "independent of resurrection." Now this is a very inaccurate statement. The future life which I ascribe to man is conscious existence after death, in a disembodied state while the body remains under the power of death, but re-embodied at and after the period of the resurrection; a view with which I believe nothing that I have written is inconsistent. Yet Mr. Morris represents me as maintaining "the doctrine of a future life *in the sense of a disembodied immortality*," p. 10, and *passim*. I look in vain for a shadow of proof of this palpable misunderstanding.

With this mistaken view of my conception of man's future life, the author completes his attack by saying, "Mr. Hinton's idea of a future life must here be borne in mind. *This he attributes to the Sadducees*," p. 9.

That I could not have knowingly pursued such a course as this must be evident from its manifest absurdity; the only thing possible is that by the use of ill-adapted words I may have inadvertently laid myself open to the imputation of it. What, then, have I said? Let the reader pardon me in

such a case, for transcribing the following portion of my pamphlet.

"The interrogatory framed by the Sadducees related, we are told, to 'the resurrection.' There is reason to doubt, however, whether this conveys the whole case. It is true that the members of this sect did, as we are here informed, 'deny that there was any resurrection,' but it is known also that they denied much more than this. From the testimony of Josephus it appears that as a philosophical school they were the materialists of that age, not allowing the soul to be of a spiritual nature, or, consequently, to be capable of existence separate from the body. This is corroborated by the writer of the Acts of the Apostles, who informs us that they said 'there was no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit,' Acts xxiii. 8. With them, consequently, the doctrine of a resurrection was identical with that of a future existence. If there was a resurrection there was of course a future life; and if there was a future life there must in their view be a resurrection, since according to them, there could be no future life but in the body. The question framed by the Sadducees must, therefore, in all propriety be held to relate generally to the subject of a future life, rather than to the fact of the resurrection of the body," p. 5.

It is evident from this extract that I have not attributed to the Sadducees *my* idea of a future life at all, since that involves a disembodied condition until the period of the resurrection; but that I have, on the contrary, spoken of the future life in their own sense of it, namely, as a life *in the body*.

Repudiating altogether what Mr. Morris has ascribed to me, I have a right to hold myself exempt from the bearing of the arguments which he has constructed on this basis, and to say that his heavy shot have been fired into a sand-bank. What my reasonings are worth on the ground on which they really stand is a question yet to be tried by him.

Mr. Morris had no real occasion for misunderstanding me; an assertion which may be with the more confidence believed, from the fact that Mr. White has not received an impression similar to his own. This gentleman is far from wanting in acuteness and sagacity; and it cannot be supposed that he would have lost such an advantage over me in argument, had it been fairly presented to him.

Mr. Morris directs his strenuous opposition against that part of my pamphlet in which I have endeavoured to lay the foundation for the application to mankind universally of the clause, "For all live unto him," by a consideration of the import of God's adopted title, "The God of Abraham, of

Isaac, and of Jacob." The ground I have taken is that this name may be understood in either a spiritual or a carnal sense, the connexion here determining it to a carnal one; the author contends that it must be taken in a spiritual sense universally and exclusively, p. 16, *et seq.*

Three of his reasons are framed on an interpretation of the word *carnal* too glaringly inapplicable for him to have supposed for a moment that it was in my contemplation. Thus he says:—

"1. It is in the nature of things incorrect to speak of God, who is *spirit*, as capable of sustaining a *carnal* relation to any of his creatures.

"2. Even if this were possible, and God had at any time sustained such a relation to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, it must have ceased with the days of their *flesh*.

"4. Had the divine title been originally intended to denote a *carnal* relation, it would not, according to our author's views of a future life, have been correctly employed as an argument to prove the existence of men who are no longer in the body," p. 17.

It is enough for me here to say that I did not use the word carnal in the sense in which the author has understood it. He speaks of a carnal relation in the physical sense; in which sense if I had spoken of it, I should certainly have done a thing not only incorrect, but absurd. The sense in which the phrase was used is, I think, fairly to be gathered from that to which it is antithetical, namely, "a relation spiritual and gracious." Mr. Morris, without any difficulty, and in common with myself, uses this phrase, not in a physical but in a moral sense, the word gracious, indeed, being capable of no other. It is consequently fair, and no more than fair, that, by the force of antithesis, the word carnal should be understood in a moral sense also. When Mr. Morris maintains that God's relation to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, was "spiritual and gracious," he means that God loved them as saints, and purposed to confer on them blessings heavenly and eternal; and when I say that the same relation was "carnal," I mean that God loved them as men, and purposed to confer on them blessings secular and temporal.

I do not doubt whether God actually did love these eminent patriarchs as saints, and confer upon them heavenly and eternal blessings; but I cannot admit that this is intended by his calling himself their God, or that the phrase

to be a God to a person denotes a relation necessarily spiritual and gracious.

I have endeavoured to sustain my view by asserting, what I conceived would be readily admitted, that this language was used respecting the entire posterity of Abraham in the line of Isaac and Jacob. To my surprise, however, Mr. Morris writes as follows:—

"3. It is true that when God declared his adopted name and memorial to Moses, he was about to interpose on behalf of the entire posterity of the deceased patriarchs, but the relation expressed by that appellation *was not said* to include this posterity. At no period of their history were they included therein. They were delivered and blessed for their 'fathers' sakes,' and by virtue of promises made to their fathers; but the relation of God to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, declared to Moses, was never extended to their entire posterity 'according to the flesh,'" p. 17.

That the relation which God declared himself to hold towards Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (that, namely, of being a God to them), when he spoke to Moses from the bush, was not *at that time said* to include their posterity is undoubtedly true; but that "at no period of their history they were included therein" is an assertion which, if my memory serves me, the Scriptures will contradict. But let us refer to the record.

Gen. xvii. 7, 8. "And I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee; and I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I WILL BE THEIR GOD."

Deut. xxix. 10–13. "Ye stand this day all of you before the Lord your God . . . that thou shouldest enter into covenant with the Lord thy God, and into his oath, which the Lord thy God maketh with thee this day; that he may establish thee to-day for a people unto himself, and that he may BE UNTO THEE A GOD, as he hath said unto thee, and as he hath sworn unto thy fathers, to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob."

To my inquiry—"If, indeed, the covenant-relation was confined to the godly part of this posterity, by what title did the remainder inherit Canaan?" the author thus replies:—

"5. It is true that God made a legal covenant with the Israelites when he had brought them out of the land of Egypt, but this they immediately broke; consequently, they possessed the land of Canaan purely by virtue of the promises made to their fathers, and to subserve the ulterior purposes of grace," p. 18.

Very true: but how came "the promises made to their fathers" to be fulfilled to the children, unless they were included in the covenant to which those promises appertained?

"6. The history of the three primitive patriarchs," the author continues, "makes it manifest that the covenant-title by which it pleased God to make himself known to them, and which he afterwards declared to Moses, was and is pre-eminently expressive of calling, and promise, and grace."

I answer—The history of the Israelitish nation "makes it manifest, that the covenant-title whereby it pleased God to make himself known to them" does not *necessarily* convey any idea of spiritual blessings.

"7. This name and memorial of God," says Mr. Morris, "is shown to be *exclusively* one of covenant and of grace, and to denote *exclusively* a relation that is spiritual, heavenly, and eternal."

The passage here referred to is Heb. xi. 9, 10, 13, 16; concluding thus—"but now they desire a better country, that is, an heavenly; *wherefore* God is not ashamed to be called their God, for he hath provided for them a city." All that this passage shows is that the language of God to the patriarchs is *capable* of an application to spiritual things, but this cannot be maintained to be its *exclusive* meaning, in the face of the incontrovertible fact that similar language was applied to the whole nation of Israel.

"8. In addition to all this evidence," says the author finally, "in proof of the spiritual and gracious character of the relation to which our Lord appealed, the same apostle has shown beyond question that the relation which God sustained to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and of which our Lord spoke, is in the nature of things restricted to the spiritual children of Abraham, or, to speak more correctly, to 'all' the children of faith, from Abel to the end of time."

Reference is here made to the fourth chapter of Romans, and the third of Galatians, to which I hope the reader will turn, as this is not the place for an extended commentary upon them. No doubt can exist that the apostle is there speaking of God's covenant with *Abraham* (he says nothing about Isaac and Jacob, however) in a spiritual sense, as may appear sufficiently from the citation of one verse:—"Now to Abraham and his seed were the promises made. He saith not, and to seeds, as of many; but as of one, and to thy seed, which is Christ," Gal. iii. 16. But what can this prove, in

the face of the fact that promises were likewise made to a natural seed, and that God said of them also, "I will be their God"?

The author speaks of "*all this evidence* in proof of the spiritual and gracious character of the relation to which our Lord appealed," as if it were not only ample but redundant. I wish to do justice to his arguments; but, to my mind, he has brought not a single atom of evidence to the point.

He proceeds to notice my assertions, "that God's covenant-relation to Abraham was only accidentally in our Lord's contemplation," and "that any other case of a substantially similar kind would have been equally conclusive." He says, it is evident that I have here pushed my argument "to an extremity;" but whither must his have led him, when he could propose to try mine by such a test as the following?

"It is true," says he, "that had it pleased God to have adopted as one of his revealed titles *this* name,—'the God of Abel, and the God of David, and the God of Daniel,' an appeal to the relation denoted thereby would have been quite conclusive to the purpose of our Lord's argument. But it was morally impossible that he should have spoken of himself as the God of Cain, of Korah, and of Belshazzar. Yet the reasoning of the author would appear to represent even this as possible, and equally conclusive," p. 19.

This is absolute, but, of course unintentional, misrepresentation. My language is,—"*any kind of relation* on God's part to a dead man is as direct and complete a demonstration of his existence as any other; *one of anger* is quite as conclusive as one of love," p. 11. I am as sensible as Mr. Morris, that God could not have called himself "the God of Cain, of Korah, and of Belshazzar," expressive as I hold that name to be of a relation benign, although not necessarily spiritual: but it is surely possible that he might have declared himself to be *angry* with them; and my argument is that this would have proved their existence, as conclusively as his avowing a benign relation to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, establishes theirs. Has he anything to urge against this?

The author falls immediately into another misconception of me.

"Putting aside, then, the mere accident of the benignant character of God's relation to Abraham," says he, so far quoting my own words, "he [Mr. Hinton] has construeted his reasoning on a denial of the principle that any such benignity is included in the declared relation of being 'a God to a person,'" p. 19.

And against this notion he proceeds elaborately to argue. Now, so far from anywhere denying that "the relation of being a God to a person" includes nothing benign, I have by implication strongly affirmed it. What I have done is to distinguish between two kinds of benignity as directed towards two aspects of character, and manifested in bestowing two classes of benefits: a distinction easy in conception and clear in fact. A relation is not necessarily "spiritual and gracious" because it is benign. God is declared to be "kind to the unthankful and to the evil," Luke vi. 35.

The idea opposed by Mr. Morris being erroneously ascribed to me, I may pass without further notice the reasonings which are directed against it, and thus close my rejoinder to this part of his reply.

Having adverted to the principal arguments by which Mr. Morris endeavours to drive me from my position, I will now proceed to examine that which he himself has taken.

In common with Mr. White, he affirms that the question of the Sadducees related to the righteous only, but he does not place his affirmation on the same ground. He lays the stress of proof on an assertion that the word resurrection was in the days of our Lord familiarly used in a restricted sense, and as referring to the righteous only. Reasoning from such an assertion, however, evidently requires that the word *resurrection* should be retained in the passage under consideration, and not be superseded, as I have proposed, by another phrase, *future life*. On this ground accordingly the author makes a determined stand, pp. 7, 9; and here I will first meet him.

Having quoted me to the effect that the rendering of *ἀνάστασις* by *future life*, instead of *resurrection*, "is not at all inconsistent with either the etymology or the use of the term," he proceeds to examine these two sources of evidence. Etymology he candidly admits to be in my favour, but "established usage," he says, "governs etymology." We have accordingly a list of all the places in which *ἀνάστασις* occurs in the Scriptures, with this single remark,—"Established usage is thus seen to govern etymology, and to prove the correctness, and even the necessity, of the word *resurrection* in every instance in which by our translators it is employed." And so Mr. Morris settles the question, without

any examination whatever of the passage under consideration, or any notice of the authorities I have quoted for my view. Were he Aristotle himself, the *ipse dixit* method of proof could hardly be better exemplified.

I cannot let him off, however, so easily. If he will not grapple with Dwight, Campbell, Macknight, Hammond, and Heinsius—all whose names appear in my support at p. 5 of my pamphlet (although Mr. Morris, as though he did not read the foot-notes, strangely says that I have "taken for granted" my own correctness)—I must compel him to a little skirmish on the spot.

Contending as he does for the word *resurrection* in opposition to the phrase *future life*, it may be assumed that he takes it in its strict sense, as denoting the act of rising from the dead. Now I ask him if, with this meaning of the word resurrection, the passage can possibly be understood? "In the resurrection whose wife of them is she?"

It is but a very short time that the act of rising from the dead can be supposed to occupy, perhaps but "the twinkling of an eye;" but, whether longer or shorter, it can hardly be conceived that during that process itself any degree of concern could be felt on the subject of marriage. The very origination of the question supposes the actual rising from the dead to be past, and the parties to exist in the state which ensues upon it.

This, which is so obvious in itself, is unequivocally put by the critics. So Macknight,—"*Therefore in the resurrection* —here the word evidently signifies a future state simply." And he refers in further proof to the phraseology of Mark, who says, "*In the resurrection, when they shall rise*," or shall have risen; where, if resurrection do not refer to the future life, it is altogether tautological. Even Bloomfield, who is not disposed to concur in Campbell's proposed alteration of the rendering, uses the following language:—"There seems little doubt but that the expression *ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν*, or *ἀνάστασις* simply as here, denoted in common acceptation, not only the resurrection of the body but the survival of the soul, *i.e. a future life*. The Sadducees, in fact, held the doctrines of what is now called materialism. Throughout the whole of this narration *ἀνάστασις τῶν νερκῶν* plainly denotes the restitution of bodies and their conjunction with souls; so that marriages, &c., might exist as the Pharisees

maintained, whose opinion it seems to have been the especial purpose of the Sadducees to expose to derision."

It being thus necessary that the word resurrection should be understood in the sense of future life, Mr. Morris's assertion that it was used with a restriction to the righteous evidently cannot be persisted in; since such a use of it must imply that the righteous only have a future life, which is false.

But without availing myself of this conclusion, I will take as it stands Mr. Morris's singular hypothesis (for it is no more) that the word resurrection in Scripture, whether expressly limited or not, "is always understood as identical with the eternal life, or immortality, of the saints of God," p. 28. The proofs adduced are as follows :—

"1. In the Old Testament Scriptures . . . the resurrection of the wicked is passed over in silence, excepting in one instance (Dan. xii. 2)." *Ibid.*

Even if this were so, this one instance violates at the outset the alleged universality of the author's rule. But it is not so, as may appear from a passage referred to by the author himself in the following paragraph; Isaiah xxvi. 14, compared with ver. 19. The verses are as follows :—

Ver. 14. "They are dead, they shall not live; they are deceased, they shall not rise."

Ver. 19. "Thy dead shall live; my deceased, they shall arise."—*Lowth.*

These verses, if literally applied, as the author wishes, would prove that the wicked would have no resurrection, which is false. But they are not applicable. "The deliverance of the people of God from a state of the lowest depression," says Lowth, "is here explained by images taken from the resurrection of the dead." And the metaphor evidently rests on the doctrine of a *general* resurrection.

To this may be added the well-known passage, Job xiv. 14, 15, where the question is—"If *a man* [not a *righteous* man] die, shall he live again?"

"2. The resurrection of *the righteous* was emphatically 'the promise,' and 'the hope of the promise made unto the fathers,' Acts xxvi. 6," p. 28.

I want proof of this. There is nothing in the passage referred to by the author to favour his opinion, but rather the contrary. Paul's words are these :—

"And now I stand and am judged for the hope of the promise made of God unto our fathers, unto which promise *our twelve tribes* . . . hope to come . . . Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise *the dead?*" Acts xxvi. 6–8.

In like manner, when Paul was before the Council his language was, "Of the hope and resurrection of *the dead* am I called in question," Acts xxiii. 6. And when before Felix, he said, "I have hope toward God, which they themselves also allow, that there shall be a resurrection of *the dead, both of the just and unjust*," Acts xxiv. 15. I take, therefore, Mr. Morris's assertion that the resurrection of *the righteous* was "the hope of the promise made unto the fathers," to be not only without evidence, but contrary to evidence. This hope was clearly the resurrection of *the dead.*

That the resurrection "held a prominence in the minds and hearts of the faithful of former dispensations," which the author next affirms, may be true, but it proves nothing.

"The destiny of the wicked," the author goes on to tell us, "is frequently contrasted with the eternal life of the rightcous, especially in the Psalms and the Prophets," p. 28.

No doubt, and with great justice; but what has this to do with the resurrection, which, as we know from Daniel, was then held to be common to both?

"3. The resurrection of the wicked was left unnoticed by our Lord, when (according to the sixth chapter of John) he inculcated the doctrine of eternal life, and spoke of the resurrection 'at the last day' (John vi. 27–58, particularly verses 39, 40)," p. 29.

To these the author might have added ver. 54, which may be given as a sample of the whole:—"Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day." In all the verses Christ is speaking of the happiness of believers in him, and it is hard to see how he could have introduced any reference to the resurrection of the wicked, or how the omission of such reference in such a connexion can illustrate the ordinary use of the word. Our Lord may easily be understood to be speaking of a happy resurrection here, because he was speaking of persons whose character would make their resurrection happy. There is high critical authority, however, for believing that the declaration, "I will raise him up at the last day," should be taken metaphorically, as referring to the *final blessedness* of the righteous.

"The resurrection of the wicked" "is also passed over in silence," the author proceeds, "by the apostle Paul, in his argumentative discourse on the resurrection of the dead, 1 Cor. xv." *Ibid.*

I know that this opinion generally prevails, but I have never been convinced by the arguments by which it is supported; the assertion of it here, consequently, is of no weight with me. If, however, the fact were so, it would only show that, in discussing a subject which had both a bright and a dark side, the apostle preferred taking his illustrations from the most pleasing sources. It cannot be safe to argue from such a fact to the use of the term resurrection.

"And further," continues the author, "the resurrection of the wicked is always doctrinally stated in contrast with that of the righteous," p. 29.

This may be granted; but what is it to the purpose?

"4. The phrase, the resurrection," the author proceeds, "was well understood and familiarly used in the days of our Lord in a restricted sense, as denoting that of the righteous. It was thus used in a hopeful and consolatory manner by Martha, and was responded to by our Lord when he said, 'I am the resurrection and the life.' John xi. 24–26." *Ibid.*

The words of Martha respecting Lazarus are, "I know that he shall rise again at the last day." That she speaks "in a hopeful and consolatory manner," is true; this, however, is not because the word resurrection itself implied happiness, but because she was contemplating the resurrection of a good man.

"And that it was commonly and familiarly used in this restricted sense by the Jews in those days," he continues, "is manifest from the language of Paul before the Sanhedrim, and before Agrippa, and also in his discourse with the Jews at Rome, Acts xxiii. 6; xxvi. 6–8; xxviii. 20." *Ibid.*

All these passages but the last have been just quoted at length, and I beg the reader to turn back to them; the last has no reference to the resurrection at all. "For the *hope of Israel*," says Paul, "I am bound with this chain." The reference is beyond doubt to the advent of the Messiah.

"Again," says this persevering reiterator, "the phrase the resurrection of the dead was used in the first days of the Christian church with a restricted reference and exclusive application to the righteous (1 Cor. xv. 21, 42; Phil. iii. 10, 11); and it is obvious that with this restricted application it was both well understood and familiarly used in those days," p. 29.

If anything is "obvious," it is that a writer who is compelled to eke out his argument by so frequent a reiteration of his opinion is in sad lack of proofs. 1 Cor. xv. has already been considered. Phil. iii. 10, 11 reads as follows:—"That I may know him and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable unto his death, if by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead." Here I admit Paul to be aspiring after a happy resurrection, such a resurrection as his Master's, whose sufferings also he was sharing in his Master's spirit; but this sense does not arise out of the term resurrection, but is brought to it by the context.

I have thus gone through the whole of the evidence adduced by Mr. Morris, and I think he has totally failed to establish his position. The reader must judge between us on this matter; but, should he be of my opinion, he will clearly see that the author's intended inference fails with his premises. His attempted argument is this:—In the Scriptures the resurrection "is always understood as identical with the eternal life, or immortality, of the saints;" therefore both the question of the Sadducees relating to the resurrection, and the answer of our Lord to that question, referred to the resurrection of the saints only. The premises, however, not being correct the conclusion cannot be drawn. It remains, therefore, that the Sadducean interrogatory may still be regarded as having related to the resurrection generally; and if so, then also our Lord's reply may be regarded as of equal latitude, since Mr. Morris is good enough to approve and adopt the reasons I have given for taking the answer to be of the same scope as the question, p. 30.

In addition to the general argument I have now examined and "found wanting," Mr. Morris avails himself, not unnaturally, of the phrases in our Lord's reply which apparently favour a restricted application of it, p. 20 *seq.*

With respect to these, he says that I have "engaged in criticism *to add strength to my defence.*" This is a mistake. I have engaged in criticism to relieve my position from the bearing of language apparently adverse to it, and for nothing more. It is enough for me to have shown that the phrases in question *may be* understood in a sense *not contradictory* to me; the author, if he effects anything to his purpose in this department, must show, not merely that they *may*, but that

they *must*, be understood in such a manner as to preclude the meaning I have assigned to the whole passage. Should he not do this he proves nothing in the case, since words which may be understood consistently with two views cannot establish either.

(1.) "They which shall be *accounted worthy to obtain* that world."

Here the author admits the correctness of my remarks on the verb τυγχάνω, *to obtain*, but objects to "the application" of them. He says—

"The word *is* of indefinite meaning, and hence may be used to denote what *might be*, or *happen;* but it is capable of, and has received, a definite application in the true meaning of *to obtain*," p. 20.

No doubt: that is to say, it *may be* used in either sense, and consequently it can prove nothing for him or against me.

The author then proceeds to the verb καταξιόω; in reference to which he goes over again the ground which I have trod before him, annexing a list of examples of the words ἄξιος and ἀνάξιος, as well as ἀξίως and ἀναξίως. All this, however, adds nothing to the proof; my observation, drawn from high critical authority and supported by it, being, that the verb καταξιόω *in the passive voice* drops the idea of *worthiness* found in its other forms. Against this the author brings nothing but his own assertion, leaving as impregnable the distinguished names of Castalio and Schleusner, of Suidas and Scapula.

(2.) "Are *equal unto the angels*."

Here again the author admits the correctness of my criticism, and of my rule that "the point of similarity" intended by the use of the word ἰσάγγελος "is always to be suggested and determined by the connexion." Against limiting the similarity in this case to the facts that they "neither marry nor are given in marriage," and that they "cannot die any more," however, he reasons as follows:—

"This argument would have been of force, if the doctrine of a disembodied human immortality had been previously and independently established in our Lord's reply. But thus far in the narrative no *evidence* of *any* immortality is found, not even that of the righteous. We are therefore bound to conclude, first, that our Lord used no such argument; and secondly, that his assertions were not made in reference to the author's doctrine of a disembodied life," p. 22.

I have given the italics in this extract as they are marked

by Mr. Morris; and from them it appears that he makes a distinction between a *declaration* of immortality and *evidence* of it. Up to the time, he tells us, when our Lord said "they are like angels," he had produced "*no evidence* of *any* immortality." He had indeed *said*, "Neither can they die any more;" but this was "*mere assertion*," and not evidence, and could not "establish" anything. I confess my surprise at this representation. Mr. Morris then holds that our Lord's *declaration* of a doctrine is *no evidence* of it! *If it were*, he would admit that my limitation of ἰσάγγελος is just! Have I need to say anything in support of it after this?

The author, however, proceeds to give his own view in the following terms:—

"The phrase ἰσάγγελος—angel-like, or on a par with angels—is expressive of a spiritual state of existence similar to that of the angels of God. These were created spiritual beings, and physically incapable of procreation. In this respect the raised saints of God will be similar to angels. For, though in 'the resurrection' they will be re-embodied, they will thenceforth be as incapable of marriage as they will be of corruptibility and death," p. 23.

1. If, by "the angels of God" the author means the holy angels as distinguished from the fallen, he is on slippery ground. ALL the angels were surely created spiritual, that is, incorporeal beings, those who "kept not their first estate" as well as the rest; and as the fall of these unhappy ones cannot have made any physical difference in them, they must be spiritual, that is incorporeal, still. To be like angels "in this respect," consequently, is as truly to be like devils, who are fallen angels, as to be like holy angels "that are in heaven."

2. No reason appears why the author should restrict likeness to angels "in this respect" to "the raised *saints* of God." From the limitation itself one might think it was the author's opinion that the raised wicked would be "capable of marriage," especially as from other places it appears that he does hold them to be capable of corruption and death. Whether he would allow this I cannot tell; but I think the inference to be a millstone about the neck of any statement from which it can fairly be drawn. Why, since incapacity of procreation characterizes alike angels and devils, may it not be deemed a point of likeness to angelic nature attributable both to the righteous and the wicked?

"But it had not entered into the heart of either the Pharisees or the Sadducees," the author goes on to say, "to conceive of this change from that which is *natural* to that which is *spiritual*. 'For the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God,' 2 Cor. ii. 6, 11. And from this *moral* cause arose the Pharisean notion of the 'indulgence of the sensual appetites' in the re-embodied state of the resurrection of the righteous, and also the Sadducean notion that the doctrine of the resurrection was 'hopelessly clogged' by a question relating to certain hypothetical marriages under a statute of Moses. But even *natural* men can apprehend the distinction and contrast denoted by 'that which is spiritual' being spoken of in opposition to 'that which is natural,' so far, at least, as to understand that the attributes and capabilities of the latter are incompatible with the condition of the former. HENCE THE SADDUCEAN DIFFICULTY WAS FULLY SOLVED BY THE STATEMENT OF OUR LORD," p. 23.

The last sentence is marked emphatically, not by the author, but myself; and it is so marked for the purpose of at once indicating my sense of the attention of which it is worthy. To be at last shown the manner in which "the Sadducean difficulty was clearly solved by the statement of our Lord" will be in the highest degree satisfactory and gratifying; and I invite the reader's attention to this passage while I apply my own. What, however, do we find in it? First, a statement that the misconceptions of both the Pharisees and Sadducees respecting the future state sprang from a "moral cause;" and secondly, an assertion that, notwithstanding all their grossness, they were still capable of understanding so much as this, that, when "that which is spiritual" is spoken of as opposed to "that which is natural," it denotes "that the attributes of the latter are incompatible with the condition of the former." "HENCE"—that is, because these stupefied sensualists had yet this gleam of common sense left in them—"HENCE the Sadducean difficulty was fully solved by the statement of our Lord"! Verily, I wish some one would solve for me the Herculean difficulty of understanding Mr. Morris. If there is any other meaning in the passage I cannot find it; nor can I find any reason why the passage itself occurs where it does, namely, in a critique on the word *ἰσάγγελος*.

(3.) "*The children of God: υἱοὶ Θεοῦ.*" Here the author undertakes to maintain that the phrase *υἱὸς Θεοῦ* (child of God) denotes universally and exclusively a state of spiritual privilege.

For this purpose he adduces in the first instance a list of

the places where it occurs, in all of which, excepting, of course, for the present the passage under review, I admit that it has the meaning he contends for. It seems to me, however, that there is not only no conclusiveness, but no weight, in this fact as an argument. If there be any weight in it, it must lie in this idea that the term *υἱὸς* contains in itself a sentiment of spiritual benignity; for Θεὸς evidently does not convey any such sentiment. You may as readily say *ἐχθρὸς* Θεοῦ, as *υἱὸς* Θεοῦ—*an enemy of God*, as *a child of God*. But that *υἱὸς* does not contain such a sentiment is manifest from its other uses: thus we have it from the lips of Paul—"Υἱὲ *διάβολου*—Thou child of the devil;" and in "*υἱοὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ*, children of the wicked one."

The truth is that the relation indicated by *υἱὸς*, in this metaphorical use, is primarily one of similarity, the secondary idea of benignity having preference in cases in which it is more appropriate. So "child of the devil" indicates a moral resemblance, and "child of God" in many places denotes the same. There is no necessity, however, to restrict the resemblance intended to a moral one. In the passage before us it may very naturally be understood of a physical one, that is, of incorruptibility, and the exigency of the passage is fully satisfied if it be so understood. Thus Bloomfield:—"By sons of God are meant those who are *like God*, that is, in immortality."

Mr. Morris, in p. 26, admits that in the phrase, "the children of God," "similarity is included;" but he maintains it to be "a similarity founded on spiritual origin and filiation," and he refers in support of his idea to the familiar passages which speak of believers as "born of God." All that I have occasion to say in reply is that this is *not necessarily* so. It is on the ground of a mere *resemblance in fact* that men are called children of the wicked one; and this is full warrant for regarding a resemblance in fact as a sufficient idea for the same phrase in the passage before us.

In support of my statement that the phrase "children of God" was not necessarily to be taken as indicating a spiritual relation, I adduced what I called the "equivalent phrase" "the offspring of God," from Paul's discourse, Acts xvii. 28. On this the author says—

"But he did not employ that poetic sentiment as including the whole human race, and as being at the same time equivalent to the New Testament phrase, 'children of God,'" p. 25.

The author mistakes my meaning, I did not say that *Paul used* the former of these phrases in the customary sense of the latter. I took the phrases apart; and I said that "offspring of God" *is* an equivalent phrase to "children of God." I cannot even now see that offspring and children, or γένος and υἱὸς, are *very* different. That the phrase γένος Θεοῦ did not mean, either from the pen of Cleanthes who wrote it, or from the lips of Paul who quoted it, what the phrase υἱοὶ Θεοῦ is generally used to denote in the New Testament, is quite true; but this is the very circumstance I availed myself of. I took the fact that γένος Θεοῦ is used to denote a relation not spiritual, as warranting the supposition that υἱοὶ Θεοῦ might be used to denote a relation not spiritual likewise.

Mr. Morris makes some extended remarks on Paul's application to his purpose of what "certain Greek poets" had said; to the effect, on the one hand, that the apostle did not "admit the existence, supremacy, and creatorship of Jupiter;" and on the other, that "both Greek and Roman poets who flourished before Paul preached at Athens had applied the terms 'God,' and 'Father,' to the expanse of the heavens, and particularly to the ether of the celestial regions," p. 25.

"By this means," he goes on to say, "we attain to an accurate conception of what certain Greek poets intended by the phrase—'For we are his offspring;' and we should bear in mind that all this, and much more, was known to the apostle Paul, when he turned the admission of those same poets to the account of both his theistical and Christian argument," p. 26.

Bearing all this in mind, then, let the reader still judge, whether the phrases "children of God" and "offspring of God" are or are not equivalent; for this is all that I have said, or have to say, about the matter.

I take the opportunity of observing, however, that the author has done great injustice to Cleanthes by identifying him with the writers whom he has described. "With respect to the Hymn of Cleanthes," says Bloomfield, "it is by Doddridge justly pronounced to be beyond comparison the purest and finest piece of natural religion extant in all antiquity; and it contains (he adds) nothing unworthy of a Christian, nay, he had almost said of an inspired writer."*

* Cleanthes was a Grecian philosopher of the Stoic school, the successor of Zeno, and so eminent as to be called by Cicero "the father" of the sect. He flourished 300 years before the Christian era.

For the reader's satisfaction on this point I subjoin an English metrical, yet literal, translation of it, with which I have been favoured by Bunnell Lewis, Esq., the classical tutor at Stepney College.

HYMN OF CLEANTHES.

HAIL! Thou most glorious of immortals, Jove,
Who bearest many names, and rulest all
For ever! Nature's Author, who with Law
Steerest the Universe. For 'tis most due
That every mortal should invoke Thy name,
For we thine offspring are, endowed with speech
Alone of all that live and 'walk the earth.'
Thee will I sing, and ever hymn thy might;
Thee all the world, revolving round the earth,
Obeys, and willing follows where thou lead'st;
Thy hands, all-conquering, wield subservient flames,
Two-edged, fiery, ever-living bolts,
While universal Nature dreads the shock;
Thou guidest general Reason, through all space
Diffused, pervading great and lesser lights;
So mighty art thou, King supreme o'er all.
There is no deed on earth without Thee, God,
Nor in the heavenly vault, nor in the sea,
Save what the wicked in their folly do.
Thou rulest the unruly, and dost make
Th' unlovely lov'd, so blending good and evil
That one eternal reason dwells in all.
But this the baser sort of mortals shun;
For they—unhappy, though in quest of bliss—
Nor see nor hear God's universal law,
Which, rightly followed, happiness bestows.
Their graceless souls rush on to different ends;
Some seek for glory in unholy strife,
To devious paths of gain some turn aside,
Others to luxury and sensual joys.
Lord of the lightning! Jove enthron'd in clouds!
All-bounteous! save from baneful ignorance,
Disperse it from our souls, give us to know
Thy righteous purposes that steer the world.
Thus honour'd, we in turn will pay to Thee
Honour and song incessant, as becomes
Mortals; for this is highest privilege
Alike to gods and men, in righteousness
Ever to sing the universal Law.

(4.) "Children of the resurrection."

On this phrase I had written as follows:—"If this phrase be taken as it is, it cannot be made to mean more than 'persons raised from the dead;' the sense in which the critics

generally take it. Or, if in accordance with the observations already made, I render it 'children of the future life,' the result is the same; it means persons who have entered on the future life." And the author remarks in these terms:—

"Now by this mode of reasoning, and the twofold change of terms and of tense on which it is founded, the statements put forward involve one or other of the following consequences: either they serve to deny that there is any resurrection of the dead, or they go to affirm that the resurrection must be understood metaphorically, and is already past," p. 27.

Mr. Morris is good enough to disown all thought of really imputing to me either of these opinions; but he presses them upon me as fair inferences. Let us see whether they are so or not.

My reasoning, he says, is founded on a "twofold change;" one "of terms" and another "of tense."

The change of terms is, of course, that, instead of using the term *resurrection* I use the phrase *future life*.

But what is the change of tense? Undoubtedly, I have spoken in the present tense, and this is the circumstance from which Mr. Morris seems to have drawn his inference; for his argument is, that since I speak in the present tense, while the resurrection is future, my statement implies, either that there will be no resurrection, or that it is already past.

In speaking in the present tense, however, I have effected *no change*. Let the passage itself witness:—"Neither can they die any more; for they *are* equal unto the angels; and *are* the children of God, *being* children of the resurrection." It was in the present tense, therefore, that the Lord himself spoke; and if the pernicious opinions inferred are in consequence chargeable upon any one, it is upon Him. No doubt Mr. Morris will now see differently; but what apology can he make for his carelessness, in allowing himself to determine without looking at his Bible, that because the first verb was in the future tense,—"they which *shall be* accounted worthy to obtain that world,"—every following verb must be so too?

He further says that the phrase of Heinsius which I have quoted, *υἱοὶ τῆς ἀναβιώσεως*, shows the incorrectness of my rendering *ἀνάστασις* by *future life*. His argument is that the prefix *ἀνὰ* denotes repetition, but that the phrase future life does not admit of the idea of repetition, p. 27.

If, however, the idea of repetition is to be *very* tenaciously insisted upon wherever the prefix ἀνὰ is found, the word ἀνάστασις must no longer be applied to the raising of the body, which has yet to take place certainly for the *first* time. Both it and ἀναβιῶσις are on this ground much more applicable to the future life; which, if not verbally, yet substantially, *has* the idea of repetition, inasmuch as to live hereafter will be to *live again*.

The last effort which the author makes to shut me up to his conclusion is on the ground that the phrase, "children of the resurrection," is a Hebraism involving the idea of moral character.

"It occurs in the New Testament," says he, "in the words 'son of perdition,' 'children of wrath,' and 'children of disobedience;' and in the Old Testament, in the words 'children of Belial,' 'children of pride,' and 'children of iniquity.' In several marginal readings which I have verified, it is found in the words 'children of death,' and is rendered in the texts 'worthy to die,' 'shall surely die,' and 'appointed to death;' by which rendering the true meaning of this class of Hebraisms is given and made manifest," p. 28.

Now I admit that in some instances this Hebraistic form of expression has, in the words of the author, "moral character" as the basis of its use; but I maintain that this is by no means its uniform or essential import. On looking a little further into the Bible we shall find unequivocal evidence of this. What will the reader say, for example, to Isa. v. 1:—"My wellbeloved hath a vineyard in *a very fruitful hill;*" *margin*, "the horn of the *son of oil*"? Or to Zech. iv. 14: "These are the two *anointed ones* (margin, '*sons of oil*') that stand by the Lord of the whole earth"? Or what will he say to an instance occurring in the very passage under examination, and therefore close under Mr. Morris's eye—"*the children of this world*"? Even where character is indicated, there is very often no implication, as Mr. Morris affirms, of desert or destiny. The phrases "*children of pride*," and "*children of iniquity*," which are specimens of a large class, denote only the actual viciousness of the parties to whom the appellation is applied, and thus, as I have said, merely "state a fact in the Hebrew form." There is ample warrant, therefore, for taking the phrase "children of the resurrection" to denote, not persons who *deserve to be* raised, but persons who *will be* raised, from the dead.

I have thus gone through the whole of the author's critical

remarks. The gist of them is that the phrases employed are most naturally to be regarded as descriptive of the righteous: but this was in the outset admitted by myself, and the proof of it, however elaborate or complete, is nothing to his purpose. It is my opponent's business to affirm, and to prove, that the terms in question must necessarily be so understood, towards which Mr. Morris has effected nothing.

All the principal arguments brought forward by Mr. Morris having now received, as I hope, due attention, it remains for me to notice those minor topics which occur in passages scattered through his pamphlet.

In one of these the author brings to light the following pernicious sentiments, as involved in my applying universally the words "Neither can they die any more," and holding all men to be in this respect "similar to God."

"Two sentiments involving grave consequences," he says, "are thus maintained: namely, first, that all men, the wicked as well as the righteous, are exempt and secure from the infliction of 'the second death;' and secondly, that the *constitutional* immortality of all men admits of a just comparison with the *essential* immortality of God," p. 26.

Mr. Morris has framed his reference to "the second death" as though he took it to be an admitted point that such an issue awaits the wicked; but he, of course, knows that it is a disputed one, which, instead of being adapted to prove anything requires to be itself proved.

As to constitutional and essential immortality, while it is evident that in some respects they differ, it is not less evident that in some respects they agree. They are diverse modes of a common subject, immortality; and while it would be improper to bring them into comparison in the point in which they differ, there can be no impropriety in comparing them in the point in which they are alike. If God is not liable to death, man, if he also be not liable to death, may properly be said herein to be like God, although in the mode of being so there may be this difference, that God is so essentially and man only constitutionally.

Another morsel of criticism turns up in the following words:—

"The word rendered 'world' in the passage under the author's notice is *αἰων*, and indicates a *future* AGE and not a present locality. It is there used in contrast with the present and continuous *age* of human history in flesh and blood. And the words rendered 'neither

can they die any more' affirm of the 'children of God,' who are the 'children of the resurrection,' that thenceforth they are possessed of an endless, that is, of an indissoluble and indestructible life, and that death will be to them a *physical impossibility*," p. 23.

In the latter part of this extract, the reader finds nothing but an assertion of the thing to be proved, which, of course, he will not mistake for argument. The former part of it introduces a new topic, requiring notice. It is a critique on the word *αἰὼν*, which is rendered "world," and which, Mr. Morris says, "indicates a *future* AGE and not a present locality."

I am quite at a loss for a reason why the author has volunteered this specimen of critical acumen, in which I see no bearing on the argument. But let us test its correctness. *Αἰὼν*, he says, "indicates *a* FUTURE *age*." I turn to Schleusner, as the lexicographer nearest my elbow, and find as follows:—"*Αἰὼν, a certain space of time, longer or shorter,* PAST, PRESENT, OR FUTURE, *a complete period, accommodated to the nature of the things spoken of.*" So much for Mr. Morris's accuracy as a critic. That *αἰὼν* does not mean *a place*—or, as he has it, "a locality"—every schoolboy knew before it was announced by the author; nor is it supposed to do so, when, as in our version, it is rendered *world*. When applied to any state of human existence, it denotes the complete period of its duration; and thence, by an analogy not remote, it comes to signify the objects in the midst of which, together with the place in which, that period of human existence is passed. We have now arrived at the full meaning of the popular term world. But, if the author prefers it, the term *αἰὼν* may be taken strictly. "The children of this (*αἰὼν*) *period of human existence* marry and are given in marriage; but they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that (*αἰὼν*) *period of human existence* neither marry nor are given in marriage." To what purpose, however, is all this criticism? What service is rendered to the author by it? What injury does it occasion to me? To me, certainly, it rather affords an advantage, inasmuch as it places in simple and naked opposition the two great periods of human existence, and so exhibits more clearly than ever the congruity of understanding the whole passage in relation to mankind at large.

In the course of his pamphlet Mr. Morris frequently

brings against me a charge which I have already had occasion to notice, that, namely, of "changing the tense of the entire subject from the future to the past and present," and so changing the idea. For my own vindication I have only to repeat that I have nowhere "changed the tense," but have in all cases taken it as it stands in the passage itself.

Since, however, Mr. Morris is so sensible of the impropriety and mischief of "changing the tense," let me be permitted to ask him why he himself has done it. Here is the fact. Our Lord's words are, "Now that the dead ARE RAISED, even Moses showed at the bush, . . . all LIVE unto him." And this is the author's comment:—

"We are thus allowed to think of a truth 'full of immortality,' because it speaks to our hearts of the 'sure and certain hope of resurrection to eternal life;' and tells us that with 'God, who quickeneth the dead, and calleth those things which be not as though they were,' the resurrection is regarded *as though* it were already accomplished," p. 15.

This is a palpable and undeniable change of the tense from the present to the future. Christ says, "the dead ARE RAISED;" Mr. Morris, that they *will be raised;* Christ says that "all LIVE;" Mr. Morris, that they *will live* hereafter. Will my reprover justify this?

But here is a change not of the tense only, but of the meaning also. Taking the verbs as Christ uttered them, that is, in the present tense, his language declares the existence *at that time* of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in common with all the dead; changing the tense, with Mr. Morris, to the future, this fact entirely disappears, and we are informed of nothing but the far distant, though certain, event of the resurrection, the dreary blank of present non-existence being filled up only by the foreknowledge of Him who "calleth things which *are not as though* they were"! What would Mr. Morris have said to me if I had done this?

In page 12 the author notices my assertion that the Sadducees "denied that there was any future life," and pithily calls it "a *postulatum* of a most gratuitous kind." It is not appropriate to such a place as this to enter at large into the subject thus mooted; but let the reader allow me to present to him the following short extract from Macknight:— "Of all the opinions professed by the Sadducees, that which distinguished them most was their denying the immateriality

and immortality of the soul, and by consequence the existence of spirits, the resurrection of the body, and *a future state.** If he has access to Campbell on the Gospels, the note on Matt. xxii. 23, will amply reward his perusal, but it is too long to insert; an abstract of it is given by Bloomfield.

Again, the author, noticing my assertion that the Pharisees "allowed the indulgence of the sensual appetites to be a part of the future life," says, curtly, "We are not credibly informed that the Pharisees allowed, or were capable of allowing, what the author supposes," p. 9. Let the reader then hearken. "Josephus," says Bloomfield (on Matt. xxii. 28), "compares the Pharisaical opinions of the sort of felicity to be enjoyed in the life to come to those of the Greeks respecting the Fortunate Isles." Now, of the delights of the Fortunate Isles "the indulgence of the sensual appetites" was the sum and substance.

Having quoted me as follows,—"The interrogatory framed by the Sadducees related, we are told, to the 'resurrection;' there is reason to doubt, however, whether this term conveys the whole case,"—Mr. Morris says:—

"For reasons which are of force in his own mind, the author thus questions the completeness of the inspired narrative," p. 5. And again,—"This information has its relative value. . . . But it would not appear to justify a doubt of the accuracy of inspired statement. The author does, however, thus doubt," p. 6.

Far from it. I neither "question the completeness" nor "doubt the accuracy" "of the inspired narrative;" but I do not believe in the inspiration of the English translation. According to Mr. Morris, our authorized version is infallible; and if any one should presume to inquire whether πάσχα (Acts xii. 4) was properly translated "Easter," he would be liable to objurgation for "doubting the accuracy of inspired statement"!

"The author observes," continues Mr. Morris, "that, by reason of the mental habits of the Sadducees, they held that 'the doctrine of a resurrection was identical with that of a future existence;' and consequently they reasoned thus:—'If there was a resurrection there was of course a future life; and if there was a future life there must in their view be a resurrection, since, according to them, there could be no future life but in a body.' We have no authentic information that the Sadducees made this kind of reasoning the occasion of their ques-

* Harmony of the Gospels: Jewish Antiquities, Disc. i., chap. 3.

tion relative to the resurrection; while, if they did thus reason, their reason differs widely from, and is in contrast with, that of the author," p. 6.

Mr. Morris is mistaken in supposing that the words he has quoted from me were intended to express the reasoning of the Sadducees. They contain my own reasoning (from which, consequently, it may be hoped they do not very widely differ) on the fact stated by Josephus, that the Sadducees did not "allow the soul to be of a spiritual nature, or, consequently, to be capable of existence separate from the body;" whence I infer, by the process which Mr. Morris has extracted, that "with them the doctrine of a resurrection was identical with that of a future existence." If there be anything laudable in this reasoning having, as Mr. Morris proceeds to say it has, "some striking points of resemblance to the reasoning of the apostle Paul on the subject of 'the resurrection of the dead,'" I hope he will give the credit of it to the right party.

The words quoted by Mr. Morris not having been "the reasoning" of the Sadducees at all, they cannot, of course, have been, as he supposes me to say, "the occasion of their question relative to the resurrection;" neither can it be the fact, as the author alleges at the bottom of the same page (p. 6) that, because I suppose them so to have reasoned, I maintain their question to have referred to the doctrine of a future life. My reason for affirming that their inquiry "must in all propriety be held to relate generally to the subject of a future life, rather than to the fact of the resurrection of the body," is that with them resurrection and future life were but one thing; and that, consequently, the whole fact should be had in view, and not a part of it.

Remarking on my application of the words "Neither can they die any more" to all mankind, Mr. Morris says—

"I am not aware that *this* is the immortality revealed in the Scriptures. It is not the 'eternal life' which Christ has promised and secured to his people," p. 4.

True, Mr. Morris; quite true. The "eternal life which Christ has promised and secured to his people" is not at all the thing that I am speaking of. But what then? Is nobody allowed to speak of any topic but this? I have certainly taken the liberty (I hope it is a pardonable freedom) of speaking of immortality in the sense of a natural adapta-

tion of human kind to endless being, which is quite another thing, no doubt, from "eternal life" as that phrase is appropriated in the Scriptures, but still a topic of some interest and importance. Will Mr. Morris not condescend to notice it? He will. He is "not aware," he says, that this immortality is "revealed in the Scriptures." Of what, then, is Luke xx. 36 a declaration?

He adds that the immortality I plead for "bears some resemblance" to that of "the incarnate Son of God, and risen Head of his body the church," p. 4.

He makes this out by quoting a passage from the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, where it is said that "Christ being raised from the dead *dieth no more;*" and he annexes to this a phrase out of the seventh of Hebrews—"after the power of an *endless life.*" The object of all this labour is to get an opportunity of saying that "the immortality of the risen Head of the church" was "consequent on his resurrection;" whence it would appear Mr. Morris would infer that the immortality of the members ought to be so too.

But in what sense have we the word immortality here used? "The *immortality* of the risen Head of the church" can mean nothing but the fact of his living for ever; for in no other sense can it be said to have been "*consequent* on his resurrection from the dead." His immortality in the sense of a natural attribute (the sense in which I speak of it) clearly was not, and could not be so. If in this sense Christ was immortal, his immortality must have been as independent of resurrection, and as superior to death, as that of any other of mankind.

Mr. Morris remarks on my reference in my Additional Note to the Greek sophist, Artemidorus, as probably "reflecting a portion of the Christian wisdom as then propagated in the world." On this he says—

> "But Mr. Hinton has not considered that Artemidorus could not have imbibed that portion of the 'Christian wisdom' which inculcates the doctrine of the 'second death,'" p. 6.

If, however, "the doctrine of the 'second death'" *were* a "portion of 'the Christian wisdom,'" why might not Artemidorus have imbibed this as well as any other portion of it? So far as his language may serve to show what was then disseminated by Christian teachers, it leaves us to sup-

pose that "the doctrine of the 'second death,'" as held by Mr. Morris, was wholly unknown to them.

In pp. 30, 31, the author notices the arguments of my fourth section, which proceed on the supposition of its being granted that the words of our Lord do refer to the righteous only. These he excuses himself from answering on the plea that they "have all been anticipated." This is convenient, and the reader will judge how far it is true. Mr. Morris, however, exhausted as he well may be by so many painful efforts, is roused to one effort more by sympathy with Mr. White, whom he thinks I have treated in an "ungenerous" manner; an act of literary knight-errantry which I have duly noticed in my remarks on that gentleman's Reply.

ATHANASIA:

OR,

FOUR BOOKS ON IMMORTALITY.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

In the year 1835 there was published in Dublin a small work bearing the following title, "Christ our Life; or the Scripture Testimony concerning Immortality. By a Clergyman of the Church of England."

The introduction to this work exhibits in a discursive manner several of the topics which occur subsequently in a more regular form; I shall consequently be doing a service to the reader, without any injustice or disadvantage to the author, if I pass them over now, with a view to notice them fully in their proper place. I proceed therefore at once to the page in which the author opens his argument in form, in the four propositions following:—

"I. That man is not by creation or natural constitution immortal.

"II. That immortality, or eternal life, is in the proper sense of the words derived to man only through Christ.

"III. That it is communicated in regeneration, and is identical with the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ in believers.

"IV. That those who do not believe the Gospel, and have not the Spirit of Christ, shall finally be destroyed, or die as to all life," p. 8.

I shall strictly follow the author in the manner in which he attempts to establish these propositions.

CHAPTER I.

ON HIS FIRST PROPOSITION.

The first proposition is, "That man is not immortal by creation or natural constitution," p. 8.

Under this proposition the author first refers to the various

phrases used in the scriptural account of the creation of man, pp. 8, 10. These phrases occur in Gen. i. 26, 27; and ii. 7.

Gen. i. 26, 27. "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him."

This passage cannot be taken to denote less than some distinguished prerogative in man as compared with the animal tribes. What was the nature of this prerogative?

According to our author, man was created in the image of God—

First, in his character; he having been made "upright" (Eccles. vii. 29), and, when renewed, being "renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him," Col. iii. 10.

Secondly, in his position; he having been placed in authority over the inferior races—"Let them have dominion . . . over all the earth."

But here he stops; "it being evident," says he, "that man might be made after the image or likeness of God morally speaking, . . . as well as in the dominion conferred on him, without being by constitution immortal."

"He *might*"—the reader will mark the hesitancy of this expression. The author does not say "he *was*." Something held him back from so decisive a word. Was it not a feeling—a feeling which will find response in every breast—that man's admitted moral and magisterial prerogatives draw after them a physical distinction? I go on, then, to affirm, that man was created in the image of God—

Thirdly, in his nature; since without some measure of similarity to God in his nature, it does not seem possible that he should resemble him in his providence and his holiness. These elevated prerogatives require an appropriate and proportionate basis. Man must be *fitted* to possess them.

Man's similarity in nature to God may be regarded as consisting, on the one hand, in his intellectual and rational faculties; and, on the other, in his incorruptibility, or in the absence from his soul, or mind, of all causes of decay—in a word, in immortality. It is scarcely to be conceived that

God *could* have impressed his glorious moral image on man without the former of these, or that he *would* have done so without the latter.

Gen. ii. 7. "And the Lord God formed man out of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."

I agree with the author in thinking that this verse will by no means bear the stress which some writers have laid upon it. All I take it to mean is, that when man began to breathe he began to live; he "became a living being."

The author takes the declaration that "God formed man out of the dust of the ground" "as descriptive of frailty and mortality," and then pursues the proof of man's mortality in the following terms:—

"But are we left to the proof, however strong, inferred from the meaning of these expressions, that man was by creation mortal? Or have we not the express declaration of God that he was so? No sooner was man created than God placed him under a law: and what was its sanction? It was DEATH: 'In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely DIE,' Gen. iii. 17. But how could an immortal creature die? The contradiction in terms is plain," pp. 10, 11.

"That man was by creation mortal," or liable to death, is a proposition which, as I suppose, has never been disputed, and which consequently needed no proof. Or, if our author was too resolutely bent on his purpose to be withheld from it even by the universal consent of mankind, he might, without taking us back to such remote ages, have established his point by simply referring us to a funeral procession or a newly-made grave. From his question, however, put as it is with an air of triumph, it seems never to have occurred to him that a creature may be mortal and immortal too. He pronounces such a statement, indeed, a "contradiction in terms;" but this altogether depends on the sense in which the terms are used. Into this matter, therefore, it will be now necessary to make some further inquiry.

What, then, does our author mean by death? He answers, to die is to "cease to exist," p. 11. The argument he adduces in support of this view is drawn from the sense in which, as he conceives, Adam would have taken the words, "Thou shalt die."

"We are bound," says he, "to take the words as Adam himself would have taken them. He had just been constituted 'a living

soul;' and to him the sentence would have been understood as though God had said to him, Live to me, or cease to live; a sentence which must have commended itself as equitable and just, but no more," p. 11.

It is by no means clear from this, however, that Adam did take the words "Thou shalt die" in the sense of ceasing to exist. The premonitions of a future life, to presume upon nothing more, must have been at least as strong in him as they are in ourselves; and it is much more natural to suppose that death meant to him what it has meant ever since, and means now, the termination of life in the body. There is the best reason to believe that to die is not to cease to exist, but merely to change the mode of our existence. Death is, I conceive, but a name for that mode of human existence in which the animal functions are no longer performed.

I ask further, what does our author mean by immortality? He plainly holds an immortal being to be one that *must* live for ever; since he asks, "how can an immortal creature die?" But this I think is not the true meaning of immortality. The idea conveyed by this word in relation to man is that he is *adapted* to live for ever, or that he is not liable to the cessation of conscious being from any natural cause.

With our author's notions of death and immortality, it would of course be contradictory to say that man was both mortal and immortal; but these definitions being repudiated, the alleged contradiction disappears. Man is mortal, that is, liable to a certain change in the mode of his existence arresting his corporeal activity: man is at the same time immortal, that is, not liable to any change from natural causes in the mode of his existence by which his consciousness and intellectual powers might be extinguished. In a word, he has a mortal body and an immortal soul. No proof of man's mortality, therefore, constitutes any argument against his immortality.

To his interpretation of the words "Thou shalt die," the author admits

"It may be objected that Adam did not die, did not cease to exist, on the day he transgressed. But why? Is it because death meant something else than death? Or is it not because God timely interposed that remedy which now saves the believer from death?" pp. 11, 12.

"Saves the believer *from death?*" The phrase is a

startling one; and so the author evidently felt, for he immediately brings against himself the objection he anticipates from his reader—"Yet Adam died, and believers now die." And thus he answers it:—

"'Yet Adam died, and believers now die!' Yes; but it is to prove the very thing the objection is meant to confute. To prove that life is not now from Adam but from another; not from natural constitution but from altogether a different source. The natural life is resigned by the believer; the Christian dies naturally, that he may rise again to life spiritually. 'It is sown a natural body,' that is, a body animated by natural life; 'it is raised a spiritual body,' that is, a body quickened by the Spirit. 'And so it is written, the first man Adam was made a living soul,' having only natural life; 'the last Adam was made a quickening spirit,' endowing those who are in him with the life of the Spirit, 1 Cor. xv. 44, 45."

"The objection is meant to confute" the assertion that Christ saves believers from death, and the author says they die "to prove" it—meaning, I suppose, that their dying is a proof of it: that is, their dying proves that Christ saves them from death! Doubtless, since, according to him, in death believers cease to exist, and since Adam also thus ceased to exist, if they live any more, *this* will prove that life is not now from Adam or by natural constitution; and this I suppose it must have been the author's intention to say.

How, then, does a deceased Christian live again? Our author's answer is, that "he dies naturally," and "rises again to life spiritually;" and in confirmation he adduces a passage relating to the resurrection of the body. It appears from this that the author does not believe Christians to exist in any condition but in the body. It might be questioned, indeed, whether he believes in the existence of the human soul at all; since, according to him, the return of the dead Christian to life is effected by the quickening of the body alone, the spirit which ultimately animates it being not a human spirit but the Spirit of God.

If this scheme be somewhat hard of understanding as it relates to believers, how is it capable of application to unbelievers? They also "die naturally," and cease to exist. Do they return to existence or not? If they do not, where is future judgment? If they do, whence do they derive their life?

"The question, however," our author proceeds, "as to the meaning of the sentence is finally decided, and the argument from the original

constitution of man completely set aside by the reason given after the fall for his expulsion from Paradise."

The passage here cited is Gen. iii. 22, 23: "And now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live for ever; therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden."

"That is," says the author, "the Lord, in compassion to his creature, 'in wrath remembering mercy,' here timely interposes to save him from that to which the popular creed condemns him, to save him from perpetuating endlessly a life which in his fallen state could only be miserable. He had not originally made him immortal, and now he will not let him make himself so. This is very plain," pp. 12, 13.

All the force of this argument lies in the assumption that eating of the tree of life was necessary to the endless existence of *the soul* of Adam, which the author quietly takes for granted. That this nutriment was adapted to secure perpetual life for the body may be admitted; but this is nothing to the author's purpose. I cannot admit, however, without proof, that the passage cited means anything more.

I have now treated of all matters brought forward under the first proposition, and may fairly observe, I think, that they go a very little way towards the proof of it. The author has spent his strength in demonstrating what was obvious enough before, that man "was by creation," and he might have added by natural constitution, "mortal;" but his business was to show that man *was not* by creation and natural constitution immortal—quite a different position, towards which he has not directed a single argument. Indeed, he has entirely misconceived the terms.

CHAPTER II.

ON HIS SECOND PROPOSITION.

I ADVANCE now to the second proposition: "That immortality, or eternal life, is in the proper sense of the words derived to man only through Christ," p. 13.

The writer begins this section in the following words:

"That 'the wages of sin is death,' we have seen, is the statement of the Scriptures from the beginning." This is clearly an inaccurate representation. What we have seen is that death was to Adam the penalty of eating the forbidden fruit; but it by no means follows from this that death is the wages of sin universally. Adam's position in relation to *this* act of disobedience to God was peculiar, and so may have been—so must have been—his punishment. In the fact stated there is no warrant for believing that death would have been the punishment of any other sin on the part of our first parent, or that it is the intended punishment of any of the sins of his posterity.

Our author goes on to say that "the statement" that "the wages of sin is death," "is afterwards repeated in passages [of Scripture] too numerous to quote." I think this also an affirmation as destitute of correctness as it is here of proof; but I can of course enter into no investigation until proof is given. That the apostle does, in Rom. vi. 23, say that "the wages of sin is death" is quite true, and his testimony needs no confirmation. What, however, is the real meaning of his words? He himself teaches us in the same epistle, that death "entered into the world" by the sin of *one* man, and that by the force of that one transgression it "passed upon all men," Rom. v. 12. If it were not so, indeed, why do infants die, who have committed no sin? Death is thus "the wages of sin," indeed; but of Adam's sin, and not our own. Yet the latter is the sense in which our author is continually reiterating the words, as though death were the penalty universally attached to sin as a breach of the moral law. In the literal sense of the term death this is not true; and hence arises a necessity from which there is no escape, of understanding it in the passage before us in a figurative manner.

As though he thought it a point of great importance, however, the author proceeds to adduce further proof of his opinion from the nature of the expiation offered by Jesus Christ. This, he insists, consisted *exclusively in his death;* and hence he infers that the penalty of sin was death.

"What is that," he exclaims, "in the suffering of which Christ is declared to have made atonement? The answer is *his death.* . . . What is the inference we are to draw as to the desert of man's sin, and the meaning of that death which is all through the Scriptures declared to be the wages of sin? *That it is literal death,*" pp. 15, 16.

Now to assert that the expiation offered by Christ consisted *exclusively* in his death, is to take an extreme position not to be maintained without difficulty. To say nothing of the humiliation characteristic of our Lord's whole existence on earth, and of the multiplied sufferings in view of which he was designated in anticipation by the prophet as "a man of sorrows," the evangelical narrative makes us acquainted with a large amount of internal anguish, endured by him in such immediate connexion with his death as to be scarcely separable from it. The sorrows of Gethsemane and the agony on the cross were surely parts of the great sacrifice. Where else, indeed, was that which Isaiah denominates "the travail of his soul"? Or what account can be given of these agonies, if we refuse to refer them, as has hitherto been done by theologians with a very general consent, to the department of expiatory suffering?* Take away this explanation and the fact remains in an utter darkness which our author has not made a single effort to dissipate. For my own part, while assigning to Christ's death an indispensable and most important place among the constituent elements of his expiatory sacrifice, I deny that it constituted the whole offering, and declare my conviction that the very foundation of our author's argument on this subject is unsound.

I demur also to the principle implied in the author's argument, that Christ in effecting atonement suffered *precisely the penalty* denounced against the transgressor. Such a view is not necessary to the scriptural conception of the atonement, and is liable to very serious objections. I feel consequently no force in reasoning of this sort:—

"If the never-ending sufferings of a creature essentially immortal be the wages of sin, has Christ paid this penalty, and discharged the debt of justice? Palpably not. He has paid no such penalty. . . . If the souls of those for whom he vouchsafed to substitute himself were under the sentence of endless suffering, then did he make his soul liable to the same," pp. 16, 17.

This is an unscriptural view of the case. Christ suffered "the just for the unjust," in such manner as to render it compatible with the judicial righteousness of God that he should exercise mercy towards sinners; but that this involves his enduring the precise penalty denounced by the

* See Dwight's Theology, Disc. 56.

law against every individual transgressor, is neither stated in Scripture nor yet demonstrated by argument.* On the footing on which our author places the matter, indeed, it would seem to be necessary that Christ should have died many times, since his dying once cannot be taken to be enduring more than the penalty denounced, according to the author, against a single transgressor.

Besides, as the author himself perceives, his scheme of atonement precludes, not merely endless suffering, but *any* suffering *after death*, from forming part of the sinner's sentence and condemnation, "inasmuch as Christ did not suffer the one any more than the other." His answer to this objection is in the following words:—

"It is indeed admitted, and distinctly recognized, as a most important truth of Scripture, that there is suffering after death in the instances of the damned; that they live after their departure from this life, until that event emphatically called 'the second death,' Rev. xx. 6, 14. But while a state of intermediate suffering between the first and second death is here distinctly admitted, it is at the same time denied, first, that this after-existence is a consequence, still less a proof, of constitutional immortality in man; and, secondly, that it [the suffering] is any part of the wages of sin, or of the sentence which Christ died to expiate. No; it is asserted, without fear of refutation, that this is ever in Scripture spoken of as a special condemnation awarded to those who are unbelievers ('who received not the love of the truth that they might be saved'—who have heard, but 'have not obeyed the Gospel of Christ.' Compare Mark xvi. 15, 16; Acts xvii. 30, 31; 2 Thess. i. 8, 9, and ii. 12. Even the rich man in the parable, who 'lifted up his eyes in hell,' had been a despiser of the Word of God, had, with his five brethren refused to hear 'Moses and the prophets'),—and, being the sentence of those who disown the Redeemer, no one was ever redeemed from it. It presupposes the atonement, and therefore could not be the object of it. Thus far, then, as to the reason why Christ did not endure this suffering," pp. 18, 19.

The first thing that strikes me in the consideration of this passage is its palpable inconsistency with the author's notion of death. To die is, with him, "ceasing to exist;" yet here he recognizes it "as a most important truth of Scripture," that even wicked men "live after their departure from this life." That is, they exist after they cease to exist. Is this less than contradictory?

I notice in the next place, his extraordinary view of the

* See Wardlaw on the Atonement, p. 54 *et seq.*, and Jenkyn on the Atonement, p. 290 *et seq.*

"suffering after death," which he admits "in the instances of the damned." This, he says, is not "any part of 'the wages of sin,'" but "a special condemnation awarded to those who are unbelievers." Suppose this were granted, surely unbelief is a sin. If not, why is any condemnation awarded to it? And if the wages of this sin be not death, but some special suffering after death, then it cannot be said that death is the wages of sin, since there is a large amount of sin of which death is not the wages. According to his interpretation of the Scriptures, however, the punishment of unbelief *is* death, as appears from one of the passages he himself has cited, viz., 2 Thess. i. 8, 9, where we are told that those who "obey not the Gospel shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord."

Our author further says the sufferings of unbelievers after death form no part "of the sentence which Christ died to expiate," which "being the sentence of those who disown the Redeemer, no one was ever redeemed from it." Is this credible? Has no one, then, ever been forgiven the sin of unbelief? And upon what ground has this sin so often been forgiven, if the expiation of Christ did not extend to it? "It presupposes the atonement," says our author, "and therefore could not be the object of it." This is fatal reasoning, if true; for a very large part of the sins of those who have heard the Gospel "presupposes the atonement," and must be according to him unatoned for, and consequently unpardonable. Yet he is only consistent with himself in coming to this conclusion, which results directly from the theory that Christ, in expiating sin, suffered the precise penalty due to the sinner; since, in that case, he could suffer only the penalty due for transgressions of the moral law. The impossibility of acquiescing in such a conclusion supplies a powerful reason for adopting a different view of the atonement.

Our author perceives a difficulty of another kind. If the penalty of sin was death—"a ceasing for ever to live"—and if Christ suffered precisely this penalty, how did he rise from the dead, and live again? He replies as follows:—

"The answer to this is obvious; viz., that Christ was raised from the dead, not in the power of natural life, but of his divine life—that life which was not forfeited because not originally possessed by man, but with which human nature was endowed in the person of Christ

when he was conceived by the Holy Ghost. Accordingly, his resurrection . . . is the reasserting of the divine life in him, not of that which is natural or merely human. To have done this last—to have lived again in the power of natural or merely human life—would have been an evasion of the sentence of death, which, as it respects man without divine life, is final and irrevocable," p. 17.

From this it appears to be the author's opinion that our blessed Lord in dying, did, as man, "cease to exist." During at least three days that glorious person, Immanuel, God with us, had no being! Did Christ himself anticipate this when he said to the dying thief, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise"? Or the Spirit of prophecy when inditing the words, "Thou shalt not leave my soul in Hades"? Or how is this reconcilable with the author's admission of the continued existence after death of even wicked men?

Christ's return to life, however, after professedly submitting himself to the doom of final and irrevocable cessation of being, our author admits has the appearance of "an evasion of the sentence;" an imputation from which, according to him, the Redeemer escapes only by having exercised in this matter his divine and not his human vitality. Now I do not see the force of this. I think if it would have been an evasion in one way it was so in the other. The whole representation, however, is unscriptural. The resurrection of the Lord Jesus is nowhere ascribed to himself. On the contrary, the uniform testimony of the apostles was, "GOD hath raised him from the dead." And this is another proof that, in the judgment of the Eternal Father at least, the sentence under which his beloved Son had fallen did not award a final and irrevocable cessation of existence.

At this point our author closes his arguments in support of his opinion that death, or cessation of being, is the punishment of sin. In my judgment he is very far from having proved it; but whether he has proved it or not, it seems to me altogether irrelevant to his object. If, as appears, he wishes to infer from it that man was mortal, this is plain enough without the trouble of demonstration. His proper object was to show that man was not by creation immortal, towards which he has not advanced a single step. On the contrary his argument favours the sentiment that man is by creation immortal, since it leaves us to infer that his being, if it had not been brought to an end by an act of punishment, would have found no other termination.

CHAPTER III.

ON HIS SECOND PROPOSITION CONTINUED.

ENTERING now on a new department of evidence, the author refers to the terms in which "the salvation effected by Christ is most commonly expressed;" "such as the word *immortality* itself, *life*, and *eternal life*," p. 19. This is a very important branch of the argument, and deserves a most careful examination.

1. He takes first the word IMMORTALITY, and observes, "that it is exclusively applied to those who are saved, and spoken of in a way utterly inconsistent with the supposition that all are immortal," p. 20. The author here refers to pages 4 and 5, where he has given a list of the places in which the words *ἀθανασία*, *ἀφθαρσία*, and *ἄφθαρτος*, in our version rendered "immortality," "incorruption," and "incorruptible," are used; and where he pleases himself with the observation, that, "in all cases the application is either to God, or that which is of God, his people, their inheritance, their resurrection, and reward." Be it so. On the other hand, a careful examination of the passages (they are but few) fully authorizes me to say, that in no case is either of these terms used to denote "the salvation effected by Christ." But this is the author's point. Everything short of this is inconclusive and irrelevant.

To look, however, at the passages apart.

(1.) That which the author first notices, and on which he lays the greatest stress, is Rom. ii. 6, 7;—God, "who will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who, by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory, honour, and *immortality*, eternal life."

Before this passage can be fairly weighed, however, the reader must decide for himself a question relating to its real scope and intention. By the commentators different, and indeed opposite views of it have been taken; some referring it to the Gospel, and others to the law. I see difficulties which appear to me not only great but insuperable in interpreting it of the evangelical method of God towards men, and I am constrained to agree with those who regard the

whole passage, ver. 6 to 11, as an exhibition of the requirements and sanctions of God's moral government. Should the reader agree with me in this view, he will feel that the text cited by our author is altogether inapplicable to his purpose, since he adduces it to prove that immortality is the *gift of Christ*, and expressive of "the salvation effected by him."

While this is a sufficient answer so far as our author's use of the text is concerned, I am aware that it leaves me open to the question, "Was undying existence, then, held out as the reward of obedience to the law? For if so, adaptation to it was not a natural property of man." I answer by saying that I do not think the position of the word immortality in this case allows it to be taken in its ordinary meaning. For this opinion I assign the following reasons:—

1. The general import of the passage, every other part of which obviously refers to happiness and misery respectively; see from ver. 6 to 11.

2. The close connexion of "immortality" with "glory and honour," words which immediately precede it, and seem to require for it a meaning congruous with their own.

3. The substitution of the word "peace" for it, when the whole phrase is repeated in the tenth verse. Upon examining the context, the reader will clearly see that the apostle's statement is in a duplicate form, ver. 9 and 10 being a repetition inversely of ver. 7 and 8. "Glory, honour, and *peace*," consequently, in ver. 10, must be taken as the equivalent of "glory, honour, and *immortality*," in ver. 7.

These reasons satisfy me that the word immortality ought here to be taken, either figuratively as a noun denoting happiness, or as an adjective, as if the apostle by hendiadys had said, "immortal glory and honour." There is critical authority for both these views, and the reader may adopt that which he prefers.

(2.) The passage next quoted by our author is 2 Tim. i. 10;—"Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel." The manner in which he makes this bear on his object is as follows:—

"It is to be observed that 'life and immortality' are 'brought to light,' not (as often asserted) in contradistinction to the comparative obscurity of Old Testament revelations, but to death:—'Who hath *abolished death*, and brought life and immortality to light;' namely,

by his resurrection as 'the first-begotten from the dead,' and 'the firstfruits of them that slept,'" p. 4.

Of the author's assertion that "life and immortality are brought to light *in contradistinction to death*," I must simply say that I cannot understand it. When he affirms that Christ abolished death and brought life and immortality to light "*by his resurrection*," I wish to know whether he regards the resurrection of Christ as an instructive fact, making a certain truth more evident than it was before, or as a procuring cause, by which a certain benefit has been efficaciously obtained. If the latter, I object entirely to his interpretation. To the former I could accede; not, however, as doing justice to the apostle's meaning, but as being a consistent part of a more general idea. For the reader will be good enough to notice what the author has not brought under his attention, namely, that the apostle declares Christ to have abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light "*through the Gospel*." The whole affair, therefore, is one of instruction, or illumination. In the clearness with which the whole scheme of redemption is now visible, since the life and death, the resurrection and ascension, of the Lord Jesus, the future prospects of mankind have become clear too. It is now evident that death is not to be the end of man, but that there is on the contrary an endless existence beyond it, in which the several issues of the dispensation of mercy will be developed.

If the view above given be satisfactory, it is obvious that the word immortality as here used cannot be taken to denote "the salvation effected by Christ," as our author asserts; but that it relates rather to the attributes and destiny of mankind.

(3.) The remaining instances I need not notice in detail. One of them relates to God (1 Tim. vi. 16), four to the resurrection of the body (in 1 Cor. xv.), and two are metaphors for purity (Eph. vi. 24; Titus ii. 7). What can the author prove by these? The use of the adjective clearly proves nothing at all. His point is, that "the salvation effected by Christ" is scripturally expressed by the word immortality; and his proof totally fails.

2. He next adduces the word LIFE, of which he says with justice that it is an "expression for the benefits of Christ's death," p. 20. The passages he cites are doubtless to the

point, and many such will readily occur to every reader. Into his remarks on this word it will be proper fully to enter.

On concluding his enumeration of texts, he thus argues :—

"Now what is the meaning of 'life' in all these passages? And why of all words is it thus selected to express the first of all the blessings of redemption, if all have life by nature, life in its fullest extent, immortal life? And above all, how are we to receive the last of these sayings, 'He that hath the Son hath life, and HE THAT HATH NOT THE SON HATH NOT LIFE'? Shall we give it a positive contradiction, and read it, He that hath the Son hath life, and so has he that hath not the Son? It is easy to say that life is not here meant by life. And why, then (with reverence we would ask), why did not God say what he meant? Why, since all have life, do we not find the difference of the life marked (as was so easy to do) by some such qualifying terms as a *blessed* life and a *miserable* life? Much is said about the Scriptures abounding in figurative language. But unless it be maintained that the whole is figurative, and the words are nowhere used in their plain meaning, these passages must be excepted, as it cannot be said they are taken from the poetical books, or quoted out of contexts couched in allegory or symbolical in their structure. Moreover, as has been before observed, this term 'life,' like immortality, is nowhere predicated of the lost," pp. 21, 22.

The author begins by asking, "What is the meaning of life in all these passages?" A fair and important question, which I will endeavour frankly and candidly to settle with him.

Before we can determine what is the meaning of life "in these passages," however, we must ascertain what are the meanings of the word itself; first its primary or literal meaning, and then the other meanings, analogical or figurative, in which it is found to have been employed. In this necessary undertaking I am sorry to say the author affords no help. According to him life means life—no more; so simple in his view is this question. Not so, however, in fact.

Life is a word primarily used to express the active or living condition of organic substances; and it is not in its strict or literal sense applicable to anything but organic substances, vegetable or animal. When applied to any other objects it is on the ground of some analogy or resemblance; that is, consequently, not literally but figuratively. Thus I ascribe life to a tree, an animal, and a man, strictly and literally; but if I ascribe it to the soul of man, to God and other incorporeal beings, or to any condition of human

existence, I do so on the ground of some resemblance and implied comparison between these objects respectively and the active condition of organic substances, that is to say, by a figure of speech. As the fact of this implied comparison cannot be doubted, so the elements of it are by no means difficult of detection. As the active condition of an organic substance is the only one in which it is capable of effecting the ends of its organization, so the conscious condition of a thinking substance, or spirit, is the only one in which it is capable of effecting the purposes for which it has been endowed with thinking powers; hence the term life, which belongs in strictness to an organized substance in a state of activity, may be applied to a thinking substance in a state of consciousness. The use of the term life to denote happiness is derived from the animal organization, which is characterized by a quick sensibility to pleasure and pain. As an active condition of the animal organization naturally affords physical gratification, and may be said in fact to comprehend all physical gratifications, since they are all states, however diversified, of the animal organization itself, and so to live is to be happy; in like manner we have adopted a mode of speech according to which to be happy is to live :— "For now *we live*, if ye stand fast in the Lord," 1 Thess. iii. 8.

Now let us inquire what is the meaning of life in the passages before us; in this, for example, "the promise of life in Christ Jesus," 2 Tim. i. 1.

Of course we take in the first instance the literal meaning, and see if this will do :—"The promise of the active condition of our organized substance." Will this do? Clearly not, and by universal consent. Let us then try another, and the nearest to this, as formed on the simplest analogy—the conscious existence of a thinking substance, or spirit. The text would then read, "The promise of conscious existence in Christ Jesus." Whether this would be satisfactory to our author I have no means of ascertaining, but from the tenor of his book I think it might be so. If not, however, it is plain that he must avail himself of a meaning founded on some remoter analogy, and consequently the more open to the remark I am about to make. For I beg the reader to observe that in taking life to mean conscious existence, we have already departed from its literal import, and have adopted an analogical or figurative signification. Now it

is on the importance of taking the word literally, and rejecting all figurative senses, that our author lays the main stress of his argument; yet he himself has done, and is obliged to do, the very same thing. Or, if he will still cling to the literal meaning of life, I require him to establish some other than that which I have given above.

Let us now hear no more of the boast of literal meanings. We alike deal in figures of speech; and the only question between us will be whether the meaning adopted by one party can be shown to be scripturally preferable to the meaning adopted by the other. We will proceed to put this to the test.

As nearly as I can ascertain it, the meaning which our author attaches to the term life is conscious existence. Now if this rendering be proposed—"the promise of conscious existence in Christ Jesus"—I say at once that it is to my mind very unsatisfactory. And the reason is this, that life is, as the author justly states, an "expression for THE BENEFITS of Christ's death," not for one but for the whole of them. Now "the benefits of Christ's death," must—it will be universally admitted that they do—extend far beyond conscious existence.

This meaning of life being here unsatisfactory, I propose one in the room of it; namely, happiness, a meaning given to the word on the ground of a just analogy, and one in which it is well known to have been frequently employed. Let us then try it. The passage will now read, "The promise of happiness in Christ Jesus." I do not see why this should not afford satisfaction in all cases in which life is used to express "the benefits of Christ's death," inasmuch as these are all of the general nature of happiness, and readily conceived of as included in the term. Our author's grand argument against it would be that it is taking life in a figurative sense, whereas he would take it in a literal one, in that, namely, of conscious existence. I have already shown, however, that conscious existence is *not* the literal meaning of life, but that on the contrary it is as truly a figurative meaning as happiness is, so that there is no force in this argument; and I do not see any other in bearing, either expressed or by implication.

Having thus answered the author's first question, I proceed to his second—"Why, of all words, is it (life) thus

selected to express the first of all the blessings of redemption, if all have life by nature, life in its fullest extent, immortal life?"

I must rectify this question a little. The author here represents life as scripturally selected "to express *the first* of the blessings of redemption." I think this is not the fact. He is undoubtedly much more correct in his previous statement, which I have already accepted and to which I adhere, that life is an "expression for THE BENEFITS of Christ's death," that is, for the WHOLE of them.

Thus rectified the question is not relevant. The supposed fact that all have life by nature presents no reason why the word may not be used to express "the blessings of salvation;" in other words, the use of the word life according to one analogy to denote conscious existence, creates no difficulty in the way of its being used according to another analogy to denote happiness. The pith of the author's question lies in the disguised assumption that life in the sense of conscious existence is *one*, "the first," of the blessings of redemption. Having assumed this, which is the whole matter in debate, he triumphantly asks how can all have the same thing by nature? I deny, and have already disproved, the assumption.

Our author now proceeds to a third question:—

"Above all, how are we to receive this saying, 'He that hath the Son hath life, and HE THAT HATH NOT THE SON HATH NOT LIFE'? Shall we give it a positive contradiction, and read it, 'He that hath the Son hath life; and so has he that hath not the Son'?"

The author will undoubtedly give credit to those who may not concur in his views for revering equally with himself "the Oracles of God," and will believe that, if he could shut us up to a "contradiction" of them, we should contend no longer. But what has he here done? He has put a question the whole force of which lies in supposing us to admit that the life which we affirm all men to have by nature is the same that Christ gives. But we do not admit this; on the contrary we strongly deny it. What we affirm is that all men have by nature life in the sense of conscious existence, and that believers receive from Christ life in the sense of happiness; and these affirmations are clearly *not* contradictory.

Our author maintains that this is "to say that life is not

here meant by life;" thus arguing as though life were a word of absolutely simple import—as though it meant one thing which nobody could mistake, and nothing besides. If this be so I require him to define the term. To say that life means life (which is all that he has here said on the subject) is indeed "easy," but it neither conveys instruction nor concludes an argument.*

"And why then," he continues ("with reverence we would ask), why did not God say what he meant?" This language is more vehement than convincing. If it means anything to the purpose, it means that God is not at liberty to employ any word which is capable of being used in two senses, which would be to deny him the use of human language altogether.

"Why," proceeds our author, "since all have life, do we not find the difference of life marked (as was so easy to do) by some such qualifying terms as a *blessed* life, and a *miserable* life?" To me it reads painfully that a man who professes a due reverence for his Maker should thus undertake to instruct him in "the grammar of the English tongue." If, however, reasons may without presumption be assigned why the Most High God did not adopt the form of phraseology prescribed for him by the author, these perhaps may have

* In p. 6, the author pursues a similar line of argument in relation to the words death, perdition, and destruction, as used in Scripture to denote the future condition of the wicked. He says that to maintain a figurative interpretation of these terms in this connexion is to affirm that, "so far from being used in their true and obvious sense, they actually denote the very opposite; and are intended to describe a condition of being—eternal life in other circumstances—immortality, but in a state of misery and suffering."

The author here imperfectly expresses his own meaning. He says that to take the words in question figuratively is to regard them as describing "a condition of being;" which is true, but is not what he intends. The instances which follow demonstrate that what he means to accuse the "popular" party of, is not regarding these words as denoting "a condition of being," but regarding them as denoting *being itself* with a condition attached. Thus he represents us as holding that death means "eternal life in other circumstances; immortality, but in a state of misery and suffering." Now this is not true. We do not understand death as meaning eternal life, or immortality, in any circumstances; but, conscious existence being presupposed, we understand death to mean simply the condition of that existence, namely, misery. This is strictly in keeping with the law of figurative interpretation, according to which, although words come to mean something different from their primary and literal—or, according to our author, "their true and obvious"—senses, they do not, of course, "actually denote the very opposite."

been among them:—First, that it was not necessary, since the words actually employed distinctly convey the meaning intended. Secondly, that it would not have been appropriate; since in a case in which "all have life," that is, conscious existence, it would have been improper to express "the benefits of redemption" by the phrase "a blessed *life*," or the sufferings of the impenitent by the phrase "a miserable *life;*" the issues are much more correctly denoted by the terms *blessedness* and *misery*. Thirdly, that it would have been deplorably feeble. Blessedness is, indeed, the meaning; but life as a metaphor conveys the meaning in a manner far more forcible. It is, in truth, the most expressive metaphor for happiness ever used in the language of mankind.

After the questions which I have thus successively noticed, our author proceeds:—"Much is said about the Scriptures abounding in figurative language;" and he makes a strong effort to preserve the word life in the passages quoted from being swallowed up in this vortex, so fatal to "plain meanings." He does not perceive, however, that he is as much indebted to figures of speech as I am. His notion that conscious existence is the "plain" or primary meaning of life is a pure fiction. The primary or literal meaning of life is the active condition of an organized substance; and if he really will have nothing to do with analogical or figurative meanings, I must resolutely hold him to this.

The author sums up this part of his argument by saying, "Life is nowhere predicated of the lost;" that is, life when used as a metaphor for happiness is nowhere predicated of the lost! Of course it is not. They have no happiness to be expressed by it.

3. From life our author proceeds to ETERNAL LIFE, which, he justly says, "is another frequent expression for salvation," p. 22.

After quoting Rom. vi. 23, "The wages of sin is DEATH, but the gift of God is ETERNAL LIFE through Jesus Christ our Lord," he asks, "Where is the sense of saying that the gift of God through Jesus Christ is that which all men have already?" Here I have only to repeat that no one says this. What we affirm is that all men have life in the sense of conscious existence, and that Christ gives life in the sense of blessedness; which is clearly not contradictory.

"And what," he continues, "is the meaning of eternal life in this passage? With what is it placed in contrast? With DEATH." Good. But what then is death? For unless we know what death is we shall learn nothing from its being contrasted with life. Upon this subject the author has not here favoured us with any remarks; his idea clearly is, however, that death means the cessation of being. But this is an inaccurate notion. Death, in its strict and primary import, signifies nothing more than that condition of an organized substance in which the organic functions have ceased; and life is no doubt its opposite. If the author, in his ardent love for plain meanings, shall be pleased to adopt these ideas, I make him welcome to them. For my own part I much rather consent to the alternative of taking both death and life in this passage in an analogical sense, although with a certainty of encountering what the author seems somewhat unreasonably frightened at, "a double metaphor." That death must in this place be taken analogically for suffering, I have already shown (p. 117); and accordingly it follows that life also should be taken analogically for blessedness.

We have next a citation of John iii. 16:—"God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not PERISH, but have EVERLASTING LIFE;" and then the following appeal:—

"What would the writer of a dictionary of Scripture terms say is the meaning of 'everlasting life' in this passage, according to the rules of sound and honest interpretation? That, being contrasted with 'perish,' it must be understood literally, unless to perish be to live everlastingly, and then there is no contrast in the passage."

My answer to this is that I will grant the author what he contends for, namely, the literal interpretation of the word life—that is, the active condition of an organized substance. Is he contented? If not, and if he may be supposed to tell me that the meaning he wishes to attach to life is conscious existence, I repeat to him that he comes into the region of analogical meanings, and abandons his argument from the literal meaning altogether. And since he thus adopts an analogical meaning for life, I require him to give an analogical meaning to the word perish also, on the ground of consistency. Who knows but upon inquiry this might come to be fairly understood of misery? And then the passage might after all retain its simplicity and beauty.

The author concludes this section with a somewhat startling and amusing assertion, that, according to the Scriptures, Christ is our life "IN EVERY SENSE OF THE WORD," p. 23. Less than a page back he was contending for the exemption of his favourite term from figurative meanings. Alas for the intoxication of an imaginary triumph!

CHAPTER IV.

ON HIS THIRD PROPOSITION.

HAVING fully discussed the matter adduced under the second proposition, I proceed now to the third, which is as follows:—"That it [immortality] is communicated in regeneration, and is identical with the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ in believers," p. 23.

The author introduces this section hypothetically.

"If," says he, "man were by natural constitution possessed of immortality, then would we expect to find the Scriptures insisting only on a modification of that life, a change of its dispositions, and a new direction of its powers, as necessary to his seeing the kingdom of God." *Ibid.*

Exactly so. Accordingly Paul tells us that he testified everywhere "repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ," Acts xx. 21; and substantially similar was the exhortation of Peter, "Repent ye, and be converted," Acts iii. 19. The author, therefore, would seem to have put the matter conclusively against himself.

He escapes, however, from this apparently imminent peril by the help of another hypothesis.

"Whereas," he continues, "if it be true that immortal life is altogether distinct from natural life—a *new life*, and from another source—then, on the other hand, we would expect to hear of a NEW GENERATION, and to find it written that 'Except a man be BORN AGAIN he cannot see the kingdom of God.' In other words, we would expect to find, not merely conversion or repentance, but regeneration insisted on in the Scriptures as necessary to our partaking of everlasting life. Now what is the fact?" p. 23.

Clearly it is a matter of divine testimony that "Except a

man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God." In devoutly receiving this testimony I am sure the author and myself fully agree. The matters which will come under discussion arise out of his view of the nature of regeneration.

This is further presented to us in the following terms:—

"The Scriptures, teaching that immortality is only through Christ and is in fact the life of God—of him 'who only hath immortality'—participated by the redeemed, teach also the doctrine of regeneration by the Spirit of God, *an actual* communication of the Spirit as the commencement of a new life, as that life in itself; whereas the popular creed, teaching that man has eternal life by nature, has been constrained to explain regeneration in such a way as reconciles it with this persuasion, to make it identical with conversion and a change of heart or affection, which is in fact to deny that there is any such thing as regeneration strictly speaking, and to interpret it as a metaphor—'a bold figure of speech' as it has actually been called!" pp. 23, 24.

"The popular creed" does not teach, as the author here affirms, that man has by nature "eternal life," but immortality; that is, an adaptation to live for ever. It pleases him to confound these terms; but as the difference between them is substantial, so it is important that it should be kept clearly before the reader.

"The popular creed" does not necessarily, as the author further alleges, confound regeneration with conversion. A difference between them is to be traced in the nature of things, and the difference has been very properly marked in systematic theology. In a change produced by divine power the act which produces it may fairly be distinguished from the result which is produced. And such is both the connexion and the difference between regeneration and conversion: regeneration is the exercise of divine power on the heart; conversion is the great transformation which arises from it. At the same time this distinction is not to be traced in the *scriptural use* of the term regeneration, which will, in all cases if I mistake not, be found to refer to the great transformation itself, and not to the act of divine power which has effected it.

Thus distinguishing between regeneration and conversion, however, I shall not satisfy the author, inasmuch as I still use the term regeneration as a figure of speech and not literally,—a freedom at which he is particularly scandalized. He, on the contrary, insists on "a new generation" in the physical sense of the term.

In support of this view he adduces the authority of our Lord in his conversation with Nicodemus.

"When the Lord told Nicodemus the necessity for regeneration, that 'except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God,' and found that he understood him literally of a new or second birth, how did he answer him? . . . He corrected, indeed, his misconception, but how? Not by saying that he did not mean a literal new or second birth, but that it was not, as Nicodemus thought, a second birth after the flesh, a second birth of natural life. 'Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man be born of water and of the Spirit he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.' Thus, for the words 'born again,' which he had first used, he substitutes 'born of the Spirit,'" pp. 24, 26.

I interrupt the quotation at this point, for the purpose of noticing an inaccuracy not without meaning or importance. The author states that Christ substituted for the phrase "born again," the phrase "born of the Spirit." Now this is not the fact. The phrase which the Great Teacher substituted for "born again," was "born *of water* and of the Spirit." This appears to me to be fatal to the author's intended argument. But let us now follow out the quotation.

"'That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit.' As if he had said, Your mistake is in taking the second birth to be after the flesh; it is a birth of the Spirit," p. 25.

Now here is a most extraordinary and unintelligible use of words. A *literal birth* is, it would seem, necessarily "after the flesh;" a "birth of the Spirit" in no way fulfils the conditions of such a process. To a common understanding our Lord's declaration that the second birth he intended was not "after the flesh," but "of the Spirit," must have conveyed the idea that it was not literal but analogical. If this is not plain to the author the reader must judge between us.

It is in harmony with this baseless notion of a literal second birth, that he describes regeneration as constituting its subject "literally and truly a child of God—a 'partaker of the divine nature,'" p. 25. The latter phrase is undoubtedly scriptural, but a reference to the context will show that the apostle used it with a very different view from the author's. The whole verse reads thus:—

"Whereby [by whom] are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises, that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust," 2 Pet. i. 4.

Now, upon the reading of this verse, it is obvious that the agency indicated is not that of the Holy Spirit but of Gospel truth, and that the effect intended is the holy result of the Gospel in transforming the believer into the moral likeness of God. Let it be granted, however, for the sake of argument, that the phrase "partakers of the divine nature" shall be taken literally; I then ask:—

1. Is not the fact thus asserted an impossibility? The divine nature, as I conceive it revealed, is in all respects infinite. In what sense can it be held to be communicable?

2. If it were admitted to be possible, could the effect of it be less than the deification of the party so endowed? Is the "nature" of God separable from God himself, or from his essential and distinguishing attributes?

In page 26, the author lays claim to the texts which speak of "an indwelling of the Spirit of God" in believers, as if this word indicated something more than "an influence." As he adduces nothing in proof of his view, it may be enough to say that in my judgment the indwelling of the Spirit is most satisfactorily conceived of as consisting in the continual exercise of a gracious influence on the heart. The Holy Spirit, no doubt, is, and from his divine nature must be, omnipresent; and the only sense in which he can be said to *dwell* in one place and not in another must be that of gracious manifestation or influence.

The author affirms that with this indwelling Spirit is connected immortality, and in proof he adduces 1 Peter i. 23, 25.

> "This," says he, "may be considered to be decided by the apostle Peter, who, speaking of regeneration, says it is a birth of incorruptible seed. 'Being born again, not of corruptible seed but of incorruptible, by the Word of God which LIVETH AND ABIDETH FOR EVER. For all flesh is grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of grass: the grass withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away, but the Word of the Lord ENDURETH FOR EVER, and this is the word which by the Gospel is preached unto you.' . . . Thus is 'incorruptibility,' and 'living and abiding for ever' (in other words 'immortality'), connected with regeneration," p. 26.

It will be difficult for the author, however, to discover in this passage any reference to the influence of the SPIRIT, which is the declared purpose for which he adduces it. The fact is that the apostle is describing the effect, not of the Spirit, but of the truth; "being born again . . . by

the WORD of God." It is the Word of God which "liveth and abideth for ever;" that is to say, it is adapted to produce a permanent and eternal transformation. The passage is altogether inapplicable to the author's design.

"But," says he, as if conscious of weakness, "the GREAT PROOF that immortality is identical with the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ, or regeneration, is in the connexion ever stated in Scripture between this truth and the resurrection—that is, the resurrection of the believer—'the resurrection of LIFE,' as it is emphatically called," p. 27.

This sentence requires analysis. First, the author says there is stated in Scripture a connexion between the doctrine of regeneration and "the resurrection." Does he mean to maintain this? He cannot, since the wicked rise as well as the righteous. Accordingly, by the help of a dash he shifts his position a little, and affirms that there is stated in Scripture a connexion between the doctrine of regeneration and "the resurrection of the believer." Does he mean to maintain this? Again he cannot; because the resurrection occurs to all whether just or unjust. Again, therefore, by the help of a dash he modifies his assertion, and tells us at last that there is stated in Scripture a connexion between the doctrine of regeneration and "the resurrection of LIFE." Most safe and innocent conclusion! After our Lord's words in John v. 29, is it necessary to set out upon an argument to prove this? Or this being proved, does it aid him in showing that regeneration is identical with immortality?

Our author in p. 30, gives us his view of this passage (John v. 29), in the following terms:—

"And so, in order that all may appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, it is declared by him that 'the hour is coming in which all that are in their graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth, they that have done good to the resurrection of LIFE' (another of those remarkable passages where 'life,' simply and by itself, is used to mark the great distinction between the saved and the lost), 'and they that have done evil to the resurrection of damnation:' where 'damnation' being opposed to 'life' teaches us that, whatever be the previous sufferings of the damned, or of however long duration, death is their *ultimate* destination." And he goes on to infer that "there is a resurrection not to life, but with a view to 'second death.'"

Here everything depends on the meaning to be attached to the word life. Our author assumes for it the sense of conscious existence, and then argues that damnation, its opposite, must mean both present suffering and future ex-

tinction. The argument proves too much; for, if it proves anything, it proves that damnation is extinction, in which case the supposed extinction of the wicked would follow *immediately* on their resurrection. But the sense of conscious existence cannot here be assigned to life. It has no claim to preference as literal, for it is not literal; and as an analogical meaning it is altogether unsatisfactory. Life in this place evidently includes the whole felicity of the saints, which is inconceivably more than conscious existence. It must, I think, be understood of happiness, and damnation of suffering. It does not hence appear, consequently, that the resurrection of life is a resurrection to endless existence, or that the resurrection of damnation is a resurrection to extinction. The scriptural connexion between the resurrection of life and regeneration relates merely to the happiness in which the resurrection of the regenerate shall issue.

The author, however, makes another effort.

"Christ," says he, "marks the distinction between resurrection and life, when he says (John xi. 25), 'I am the resurrection and the life.' Why add 'life' to 'resurrection'? Because there is a resurrection not to life, but with a view to 'second death;' and so he proceeds to state that it is to the believer only he is revealed in this character: 'I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead yet shall he live, and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die,'" p. 30.

I think the author has taken these words altogether out of their scope. It deserves to be recollected that they did not constitute a part of a didactic discourse, but that they were uttered in connexion with a particular occurrence, and with a view to prepare the mind of a friend overwhelmed with sorrow for a signal display of the Saviour's power. It was to Martha weeping for the death of Lazarus that Jesus said, "Thy brother shall rise again." Her answer was, "I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day." At this moment, and with a view to call away her thoughts from that remote though glorious period to the hour and the scene where he was about at once to try and to reward her faith, he replied, "I am the resurrection and the life." In other words, "I have power to restore the dead to life, and to preserve the living from death." Such I cannot but take to be the meaning of this declaration; and it seems to me that what follows is an illustration of it in its two parts. "He that believeth in me, though he were dead yet shall he live

[if I please to raise him]; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die [if I please to keep him alive]." The studious reader may here refer to Macknight's note on the place, where this interpretation is well sustained.

With this view of the passage I cannot admit it as any proof that there are to be two kinds of resurrection at the last day, one to conscious existence and another to extinction.

I cannot pass away from this unscriptural notion without remarking on the author's use of the phrase, "second death." He employs it here and elsewhere as though he thought it was literally and scripturally applicable to the final administration of God towards mankind. Now I call this gravely in question.

The only places in which the phrase "the second death" occurs, in either the Old or New Testament, are these:—

Rev. ii. 11. "He that overcometh shall not be hurt of the second death."
Rev. xx. 6. "On such the second death hath no power."
Rev. xx. 14. "The lake of fire. This is the second death."
Rev. xxi. 8. "The lake which burneth with fire and brimstone, which is the second death."

Now it is worthy of remark that this phrase is found nowhere but in the book of Revelation, where it is part and parcel of the mass of splendid symbols of which that book almost wholly consists. Might it not have been expected that, if it had been properly applicable to the final consummation which is in prospect for mankind, it would have been used somewhere else; either in the discourses of our Lord, or in the addresses or writings of the apostles?

I ask, however, whether the author is willing to abide by his own position. Does he really think that death in its literal meaning is to occur to any man a second time? Far from it. The idea he has is that of annihilation, or "ceasing for ever to be." But death is not ceasing to be, it is merely an altered mode of existence. In its literal sense death applies to no part of man but his animal organization. Is the dissolution of this what the author expects to be repeated? Certainly not; neither this, nor anything else which belongs to the literal meaning of death. He looks for an extinction of being; a result of which the phrase "the second death," properly understood, is not expressive.

What the phrase does mean is not obscurely indicated by the circumstances in which it is employed. It is evidently explanatory of an act of vengeance upon God's enemies, described as "casting them into the lake of fire." "This," we are expressly told, "is the second death." Now "the lake of fire" is itself a symbol, as may be inferred, not only generally from its place among symbols, but particularly from the circumstance that personages necessarily symbolical—"death and hell"—are said to be cast into it. Further, it is the manner of the writer of the Apocalypse to elucidate one symbol by another, as when the "two witnesses" are said to be "two olive trees," Rev. xi. 4. "The second death," therefore, is fairly to be regarded as an additional symbol, used to set forth in a more striking manner an awful exercise of divine wrath, which had already been symbolically described as casting vanquished foes into a "lake of fire." Thus understood the phrase is removed altogether from the use which our author has made of it.

To return. Our author, although he has contrived not formally to assert it, does make an attempt to prove that there is a connexion between regeneration and the resurrection of believers. His argument is in the following form.

"We learn that the soul of Christ, which otherwise never would have revived, was quickened by the Spirit after having died: that is, according to the original sentence denounced against man's sin, the human soul of Christ died at the same time with his body. The natural life originally conferred upon Adam, which constituted him 'a living soul,' and which was forfeited by his transgression, was completely resigned by the Redeemer; and when he lived again in soul and body, and rose from the dead, he was *as to both* quickened by the Spirit. Now of this resurrection-life of Christ believers become partakers in regeneration," p. 28.

This is somewhat hard to be understood; for, according to our author, "the resurrection-life of Christ" was preceded by the total extinction of his being as man, both in body and soul, and consisted in a new existence of both, not animated by any human vital power but by the Holy Spirit. Of this "resurrection-life of Christ," says our author, "believers become partakers *in regeneration.*" The period is *rather early;* since at that time they are living by natural power, and can scarcely be supposed with any convenience to live by two powers at once. It might have been time enough to have been made partakers of Christ's "resurrection-life"

when the period of their own resurrection should have arrived. But let us suppose this difficulty out of the way, the author next tells us that believers are in regeneration made partakers of *the life of Christ;* not merely that they live in a similar manner or by the same energy, but that "THE VERY LIFE OF CHRIST is imparted to, and participated in, by the regenerate." What he means by this I cannot tell; unless, which seems possible, it may be an extravagant way of saying that the Spirit by which he alleges Christ to live is imparted to believers. It remains, however, as an objection to the notion that the regenerate live hereafter in the same manner as Christ, that the author holds Christ to live, not as man but solely by the Spirit, and this in consequence of the total extinction of his human being when he suffered the penalty of sin. The natural existence of believers, however, will not become extinct, this extinction being, according to our author, precisely the wages of sin which Christ bore in their stead. They, therefore, will possess an unextinguished being, and will live as men, which Christ does not. It does not appear, therefore, that there is any sense in which believers can be said to become "partakers of Christ's resurrection-life," either here or hereafter.

The author brings two texts of Scripture to his aid, but they render him little service. The first is Ephes. i. 19; which he adduces to prove that regeneration is wrought by the same power that raised Christ from the dead. No doubt; but this does not prove that the two operations are one and the same. The second is Ephes. ii. 5; "Hath quickened us *together with* Christ." But one person may be made alive "together with" another, without becoming partaker of his "very life."

He states his opinion also, that his view is the only one by which justice can be done to the Scripture doctrine of "THE UNION WITH CHRIST," which is now, he tells us, "in common with regeneration," "treated *as an allegory*," p. 29. Either the author here forgets the wide difference between an allegory and a metaphor, or his fairness fails him. Doubtless the union of believers with Christ is, as he justly calls it, "a blessed truth of Scripture;" but this still leaves us to inquire in what sense the words are employed. He insists on the literal sense, I maintain the metaphorical; and

in each case the union is, as both he and I are desirous it should be, a "reality."

In order to make out the literal union for which he contends, the author uses the phrases—"the Spirit of Christ," and "the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus," in the sense in which we say the spirit, or soul of a man,* a course which I cannot but think utterly unwarrantable. Both these phrases occur in the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, the first in the second verse—"the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death:" the second in the ninth verse—"If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." It is surely not necessary to go into an exposition of these texts, in order to be satisfied that the phrases picked out of their connexion by our author will not bear the meaning he has put upon them. The sort of union between Christ and believers which he thus comes to imagine is that of many bodies animated by a single soul!

The author further argues in the following manner:—

"Accordingly, as in Christ, so in the regenerate, the Spirit is the earnest of resurrection. So reasons the apostle, Rom. viii. 11: 'But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by (or because of, *marg.*) his Spirit that dwelleth in you,'" p. 29.

Here the author quietly assumes the literal interpretation of this passage, as though it was undisputed; whereas, in fact, many eminent critics and commentators have understood it as referring to a moral resurrection, and all admit that no interpretation is free from great difficulties. My own opinion has long been in favour of the figurative meaning; but I do not think it worth while to go into the discussion of the question, as I consider the divided sentiment of the critical expositors a sufficient reason for not pressing it into an argument. A disputed passage can *prove* nothing. Even allowing it, however, to relate to the resurrection of the body, it must be taken to refer rather to the manner of it than to the event itself; since, in point of fact, the wicked also will rise. No peculiarity can attach to the righteous in

* "The Spirit of God . . . is the very life of Christ, . . . is hence denominated 'the Spirit of Christ,' and 'the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,'" p. 28.

this matter, or result from the indwelling of the Spirit, except in the glory of their appearance and the blessedness of their condition.

In concluding this part of his argument the author pleases himself with the following reflections,—

> "Here," says he, "we discern the true reason why man, once saved, can never again fall. Because it is the life of Christ, the life 'hid with Christ in God,' of which he is made partaker: 'the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus.' This life Adam had not. He had but the perfection of creature life. He was the head of natural life only. And therefore he fell. But, 'saved in the Lord with an everlasting salvation,' the believer now stands to fall no more," p. 31.

In the excellency and value of this scriptural sentiment I most cordially agree with him; but how nearly he has hit upon "the true reason" of it I must be permitted to doubt. He thinks he has secured it by representing Christ and his people as PHYSICALLY ONE; I confess my preference for the opinion that Christ and his people are SPIRITUALLY ONE.

If, however, on the one hand, the author accomplishes anything satisfactory to himself in this direction by so painfully constructing his theory of a physical union, he lays himself open on the other to a serious objection; for he plainly represents regeneration as a physical act upon God's part, and the transformation produced by it in man as a physical change. He defines regeneration to be "A NEW GENERATION" and "AN ACTUAL COMMUNICATION of THE SPIRIT" (p. 23); and he argues throughout on the supposition stated above. Now if a physical change be held essential to salvation, the great work of redemption is withdrawn from the moral administration of God. It is no longer anything more than an exercise of his creating power, or a department of his sovereign providence.

This is far indeed from being the aspect of the Gospel. There salvation is presented to the hope of man in connexion with commands, exhortations, and encouragements to action, in such a manner as to indicate that by the required action it may be secured; while, on the other hand, inaction is not only lamented as foolish but denounced as criminal, and represented as leaving on the undone the reproach of their own destruction. "Repent ye, and believe the Gospel." "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be condemned." Mark i. 15; xvi. 16.

But all this is unfounded and fallacious if the change required is physical and not moral, not of character but of nature. The aspect of our author's doctrine thus becomes very serious; it amounts to nothing less than an entire subversion of the Gospel.

CHAPTER V.

ON HIS FOURTH PROPOSITION.

HAVING now considered all the matter adduced by our author under the third, I proceed to the fourth proposition, which, we are told, has respect to "the fate of those finally lost." It is in these words:—"That those who do not believe the Gospel, and have not the Spirit of Christ, shall finally be destroyed, or die as to all life," p. 32.

I have already declared my intention not to enter in any way on the question of the duration of future punishment;* and as this is the only question the author proposes to discuss in the present section, my proper course might seem to be to pass it over altogether. A suitable place may be found, however, for two or three observations.

I draw attention in the first place to the limited scope of the proposition itself. It adverts to the future condition of those "who do not believe the Gospel, *and* have not the Spirit of Christ;" but the latter of these descriptions, although capable of a more extended application than the former, is here evidently restricted and determined by it, so that the proposition must be held to relate to the future condition of those *only* who "do not believe the Gospel." In perfect consistency with this interpretation of it, the author begins the discussion by reciting the fact "that a state of suffering after death awaits those who 'obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.'" It is moreover to unbelief *alone*, according to him, that the suffering of which he is about to speak is annexed. There is a large part of mankind, how-

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* Preface.

ever, who, having never heard the Gospel, cannot be ranked with unbelievers. What is to become of these? Our author absolutely closes his argument, and his book, without making a single reference to this question. For what reason he took such a course it is not for me to conjecture; but this may be fairly said, that his having done so deprives his argument of all claim to respect. There is thus a vast portion of the human race who must be disposed of in some manner hereafter; the Scriptures doubtless foreshow their destiny, and it behoved the author to adduce their testimony on this part of his subject. May not the fact that he has not done so be taken as an indication that he could not? Is not his silence a proof that his theory presents to him no method of providing for this part of the case? And is not this inadequacy of his theory a sufficient proof of its fallacy?

Let us see how the matter stands. Our author's positions are—that man is not naturally immortal; that immortality is derived to man through Christ, and communicated in regeneration; and that unbelievers will cease to be. But why UNBELIEVERS? According to the true antithesis he should have spoken of the UNREGENERATE, and this term would, with its counterpart, have comprehended the whole race. Was he afraid to use it? Is it then true that some of the unregenerate, those namely who are not unbelievers, will not cease to be? If so, what becomes of the notion that immortality is derived to man only through Christ? If not so, why does he limit the cessation of being to a part only of the unregenerate, namely, to unbelievers?

Again, in reference to those who will finally cease to be, our author says they will "BE DESTROYED;" meaning, as it would appear, that their existence will be terminated by a divine act of punitive retribution. Now this leaves it to be inferred, that if their existence were not terminated by such an act it might not terminate at all; and as this is the only mode of its termination of which the author gives any intimation, it may be further inferred that men would otherwise, and according to their own nature, live for ever. Here, then, is the doctrine of the natural immortality of man, in the only sense in which it has ever been generally held by Christian professors, taught in "expressive silence" by the author of "Christ our Life"!

But this is not all. If, in the case of unbelievers, an ex-

istence naturally endless is cut off by a divine act, it follows that believers may possess an adaptation to endless existence, or immortality, without deriving it from Christ. Their original nature is the same as that of unbelievers; and I see neither any reason why they should be supposed to be deprived of it, nor any proof of the fact. It seems to me much more reasonable, and much more scriptural, to believe that they will exist for ever in accordance with their primary natural endowments; and that the LIFE they derive from Christ is that glorious felicity which no words can literally express, and which no metaphor can more nobly express than one founded on the existence we originally received from the hands of our Maker.

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

In the year 1844 the Rev. H. H. Dobney, of Maidstone, published a small volume entitled "Notes of Lectures on Future Punishment;" and in the year 1846 he published, under the name of a "Second Edition," a volume considerably larger, entitled "The Scripture Doctrine of Future Punishment."

It does not comport with my design to notice generally the contents of these volumes, which come within the scope of the present work only as calling in question man's immortality. As the second edition, although it is much enlarged, does not contain the whole of the matter to be found in the first, it will be necessary for me, to refer occasionally to both of them.

In his treatment of the subject, Mr. Dobney begins by formally raising the question whether man is immortal; and he devotes one chapter to the argument from reason, and three others to the argument from Scripture. I shall follow closely in his track.

CHAPTER I.

ON HIS STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION.

I commence by offering some remarks on his statement of the question, which in truth is not in the simplest terms, or quite free from obscurity. His words are these:—

"1. Can reason (independently of revelation) prove man to be immortal?

"And if not,

"2. Does Scripture teach that immortality is the absolute portion of every man? Of man, that is, as man?"

So in the first edition, p. 60. In the second edition, p. 82, the second part of the question reads thus:—

"2. Does Scripture teach that immortality is the absolute and inalienable portion of man? Of man, that is, as man?"

I cannot read this part of the question as stated by Mr. Dobney, without having my attention arrested by the words "absolute and inalienable." It is at least a singularity that words modifying the general subject should be inserted in the second part of a question, when they have not been inserted in the first; and it is an additional singularity that a word still further modifying the general subject should be inserted in stating it the second time. The most natural and the most desirable method would have been to reduce the question to the simplest possible terms, and to have made the one part of it strictly correspondent with the other.

Since, however, he has stated the question in two sets of terms, let me be allowed to ask what is really the meaning of the words "absolute and inalienable," with which the latter part of the question is especially charged? Do they mean nothing? If so the use of them is both a misfortune and a fault. And if they mean anything, they must of necessity render the question raised in the second part to that extent different from the question raised in the first. The first part is, Does reason teach that man is immortal? The second is, Does Scripture teach that man is *absolutely and inalienably* immortal? This is not logical. If there is to be a clear antithesis between reason and Scripture, the words "absolute and inalienable" should be either present in both clauses or absent from both. In truth, the main question should have been, Is man immortal? And the subordinate ones, 1, Does reason teach it? And if not, 2, Does Scripture teach it?

That it is not without cause or without meaning, however, that Mr. Dobney has introduced in his statement of the question the words "absolute and inalienable," the subsequent course of his argument fully shows; and nothing is

left for me but to take them at the outset in their apparent import, and deal with the question accordingly.

Now it appears to me that to say that "immortality is the *absolute* and *inalienable* portion of man," is to say that he possesses immortality in his own right (*absolute*), and that he cannot by any means, or under any circumstances be deprived of it (*inalienable*).

If I am right in this interpretation of the words, and if this is the question really brought before us by the author, I offer upon it the following observations:—

1. That this question is widely different from that which Mr. Dobney first proposed to discuss. This is not to ask whether man is immortal; but whether he is so in one of several possible modes of immortality.

2. That this is a question which it is not necessary to discuss at all; since it is one of which few persons, if any, in modern times, whether theologians or philosophers, have shown any inclination to maintain the affirmative.

3. That this question is by no means germane to his argument. It may well be admitted that man is not absolutely and inalienably immortal, and yet it may be held that he is immortal in a sense which, although short of this, shall be quite sufficient to entail all the consequences which Mr. Dobney is anxious to avoid.

4. That this mode of putting the question is injurious, if not fatal, to his design. For it implies that against any other mode of human immortality than the absolute and inalienable he has no objection to make, and it may fairly be taken to promise that, short of this, he himself will be found ready to concede and maintain the immortality of man.

In bar of these observations it may perhaps be said, that the second part of the question as stated by Mr. Dobney concludes with a phrase explanatory of the terms used:—"Does Scripture teach that immortality is the absolute and inalienable portion of man? *Of man, that is, as man?*" But I see nothing explanatory in this additional phrase. It merely shows that Mr. Dobney has no idea of any mode of immortality pertaining to "man as man" except the absolute and inalienable.

I cannot pass from this subject without observing that, in entering on the discussion of the second part of his question,

Mr. Dobney restates it in a form still further diversified. "Our second question," says he, "as already stated, is—does Scripture teach that immortality is the portion of every man? That man as he is, and independently of character, is immortal?" p. 103.

With all due submission to Mr. Dobney, this is not the second question "*as already stated;*" to which the eighty-second page of his book bears witness. And the differences are far from being either inconsiderable or unimportant. The question "as already stated" was, "Does Scripture teach that immortality is the *absolute and inalienable* portion of man?" What has now become of these emphatic terms? Did they mean nothing that they are thus unceremoniously discarded? Or is the purpose of their introduction better answered by their being now kept out of view?

Further, while something is here dropped out of the question "as already stated," something is added which has not appeared in any statement of the question before. The question now asks whether "man as he is, and *independently of character*, is immortal?" And even again it is varied thus:—"In other words, do they [the Scriptures] teach an absolute and universal, or a contingent and conditional immortality?" Another element certainly of no trifling moment is thus suddenly introduced, the effect of which is to raise a point altogether new, and to submit to the arbitration of Scripture a question different from that which had been just submitted to the judgment of reason.

It seems difficult not to infer from so shifting a mode of stating the question that Mr. Dobney had not a very clear perception of the object before him.

CHAPTER II.

ON HIS DEFINITION OF IMMORTALITY.

From Mr. Dobney's mode of stating the question I pass on to his definition of the principal term, immortality, which is not less open to remark.

In his first edition Mr. Dobney gave no definition of this

term; and he states that he was led to do so in the second edition by a remark of his reviewer in the *Eclectic*, who, it seems, stumbled on an erroneous notion of his meaning. Now a definition is always of great importance in an argument, and one given under the influences operating in the present case may be expected to be particularly correct and luminous. Let us carefully examine that which is before us.

"By immortal, then, is meant," says Mr. Dobney, "one who will live for ever; and by immortality, never-ending existence. He is immortal, not who *might have lived* for ever, but for certain reasons will not; but only he who positively *shall live* for ever," p. 84.*

My own view certainly differs materially from this.† I take the proper immortality of a creature to be its non-liability to death (here understanding the term death of a cessation of its proper being) by natural causes, or by causes proper to itself. This idea of man's natural immortality has been generally, if not universally, held among professing Christians, both ancient and modern.

It is obvious, therefore, that Mr. Dobney's definition fails in one important respect; it is not applicable to the views of his opponents. He professes to enter into conflict with "the orthodox or popular party" among the evangelical dissenters of the present day. I know of no evidence, however, that they, or any considerable number of them, conceive man to be immortal in the sense that he "*positively shall* live for ever;" yet this is the strictly-defined position against which the author professes to direct his destructive reasoning. He is thus arguing against a tenet which his opponents do not hold. He is besieging a deserted fort, and battering down walls which no one defends. Let him fully prove his point, and accomplish all that he aims at; "the orthodox" can then have nothing to do but to regret the waste of so much valour and devotion.

Seeing that Mr. Dobney had not in his first edition given any definition of immortality, the *Eclectic* reviewer was not altogether to blame in assuming that he understood it in the same sense as those whom he had undertaken to refute. It would have been both rash and unfair to have imputed without evidence to any man, and especially to so acute a

* The italics are Mr. Dobney's.

† See this view fully considered in "Who will Live for Ever?" p. 52. Note A.

man as the author, so manifest a blunder as he has actually committed.

To his double statement that the wicked are not immortal, and that their existence will finally be terminated by a punitive divine act, the reviewer had replied that, if the existence of the wicked was to be terminated by a divine punitive act, this itself implied their immortality; plainly understanding, and supposing Mr. Dobney to understand by immortality a natural adaptation to endless existence. To parry this Mr. Dobney exclaims, "This is not what I mean by immortality; none are in my view immortal, but those who *positively shall* live for ever." And then he makes a note of admiration intimate his opinion that the reviewer's retort was absurd. How could the reviewer have supposed that Mr. Dobney would have understood his principal term in a manner so dissimilar to his professed opponents?

It is not the only misfortune of Mr. Dobney's definition, however, that it is not applicable to the views of his opponents. It is worse to say that it is not consistent with the scope of his own reasoning.

In his remarks (first ed., p. 75) on the scriptural term everlasting (*αἰώνιος*), while justly maintaining on the one hand that the duration indicated by it must be determined by the nature of the subject to which it is applied, he admits on the other that as applied to the future state, and consequently to future punishment, it indicates duration "through the whole period of man's existence."* And he proceeds to lay it down that the punishment of the wicked will be of limited duration, because (and only because) their existence will be so. Now the idea of immortality which is here in Mr. Dobney's mind is not that of actual endless existence, but that of natural adaptation to it. A sinner's existence, he must be understood to tell us, will naturally terminate; therefore his punishment will terminate, because the word which calls it everlasting must be explained according to the nature of the subject to which it is applied. To reason in this manner, Mr. Dobney must have been contemplating the question whether man is naturally adapted to live for ever. According to his definition, however, he ought to have been doing no

* This admission is omitted from the second edition. The author has not assigned any reason why, and I am not in a condition to suggest one.

such thing. He ought to have been occupied with the very different idea that man "*positively shall* live for ever."

Another proof that an idea of man's immortality different from that which he has embodied in his definition was sometimes in the author's mind may be found in p. 104, where he supposes "the self-communing" God to say—"We have hitherto made only creatures that will sooner or later die; let us now make an immortal creature"—that is, by clear antithesis, a creature adapted by its nature to live for ever; which is exactly the idea the reviewer supposed him to hold.

I can scarcely believe that Mr. Dobney would have fallen into this error if he had framed his definition in the first instance. The misfortune seems to have been that he wrote his book first, and framed his definition afterwards; and then not so much under a feeling that the elucidation of his argument required it, as for the purpose of parrying a blow from a particular antagonist. The result of such a process is not unnaturally a piece of incongruous patchwork. It is like putting a piece of new cloth in an old garment; "the new agreeth not with the old."

CHAPTER III.

ON HIS TREATMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON.

I PROCEED now to Mr. Dobney's treatment of the arguments from reason and from Scripture in favour of the immortality of man, p. 85 *et seq.*

On the former of these topics, however, I have very little to say, since, in common with himself, I do not hold that man can by unassisted reason be *proved* to be immortal. The remarks which the perusal of this chapter has suggested do not appear to me either sufficiently important or sufficiently relevant to demand insertion here; I go forward, therefore, at once to the argument from Scripture.

CHAPTER IV.

ON HIS TREATMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.

In treating the scriptural argument for man's immortality, Mr. Dobney adverts in the first place to the account of his creation; and primarily to—

"1. The declaration that God made man in his own image," Gen. i. 27, p. 104.

In the consideration of this passage, the author claims in the outset some "important limitations," which will readily be granted him, since no one pretends that man was created like God in all respects. Having enumerated some of the necessarily peculiar attributes of God, he proceeds as follows:—

"And if man be not like God in any of these glorious attributes, what reason is there for selecting immortality, and asserting that it is in this respect that man bears the divine image? Especially since the immortality of God and the creature is infinitely unlike, seeing that the immortality of the Divine Being is essential, and looks backward to the eternity that is past as well as that which is future; in which sense the apostle says, He 'alone hath immortality.'" *Ibid.*

Here he lays it down as a reason why immortality should not be "selected" as a feature of resemblance, that "the immortality of God and of the creature is infinitely unlike." But this, if it were a valid reason, would bar any resemblance at all, since it is equally true of every attribute which can be named. That God alone hath "essential" immortality is true, but not to the purpose, seeing that such immortality is not claimed for man; nor does this fact raise any difficulty in the way of ascribing to man a natural immortality, that is, a natural adaptation by his Creator to exist for ever. The "reason" that there is for believing man to resemble God in this respect shall be assigned presently. Mr. Dobney proceeds:—

"To say that 'the image of God' as here used denotes immortality, is to represent the self-communing God as saying, if it may be allowed us to paraphrase the expression, 'We have hitherto made only creatures that will sooner or later die, let us now make an immortal creature.' And I venture to think that this is not the obvious idea, and that it has more of verisimilitude to suppose that the self-same address

rather exhibits the Creator as saying, 'Hitherto we have made but irrational and unaccountable creatures, fit only to serve the purposes of a superior; let us now make an intelligent being, possessed of a self-consciousness and a moral nature, capable of rational happiness, and who shall rule over the inferior tribes as their lord,'" pp. 104, 105.

He thus thinks that, in the phrase "the image of God," immortality "is not *the obvious* idea," but that "it has more of verisimilitude to suppose" it intends "an intelligent being, possessed of self-consciousness and a moral nature, capable of rational happiness, and" destined to "rule over the inferior tribes." To this I respond, So far so good. But Mr. Dobney clearly ought to add to his enumeration the idea of holiness, as required by the language of the apostle which he afterwards quotes, Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10.

Let us see, then, what we already have as admitted points of resemblance. First, holiness; secondly, dominion; thirdly, an intelligent, rational, and moral nature. Suppose now we were to add to these immortality, or an adaptation to endless being, might it not be regarded as the natural complement of the catalogue? Would it be at all improbable—might it not, on the contrary, be deemed highly probable, that God, who had made a creature to resemble him as far as a creature might in the attributes named, one of which at least, and this the chief of them, looks far beyond the present world, should have made the same creature resemble him as far as a creature may in his incorruptibility also? Or is it more likely that the Creator attached these distinguished prerogatives to a nature as physically fleeting and perishable as that of the inferior animals?

Against this conclusion Mr. Dobney argues from a supposed necessity that the distinctive attributes of man should be, to use his own term, "obvious."

"Since we must find in the expression 'the image of God,'" says he, "some characteristic in which man differs from the brute creation, so also must we seek for some *obvious* endowment which may, in some measure, render him like his Maker. It must be some very manifest quality, visible at a glance, that shall constitute man as distinct from the other creatures the image of God. And when we have found one or two *palpable* points of difference between him and them, such as those alluded to, and by which he really does bear some resemblance to his Creator, why should we arbitrarily fix on another endowment, which, whether he has it or not, cannot become self-evident (like those other qualities which it is acknowledged on all hands he does possess), and the knowledge of which unapparent quality would have

to be made known to him by revelation, without which he never would discover that he possessed it? The very phrase 'image of God' would seem to denote some easily recognizable resemblance," p. 105.

Mr. Dobney really begs very hard. Having granted us "one or two palpable points" of resemblance between man and his Maker, he hopes no one will insist on penetrating beneath the surface of the subject, or unkindly suggest a point of resemblance which is not "obvious." I would oblige him, if it were possible; but—*amicus Socrates, sed magis amicâ veritas*—much as I love Mr. Dobney, I love truth more. Having selected, not "arbitrarily," but on a ground of strong probability, the attribute of immortality as one in which man "really does bear some degree of resemblance to his Maker," I cannot find sufficient reason to abandon my opinion, either in the one circumstance that the resemblance is not "visible at a glance," or in the other that it would not have been known to man unless revealed. As to the phrase "the *image* of God," there is no critical or other authority, I believe, for restricting its application to "easily recognizable" resemblances.

The author has yet another arrow in his quiver.

"If the assertion that man was made in the image of God proves his immortality," he continues, "then the evangelical statements in the New Testament about 'a new creation' of man, the Christian being a 'new man,' 'created anew in the image of God,' must imply that the image had been destroyed, . . and restored only by believing in Christ," p. 105.

This is a *non sequitur;* the conclusion does not follow from the premises. If the language used by the apostle implies that the image of God had been destroyed, it does so quite independently of the question whether the assertion that man was made in the image of God proves his immortality. No doubt the language of the apostle does imply that the image of God, *in the sense in which he there speaks of it*, had been destroyed, but no more. Now the apostle is speaking of man's moral resemblance to God exclusively, and his language consequently does not imply the destruction of anything more than this. Were Mr. Dobney to insist upon extending the implication of the apostle's language to man's immortality, I might with equal reason claim its extension to his rationality and earthly dominion.

Under this head the author adverts—

"2. To the difference of expression observable when man and the animals are respectively mentioned," as in Gen ii. 7, p. 106.

Into this topic he goes at great length; but I have no need to follow him, as I have said already, and here repeat, that I do not attach any value to the argument of which the passage referred to has been made the basis.

From the account of man's creation Mr. Dobney advances (p. 112 *et seq.*) to that of his probation in Eden, and to the threatening of death; and he pursues at great length the question, "What was the death thus threatened?" in expectation of deriving from it a "positive" argument against the immortality of man. In this I do not think he has succeeded.

His whole reasoning discovers a want of precision, accuracy, and fairness, which tends to destroy all confidence in his conclusions.

For instance; having asked what the death threatened *to Adam* was, he goes on to say, "the popular orthodox opinion concerning the death threatened *to the sinner* is," &c. (p. 113); thus at once leaping to a generalization without either warrant or intimation.

Again; his statement of the orthodox opinion, that the death with which Adam was threatened comprehended death spiritual, temporal, and eternal, is expanded into five particulars in a spirit of palpable exaggeration and caricature.* There would have been more persuasiveness if there had been gentler words, and more convincingness if the opinions referred to had been quoted from the writings of those who hold them.

Further, he takes an opportunity of a bye-hit at a part of this doctrine, in a manner in which it is evidently impossible to do any justice to it, and which involves in fact a gross misrepresentation of it. "I shall not comment," says he (but he goes on to comment immediately), "on the apparent strangeness of the idea, that God *condemns those who have sinned once to sin on and on for ever.*" Such is the distorted view he gives of a doctrine which teaches no more than that, in consequence of Adam's eating the forbidden fruit, his

* "The separate existence of the soul in an intermediate state of misery, and a *shivering* expectation of worse."—"To resurrection of the body and re-union therewith of the soul, *in order that the entire man may be capable of intenser anguish*," &c., p. 113.

posterity were to be born with a bias to evil, and in defence of which certainly *something* is to be said from the federal relation held to subsist in this transaction. Writing of this sort makes one feel disposed to ask the question, Is Mr. Dobney angry?

But let me be permitted to quote entire one sentence, almost every line of which presents matter for animadversion.

"We have seen what is the orthodox opinion of the death threatened to the sinner, that it includes death temporal, death spiritual, death eternal. But if this be, as divines tell us, what is now meant by the death threatened to the sinner (for death has, from the beginning of the world down to the close of revelation, been the penalty threatened to the sinner), it must have been the penalty originally threatened to Adam, which indeed is generally agreed, for who supposes the death threatened to the first sinner to differ from the death threatened to the second or any other? All through Scripture death is exhibited as the just wages of sin, and assuredly it is fitting to take our first idea of its meaning where first we find it used," p. 114.

In this passage Mr. Dobney begins by saying, that death temporal, spiritual, and eternal, is, "*as divines tell us*, what is now meant by the death threatened to the sinner." Now, so far as my knowledge extends, this is not the fact. Certainly many divines, and I believe those whom he terms orthodox generally, teach on the one hand that death temporal ensues to the posterity of Adam as a consequence of *his* sin, and not of their own; and, on the other, that death spiritual was entailed on the race on a similar ground.

Mr. Dobney immediately adds—"Death has, from the beginning of the world down to the close of revelation, been the penalty threatened *to the sinner*." I think this is not so. Death was the penalty annexed to a certain transgression of the divine will by our first parents; but I know not how it can be proved to have been annexed to disobedience on the part of any other persons. Mr. Dobney, indeed, affirms that "all through Scripture death is exhibited as the just wages of sin;" but when he wrote this he must clearly have forgotten at least one passage—Rom. v. 12—which teaches, that "by *one man* sin entered into the world and death by sin." Now, if death ensues to the race of man through the primary transgression of its federal head—an opinion from which Mr. Dobney does not appear to dissent—no further proof can be wanting that it is not, and cannot be, the

penalty annexed to individual offences. Nor is it at all necessary to suppose that it is so, because there are other terms in which the penalty of sin as such is distinctly expressed: as in Rom. i. 18—"The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all unrighteousness and ungodliness of men;" and Rom. ii. 8, 9, "Indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, to every soul of man that doeth evil."

Nor is it at all necessary to suppose that the penalty of death attached to any other act of disobedience on the part of our first parents than the eating of the forbidden fruit. The requirement to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil was no part of the moral law. It was part of a peculiar dispensation, and it was adopted as the test of obedience in a case in which Adam stood, not solitary but as the representative of human kind, and in which large consequences (however they may be defined) were to accrue, both to himself and his race, from his individual act. Can anything be more probable, or more necessary, than that the penal result annexed to his disobedience in a case so peculiar should have an appropriate and corresponding character? What ground can there be for inferring that the penalty in this case is the same as that annexed to the breach of the moral law?

When therefore Mr. Dobney asks, "Who supposes the death threatened to the first sinner to differ from the death threatened to the second or any other?" I reply by saying that the question is not correctly put. Death was threatened to the first sinner, not simply as a sinner but as a sinner under peculiar circumstances; and death in the same sense has never been threatened to any sinner besides.

If I am right in taking this ground, Mr. Dobney's inquiry into the nature of the death threatened to Adam is altogether beside the mark. Whatever it may have been, or whatever Adam may have supposed it to be, or in whatever method his notion of the term may be best arrived at, the inquiry can throw no light on the destiny of transgressors of the moral law.

But even were it otherwise, and were the import of the first threatening what Mr. Dobney supposes (but not *proves*) it to be—namely, annihilation—and were it further of universal application, this would be perfectly consistent with the doctrine of man's immortality as usually held, and would

by implication establish it; since the alleged termination of man's existence hereafter by a punitive act may fairly be taken to imply that without such an act it would not have terminated—in other words, that, according to his nature, he is immortal.

In the commencement of his next chapter Mr. Dobney congratulates himself anew on having "seen reason to believe that the death threatened to Adam was the death of the entire man, the cessation of all conscious existence," and he proceeds to say, "Many other things concur to establish *this belief;* among the chief of which," he adds, "we shall find the inspired declarations concerning the blessings that accrue from the mediation of Christ," p. 127. On this I have only to observe, that, in so far as any inspired declarations may "establish the belief" of the opinion that the death threatened to Adam was annihilation, they can render no service to Mr. Dobney's argument, that point being, as I have just shown, totally irrelevant.

Passing by other topics, the author proceeds:—

"Having heard man sentenced to death, we may with propriety come at once to consider that grand evangelical doctrine which has so close a connexion with our subject, and so decided a bearing thereon, namely, the resurrection," p. 127.

He then goes at great length into this subject, exhibiting the several theories held respecting the intermediate state, handling several passages in order to show how much more importance the apostles attached to the doctrine of the resurrection than Christians do now, and otherwise employing himself in a somewhat discursive manner through no less than thirty pages: I am happily released from the necessity of following him, however, by his having given at the close of the chapter a summary of the points which he considers himself to have proved in it, and a statement of their supposed connexion with the matter in hand. The summary is as follows:—

"I. There is a resurrection of the dead generally. This, however, which is no deduction of reason, is a doctrine peculiar to revelation, and constitutes one of its grandest disclosures.

"II. The final judgment of each individual, with its award to heaven or hell, is consequent upon resurrection.

"III. The resurrection-state was that which apostles longed for, earnestly desiring to find themselves in their house from heaven, or heavenly house, that is, their second, their spiritual body.

"IV. Future conscious existence is connected with and dependent upon, if not identical with, resurrection, so that no resurrection no future life.

"V. The resurrection grows out of the mediatorship of Christ: so that no mediator no resurrection, and therefore no future state.

"From which it follows that, had not the mediatorial system supervened on the fall of man, and had the sentence consequently been executed on Adam and remained in force, he would have utterly ceased to exist at death," pp. 156, 157.

Without entering into any argument on the positions here laid down, or the expositions on which they are founded (with some of which, however, I do not agree),* all that I have occasion to say on this extract is comprised in the two following observations, which proceed on the supposition that Mr. Dobney has proved everything he affirms:—1. That nothing he has said bears on the doctrine of man's immortality as generally held and defined. He is showing what pertains to man as a sinner, and under a mediator; I speak of man antecedently to sin, and of the adaptation of his nature as a creature of God. I affirm that according to his nature man is immortal: it is no answer to this to say, that man as a sinner has no future existence but by Christ. 2. That if it be now more evidently true that cessation of existence is the consequence of sin, it is still as strongly as ever implied in this very fact, that, but for sin, man's existence would never have ceased.

CHAPTER V.

ON HIS TREATMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE CONTINUED.

HAVING brought to an end his elaborate attempts to demonstrate that the death threatened to Adam was annihilation, Mr. Dobney in his next chapter reverts to the question of

* Mr. Dobney has been occasionally betrayed into a flippancy of expression not quite in keeping with the gravity of his argument. I give one example. "For my own part, I have not the presumption to disagree with an apostle, and always rest satisfied with either the argumentative processes or the authoritative assertions of inspired men," p. 141. I am sure the author does not really mean to say that he more profoundly respects inspired authority than his opponents do.

man's immortality; and on the ground that, "according to an apostle, Christ is especially the grand teacher of immortality," he passes at once to the New Testament, pp. 159, 160.

In conducting this part of his argument, Mr. Dobney begins by marshalling in opposite columns a long array of texts, from which I quote for the reader's satisfaction the first text on each side.

"The righteous shall go into *life eternal.*"	"He that believeth not the Son *shall not see life.*"

Perceiving, however, that this array of texts proves nothing, he goes on to say—

"Of course we are not unaware of the common practice of explaining life to mean happiness, and immortality an eternity of bliss; while destruction, perdition, death, are explained to mean an eternity of miserable existence," p. 161.

My attention is arrested by this passage for two reasons.

First, because it contains an inconsistency on Mr. Dobney's part not altogether without significance. An attentive reader of it will see that its several clauses are not similarly constructed. The first clause is defective. To agree with the rest it should read thus—"the common practice of explaining life to mean [existence in] happiness, and immortality to mean an eternity of bliss; while destruction, perdition, death, are explained to mean an eternity of miserable existence." I cannot help asking what may have been the cause of this irregularity? It is certainly observable that *existence in happiness* is the very meaning which Mr. Dobney himself attaches to the word life in the passages in question, see p. 183: was it some obscure recollection of this that betrayed him into the singular inconsistency above noticed?

Secondly, because it contains a misrepresentation, unintentional no doubt, but requiring correction. With Mr. Dobney, I am "not unaware of the common practice of explaining life to mean happiness" in the passages quoted; but I know of no persons who have explained immortality to mean "an eternity of bliss," or destruction, perdition, and death to mean "an eternity of miserable existence." For myself and others I repudiate this interpretation. If in any case I should see reason to explain immortality by bliss, I should drop the idea of endless being; and when interpreting destruction, perdition, and death, of misery, I should not

take them in the sense of existence too, still less in the sense of endless existence. I should do this upon a principle of interpretation which I hold to be sound and irrefragable; namely, that in ordinary discourse words should convey but one meaning at a time. So by immortality I may understand, as required, either deathlessness *or* felicity, but not both at once; and by death, either that modification of human existence commonly so called *or* misery, but not both at once. May I hope the author will allow me the benefit of this explanation?*

He thus proceeds—

"Nor will I deny that life may be sometimes used in the sense alleged. But then that it is invariably used so no one will affirm on the other part; while every one will admit that it is frequently used in its primary and common signification. So that we must try to discern the precise force of the words as used in the numerous passages now adduced, which are presented above merely as generally illustrative of the manner in which the Scriptures uniformly speak of the future portion of the two opposite classes of mankind," p. 161.

After this very just and candid statement the reader might expect to proceed immediately to an exercise of biblical criticism, but he must have patience.

The author here repeats a fault which the *Eclectic* reviewer had pointed out to him. He insinuates that the word life is so prevailingly taken in the sense of happiness, "chiefly because expositors have previously determined that all men without exception are immortal." I submit that this is an uncandid inuendo, an "unworthy imputation." Those who think that all men are immortal are clearly entitled to have it believed that they think so, not because expositors have so laid it down, but in the exercise of their own judgment on God's Word. Why should not Mr. Dobney allow to his opponents as independent a judgment as he claims to exercise for himself?

Before proceeding to his textual examination, Mr. Dobney further detains himself by an extended notice of 2 Tim. i. 9, 10, to which, as he brings it forward again, I shall afterwards refer, and by some preliminary remarks (pp. 168, 171), of which I must take notice now.

After the first, which merely lays down the admitted and

* This explanation furnishes the only reply which is necessary to a passage quoted from Archbishop Whately, pp. 181, 182.

obvious rule that a literal sense is to be preferred unless sufficient cause can be shown for the contrary, the remaining remarks relate to the opinion that God will by a punitive act terminate the existence of the wicked; and they allege that this is, 1, "not impossible;" 2, "not absurd;" 3, "not improbable;" and, 4, "not contradictory to Scripture." My reply to all this is that it is not relevant to the matter in hand. Admitting it all to be true, the position that man is naturally immortal remains totally unaffected by it.

I take advantage of the first remark, however, relating to the "literal sense," to make an observation conducive to a clearer view of the subject before us.

The *Eclectic* reviewer assumed as the literal meaning of the word life, existence; and happiness as its metaphorical meaning. While I am still satisfied of the validity of the argument constructed by the reviewer on this basis, I have come to an opinion, as expressed in the preceding Book, p. 125, that the word life requires to be differently understood. The term is primarily applicable to organized material substances at large, and denotes neither more nor less than a certain mode of their existence; that, namely, in which the appropriate organic functions are performed. This is the literal and primary meaning of the term life. When the word is extended to animated beings, the distinguishing feature of whose living condition is consciousness, it comes to signify conscious existence, and is applied although the organized matter partially constituting such being may undergo the change called death. By an analogy somewhat more remote, and since the only value of animated life, or conscious existence, lies in the happiness derivable from it, life comes in some cases to denote happiness.

For my present purpose I need not go further than this. Conscious existence and happiness are the two ideas relevant to the discussion before us. What I wish to be observed is that neither of them is the literal and primary import of the term life, but that they are both of them derived by analogy from the primary meaning. The question, therefore, will not lie between the adoption of a literal and that of a figurative meaning; but we shall have to decide between two meanings both of them analogical, according to the evidence which each case may supply.

It is the more important that the preceding observation

should be made in this place, and that it should be attended to by the reader, because it is on the assumption of his contending for a literal meaning that the author supposes his preliminary remarks to bear on the argument.

"If then," says he, "the literal sense involves nothing contradictory, nothing impossible, nothing absurd, nor *à priori* improbable even, but the contrary; then, according to one of the most obvious and commonly received canons of interpretation already alluded to, not only would there be no presumption against the literal rendering, but the presumption would be altogether in favour of it," p. 172.

I am sorry to have deprived Mr. Dobney of the benefit of this reasoning (which, however, would have amounted to nothing, since the presumption is *always* in favour of a literal rendering without any special ground), but it must be manifest that, as matters now stand, it is thrown entirely out of bearing.

I do not think I shall expose Mr. Dobney to any further disadvantage by this new exposition of terms. He indeed, after the *Eclectic* reviewer, often speaks of the literal and primary meaning of life; but I shall readily understand that he intends by this the idea of conscious existence.

Arriving at length at his promised examination of passages of Scripture, Mr. Dobney gives himself the trouble of showing by examples, first, that the word life in Scripture sometimes means existence only; and secondly, that it may sometimes be so understood when *men* are spoken of. This ground is common to us both. His third position is more to the point. It is in the following terms:—

"III. That the word life is sometimes to be understood literally" [that is, as denoting conscious existence], "when employed in a declaration of the benefits bestowed by Christ on those who believe in him," p. 174.

This is distinct and critical. Let this be established and the controversy is at an end. I shall notice the passages cited by Mr. Dobney in the order he has chosen.

(1.) John vi. 57, 58. "As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father; so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me. This is that bread which came down from heaven; not as your fathers did eat manna, and are dead: he that eateth of this bread shall live for ever."

Mr. Dobney commences his critique on this passage with the following somewhat remarkable words:—

"No expositor would expound it thus: 'As the happy Father hath sent me, and I am happy by the Father; so he that eateth me shall be happy by me.'"

Clearly not. But Mr. Dobney is here amusing himself. Or has he forgotten that the question raised relates to the meaning of the word life, not as applied either to God the Father or the Son, but exclusively as applied to "the benefits bestowed by Christ on those who believe in him"? He adds,

"As no one would wish to set aside the literal sense of the word in the first and second clauses, so neither can it be rejected in the last."

On the contrary, I affirm that the use of the word life in the first and second clauses throws no light at all on its use in the last, where the subject to which it is applied is so totally different. I ask besides, whether Mr. Dobney would accept what he intends by the literal meaning for the first two clauses, and read—"As the consciously existing Father hath sent me, and I consciously exist by the Father"? Bloomfield, with many others, takes ζῶν [living] in the first case in the sense of ζωοποιῶν, and reads, "the *life-giving* Father." And the life which Christ declares himself to have by the Father would seem most naturally to relate to his mediatorial office, in virtue of which alone it was that any one eating him should live by him. As to this clause, if we are to take *live* literally, I do not see how we can avoid taking *eat* literally also, which would complicate the matter rather awkwardly. Kuinoel, quoted by Bloomfield, gives the following paraphrase: "He who useth the spiritual nourishment I shall give him by my doctrine and my death, shall obtain happiness through my intervention."

(2.) John xiv. 19. "Because I live, ye shall live also."

"Where again," says Mr. Dobney, "no one will venture seriously to expound it, though the sentiment is true, 'Because I am happy, ye shall be happy also.'"

In this, however, he is not correct; for on turning to Schleusner, under ζάω, I find the following view of this passage—"participes eritis aliquando felicitatis qua ego post mortem apud Deum fruar." Bloomfield takes ζῆν for ἀναζῆν. Mr. Dobney's interpretation would run—"Because I consciously exist, ye shall consciously exist also." The meaning I take to be that Christ's mediatorial exaltation would secure

the final happiness of his followers; a sentiment perfectly suited to the connexion and the context.

(3.) John v. 26. "For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself."

Mr. Dobney endeavours to show that life must be here taken in its literal sense, because it is obviously so used in the preceding verse:—"Verily, verily, I say unto you, the hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and live." My reply is that the passage is wholly irrelevant; since the only question before us relates to the meaning of life when it is applied to "the benefits conferred by Christ on those who believe in him"—which here it is not.

(4.) John xi. 25. "I am the resurrection and the life."

Mr. Dobney adverts to this passage with a strongly-marked dubiousness. "The statement of our Lord to Martha, weeping bitter tears of sorrow," says he, "*may perhaps* be fairly adduced." By all means let us do justice to it.

What Mr. Dobney contends for—and he contends for it with as much tenacity as though he thought the point would be obstinately disputed—is that the word life should not here be "spiritualized," but "literally understood." We grant him at once this demand, although not in his sense. The whole passage doubtless refers to Christ's control over the *organic life*, which he thus emphatically asserts in order to comfort Martha, and to awaken her expectation of her brother's resurrection from the dead: but here is no promise to believers, or declaration of what belongs to them as such, since the resurrection comprehends mankind.*

The author, perceiving and admitting that we have "yet to ascertain who are to be raised—who are to be endowed with life," proceeds to attempt a limitation of the fact to the righteous in the following manner:—

"We are elsewhere assured that all the dead, both small and great, shall be raised, but that they only shall receive everlasting life who are saved by Christ: 'I give unto *my sheep eternal life*, and *they* shall never perish.' 'All that are in their graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good to *the resurrection of life*, and they that have done evil to the resurrection of condemnation.' Let this passage be accepted as expository of the former one, showing

* See page 137.

who are to receive the crown of life when they are raised from the dead; for as in that life must be understood literally, so in this," p. 177.

The author's reasoning is liable to a fatal objection. In order to determine the idea of life in one passage he brings forward others in which the sense of it has not yet been determined. For although he says that life must in the passages he has quoted be taken literally, that is, in the sense of conscious being, this has not yet been settled, and I shall have something to offer before I give my consent to it.

The texts thus incidentally introduced are the following:—

(5.) John x. 28. "I give unto *my sheep eternal life*, and *they* shall never perish."

The author makes on this text the following remark:—

"We are assured that all the dead, small and great, shall be raised, but they only shall receive everlasting life who are saved by Christ."

Exactly so; but this is quite intelligible on the supposition that all will exist for ever, while only the saved will be happy.

(6.) John v. 28, 29. "All that are in their graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good to the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil to the resurrection of condemnation."

Here Mr. Dobney lays it down, but without any attempt at proof, that in the phrase "resurrection of life" the word life "must be understood literally." I might ask whether his mere assertion is enough to settle such a point as this. To go on, however. The passage before us supplies in my judgment a clear instance in which the word ἀνάστασις (resurrection) ought to be translated "future life," a translation for which there is high critical authority. "All that are in their graves *shall come forth.*" Here, strictly speaking, is expressed the act of rising from the dead, in which "*all* that are in their graves" are included. And they are to "come forth" to a resurrection (ἀνάστασις) respectively of life and of condemnation. The fact of rising from the dead, however, having been previously expressed by the term "come forth," it follows that ἀνάστασις ought to be rendered, not resurrection, but future existence. If such be the proper meaning of the passage all hope of understanding the term life of conscious being is gone. We cannot suppose our Lord

to say that "those who have done good" shall come forth to a future existence of *life;* he must have intended to speak of a future existence of *happiness.*

Mr. Dobney concludes his enumeration of texts with—

(7.) 2 Tim. i. 10. Christ "hath brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel."

He insists that this is a passage in which life "as made the matter of declaration by Christ, must be understood literally." Now there is no dispute about understanding life literally—that is, of conscious existence—in this place, or about Christ having made it a matter of declaration; but the question remains to be asked, whether this life pertains to all men, or whether it is among "the benefits bestowed by Christ on those who believe in him." In an earlier page, to which reference has already been made (p. 163 *et seq.*), Mr. Dobney assigns several reasons for thinking that the verse does not "teach a universal and unconditional immortality." It is fit that I should now weigh them.

"May not the general assertion," he asks, "that Christ has placed the doctrine of immortality in a clear light still leave room fairly for the question, does this relate to all mankind, or to some only? That is, is it absolutely or contingently true?"

I shall be doing no injustice to Mr. Dobney if I put his second question into the following terms:—Does the passage before us teach a constitutional or a conditional immortality?

In behalf of the latter he argues as follows:—

1. "Christ also placed in clear noon-day light the fact that God forgives sins; while it is nevertheless true, that he forgives only those who turn to him in true repentance."

Answer: Christ as plainly taught the condition of forgiveness as the fact. Has he anywhere taught a conditional immortality?

2. "The apostle intends the assertion as something exceedingly blissful; but immortal life is a glorious fact only for the saved."

Answer: The fact of being endowed with an adaptation to endless conscious existence is a high and glorious prerogative of human nature, irrespectively of either character or happiness; and in this view alone, not as "blissful," the apostle seems to me here to speak of immortality.

3. "In the verse before the text the apostle speaks, not of all mankind, but of some only. Let us read it in its connexion:—'Who hath

saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began, but is now made manifest by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel.' So that, if we read the two verses together, as we ought, our present text would really seem to have its most appropriate meaning in an assertion of the glorious abolition of death, and enjoyment of immortal life, for all that are 'saved, and called with an holy calling, according to the grace given them in Christ Jesus before the world began.'"

Answer: I have been somewhat struck, I must confess, by this argument; not, however, by its force, but by its inconsistency. In p. 177, Mr. Dobney has laid it down, that in this passage the word life "must be understood literally," that is, in the sense of conscious existence, and, of course, immortal life in the sense of endless conscious existence; but here he demands that the same phrase should be understood in the sense of happiness,—"the *glorious* abolition of death, and enjoyment of immortal life, for all that are saved." This certainly is not the "literal" sense of the terms, which yet, according to him, is the sense in which they "*must* be understood." If Mr. Dobney gives up the literal meaning, the passage is no longer to his purpose, and it may be blotted out of his catalogue; if he retains it, he must relinquish his present argument altogether.

I dispute, however, the entire position which Mr. Dobney has taken. He says that in the former verse "the apostle speaks, not of all mankind, but of some only." As he has said nothing to prove this, I cannot tell upon what arguments he would rely. There is nothing in the passage to show it, except the use of the pronoun *us*,—"who hath saved *us*, and called *us*." If this pronoun be strictly taken, the passage can refer only to Paul by whom, and Timothy to whom, the Epistle was written, which would hardly suit Mr. Dobney's purpose. Giving it a more extensive application, there is nothing in the language employed necessitating the limitation of it to believers, since there is nothing implying a personal interest in salvation. Supposing him to be speaking of the whole world, Paul might say, God "hath saved us," or put us in the way of salvation, the sense adopted by Bloomfield. The call of the Gospel, which is undoubtedly "a holy calling," or a call to holiness, is clearly addressed to all men; while the great salvation provided and revealed for

all is "not according to our works, but according to [God's] own purpose and grace, given us in Christ Jesus,"—exercised towards all men through Christ,—"before the world began." That this language *may be* explained of personal election and effectual calling I admit; but I do not think it requires to be so explained, or that so explaining it best accords with the spirit and connexion of the passage. My opinion is that the whole passage relates to all men.

4. "It is quite the manner of inspired writers to assert in a general way, and without any restriction, blessings which God the Father of all has exhibited for all, but which nevertheless will be really enjoyed only by some, because only some will avail themselves of the provision so amply made."

Answer: As Mr. Dobney has given no specimen of this class of texts, I am unable to judge either of the force or of the exact import of his argument. Whatever it may mean, however, I do not see that it can affect the interpretation of this passage, unless it were previously shown that immortality was a conditional prerogative.

5. "The immortal life here spoken of is connected with the Gospel —'brought life and immortality to light *through the Gospel*'—so that it would seem to be one of the Gospel blessings, and if so, to be enjoyed on Gospel terms."

Answer: "Everlasting destruction" is, like immortality, "brought to light through the Gospel;" so that, according to Mr. Dobney, "it would seem to be one of the Gospel blessings." Mr. Dobney, however, feels the fallacy of this argument so sensibly, that he announces his intention not to lay "*much* stress" upon it.

6. "If Christ hath more clearly than any preceding teacher revealed, and that authoritatively, an immortal existence for man, we are bound reverently and submissively to sit at his feet, and learn of him the true words of God on the subject."

Answer: Undoubtedly. This I have just been doing under Mr. Dobney's guidance, and to his point he has proved —nothing.

These are all the reasons which Mr. Dobney assigns for "refusing his assent to the interpretation which would make this verse teach a universal and unconditional immortality." I trust I have treated them fairly.

In concluding his remarks on the passage before us, Mr. Dobney makes some animadversions on the *Eclectic* reviewer, which I cannot pass wholly without notice, p. 166 *et seq.*

The reviewer had pleaded in bar of a limited interpretation of this text, first, that no limitation was indicated by the apostle. On this Mr. Dobney remarks at some length, and I think he has shown that this plea was not sufficiently guarded. The reviewer should, no doubt, have been willing to admit a limitation on any sufficient ground. He had pleaded secondly, that as the death abolished and the immortal life revealed stand in direct contrast with each other, they must be regarded as co-extensive. To this Mr. Dobney makes no objection; but he sets out from this point on a somewhat singular argumentative progress, in order to arrive at his former conclusion, that mankind, without the mediation of Christ, are exposed to death in the sense of a punitive termination of their existence. I do not believe this, and I think the process by which Mr. Dobney attempts to prove it inconclusive; but suppose I admit it? It is in no way inconsistent with man's natural immortality.

The reviewer had observed that, "it would do strange violence to this text to make it teach future existence for all, and immortal existence for a part." To which the author rejoins—"Well, but who attempts to do this?" I answer, every one who, admitting the reference of the text to mankind at large, would withhold from universal application the term immortal. Asserting as he does the restricted reference of the whole passage, Mr. Dobney is, of course, not of this number.

The author makes, in conclusion, an effort to show that the reviewer's argument lands him in universalism. He had maintained that Christ "abolished death" for all mankind. Now, says Mr. Dobney,

"My reviewer, on another page of his calmly argumentative and forcible paper, lays it down that death, when threatened to the sinner, or mentioned as that from which Christ saves, means the entire aggregate of all the penal consequences of sin," p. 168.

Perhaps so, "*on another page*," and in another connexion; but in treating the passage before us he is not speaking of death "as threatened to the sinner," or "as that from which Christ saves." The phrase "hath abolished death" is clearly no synonym for salvation. He continues—

"And as life, eternal life (and immortal life is an exact synonym), according to him, denotes the entire aggregate of good conferred by Christ, then, too, . . . seeing all men have this immortal life, all men are to be happy." *Ibid.*

It is quite evident that, in his treatment of the passage, the reviewer has *not* spoken of immortal life as synonymous with eternal life in its evangelical sense, or in any other way than as relating to conscious existence.

In these remarks Mr. Dobney has shown more eagerness to bite the reviewer's heel, than command of correct thought and logical sequence. I have noticed them, however, lest it should be supposed that they were unanswerable.

After having completed his enumeration of the passages in which he claims that the word life should be understood literally, "when employed in a declaration of the benefits conferred by Christ on those who believe in him," Mr. Dobney proceeds to an argument of a more general and comprehensive character, still founded, however, upon the passage we have last examined.

"A belief of this assertion of the apostle's," says he, "that it is Christ especially who hath set in a clear light the weighty doctrine of immortal life, would seem to shut us up to a literal rendering of those passages which contain such phrases as life, eternal life, not perishing, and the like, as used by our Lord. For the case stands thus. An inspired apostle declares that Christ hath brought this subject of a future and endless life to light. Then it is but reasonable to expect to find in Christ's discourses this subject of infinite existence treated of more distinctly than in any preceding revelation," pp. 177, 178.

Surely it is neither fair nor safe, but on the contrary very likely to mislead, to argue from a general ground to the meaning of particular passages of Scripture. What every passage means ought to be sufficiently discoverable from the place itself and its immediate or remote adjuncts, the consideration of which, indeed, must be held requisite to just interpretation. Mr. Dobney, on the other hand, would have us determine the meaning of a large number of texts by the single fact (supposing it to be such), that Christ has said a great deal about a certain subject. Can this lead to truth?

If Mr. Dobney really thinks that the passages to which he has thus referred do relate to the question of immortality, why has he not introduced them in his list of places where the word life requires to be so understood? From his not having done so, it cannot be unfair to conclude that he himself has seen no ground for placing them in this class; and yet, for no other reason than that a great deal is said somewhere, he lays it down that it is said in these passages.

Further, the words of the apostle will not sustain this

exclusive reference to the *discourses* of our Lord. His words are—"hath brought life and immortality to light *through the Gospel.*" Now it must be evident that the term "Gospel," as here used, cannot be limited to the personal ministry of Christ. I should not be disposed to limit it even to the whole teaching of Christ and his apostles, but should rather understand it of the entire evangelical system of divine administration towards mankind. Of all the light which this system throws upon the nature and destiny of man Christ may properly be said to be the author, whether it arise from a series of facts in which he is the principal agent, or from discourses or documents delivered or written by his disciples. There may be even little in Christ's discourses on the subject of immortality expressly, and yet the declaration of the apostle may be justified.

The discourses of our Lord, however, were not wanting in explicit reference to this subject. Upon at least one recorded occasion, he took a public opportunity of entering directly into the controversy then existing among the Jewish sects in relation to it, and gave not only an authoritative decision, but a conclusive argument. See his conversation with the Sadducees, recorded in Luke xx. 27–38; and the examination of this passage in "Who will Live for Ever?" printed in the present volume.

The Great Teacher may be held also to have thrown much light upon the subject of human immortality by so perpetually drawing his motives from the future state of existence, and so forcibly directing the attention of his hearers to it. For it deserves to be remarked, that the doctrine of man's proper immortality did not require to be stated in order to be known. It is in historical proof that it was already known, and, although partially disputed, generally received. It was a part of the authorized and popular belief of the Jews. For our Lord to appeal to this belief was to sanction it, and by adopting the opinion believed in the most effectual way to teach it. To them, believing their natural immortality, his words life, eternal life, and their opposites, would naturally and necessarily have the meaning of happiness and misery respectively, and an express caution must have been required had he intended it to be otherwise. The manner in which he opened the future to the view, and the clearness with which he exhibited the joys and sorrows of which

futurity was to be the theatre to man, go to make good the apostle's declaration.

In a word, Christ treated this doctrine as he treated all others. He taught none systematically. His more regular discourses—his sermon on the mount for example—were not doctrinal. What he said even on the atonement itself was chiefly incidental. His argument for man's immortality is perhaps the clearest and most direct recorded to have ever fallen from his lips.

In concluding my review of this part of Mr. Dobney's argument, I may be permitted to say that I am disappointed at its meagreness, and by the paucity of instances adduced. I observe also that his list, scanty as it is, contains none of the leading passages relating to his subject; such as John iii. 16, Rom. vi. 23, and others. If his position be true, it can surely be shown by a much larger and more influential exhibition of instances than this. He may perhaps have others noted down, but it is reasonable to suppose that he has adduced what appeared to him the plainest and the strongest. He comforts himself, indeed, on this head, with the reflection that, if they are to his point, "be they ever so few," or "only one," they must be held to establish it; but even this statement is liable to be modified by the remark, that definite classes of texts may require to be interpreted harmoniously, and that the ascertained meaning of many may be a proper guide to the doubtful meaning of a few. Small as the satisfaction would be, however, of seeing so important an issue suspended on the interpretation of "only one" text, I do not think that even that is left to him.

CHAPTER VI.

ON HIS TREATMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE CONTINUED.

After all Mr. Dobney's strenuous attempts to maintain the position I have been examining, in point of argument he declines to occupy it. In page 183 *et seq.* he frankly and distinctly renounces it.

The *Eclectic* reviewer had observed that the term life, as the subject of divine promise through Christ, must be taken to denote some inestimable blessing, and that consequently it was unsatisfactory to understand it of existence merely; "which," says Mr. Dobney immediately after quoting the reviewer's words, "*as no one has affirmed so no one will contend for*," p. 183.

Here I beg leave to refer Mr. Dobney to p. 174 *et seq.* of his own volume, where he strenuously contends that the word life "is sometimes to be *understood literally* in a declaration of the benefits conferred by Christ on those who believe in him." Now to understand life literally is, doubtless, according to the definition of terms then in his view, to understand it of existence merely as distinct from happiness; and this is the meaning on which Mr. Dobney insists, to the specific and entire exclusion of happiness, in all the passages which he quotes. I am aware that, in stating the question in p. 172, he asks whether life, when it is matter of promise by God through Christ, "has *or includes* the idea of continued and never-ending existence;" but I see no reference to such a mode of stating the question anywhere else. It is inapplicable to his expositions of Scripture, and indeed directly subversive of them.

On this point I may refer also to Mr. Dobney's definition of immortality, noticed in the commencement of this discussion. He distinctly states that he means "by immortality never-ending existence," p. 84; that is (for he continually uses the terms interchangeably) "eternal life." Yet when his reviewer tells him that, in the position in which this phrase is found in the New Testament, it is not satisfactory to understand it of never-ending existence merely, he turns short round, and exclaims, O! I do not mean never-ending existence *merely*, but that and something else conjoined with it!

"The question is not," Mr. Dobney proceeds, "whether mere existence be all that Christ bestows, but whether or not Christ does bestow that immortality (endless existence) which he fills with unspeakable happiness," pp. 183, 184.

Very well. I say that eternal life is used in Scripture to denote ALL that Christ confers on believers; witness John iii. 16; Rom. vi. 23. Let us now see what the author affirms to be the scriptural meaning of eternal life.

"The points on which a mind yearning for immortality requires authoritative instruction seem to be these. First, is there immortality at all? And if so—Is it the prerogative of all men indiscriminately, or only of some? And if of some—Of whom, and how attainable? . .

"To Him, then, I say, . . . who is to all creatures the fountain of life, whence all their living energies are derived, we reverently approach with the sentiment of Peter on our lips, 'Thou hast the words of eternal life.' . . . Our question is touching life—and life interminably prolonged—drawn out to all eternity. Assuredly he could not use words plainer or more relevant than those employed in the very question we propose. It is of life and of eternity we ask—it is of life and of eternity he speaks. And in these self-same and plain terms he tells us of the very thing we inquire about; that is, he speaks to us of 'life,' 'eternal life,' 'everlasting life,' 'never perishing,' &c., in a word, of immortality," pp. 178, 180.

It is clear then that Mr. Dobney holds *the meaning* of eternal life in the lips of Christ to have been endless existence. Now eternal life is all that Christ bestows on believers; whence it seems plainly to follow that, according to him, endless existence is all that Christ confers on believers.

If indeed it were not so, why should Mr. Dobney endeavour to escape from this conclusion, by availing himself of the reviewer's reference to those scriptural terms which relate to holiness, communion with God, &c., as parts of a believer's happiness?

"The reviewer himself admits," says he, "that there are other terms in Scripture which convey the notion of holiness, communion with God, &c.," p. 184.

This admission, however, is nothing to the author's purpose: the incontrovertible fact being that these notions, however often separately expressed, are also included in the comprehensive term eternal life; while his quotation of it shows a consciousness that *he* had used the term eternal life in such a manner as to exclude them.

Hence also he finds it necessary to assert emphatically that he really does believe that Christ will confer on his people, not only being, but well-being.

"I affirm," says he, "as strongly as words will serve, that the saved shall receive through Christ, to whose gracious mediation they owe every blessing both in this world and that which is to come, every form and degree of good of which they are capable, and not 'existence merely,'" p. 184.

No one ever entertained a question of Mr. Dobney's sentiments on this point. In truth, it is necessary to his system

that he should take the word life as expressive of the two ideas existence and happiness, or a happy existence, for which accordingly he goes on to plead. What I here particularly notice is that he thus abandons the ground he has previously endeavoured to maintain. Had he been successful, his very success would have been embarrassing to him.

After quoting the reviewer to the effect that, as various elements of the felicity emphatically expressed by the term life are specifically referred to in Scripture, it might be expected that existence itself should be referred to in a similar manner if it were a part of "the gift of God," Mr. Dobney says—

"Since he alleges that if existence itself 'were a part of the gift of God'—*and it seems strange to question this*"—p. 185.

I arrest this quotation here for the purpose of noticing a somewhat singular diversion of Mr. Dobney's mind from the point before him. The reviewer is evidently, as appears both by the connexion and the marks of quotation, referring to existence as a supposed part of the gift of God *through Christ;* while Mr. Dobney writes as though he understood the reviewer of existence as the gift of God *in creation.* If this be a mistake it is unfortunate; if an artifice it is transparent and harmless. I now resume the quotation.

"Since he alleges that, if existence itself were a part of 'the gift of God,' so important a particular might be expected to appear on some other occasion than in the use of the term life, I inquire what better terms could have been selected? . . . How was life to be better designated than by the self-same word itself, with the epithets eternal, everlasting, abiding for ever, and then the expression of the same thought negatively—shall not die for ever, shall never perish, shall not die any more?" p. 185.

Separating from this string of phrases the last, which does not belong to the same class of passages, and which I have elsewhere endeavoured to show constitutes a declaration of the deathlessness of the whole race,* I reply that these terms would have answered Mr. Dobney's purpose very well, if they had not been used in circumstances and in a mode (namely, as expressive of the whole blessedness of salvation) which do not allow them to be understood in the sense he wishes. They are now no longer suited to an object for

* "Who will Live for Ever?"

which if they had been wanted, it is fair to suppose they would not have been otherwise appropriated.

"If," says Mr. Dobney, "these terms are to be denied as teaching that continued existence itself is obtained for us by Christ (which existence he also fills with everlasting happiness), then the Scriptures would almost seem unfit for the common people; for that this is the obvious sense I respectfully submit," p. 185.

That Mr. Dobney need not indulge the fear of the Scriptures being "unfit for the common people" unless the words in question be determined in his sense, may appear with some probability from this, that the common people, familiar as they have been with the Bible, have never been of his opinion. Even *they* know that the "obvious," or rather the apparent sense, is not always the real one.

Mr. Dobney then proceeds "in further reply" as follows :—

1. "That no argument whatever can set aside the fact already shown, that there are passages in which the term must necessarily be understood literally, where life—eternal life, is the subject matter of declaration and promise," p. 186.

Answer: This fact has not been shown. The attempts to demonstrate it have already been disposed of; see p. 164 *et seq.*

2. "If such passages are not allowed to teach the grand doctrine of immortality which Christ placed in the clearest light, there are none that do teach it; and the apostolic assertion, 2 Tim. i. 10, is eviscerated."

Answer: This also is mere repetition, and has already been considered: see p. 172 *et seq.*

3. "The same objection would apply to passages in which God is said to live for ever and ever."

The objection is that, since various constituent elements of "eternal life" are specifically mentioned in Scripture, it might be expected that existence also, if it were one of them, should be similarly mentioned. Now Mr. Dobney says that "the *same* objection will apply to passages in which God is said to live for ever." I confess I cannot understand this. But let us go on.

"It would be as reasonable," adds Mr. Dobney, "to ask in a tone of triumph, What! are we to believe that mere existence is predicated of God? Surely God is infinitely happy; and therefore when an angel or an apostle affirms barely of him that he 'liveth for ever and ever,' this formula must convey the idea of infinite felicity."

Still I cannot understand. It seems to me as if the author were here stating an hypothetical argument in favour of understanding life to mean both existence and happiness. Let us go on further.

"Every one would perceive this sort of argument to be of little value, and the reply would be ready. We know from other sources that God over all is happy for evermore, and are content to find in this one phrase the one idea, which indeed is magnificent beyond conception, of infinite existence."

This is clear, and proves to a demonstration that the one phrase "eternal life" ought to be taken for "one idea"—for either existence or happiness; and not, as Mr. Dobney takes it, for the two ideas of existence and happiness.

Now for the application.

"So we know from other passages that they who receive the gift of life shall be made gloriously perfect in all respects, in knowledge, purity, bliss; that they shall see God, reign with Christ, &c. Why not be content, then, to derive the amazing fact of never-ending existence from those texts that teach it, and the ineffably glorious characteristics of that everlasting life from the texts which more distinctly exhibit them?"

Answer: There are no "texts that teach" never-ending existence to be the gift of Christ to his followers. The phrase everlasting life is unquestionably used to express the entire felicity of the redeemed; and it cannot, therefore, when so used, be understood according to a different analogy, that is, of never-ending existence. Is the term life ever so placed when used with relation to God?

4. "Besides," proceeds Mr. Dobney, "even if it be conceded that the phrase eternal life is in Scripture terminology the technical term for the whole aggregate of the blessings bestowed on the righteous, why should the idea of immortality, which after all must lie at the basis, be excluded as one of the blessings conferred? If the phrase includes many things, why may not infinite existence be one of the many?"

Answer: Because the analogies by which life means respectively conscious being and happiness are distinct, and remote the one from the other.

"And would there not," the author continues, "be a beautiful propriety in selecting that endowment which is indispensable to all others, and in itself the mightiest of all, as precisely that which, because of its grandeur, shall be chiefly adopted as representative of the whole?" p. 187.

Answer: No. Because the term life, if used to denote conscious existence, could be used at the same time as "representative of the whole" felicity of the redeemed only by a confusion of ideas which require to be kept apart.

At this point Mr. Dobney distinctly takes his ground in the following manner:—

"And as to life being generic and inclusive. Suppose it be conceded, what philological or even dogmatical objection would then lie against understanding it thus? Life is a term generic and inclusive, and means,—(1.) Existence, literally; conscious being, without which, of course, no other good can be possible: and, (2.) Happiness; because generally life is esteemed of the highest importance. . . . So that the most valuable endowment of man, without which he could have no other, is well chosen as the term by which to set forth the whole sum of happiness; and thus the word life may mean, continued [conscious?] existence made happy," p. 186.

I entirely agree with the author, that "the most valuable endowment of man, without which he could have no other, is well chosen as the term by which to set forth the whole sum of happiness;" but this supplies no reason why the two ideas should be expressed by it at one and the same time. This was the ground taken by the *Eclectic* reviewer, to whose remarks Mr. Dobney replies as follows:—

"But against this it is laid down, as though it were an indisputable axiom, that the word must have one of two significations, and cannot have both: it must be interpreted either literally, and so mean existence only; or figuratively, in which case the literal sense is altogether excluded.

"I reply (1.), by denying the soundness of the principle, which almost seems made for the occasion.

"And (2.), by reminding the reader, that the very holders of the popular notion falsify this same principle, when they treat of the death threatened to the wicked," pp. 187, 188.

To this twofold reply, the reviewer published his rejoinder in the *Eclectic* for June, 1846, in the following words:—

"Insisting, as it is quite necessary he should (p. 187), that the word life, in the scriptural phrase *eternal life*, should be understood as conveying two ideas, first that of existence and then that of happiness, he encounters an objection that this is understanding the word both literally and metaphorically at the same time, and is therefore inadmissible. To this he offers two replies. One of them is that writers on the other side have done the same thing, which could be nothing but an *argumentum ad hominem*, even if examples of it could be cited from our own pages. The other is couched in the following terms: 'I reply by denying the soundness of the principle, *which almost seems made for the occasion.*' The expression which we have

marked in italics is merely a slip of the author's pen. It is at all events a deviation—and we are happy to say a solitary deviation so far as we have noticed, from the courtesy elsewhere studiously observed towards us.

"Mr. Dobney denies the soundness of the principle that a word must not be understood both literally and metaphorically at the same time, and complains somewhat that we laid it down as 'though it was an indisputable axiom.' We must confess that we thought it so, and that we still think it so. It is to our mind inherent in the very nature of a metaphor. For what is a metaphor? Turning to the first authority at hand (the *Oxford Encyclopædia*), we find the following definition of it. 'Metaphor, in rhetoric, a trope or figure, whereby a word is transferred from its proper signification to another different from it by reason of some similitude between them.' This definition, in which we believe all authorities agree, is decisive to our purpose; for if, in metaphorical use, a word is transferred from its proper signification to another different from it, it is plainly inadmissible to understand it both literally and metaphorically at the same time. The metaphorical use involves of necessity the dropping of the literal meaning.

"Examples are not less decisive to this point than definition. We call a blooming child a rose-bud, a courageous man a lion, and youth the morning of life. Here is a metaphorical use of the words rose-bud, lion, and morning, but in every case the literal meaning is dropped, since no one means to say that a blooming child is really a rose-bud, or a courageous man really a lion, or youth really the morning. The result will be the same by whatever number or variety of examples the rule may be tested. And it is the same with scriptural metaphors as with others; as when we are told, for example, that God is our sun and shield, that our days are a hand-breadth, that our life is a vapour. To these illustrations we may add that the reason of the rule is obvious from the manner in which a metaphor is formed. It is founded, we are told, 'on some similitude' between two objects; and hence it is said to be an abridged simile, or a comparison reduced to a single word. The early part of life is in some respects like the early part of the day, and this resemblance may be either drawn out at length into a simile, as by saying youth is like the morning, or condensed into a metaphor, as in calling youth the morning of life. Now the likeness between two objects thus brought into comparison being never entire but only partial, it is plain that, in the metaphorical use of a term, we must get an idea so far different from the original one that the same things cannot be predicated of both, and it would consequently be false to consider both of them as conveyed by it. We call a brave man a lion because in a certain respect he resembles a lion; and as we go on to speak of him in terms in no way appropriate to a real lion, it would be delusive and absurd to hold that we retain the original idea of the term, and mean by it a lion and a brave man too. The very notion, indeed, of retaining the original idea of a term used metaphorically involves a fallacy. A metaphor is nothing but an abridged comparison; only let it be spread out into a comparison, and it will be seen that there is in truth no original idea to be retained, as when we say our life is like a vapour,

there are simply two objects, the one compared with the other; and in a metaphor properly understood there is nothing more.

"To apply these familiar distinctions (which we feel ashamed to have to bring out so elaborately on such an occasion) to the case before us. The word life, literally denoting existence, is sometimes employed in Scripture to denote happiness, of which it is needless to cite examples as it is an admitted point; it is also admitted by Mr. Dobney that this is a metaphorical use of the term life: consequently we affirm, in accordance with the rule laid down, that when the term life is used to denote happiness it cannot be held to retain its original idea, or to mean existence and happiness too.

"It is in vain for the author to cite the authority of Tholuck, or any other authority even though it were our own, against this position. It is unquestionably an important principle of interpretation, from the violation of which much mischief has arisen, and nothing but mischief can arise. The disregard of it in his own case has given rise to much of the inconclusiveness discernible in his argument, and has supplied him with his chief facilities for avoiding the force of ours."

I have already (p. 163) intimated my present opinion that the term life denotes primarily the active condition of organic being; and that it is by analogy that it comes to denote first conscious existence, and then by a further analogy happiness. I cannot regard the question now, consequently, as one strictly between a literal and a metaphorical meaning of a term. It is rather a question between two analogical meanings. The result is the same, however, since meanings derived from a common primary by different analogies of course convey dissimilar ideas; and the just use of language requires that a word should not be used to convey dissimilar ideas at one and the same time. An exception to this rule must of necessity be allowed where words are, as on some occasions they are (avowedly or covertly), intended to convey a double sense; but these are clearly exceptional cases, and may be said to confirm the rule.

I have thus laid down a rule by which I have already shown my own willingness to abide, and by which, notwithstanding any examples which may be adduced to the contrary, I am convinced all expositors of Scripture ought to abide. The necessities of human language and thought require it. It is quite as much as we can do to carry out successfully any process of argument or instruction when we make words convey one idea at a time; to make them convey two is the sure road to confusion and mistake.

To turn from the rule, however, to the practice, on which the author seems confidently to rely.

"If," says he, "there were a single passage in which a word was used both literally and figuratively—the physical and primary sense being combined with the *spiritual*—" [I will take this to mean, *metaphorical*] "the objection is met. Now I submit that there are many passages in the New Testament where the same word is evidently inclusive of both significations," p. 187.

Of these "many passages" he favours us with a citation of two, adding weight to his examples by quoting the words of Professor Tholuck.

(1.) John i. 4, "In him was life, and the life was the light of men."

"On this passage Tholuck says—

"'It may here be asked whether ζωὴ means all life, and consequently the natural also, or whether it means exclusively the life in God, spiritual life. . . . The source of all living energies actually dwells in the Logos, and their highest manifestation is the life of the spirit in man. It is therefore not necessary to attach to ζωὴ the idea of spiritual life exclusively, especially as ζωὴ is in the first instance without the article; though it must be added that a reference to the spiritual life prevails,'" pp. 187, 188.

Against this opinion of Tholuck I have to set that of Schleusner, Bloomfield, and various distinguished critics cited by him, who attach to ζωὴ in this place the idea of spiritual power exclusively; in my judgment decidedly the better interpretation.

(2.) John v. 21–29.

"On these nine verses, to which, in order to avoid a long quotation, I beg the reader to refer, Professor Tholuck says—

"'In this discourse the physical and spiritual agencies of Christ are probably combined,'" p. 188.

Let us now hear the opinion of other commentators. Bloomfield, having recited the view taken by Tholuck, after Œder, Eckerman, Schuster, Hammer, Ammon, and Paulus, proceeds to say—"But that hypothesis has been elaborately refuted by Wolf, Kuinoel, Schott, Storr, and Flatt; who have shown that, according to the laws of grammatical and historical interpretation, the passage can only be understood of the resuscitation of the dead *in its proper sense*." And this view of the passage approves itself to my judgment.

5. Mr. Dobney next adverts to the remark of the reviewer that "if life means happy existence, death may mean miserable existence." To this he objects (p. 189), and I think with reason, that the antithesis is not fairly put, and that, on the principle of interpretation on which life is taken

to mean a happy *existence*, death should be taken to mean a miserable *destruction*. No point in the argument, therefore, is made by the reviewer's remark.

Upon this topic I should have had nothing more to say, had not the author gone on to seek in this remark a confirmation of his own opinion. He does this in two ways.

"And thus," says he, "a fair adoption of his own principle confirms instead of confuting my argument," p. 189.

This is written as though it was the reviewer's "own principle" to denote by life happy existence, which is an entire misconception.

"How could the reviewer consistently object to my stating the case as derived from his own article, thus:—The reviewer affirms the death threatened to the wicked to mean miserable *existence:* . . therefore the life promised to the righteous must mean a happy *death!*" p. 189.

This would be forcible were it only *true* that "the reviewer affirms the death threatened to the wicked to mean miserable existence;" but this being altogether a mistake, the blow misses its object.

The author presents his concluding argument in the following terms:—

"Kindred passages serve also to guide us to the literal meaning. For if we had other texts of Scripture in which permanent existence was promised in other phraseology than that now under consideration, it would doubtless strengthen the conviction that we are right in literally interpreting such terms as everlasting life, living for ever, &c. But we certainly have such texts," p. 189.

The texts adduced in support of this assertion are the following:—

"(1.) 1 John ii. 17, "The world passeth away, and the lust thereof; but he that doeth the will of God *abideth for ever.*"

Here we certainly have not the word life; but Mr. Dobney has said little to establish the idea of "permanent existence." His only remark is that abiding for ever "is antithetically asserted of the righteous, in distinction from the transitoriness and evanescence of the world." I think on the other hand that, looking to the commencement of the passage in the 15th verse, the idea of the place is different. "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world: for . . . the world passeth away, and the lust thereof; but

he that doeth the will of God *abideth for ever*"—that is, has a source of permanent happiness. The idea is not the brevity of the world's duration, but its transitory value as a source of enjoyment.

(2.) Isa. liii. 10, as rendered by Lowth—"If his soul shall make a propitiatory sacrifice, he shall see a seed which shall prolong their days." Mr. Dobney adds, "If, however, the bishop's rendering should be objected to the argument does not suffer, inasmuch as on the received translation prolonged existence notwithstanding he should die would then be promised to the Messiah—'he shall prolong his days.'"

Of the former of these renderings Mr. Dobney says that—

"It is quite in accordance with many other prophetic assertions; as, for example, Ps. lxxxix. 36, 'His seed shall endure for ever;' and xxi. 4, 'He asked life of thee and thou gavest it him, even length of days for ever and ever.'" And of the latter he says it is "accordant with the promise in another Messianic Psalm, 'Thou wilt show me the path of life,' xvi. 11; and again, 'With long life will I satisfy him, and show him my salvation,' xci. 16."

I must be permitted to express my surprise at encountering so considerable a mass of citations from the OLD Testament, where Mr. Dobney is professedly treating the revelations of the NEW. If it be really true that the prophets and the Psalms contain so much to his purpose, he has done grievous injustice to his argument by omitting to treat the contents of the Old Testament separately.

But for the passage in Isa. liii. 10. The rendering of Lowth is so much over-weighed by the authorities in favour of the common reading, as quoted by Mr. Dobney himself, that it may be dismissed without further notice. As to Psalm lxxxix. 36, the phrase evidently means that the royal line in David's family should not be cut off, as in the case of the kings of Israel, the term "for ever" being, according to a just principle appealed to by the author, limited by the nature of the subject. Psalm xxi. 4, does not refer to any "seed" at all, and is consequently quite beside the mark.

Of the common reading of Isa. liii. 10—"he shall prolong his days,"—Mr. Dobney says, "the argument does not suffer" by it, "inasmuch as prolonged existence notwithstanding he should die would then be promised to the Messiah."

Not disputing for the moment this interpretation of the words, I do not see how it is in any way applicable to the

author's purpose. His affirmation is that we have texts which, without using the word life, teach that endless existence is promised to believers in Christ. Now it appears to me that the passage in question can supply no proof of such an affirmation: first, because it relates not to believers but to Christ himself; and secondly, because it cannot be classed among those which do not employ the word life, since the phrase "to prolong days" is a pure Hebraism for "to live." Hence accordingly Dr. Pye Smith, in rendering into English the German translations of this passage in the place referred to by Mr. Dobney, uses the very word—"he shall live." The same reasons dispose of Ps. xvi. 11, and xci. 16.

I cannot assent, however, to Mr. Dobney's interpretation of Isa. liii. 10. He says that "prolonged existence" is there promised to the Messiah, "notwithstanding he should die." Not to dwell on the observation that "prolonged existence" is not necessarily endless existence—which is strictly Mr. Dobney's subject—it seems to me that the phrase suggests rather the idea of existence *renewed* than *prolonged*. Notwithstanding the Messiah should die, he should *live again*. And so the passage is taken by the commentators (see Scott *in loc.*) as foretelling Christ's resurrection. I am not satisfied, however, with the use of the term "existence" at all in this connexion. Mr. Dobney makes it antithetical with death, as though he held death to be a state of non-existence. I cannot but avow my entire dissent from this view. Death, as I have more fully explained in the preceding chapter, is a change in the mode of human existence effected by the cessation of the organic functions, but one not interrupting the conscious being of the individual. The words "he shall live," consequently, on this understanding, relate only to the resumption of his life in the body, or his resurrection from the dead.

CONCLUSION.

After quoting some specimens of unguarded language from Robert Hall and Moses Stuart which in no way affect the argument, Mr. Dobney concludes the discussion in the following terms:—

"I trust the objections against a literal interpretation of the terms in question have been fairly met, and that it will be seen the preponderance of argument is in favour of the view suggested," p. 192.

But *one* term has been in question, namely, the term life, and this only when used to denote the blessings conferred by Christ on his followers. To the interpretation of this in the sense of conscious existence there remain still these somewhat grave objections: first, that all Mr. Dobney's attempts to establish it have been unsuccessful; and secondly, that if it were granted to him he would repudiate it. "The view suggested" by him and required by his system, is that life should be taken in a compound sense, combining, and in my opinion confounding, ideas derived from distinct analogies. In favour of this he has said little, and that little manifestly inconclusive. He adds,—

"But let us not close this chapter without again distinctly recognizing an important fact; namely, that our conclusion will not be in the least degree invalidated by the adduction of passages, be they ever so numerous, in which life—eternal life—is used metaphorically. For if there were a thousand texts in which fair criticism could find only the figurative employment of the term, these would not detract from the authority of those other texts relating to the righteous in which enlightened criticism would find the literal sense. And then, if there were such, be they ever so few, they establish the doctrine that life infinitely protracted (immortality) is the gift of God through Christ to them that believe," p. 193.

My reply to this is twofold. First, that I have examined all the passages brought forward by Mr. Dobney as instances of the use of the term life in its literal meaning, and shown, as I hope, that he has not made good his case in any of them. Secondly, that, if he had made good his case, they would by his own admission fail to establish the doctrine he maintains, inasmuch as he allows the necessity for his purpose of contending that life must be understood in the complex sense of both existence and happiness.

"And then again," he proceeds, "if immortality be a prerogative conferred on the pious through the Mediator, it must follow that sinners were not *ab initio* endowed therewith; and also that none who reject Christ and his great salvation will live for ever; and so, consequently, the threatening to them of destruction, of perishing, of second death, must be literally understood"—

This is clearly a *non sequitur*. On the supposition that men are not naturally immortal, what most directly follows is that they will naturally perish.

"And therefore that the death threatened to Adam was that which has been already intimated"—

This is a circumlocution for annihilation. But this also is a *non sequitur:* for it does not follow that because the destruction threatened to sinners at large is annihilation, therefore the death denounced on Adam was such.

"And that the popular doctrine, unsustained by Scripture, must be abandoned. Yes, all this," he adds in a tone of irrepressible gratulation, "if there be only one text in Scripture which teaches that life in its literal sense is conferred by Christ as a blessing on believers!"

I shall resist the provocation to a smile which this passage supplies. Mr. Dobney, however, is somewhat premature in his opinion that "the popular doctrine," as he is pleased to call it, is materially damaged. Before a position can be taken it must at least be assaulted. But he has totally misunderstood the popular doctrine, and consequently, so far as impugning it is concerned, his labour is absolutely lost. He has been contending against the notion that men positively shall exist for ever, a notion which is not held. Against the idea that men are naturally adapted to live for ever, which the popular party do hold, he has said not a word.

In his concluding sentence, Mr. Dobney congratulates himself that his view

"Happily harmonizes the whole of the sacred writings on this and kindred subjects; so that, though on this point we recede from orthodoxy, we in that proportion approach nearer to truth; though we shake a human system, I thank God we establish the Scriptures," p. 193.

So all of us fondly think who engage in theological controversy. Yet I know persons who have read the author's book without being convinced by it; and doubtless these pages, if ever they see the light, will be far from convincing all who may peruse them. It is but a vain fancy that, when we attack what we think an error, we are like Samson grasping the pillars of the idol temple. Mr. Dobney, no doubt, has made a sincere and earnest appeal to the understandings of men; so have I; and he will readily concur with me in saying, God speed the right!

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

In the year 1846 the Rev. Edward White, pastor of the Congregational church in the city of Hereford, published a volume with the following title,—"Life in Christ: Four Discourses on the Scripture Doctrine that Immortality is the Peculiar Privilege of the Righteous."

In some parts of this volume the author endeavours to disprove the opinion of the eternal suffering of the wicked, and of these it will be accordant with the design of the present work for me to take no notice. I treat of man's immortality, nothing more; I shall confine myself, therefore, to those portions of Mr. White's book which relate to this question.

The title of the work, which contains an assumption scarcely, perhaps, in good taste, is by no means accurately descriptive of its contents. Instead of LIFE IN CHRIST, it might have been more appropriately called DEATH BY SIN; for the great aim of the author is to establish the position that death is the penalty of sin, and thus to necessitate the inference that those who live for ever will live by Christ. I shall endeavour to examine the argument with what care and candour I can command.

CHAPTER I.

ON HIS DEFINITION OF IMMORTALITY.

THE passage in this work which approaches nearest to a definition of immortality (for there is no formal definition of it) is the following:—

"The idea commonly entertained on this subject is, that man was created at first with a body that could die and with a soul that could not die, but must, by its own essential quality, or by the will of the Most High (which is the same thing), live for ever," p. 5.

This extract, although far from truly representing "the idea commonly entertained," shows clearly that Mr. White speaks of man being immortal in the sense that he "*must* live for ever." The same phrase occurs in p. 7. In p. 11 we have the word "eternal" used as synonymous with immortal; and in p. 25, the "eternity" of the soul is spoken of. In p. 33 the phrase "essentially indestructible" is used; and a few lines afterwards these words, "whether of a necessary or an actual immortality in the human soul." "Essential immortality" occurs, p. 34; "an indestructible being" p. 38; "absolutely immortal" p. 40; and "native eternal immortality" p. 82.

It is unnecessary to proceed further. It is beyond question that the author uses the word immortal, in common with Mr. Dobney, as meaning that mankind "*positively shall* live for ever."

This, however, is not the received doctrine of man's natural immortality. What this doctrine really is, cannot, perhaps, be more briefly or satisfactorily stated than in the words of Dr. Samuel Clark, in his celebrated letter to Dodwell:—

"When we speak of the soul as created naturally immortal, we mean that it is by the Divine pleasure created such a substance as, not having in itself any composition or other particle of corruption, will naturally, or of itself, continue for ever; that is, will not by any natural decay, or by any power of nature, be dissolved or destroyed; but yet nevertheless depends continually upon God, who has power to destroy or annihilate it if he should think fit."

I believe this is "the idea commonly entertained" on this subject. It is at all events one which Mr. White was scarcely entitled to overlook.

The author does a further injustice to the subject, by using the word eternity as synonymous with immortality. To exist eternally is, in the most limited sense of the words, to exist without end; a sense in which the phrase may be applicable to some notions of the human soul once held by pagan philosophers, but in which it has no applicability at all to any opinion ever extensively held among Christians. Etymology radically distinguishes eternity from immortality,

which, in plain English, is non-liability to death; as the corresponding Greek terms,—*ἀθανασία*, deathlessness, and *ἀφθαρσία*, incorruptibilty—may serve to evince. All terms expressing eternity are derived from *αἰὼν*, *quasi ἀεί ὤν*, always being.

Thus mistaking at the outset the idea of immortality against which he was to argue, it follows as a natural and necessary consequence that his argument is altogether out of bearing. His main effort is directed to prove that death, or forfeiture of human existence, is the punishment of sin, whether in the transgression of the law or the rejection of the Gospel. But if this be granted, it may yet be true that man was created with an adaptation to exist for ever, and by this very statement it becomes the rather probable that he was so. What Mr. White should prove is, not that the soul will judicially perish, but that it will naturally perish. Not an effort in this direction, however, has been made by him.

The doctrine of man's natural immortality as above stated entails all the consequences Mr. White is anxious to avoid; for if mankind will live for ever unless their existence be penally cut off, then the righteous, in whose case no such cause of extinction can be supposed, will live for ever by their own nature, and not by the gift of Christ.

Were Mr. White's error of definition rectified, it is probable that I should not have any further ground of controversy with him. In p. 9 he says, "That the soul is not composed of matter is readily admitted, and that therefore it is capable of surviving the body is granted also." This is very nearly admitting that the soul is capable of living for ever.

CHAPTER II.

ON HIS THEORY OF HUMAN NATURE.

Our author's views on the structure of man are somewhat peculiar, and enter largely into his argument; it is consequently the more needful to take careful notice of them. He begins by laying down the following principle:—

"It cannot be too earnestly insisted on, that man is regarded by the Scripture writers as consisting essentially of an animal body animated by a soul. Neither alone is a man. Exactly as the union of oxygen and hydrogen produces water, . . . so the union of body and soul constitutes a living man," p. 24.

I have no great fault to find with this. I may notice, however, an inaccuracy in the last phrase. The author ought clearly to have said, "The union of body and soul constitutes *a man*"—not "*a living man;*" whether it be "*exactly* as the union of oxygen and hydrogen produces water" I must leave those who know more about such matters than I do to determine. It may be suspected that he inserted the word *living*, under the influence of an obscure recollection that we do sometimes speak of man in circumstances in which the body and soul are not united; as when we say a dead man. I admit, however, that man, in his complete state, in the full sense of the word, consists of body and soul in union; and that, when the word man may be applied to either body or soul separately, it is by using the name of the whole for a part. The author proceeds as follows:—

"It is further to be especially observed, that throughout the canon of Scripture the characteristic nature (as the apostle terms it, *the image*, εἰκὼν) of the first Adam is considered as existing, not in his spirit, but in his body; so that man is regarded, not principally as spirit, but as flesh," p. 25.

On this passage it is necessary to make some remarks. I shall first examine the principle laid down, and then inquire into the support alleged to be derived to it from Holy Scripture.

I. The principle laid down is, that "the characteristic nature of man consists, not in his spirit, but in his body."

As Mr. White has given no explanation of what he means by his principal term "characteristic nature," I cannot be sure that I shall attach to it the same idea as himself; but I shall, I hope, do it no violence by the following statement.

The "nature" of a thing consists in the properties with which it has been endowed by the Creator; and the "characteristic nature" of a thing consists in the property or properties which characterize it as compared with other things, and distinguish it from them: the characteristic nature must consist, accordingly, not in any properties which the object contemplated may have in common with others

with which it may be compared, but in those only which constitute a difference between them.

Now Mr. White tells us that "the characteristic nature of man consists, not in his spirit, but in his body:" "the characteristic nature"—the properties, that is to say, which characterise man as compared with other beings, and distinguish him from them. I ask, then, with what beings does he intend man to be compared; with those above or those below him? If with those above him, the assertion may be true that his characteristic nature is his body; that is, that man's corporeity broadly distinguishes him from angels. But if with those below him the same assertion will be obviously false; since man's bodily structure allies him to the brutes, and his spirit, or rational nature, distinguishes him from them. If I should be told that the comparison intended is with neither the one nor the other, but with both, or with beings generally, I must still say that the proposition laid down is not correct. Man's body distinguishes him from angels, but not from brutes; man's spirit distinguishes him from brutes, but not from angels; that which distinguishes him from both, or constitutes his "characteristic nature" as compared with both, is the composition of his being by the union of body and spirit. In this respect neither the beasts of the field nor the angels in heaven resemble him.

I conclude, therefore, that, in asserting that "the characteristic nature of man consists not in his spirit but in his body," Mr. White is clearly mistaken.

II. Let us now ascertain the value of the references to Scripture, made to show that "man is regarded, not principally as spirit, but as flesh."

Into his proposition the author ingeniously weaves a reference to 1 Cor. xv. 49, without however naming the passage, or taking any pains to show that it is to his purpose:—"The characteristic nature (as the apostle terms it, *the image*, εἰκὼν) of the first Adam." It seems, then, that, when the apostle uses this term, εἰκὼν, he means by it "the characteristic nature of the first Adam." Let us now look at the passage itself. It runs thus:—

"As we have borne the image (εἰκὼν) of the earthly, we shall also bear the image (εἰκὼν) of the heavenly."

Now it appears to me plain that εἰκὼν cannot be here

taken in the sense of "characteristic nature;" since, if it were so, the apostle would assert that in the resurrection the raised would no longer possess the characteristic nature of mankind, but the characteristic nature of Christ; an assertion quite fatal to at least the subsequent theory of Mr. White. It is enough to take εἰκὼν in the sense of resemblance, as given by the lexicographers, and to read,—"As we (in our bodies) have borne the resemblance of the earthly, we shall also bear the resemblance of the heavenly."

Mr. White reasons from the fact that God called man Adam.

"Hence it was," he says, "we may justly presume, that the name given to the protoplast by Him whose words are ever the best was Adam, from Adamah, the earth or ground; in order to remind both himself and his posterity of their true origin and character," p. 25.

"In the day that God created man," the inspired historian informs us, "in the likeness of God made he him; male and female created he them; and he blessed them, and called their name Adam, in the day when they were created," Gen. v. 1, 2. We take the fact, then, that God affixed to the human race the descriptive appellation Adam, the Earth-born. What does this teach us? Nothing more than we learn from the antecedent narrative (ch. ii. 7), that "the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground." Admitting that it was God's design hereby "to remind both himself [the first man] and his posterity of their true origin and character," it could be so only so far as their structure was earthly; the name cannot be taken to prove that man was either wholly or principally dust. Besides, Adam was not *the* name, or the first name, given to our race. Our first parent was primarily called *Ish*, and his companion, *Isha* (Gen. ii. 23), that is Man, and Woman; terms in which Mr. White does not affect to find any reference to dust, but which with much ingenuity he avoids, by employing the unusual word "the protoplast." The name Adam was subsequently applied to both our first parents as a secondary and partially descriptive appellation, after the manner in which Adam called his wife's name Eve, "because she was to be the mother of all living," Gen. iii. 20.

He cites Gen. ii. 7, "And God formed *man* from the dust of the ground," as showing "that the organized form was called Adam even before the divine breath had kindled the

inward life;" but this, if it proves anything to the point now before us, directly disproves his own first principle that neither the body nor the soul alone is man.

He then notices the expression of Abraham (Gen. xviii. 27), "Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, who am but *dust and ashes*," in the following terms:—

"Hence it was, we may suppose, that Abraham, the friend of God, well instructed in the true constitution of man, humbles himself before the Eternal Spirit as '*dust and ashes;*' not, doubtless, intending to deny that there was a spirit in man, and that the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him more understanding than the fowls of heaven, as his own descendant Elihu subsequently declared; but strongly expressing his sense of the fact that the foundation of man's being is laid in the dust, and that his closest relationships and affinities are not with the spiritual and everlasting universe, but with the material and mortal creation around him," p. 26.

Here is a vast philosophy to build on a casual phrase, which, however, can be very well accounted for without any reference to it; since the attitude of Abraham in pleading with God for Sodom gave an obvious propriety to expressions of the deepest humility. On the other hand, the very fact of such a plea demonstrates that Abraham felt himself at least *as closely* connected with the spiritual as the material portion of the universe.

Mr. White next reminds us of the declaration of our Lord, "that it was his *flesh* he would give for the life of the world."

"It was likewise from a consideration of this view," says he, "that our Lord, who is sometimes said to have given *himself* for our sins (Gal. i. 4), yet declares, on his own authority, that it was his *flesh* which he would give for the life of the world, John vi. 51. It was his human nature which formed the propitiatory sacrifice, and that nature he speaks of as flesh," p. 26.

Undoubtedly, the word flesh is here, as often elsewhere, used to denote the entire human nature; but this is nothing to Mr. White's purpose. If its literal meaning were enforced it would prove that human nature is nothing but flesh, which he denies; and taken otherwise, it is nothing but an example of a very frequent case, the employment of a part to express the whole. I might as well quote on the other side, the words, "Thou shalt make his *soul* an offering for sin," Isaiah liii. 10.

As if calling to recollection, indeed, that counter examples

of scriptural phraseology might be quoted, the author adds in a note (p. 27) his acknowledgment, "that each portion of a compound nature may assume to itself the employment of phraseology which in strict propriety belongs only to the whole being;" qualifying this admission, however, by adding, "still this is but a conventional impropriety." "A conventional impropriety"! Here are the examples of it adduced by Mr. White himself:—"This day shalt *thou* be with *me* in paradise;" "Whilst *we* are at home in the body *we* are absent from the Lord." And a great many more instances might be cited. Yet this mode of speech is to be slurred over as "a conventional impropriety," meaning nothing, while the opposite mode of speech, which may with quite as much justice be called a conventional impropriety as this, is made the basis of a stringent conclusion. For the cases are strictly analogous. In one instance you use a term expressive of the whole man when you mean but a part,—"*We* are at home in the body;" in the other you use a term expressive of a part of man when you mean the whole,—"*My soul* doth magnify the Lord,"—"I who am but *dust and ashes*." If the former be a conventional impropriety, so is the latter. In fact, however, though both are conventional, neither is an impropriety. They are both proper modes of speech, of frequent use and of easy explanation. Mr. White's attempt to argue from that on which he has insisted is utterly vain. If he, by quoting passages in which human nature is spoken of by terms relating to the body (of which, however, he makes but a slender array), can prove that the Scriptures regard man as principally flesh, I, on the other hand, by quoting passages in which human nature is spoken of by terms relating to the mind, can prove that the Scriptures regard man as principally spirit. Here is an instance in which the body is spoken of as the mere clothing of the man:—"I must put off this my tabernacle," 2 Pet. ii. 14. But the truth is that neither of us can prove by such means either one thing or another.

The author next adverts to the apostle's citation, in 1 Cor. xv. 45, of the words of Moses, "The first man Adam was made a living soul," or, as he properly explains it, person. He says that Paul cited these words "for the express purpose of drawing a broad line of distinction between a mere living animal (since the same words, living soul, are employed,

to denote the beasts) and a truly spiritual, life-giving nature," pp. 27, 28.

Now with all the care I can exercise I cannot see this. The whole verse reads thus: "The first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit:" or by a better rendering—"The first man Adam was a living person, the last Adam was a life-giving person." The connexion shows that the contrast intended is not between ψυχὴ and πνεῦμα, *soul* and *spirit*, which here equally signify *person*, but between *living* and *life-giving*. The whole citation appears to be beside the mark.

Mr. White will have it, however, "that Paul really intended to represent the first Adam as having been created only a moral animal, dependent on the elements;" and he immediately brings forward what he calls his "best proof" of it. It is 1 Cor. ii. 14.

"The best proof," says he, "that Paul really intended to represent the first Adam as having been created only a moral animal, dependent on the elements . . . (in good truth, so much an animal that, notwithstanding the image of God, his whole person is still denoted by a phrase applicable also to the lower creation), will be found in his language in the second chapter of this same Epistle. As he was writing to a Greek church, and therefore to one peculiarly in need of sound philosophical statements and accurate expressions, his words deserve particular attention. After declaring that he taught the things of God in a divinely appointed phraseology, he proceeds:—'But the natural man (ψυχικὸς, *the animal man*, the same term employed in the fifteenth chapter in relation to the body) discerneth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned,'" pp. 28, 29.

The argument which the author raises on this text is as follows:—

"Here we find the same adjective, ψυχικὸς, used to denote man's *mental* character, which in a subsequent passage (chap. xv. 45) is employed to denote his whole person but with a special reference to his *body*."

On this I remark—

1. That in chap. xv. 45, ψυχικὸς is not applied to the whole person of man, but to his body only.

2. That in chap. ii. 14, ψυχικὸς is applied, not to the *mental*, but to the *moral* character of man. Of the scriptural application of the word to a moral sense a decisive example occurs in James iii. 15. "This wisdom descendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual (ψυχικὸς), and devilish." And

that it is used in a moral sense in the passage before us a glance at the context makes sufficiently evident. The "natural man" of the 14th verse is obviously the same as he that is imbued with "the spirit of the world," in the 12th; and it is the carnality of his affections, not any peculiarity of mental constitution, which impedes his understanding and appreciation of the Gospel.

Mr. White further endeavours to derive support to his theory from the course of Paul's argument in 1 Cor. xv.

"An additional confirmation of these statements," says he, "arises from the remarkable circumstance that, in the before-mentioned chapter (1 Cor. xv.), the apostle appears to discuss the subject of the resurrection of the body as if all the hopes of humanity were bound up in that great consummation. . . . What can we gather from this remarkable style of reasoning, except the conviction that Paul regarded the body as fundamentally the man; and that the essential, independent immortality of the soul formed no part of that 'hidden wisdom' which he was commissioned to divulge to the nations? For from the preceding scriptural principles it will necessarily follow *that the spirit of a man is not a man*, and that, if a redemption of *man* is to be effected by Almighty benevolence, there must be a resurrection of the dead," pp. 29, 30.

Undoubtedly here is some truth. The author is quite safe in asserting that, "if a redemption of *man* is to be effected, there must be a resurrection of the dead," since "the spirit of a man is not a man." But what is this to his purpose? It goes a very small way towards proving that "Paul regarded the body as fundamentally the man." His exclusive reference to the resurrection of the body when he was formally replying to persons who denied it, proves only that he knew how to keep to his subject.

In fine Mr. White leans upon our Lord's argument with the Sadducees, Luke xx. 27 *et seq.* After quoting the words —"But that the dead are raised even Moses showed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob: he is not a God of the dead but of the living, for all live unto him"—he asks, "In what manner does this quotation prove a resurrection of the body?" I answer, It does not prove a resurrection of the body at all: and I regard its want of adaptation to this end as a powerful argument for believing that not a resurrection of the body, but a future life, was the subject in dispute; a view strongly supported by Dr. G. Campbell and other critics, and not the less worthy of adoption because it is maintained by the

author himself in the volume before us, p. 122. But now let us hear Mr. White answer his own question.

"Our Saviour," he tells us, "intends to intimate that God, graciously calling himself the God of Abraham four hundred years after his death, implies a relation still subsisting between himself and the compound person of Abraham (through the promise of 'Him that quickeneth the dead, and calleth those things which are not as though they were,' in virtue of which 'all live unto him'), and therefore a resurrection of the body of Abraham was certain," p. 31.

So then, he limits the reference of our Lord's words to the *future* fact that Abraham's body *will be* raised. Yet the words used seem to assert a *present* fact—"But that the dead *are raised.*" Besides this admits that, so far as the time then present was concerned, Abraham was really dead in the sense of non-existent; and it thus contradicts our Lord's argument that "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." The force of this argument requires evidently that the parties contemplated should be *then* living. Now the spirit of Abraham doubtless was living at the time, and this fact presented an obvious basis for our Lord's argument. The resurrection of the body, as a remote although certain event, did not do so; and hence Mr. White finds himself under the awkward necessity of reducing the whole to a mere anticipation, and of regarding the entire declaration as the words of Him who "calleth things which ARE NOT *as though they were.*"

Mr. White notices in the last place, "the intentional brevity of Scripture when speaking of the state of the disembodied soul after death."

"Generally," says he, "the whole stress of attention is directed, in reference both to reward and punishment, to the resurrection of the man," p. 32.

If Mr. White would say—to the resurrection *and that which follows it,* I should have no objection to make to this statement. As it is he can hardly maintain its correctness; since he must recollect many passages which speak of "judgment to come" without any explicit mention of the resurrection of the body, although always implying it. The statement thus modified, however, yields no support to his position.

The author winds up his argument in the following terms:—

"Now since the Scripture thus everywhere teaches the essentially

compound nature of man, and regards that compound nature throughout as the subject of the scheme of redemption, with a special reference to the body as its characteristic image, is it probable that the same Scripture should teach us that the body is a worthless, accidental appendage, mortal and corruptible, and that the soul is an independent and everlasting intelligence, the veritable humanity?" p. 32.

I must here observe that the question is not fairly put. I know of no one who holds that the soul is "the veritable humanity." I know of no one who holds that the soul is "an independent and everlasting intelligence." I know of no one who holds that the body is an "appendage" to man, still less that it is a "worthless," and least of all that it is an "accidental" one. The exaggeration which is here manifest can hardly be taken to indicate less than one of two things; either that the author does not understand the real question in debate, or that he has a misgiving of the conclusiveness of his reasoning.

That man is in Scripture regarded as "the subject of the scheme of redemption *with a special reference to the body*," is an assertion, I think, totally unsupported by proof; and I may add utterly contrary both to reason and to Scripture. Redemption, no doubt, contemplates man as he is, both body and soul; and both these "component parts of his nature" according to their relative and proportionate value, that is, the soul chiefly, and the body subordinately—for I suppose it is not questionable whether the soul be the *chief* part of man.

If there are any passages of Scripture which seem to show a special reference of redemption to the body, there are others which would equally avail to show a special reference to the soul. In 1 Peter i. 9, for example, it is distinctly called "the salvation of the soul." In Heb. x. 39, we read of "those who believe to the saving of the soul." In James v. 20, we are assured that he that turneth a sinner from the error of his way "shall save a soul from death." In 1 Peter ii. 25, Christ is said to be "the Shepherd and Bishop of souls." In Matt. xi. 29, the Lord says, "Ye shall find rest to your souls."

In all these passages the word used is ψυχὴ; a word which, because it is applied to animals universally, Mr. White seems half inclined to constitute into a proof that all creatures to whom it is applied are animals only. There is

unquestionable evidence, however, of its being used to express the soul of man in its noblest powers, and one very familiar instance of its employment as synonymous with πνεῦμα. This is Luke i. 46, 47 :—"My soul (ψυχὴ) doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit (πνεῦμά) hath rejoiced in God my Saviour." In 1 Cor. v. 5, the word spirit stands alone :—"That the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus." This kind of argument, however, is on both sides equally without force.

"Is it likely," asks Mr. White in conclusion, "that one component portion of a compound being is essentially indestructible, when that being himself—the man, resulting from the union of the parts—is mortal and corruptible?" p. 33.

This question is obviously raised upon an untenable ground. The good pleasure of the Creator cannot be determined by our notions of probability. Besides, if there is any force in the argument—"Is it likely?"—it must be applied to many subjects besides the immortality of the soul. The composition of such a creature as the author has described (although man is really not such),* may be unlikely in his judgment or in mine, and yet it may be true. The proper question is not is it likely, but is it a fact.

CHAPTER III.

ON HIS CONCEPTION OF DEATH.

HAVING thus examined Mr. White's hypothesis of the "characteristic nature" of man, it will be proper to pay some attention to his conception of death. His words are these :—

"Exactly as the union of oxygen and hydrogen produces water, and when their union is dissolved WATER is destroyed even though its elements may remain; so does the union of body and soul constitute a living man, and when their harmonious conjunction is dissolved the *man* is no more; he is dead; the dissolution of the compound nature being the destruction of the humanity, without any reference to the

* I refer to the term "*indestructible*," which Mr. White is very desirous should be used as synonymous with immortal. I cannot oblige him. I must beg to be permitted to employ the term *incorruptible*.

destiny of the component portions of it. This is the true scriptural idea of death, the dissolution or separation of the parts of our nature," p. 25.

It cannot but strike the reader of the preceding Books, that we have here to do with a definition of death altogether different from that used either by Mr. Dobney or by the Clergyman of the Church of England. Both these writers speak of death as the utter cessation of existence, or of conscious being. According to Mr. White death is nothing more than "a separation of the parts of our nature," "without any reference to the destiny of the component portions of it." So considerable a diversity in the definition of a principal term cannot but embarrass the common argument.

Mr. White's view appears to me, as it must to his friends, far from satisfactory. According to his philosophy, the occurrence of death leaves in separate existence a human body and a human soul, both of them, so far as the change which has taken place—disjunction merely—can have affected them, in a state of activity, and both of them waiting to be disposed of by some law additional to the great law of mortality. How will Mr. White explain even the corporeal decay consequent on death, if this event be nothing more than a separation of the body from the soul? What is there in such a separation adapted to account for it? And still more, how will he dispose of the souls of men, thus released with unimpaired consciousness from corporeal ties?

In a subsequent page, when arguing from his definition of death, he exhibits the following scheme of doctrine on this point.

"We cautiously abstain from insisting on an absolute destruction of the spirit as necessarily conveyed in the threatening of death; for according to the preceding view, that curse was fulfilled in the separation of body and soul. But the curse left it open for God to preserve the spirit alive after death if he so pleased, since the letter of the law required nothing further than the 'killing' of the man (2 Cor. iii.); and this circumstance was taken advantage of afterwards, when God actually did uphold the separate spirit in existence in consequence of the intervention of the system of mercy. We contend therefore that the sentence of law, not contemplating in itself a resurrection of the man, does not in its spirit contemplate a survivance of the soul, but its passing away into the land of forgetfulness, as not being itself singly and alone a subject of jurisdiction to that authority which regarded only the compound humanity.

"As it was open to the Supreme Ruler, on the one hand, consistently with the letter of the law to uphold the departed spirit in

being, it was, according to our representation, open to him, on the other hand, consistently with the spirit of the law, which demanded a final dissolution of man's nature for ever, to deprive it of being; the actual event of the soul's survivance at death not depending upon the curse of the law, but upon the intention of God as to the introduction or withholding of a system of redemption. The doctrine of Scripture, then, requires us, in brief, to conclude, that the dissolution of the *man* was the whole curse of the law, and that, therefore, the spirit of that curse did not contemplate, as it certainly did not demand, an eternal . . . survivance of the soul; while yet, notwithstanding, the absence of any explicit demand for its literal destruction admitted of its survivance in Hades, in order to render a resurrection of the man possible under a scheme of rewards and penalties arising from a merciful plan of redemption. And when, at the termination of such a second probation, the curse takes a second and an aggravated effect on the sinner, the absence of any intention in God to grant a resurrection of the condemned from the second death may render it conformable to his wisdom and justice to destroy both body and soul in hell," pp. 52, 53.

Mr. White here says that "the actual event of the soul's survivance at death" is at the divine option; that it "depends upon the intention of God as to the introduction or withholding of a system of redemption;" that, after the breach of the law, "God actually did uphold the separate spirit in existence in consequence of the intervention of the system of mercy," but that, after the rejection of the Gospel, "the absence of any intention in God to grant a resurrection of the condemned from the second death may render it conformable to his wisdom and justice 'to destroy both body and soul in hell.'"

1. According to this system the souls of those who reject the Gospel *may* (for the author expresses himself doubtfully) finally become extinct. But several questions here present themselves.

2. First, what will become of the separate spirits of those to whom the Gospel has never been known? They are, it seems, held in existence after death by virtue of the system of mercy; but how they are to be disposed of does not appear. As the supposed second death, with its appendage of extinction, is described as exclusively the penalty of a rejected Gospel, there seems no way of their escaping from an endless conscious existence.

3. Secondly, what benefit will those who receive the Gospel derive from their personal interest in it? If their separate spirits continue to exist at death, it is in common with the

whole race, whose separate spirits, Mr. White assures us, are held in being in consequence of God's design of mercy. If, further, their separate spirits are held in endless existence, it is in common with those who have never heard the Gospel, and who consequently have not by rejecting it committed the crime to which extinction is said to be attached. It can be only for the re-union of the body and the soul, therefore, that believers will be indebted to their reception of the Gospel; not even for endless conscious being which would have attached to the separate spirit, but only for *being* as human.

4. Thirdly, on what ground can it be held, that "the event of the soul's survivance at death" is at the divine option?

Assuming that the penalty of sin was death, the author lays it down expressly, "that the dissolution of the *man* was the whole curse of the law," and maintains, that "the curse *left it open* for God to preserve the spirit alive after death, if he so pleased." I cannot see the justice of this representation. If the disjunction of body and soul be "the whole curse of the law," then, supposing it to have been inflicted, we have both a body and a soul necessarily existing although existing separately; and, since the whole curse of the law has been suffered by the man once constituted by their union, existing in circumstances in which no further evil can properly be supposed.

Mr. White says, however, that while "the *letter* of the law requires nothing further than the 'killing of the man,'" "the sentence of law, not contemplating in itself a resurrection of the man, does not *in its spirit* contemplate a survivance of the soul, but its passing away into the land of forgetfulness, as not being in itself, singly and alone, a subject of jurisdiction to that authority which regarded only the compound humanity." In another place he expresses himself to the same effect, as follows :—

> "And since the spirits of animals pass away at death, being unserviceable apart from the frame which they animated; so does it seem that the sentence of law, 'thou shalt surely die,' contemplated the usual destruction of the spirit of Adam in the execution of the curse," p. 69.

To say nothing of the singular use here made of an expression chipped out of Psalm lxxxviii. 12,—"the land of

forgetfulness,"—where it is merely a poetical phrase for death, I beg attention to the distinction drawn by the author between the *letter* of the law and the *spirit* of it. I regard this distinction as wholly unwarranted and inadmissible, since the spirit of a law is no other than its intention, which the letter of it ought exactly to express. Mark the effect. The *letter* of the law "required nothing further," Mr. White assures us, "than the 'killing' of the man;" but the *spirit* of the law "contemplated the destruction of the spirit of Adam in the execution of the curse." Here is, then, by far the greater of two calamities not announced in the letter of the law, but lying concealed in its spirit. And thus, by regarding alternately the letter of the law and the spirit of it, there is opened to the Divine Being a course of action which is thus described:—

"For as it was open to the Supreme Ruler, on the one hand, consistently with the *letter* of the law, to uphold the departed spirit in being, it was, according to our representation, open to him, on the other hand, consistently with the *spirit* of the law, which demanded a final dissolution of man's nature for ever, to deprive it of being," p. 53.

On this passage I observe,—

1. That a law is no longer a rule, when, by a shifting regard now to the letter and now to the spirit of it, the judge may adopt courses diametrically opposed to one another.

2. That, however in human laws the letter may be conceived to be imperfectly expressive of the spirit, such an idea cannot be entertained of the divine law.

3. That, generally speaking, laws ought to be administered according to the letter, no option in this case remaining with the administrator except on a supposition of infirmity, which to divine law cannot be attached.

4. That if in any case the letter of the law should differ from its spirit, a judge who has an option should always administer it according to its spirit, and not according to the letter.

5. That for God to deprive of being the spirit of man would be an act most solemn and awful; and that God cannot be conceived of as having, under a system of law, an option in this respect.

6. That such an act, which is not only in its nature penal, but the most aggravated form of legal penalty, cannot be

conceived of as within the divine administration unless required by law.

I might add to these general observations an inquiry after the scriptural ground on which the alleged distinction between the letter and the spirit of the divine law reposes. Mr. White has, *more suo*, presented us with an insulated expression out of 2 Cor. iii. — "The letter killeth"—apparently assuming, what is not a fact, that it relates to the moral law. Discreetly, however, he avoids any reference to the same connexion as warrant for his notion of the spirit of the law, although the antithesis was full in his view,—"The letter killeth, but the spirit *giveth life*." This was not the sort of spirit that suited him. The spirit of the law as he has conjured it up contemplates extinction.

In other places Mr. White seems to regard "the destruction of the spirit of Adam in the execution of the curse," as according to "the ordinary course of nature" (p. 69); or to "the usual course of nature in the death of animals" (p. 70). He cannot, however, have the advantage, if any, which this view might afford him. For in that case "the destruction of the spirit" would be "necessarily conveyed in the threatening of death," an assertion from which, he tells us, he "cautiously abstains," in order that he may represent the disjunction of body and soul as "the whole curse of the law." In the latter of the places quoted above he seems to make an effort to combine the two ideas, but in language so extraordinary that I cannot but suspect some inadvertency. He says that, in punishing those who reject the Gospel, God "will no longer interfere to uphold its [the soul's] existence, but will pursue the usual course of nature in the death of animals, and destroy both body and soul in hell" (p. 70). Is it, then, "the usual course of nature" for both the bodies and souls of animals to be destroyed "in hell"? One might almost suspect that Mr. White thought so, since he immediately closes this paragraph with the following quotation from 2 Pet. ii. 12:—"These, as natural brute beasts made to be taken and destroyed, *shall utterly perish in their own corruption*."

Passing by this inadvertency, however, Mr. White clearly means to appeal to this text as authorising the opinion, that it is after the usual course of nature for the bodies and spirits of dying animals to be "destroyed" in the sense of extinc-

tion. Without going into this question, which has its difficulties, it may be enough to say that the apostle is not referring to the subject; his words refer merely to the slaughter of animals by men for necessary defence.

Mr. White further endeavours to establish a close connexion between the two clauses he has quoted—"These, as natural brute beasts made to be taken and destroyed, shall utterly perish in their own corruption;" *i. e.* as in death the bodies and souls of beasts are put out of existence, so shall it be with the bodies and souls of the wicked. This is more ingenious than just. In truth, he is not entitled to this close collocation of the clauses, which in the Epistle are separated by another which the author has not quoted, thus:—"These, as natural brute beasts made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil of the things that they understand not; and shall utterly perish in their own corruption." The comparison intended by Peter is entirely different from that suggested by Mr. White. It is that, as the ungodly troublers of the early churches, of whom he was writing, acted like irrational [φυσικὰ] creatures in speaking evil of what they did not understand, so, as brute beasts were taken and destroyed for the safety of men, these more mischievous beings should be removed from the churches by some merited judgment brought on them by their iniquity.

I conclude these remarks by expressing my conviction that Mr. White has chosen an inaccurate and unsatisfactory definition of the term death. There is, indeed, strong evidence that the idea of death on which he here so elaborately argues was not satisfactory to himself; for when in a subsequent page (pp. 165, 166) he addresses himself expressly to the definition of the terms life and death, he entirely omits it from his enumeration of meanings. Undoubtedly, when a human being dies the separation of the soul from the body takes place; but this is rather a collateral and accidental than the main fact. The principal change, I conceive, is the cessation of the organic functions. The existence of the spirit is thenceforth necessarily separate, and the body, as organic, perishes.

CHAPTER IV.

ON HIS VIEW OF ADAM'S POSITION IN EDEN.

I SHALL now offer a few remarks on Mr. White's view of the position of Adam in Paradise. On this subject he writes as follows :—

"We venture to suppose, then, that from the account furnished by Moses a plain reader would naturally understand that Adam was not created in the possession of immortality, either in his body or soul; yet also that he was not created under a definite sentence of death, as was the case with the remainder of the creation around him, since the boundless prospect of eternal life was open to him upon the condition of obedience during his trial. In other words, we should rest in the conviction that the first man was not created absolutely immortal, but was placed on probation in order to become so," p. 40.

The author here defines the condition of our first parents by two negative terms.

On the one hand, he was created, "not in the possession of immortality, either in his body or his soul." The phrase, "in possession of immortality," is obscure. I suppose the author's meaning to be that Adam, on his creation, was not sure that he should live for ever, but that this was a contingency; he might or he might not.

On the other hand, he was created, "not under a definite sentence of death." That is, it was not his fixed destiny to die. This also was a contingency; he might or he might not.

A positive idea then fills up the interval between these two negatives. "The boundless prospect of eternal life was open to him upon the condition of obedience during his trial." In other words, Adam would certainly live for ever, if he did not eat of the forbidden fruit.

I may here repeat, then, the observation before made, that, to whatever extent this theory may be established, it cannot affect the doctrine of man's natural immortality as I have already stated it. What I assert is man's *natural adaptation* to live for ever; what Mr. White aims to prove relates to man's *actually* living for ever. I speak of physical attributes, he of practical issues. Further, if Mr. White should establish his point he will confirm mine: for if Adam, upon

condition of obedience, would actually have lived for ever, it would seem that he ought to have possessed a natural adaptation to such an issue of his being; otherwise something would have been annexed to his good conduct as a reward to which he had no natural adaptation, and the possession of which would have implied a fundamental physical change. If the familiarity of the illustration may be pardoned, it would be like saying to a fish,—Mind how you swim, and you shall be elevated into a fowl.

Again: if, as Mr. White affirms, Adam was to have lived for ever upon condition of obedience, it is of course implied that he would not have lived for ever except on condition of obedience; in other words, that he would have died of himself, or in the course of nature. To the contrary of this, however, we find that death was threatened to Adam as the punishment of his disobedience; so that we may fairly presume that if he had not disobeyed he would not have died. Does it not inevitably follow from hence that Adam must have been endowed with a natural adaptation to endless life? And if Adam was endowed with a natural adaptation to endless life, so that he would have actually lived for ever unless his existence had been cut off by sin, how can his actually living for ever be the reward of his obedience? It is then the result of his natural endowments, the effect of these not being cut off by sin.

I observe further, that the idea that Adam was placed on probation in order to acquire endless existence derives only a semblance of support from the Mosaic narrative. Mr. White, indeed, "ventures to suppose" that "a plain reader would naturally understand" it so; a supposition which is sufficiently contradicted by the fact that very few readers of the Bible ever have understood it so. But what is the proof? Mr. White adduces nothing but a single reference to the tree of life, of which he speaks in the following terms:—

"The effect of the tree of life seems to have been to repair perpetually the decays of nature, and to prevent the approach of death; so that, since we are given to understand the result of man's 'putting forth his hand and taking of it' after his fall would have been his 'living for ever,' we may undoubtedly conclude that divine goodness had destined for Adam, had he obeyed the Creator, the magnificent inheritance of immortality," p. 39.

The author here seems properly to confine his reference to

the tree of life to Adam's life *in the body;* beyond which there is not a shadow of reason for extending either the efficacy or the design of it.

But the conclusion which the position and use of this tree in Eden seems rather to warrant is, that God, having adapted the soul of Adam to endless being by its physical qualities, provided this physical means for perpetuating the life of the body also. The bearing of the test instituted in Eden was not that by obedience life should be gained, but that by disobedience life should be forfeited:—"In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," Gen. ii. 17.

What the reward of Adam's obedience would have been is a question which it is difficult for us to answer, because no explicit answer is given to it in the Bible; what the effect of his disobedience was to be we are told briefly in Genesis, and more fully in the Epistle to the Romans. It by no means follows, however, that, because the penalty of disobedience was death, the reward of obedience would have been "life prolonged to eternity," p. 41. There is clear room for supposing that it might have been some mode of happiness for our first parent and his race undescribed to us, and in our fallen condition not requiring to be known.

But Mr. White can gain nothing by proving, even if he could prove it, that in Paradise Adam was placed on probation for immortality.

The arrangements made with Adam in Paradise constituted a peculiar dispensation, subsequent and superadded to the moral law; a dispensation in which he was regarded as the federal head of the entire race, and underwent probation for them. Consequently, even if Adam was on probation for immortality, he alone was so, and mankind at large are not so. They are but passive recipients of the consequences of the trial of that one man, in whose conduct their destiny was mysteriously involved. Mr. White's scheme, however, if I understand it rightly, is that mankind at large are on probation for immortality.

I admit, indeed, that there is some degree of obscurity and of apparent inconsistency in his language at different times. In some passages he speaks of men as having lost their hope of immortality by the fall, that is, by Adam's misconduct, through which death, which he alleges to be "the curse of the law," comes upon his race (p. 193); in

other places, however, he represents the "eternal law" as of universal bearing,—for what other purpose, indeed, could it need to be repeated, as he affirms it was, at Sinai?—and as constituting for men the rule of a first probation, as distinguished from a second probation, the probation of repentance under the Gospel (pp. 203, 204). Upon this point it is obviously necessary that the author should be explicit and distinct. He must take one ground or the other, he cannot occupy both. If "the whole curse of the law" comes on men by Adam's sin, then men are not under probation by the law; if men are under probation by the law, its curse does not come upon them by Adam's sin.

I cannot think that Mr. White really means to take the former of these positions, since it entails consequences from which I am sure he would revolt; I take him to hold the latter opinion, that mankind are under probation by the law. I take him to hold, consequently, that all men are under probation for immortality, this being the only kind of probation of which he anywhere speaks. Now I say that he does nothing towards establishing this point, by showing that Adam was under probation for immortality in Eden, because our first parent there held a relation absolutely exclusive and peculiar. He stood, and was tried, alone, and for his race.

CHAPTER V.

ON HIS VIEW OF THE CURSE OF THE LAW.

In page 57 Mr. White lays down the following principle:—

> "This death [the literal death threatened to Adam] was THE CURSE OF THE LAW; not merely of the Mosaic law, but of that everlasting law under which Adam was created at first, and of which the thunders of Sinai were only a manifestation. In the language of Paul, 'The letter killeth,' 2 Cor. iii. 6."

The principle thus stated holds an important place in the author's argument, and may be said indeed to lie at the

foundation of his entire system. If this be destroyed the whole lies in ruins. I offer in opposition to it the following observations.

1. No such thing appears on the face of the narrative. Adam was forbidden to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and the penalty of death was annexed to the violation of *this* precept:—"In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," Gen. ii. 17. Nothing more. We are not anywhere told that the same penalty was attached to sin generally, or even to any other act of disobedience.

I am entitled, then, to ask on what ground the generalization is made, and why it is inferred that, because death was to follow the eating of the forbidden fruit, it was to follow sin universally.

2. It may be said that the law has but one penalty, and that as sin is essentially homogeneous so must be its punishment.

In reply to such an observation, however, I should submit that the transaction of which the threatening of death is a part did not take place under the law, but that it was altogether separate and peculiar. Mr. White himself has noticed the fact that Adam was not created *in Eden*, but was afterwards put there; and in a work which I have reason to believe he has read,* he may have seen this circumstance adduced as a proof that Adam's state in Eden was not the *first* state of man. From the first moment of his existence the moral law with its requirements and sanctions bore upon him, and must be taken to have been revealed to him. The arrangements in Eden constituted no part of either the one or the other, but were entirely new; so new and so complete that they may be fairly said to have constituted a distinct dispensation. Let a few differences be observed.

(1.) Adam's probation under the moral law would have been personal; in Eden it was federal, as is expressly affirmed by the author.

(2.) The moral law prescribes only moral duties; but here is a precept exclusively positive, the eating of that tree being neither right nor wrong except as marked by the divine precept or prohibition.

(3.) Probation under the moral law is continuous; whereas

* Theology, by J. H. Hinton, M.A.

in Eden probation was confined to a single act, and of necessity to a short period—for aught we know to a single day.

In a case so peculiar, and evidently not belonging to the administration of the moral law at all, how can it be supposed that the penalty annexed to disobedience under it was the curse of the moral law? The facts of the case supply strong evidence of the contrary.

3. Mr. White, however, makes an appeal to Scripture, not only by the citation in this place of an irrelevant phrase out of 2 Cor. iii. 6, but by a lengthened adduction of passages in a subsequent part of his volume, pp. 106 *et seq.* It will be convenient that I should notice these testimonies here.

His general position is, that the inspired writers universally employ terms with reference to the wicked which "menace them with *destruction, excision, and death.* The language of every writer in succession," says he, "points to the same conclusion," p. 105.

(1.) He refers first to the Mosaic law, of which he says justly that the curse was death. To make this fact of use to him he strives to identify the Mosaic law with the moral law.

For this purpose he tells us that "the law of Moses was, as the apostle declares, a repetition, or re-entrance of God's eternal law," p. 108.

I object altogether, however, to this view. The passage to which Mr. White refers is, I suppose, Rom. v. 20—"The law *entered* that the offence might abound;" which some critics have been disposed to render "the law re-entered," *παρεισῆλθεν.* A much more approved rendering however is, "the law accessorily entered;" and there seems to be no doubt of the propriety of understanding the passage of the ceremonial, and not of the moral law.

Mr. White further adduces the Mosaic promise of life.

"We have the authority of the Lord Jesus Christ," says he, "for understanding the promise of life made to the obedient servants of God by the great legislator as pointing on to life eternal: for, when the young ruler inquired what good thing he should do that he might have eternal life, the Saviour referred him to the law, with its promise of life to the genuine Israelite," p. 106.

This surely is not a fair representation of the case. When our Lord had said, "If thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments," the ruler asked, "Which?" Christ then

named some exclusively moral precepts; and when the ruler answered that he had kept them, the Great Teacher prescribed a new condition, *not contained in the law*—"If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me." It is evident, therefore, that the course pursued by our Lord was intended, not to teach him that he could have life by keeping the law, but to bring to light the pride and worldliness of the inquirer's heart.

The author brings to his aid finally the following words of Peter:—

"For Moses truly said unto the fathers, A prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you like unto me; him shall ye hear in all things whatsoever he shall say unto you. And it shall come to pass that every soul which will not hear that prophet shall be destroyed from among the people," Acts iii. 22, 23.

This passage, however, has no weight, unless it can be made clear that Moses in the words quoted from him referred personally to the Messiah. Upon consulting the context, Deut. xviii. 9 to 22, there appears much reason to doubt this, and to believe that the entire passage relates to the system of prophetic instruction divinely instituted among the Israelites. That many distinguished critics are of this opinion may be seen in Bloomfield; while he himself admits the case of these critics to be strong, and finds no *reason* to allege in contradiction of it. A similar use of passages from the Old Testament is far from infrequent in the New.

(2.) We have next three quotations from the 18th, 20th, and 21st chapters of the book of Job; respecting which it is enough to say that they do not relate to the punishment of sin at all, but to God's providential dealings with men.

(3.) Various citations from the Psalms succeed, and others from the book of Proverbs.

That these are not *all* of them very pertinent may appear from the following sample, taken from Psalm xlix.:—"Man that is in honour and understandeth not is like the beasts that perish." The words of the Psalmist here denote nothing beyond a brutish stupidity.

Many more are mere descriptions of the divine administration, under a dispensation which signally connected obedience with temporal benefits and disobedience with temporal calamity; such obedience or disobedience not having respect

to the moral law, but to the Mosaic institutes. Of this class is the following, from Psalm cxii.:—"The horn of the righteous shall be exalted with honour. The wicked shall see it and be grieved; he shall *gnash with his teeth, and melt away.*" The latter part of this passage Mr. White thinks so much to his purpose, that he not only marks it in italics, but appends to it a quotation from Matt. xiii. 50:—"There shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth." Is it possible, then, that he conceives the phrase "gnashing of teeth" in such different connexions to belong to the same subject?

If there is one of the texts to his point it is Psalm ii. 9, 12—"Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt *dash them in pieces* like a potter's vessel. . . . Kiss the Son lest he be angry, and ye *perish* from the way." Yet even this is most probably to be understood of the temporal calamities destined for nations adverse to Christianity. "Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings; be instructed, ye judges of the earth. Kiss the Son," &c.

In truth, the passages generally do not refer, as it is necessary they should, to *the punishment of sin;* and if in any case they do so, they can prove nothing to Mr. White's purpose independently of an investigation in each case of the meaning in which the terms are employed.

(4.) Turning to the prophets, our author quotes the 18th chapter of Ezekiel, which contains the oft-repeated declaration, "The soul that sinneth it shall die." This is frequently quoted as though it were a recognized annunciation of the penalty of sin, without recollecting how distinctly and inevitably the connexion determines it to a different meaning. The chapter commences thus:—

"The word of the Lord came unto me again, saying, What mean ye, that ye use this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge? As I live, saith the Lord God, ye shall not have occasion to use this proverb any more in the land of Israel. Behold all souls are mine: as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine: *the soul that sinneth* IT *shall die,*" Ezek. xviii. 1 to 4.

The whole meaning of the words evidently is, that in the calamities then falling on the Jews every one should thenceforth suffer for his own doings: this, and no more.

Mr. White closes his prophetical extracts with the words of Malachi—

"For behold the day cometh that shall burn as an oven, and the

proud and all that do wickedly shall be as stubble, and the day that cometh shall burn them up, that it shall leave them neither root nor branch," Mal. iv. 1.

On reference, this is obviously part of a prophecy relating to the first advent of Christ; and it is consequently irrelevant to the matter in hand.

In p. 241 *et seq.* the author proceeds to the consideration of texts in the New Testament.

"The wicked," says he "are threatened with death and loss of life in various forms nearly two hundred times in the New Testament. They are threatened with perishing and destruction nearly sixty times," p. 241.

This is certainly often enough if the declarations are to the point. To be to the point, however, each text must have two characteristics: first, it must relate to the punishment of sin, and be descriptive of the curse of either the law or the Gospel; secondly, it must describe the punishment of sin in such manner as not to determine the phraseology to a figurative rather than a literal meaning. With these tests in our hands let us examine the passages adduced, p. 255 *et seq.*

(1.) Matt. iii. 12. "He will throughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner; but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire."

This passage does not apply, as any one will see who will refer to verse 9, where the connexion begins. "Think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father," &c. Christ's "floor" here spoken of is evidently the Jewish people, and the words "immediately related to the reception of the pious Jews into the Christian church, and the terrible judgments about to be executed on the rejected Jewish nation." Scott, *in loc.*

(2.) Matt. v. 30. "It is profitable for thee that one of thy members perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell."

"Here," says Mr. White, "there seems to be a comparison drawn between the evils of the perishing literally of one member and of the whole body," p. 256.

I am so far from seeing this that the very contrary appears to me to be the meaning of the passage. It is not, as Mr. White would read it, "It is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should" *perish*, but—"*be cast into hell:*" a mode of expres-

sion by which the *total loss* of a single member is represented as preferable to a *state of suffering* of the whole body. The text supplies a direct argument *against* the author's theory.

(3.) Matt. vi. 25. "Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink: nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?"

"Our Lord, by this question," says Mr. White, "intimates that, if his hearers neglected the kingdom of God on account of meat and drink, they would lose their lives in the world to come," p. 256.

How can this be made to appear? The author adduces no proof of it, and it seems to be utterly remote from the scope of the passage. Our Lord is rebuking an excessive anxiety about satisfying the primary wants of the body; and he suitably suggests that there are other and more important subjects to be thought of: "the life is more important (μείζων) than meat, and the body than raiment."

(4.) Matt. x. 28. "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell (Gehenna)."

This passage has clearly no reference to the punishment of sin. God's being "*able* to destroy both body and soul in hell," concludes nothing as to the nature of the curse of the law. The "threat," if there really be one here as Mr. White suggests, is addressed to timid disciples.

(5.) Matt. xvi. 24, 26. "Then said Jesus unto his disciples, If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it. For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" Or, as in Luke ix. 26: "What is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world and lose himself, or be cast away?"

Luke xvii. 33. "Whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it."

John xii. 25. "He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal."

Here Mr. White lays it down that to lose or to seek to save the life, is determined by the connexion to mean the desire of preserving the natural life, hence inferring that life is to be understood in the same sense throughout; and upon this position depends the whole of the argument he constructs on these texts. On the contrary, the connexion seems to present an insuperable obstacle to such an interpre-

tation. So understood, for example, the passage can scarcely be less than contradictory: *e.g.* Luke xvii. 33—"Whosoever shall lose his natural life shall preserve his natural life." Much to be preferred is the view taken of these passages by Schleusner, who places them under the following meaning of the word ψυχὴ, "salus, felicitas animi humani, in hac pariter ac futura vita"—*welfare, the happiness of man, alike in the present and the future life.* The latter part of John xii. 25, gives the complete sentiment:—"He that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal:" *i. e.*, he who is willing to sacrifice his welfare in this world, shall secure his future and everlasting welfare.

(6.) Luke xiii. 1–5. "There were present at that season some that told him of the Galileans, whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices. And Jesus answering said unto them, Suppose ye that these Galileans were sinners above all the Galileans because they suffered such things? I tell you, nay; but except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish. Or those eighteen upon whom the tower in Siloam fell and slew them, think ye that they were sinners above all men that dwelt in Jerusalem? I tell you, nay; but except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish."

Mr. White's remark on this passage is as follows:—

"This cannot signify that they should perish in the same *manner*, through the cruelty of Pilate or the fall of towers; therefore it remains only to apply the adverbs of likeness to the doom itself—literal loss of life, perishing."

It is clear, however, that one contingency more remains. It remains to observe the scope of the passage. Our Lord's design evidently was to correct an idea prevalent among the Jews, that calamities came as the punishment of sins, and their inference that those who met with no calamities had nothing to fear from divine wrath. In opposition to this he teaches that all were sinners, and that all would, unless they repented, be punished *as surely* as the sufferers referred to had been; the comparison contemplating neither the manner nor the nature of the punishment inflicted, but the certainty of punishment itself.

(7.) Luke xx. 18. "On whomsoever it [that stone] shall fall it will grind him to powder."

Mr. White says "this figure was not likely to have occurred to any mind in which the dissolution and destruction of human nature was not regarded as the punishment of

the wicked." But why did he not quote the whole verse?—"Whosoever shall fall on that stone shall be broken, but on whomsoever it shall fall it will grind him to powder." If the latter of these figures denotes death, the former clearly denotes only bruises; a figure which, to employ Mr. White's argument, "was not likely to have occurred to any mind in which the destruction of human nature *was* regarded as the punishment of the wicked."

(8.) Luke xx. 35. "They which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage."

Mr. White affirms that "in this passage the resurrection from the dead is spoken of as the peculiar privilege of the righteous," and on this unsupported affirmation he proceeds to argue. I affirm on the contrary, that the passage out of which he has taken the words relates to mankind at large; a proposition which I have endeavoured to sustain in "Who will Live for Ever?" See p. 40 of this volume. If, however, there were in this or any other texts an "apparent restriction of the resurrection" to the righteous, what could be inferred from it? Mr. White would "detect" in such passages "the doctrine that the resurrection of the wicked will take place only in order that they may undergo" a "second death." I confess that I see no evidence of this. It seems to me rather, that, if the word resurrection is used by any of the sacred writers in a manner which restricts it to the righteous, that fact determines it in those cases to a metaphorical use; and proves that it does not there mean the resurrection itself, which is known to be common to all mankind, but something else, according to the context, which is peculiar to the righteous.

(9.) John vi. 27. "Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth to everlasting life, which the Son of man shall give unto you." Verses 48–50,—"I am that bread of life. Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness and are dead; this is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof and not die. If any man eat of this bread he shall live for ever."

Mr. White justly calls the chapter out of which these verses are taken a "most wonderful and interesting chapter," but I cannot concur in his interpretation of it. He contends that in ver. 50—"This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof and *not die*"—the word

die should be understood of literal death, supporting his view by the antithetic character of ver. 49. But—

(1.) Such a mode of interpretation gives a sense which is false in fact; since those who eat of the bread from heaven do die, precisely as those did who partook of the manna.

(2.) Such a mode of interpretation requires a literal understanding of the term *eat*, which is impossible and absurd. This term is figuratively used for faith, see ver. 35.

(3.) Such a mode of interpretation overlooks the fact that it is only in a figurative sense that Christ calls himself *bread*. This primary figure determines the manner in which all the terms connected with it are to be understood.

These considerations overrule the law of antithesis appealed to by Mr. White. It is in truth an antithesis between a natural and a spiritual object—between something which is literally bread and something which is figuratively bread: and consequently, all that is said of the former is literal, and all that is said of the latter is figurative.

(10.) John viii. 34. "Jesus answered them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin. And the servant abideth not in the house for ever; but the Son abideth ever. If therefore the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed."

This passage Mr. White regards chiefly as introductory to that which is to follow. He says,—

"The intimation of the servant of sin *not abiding* in the house for ever, taken in connexion with the passage next to be noticed, seems to point strongly to the interpretation proposed."

(11.) John viii. 51. "If a man keep my saying, he shall never see death."

Mr. White says justly that the Jews understood these words of our Lord literally, as indeed is evident from their reply; but when he adds that our Lord "did not object to their interpretation, *but confirmed it*," I ask for proof. The author says he did so "by predicating of himself an existence denoted by a form of speech suitable only to an ever-living nature;—'Before Abraham was, I am.'" I reply—

(1.) That any one, upon referring to the context, will see that this declaration of our Lord is far removed, both from the first reply of the Jews and from its subject; and that it is no more than a rejoinder to their subsequent inquiry,—"Thou art not yet fifty years old; and hast thou seen Abraham?" ver. 57.

(2.) That Christ's declaring himself to possess "an ever-living nature" can in no way determine the text before us to a meaning contrary to fact. Those who keep his words *do die.*

(3.) That Christ really met the mistake of the Jews in a very different manner. The sting of their question was in its tendency to detract from his glory:—"*Whom makest thou thyself?*" "Jesus answered, If I honour myself, my honour is nothing; it is my Father that honoureth me, of whom ye say that he is your God, yet ye *have not known him*," ver. 54, 55.

(12.) John x. 10. "The thief cometh not but for to steal, and to kill, and to destroy: I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly."

The force of this passage as adduced by Mr. White lies in the supposition that "literal life was the benefit to be obtained through the mediation" of Christ. In this case, however, he has not even the support of the antithetic clause for his opinion. From ver. 8 it is manifest, as all the critics agree, that by "the thief" of ver. 10 our Lord means false pretenders to his office; and unquestionably, in none but a figurative sense did they come "to steal, to kill, and to destroy."

(13.) John xi. 49, 50. "And one of them named Caiaphas, being the high priest that same year, said unto them, Ye know nothing at all, nor consider that it is expedient for one man to die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not."

This passage does not relate to the punishment of sin. Mr. White's quotation of Luke ix. 56, with its italics and capitals, will surprise every reader who will turn to the context.

(14.) Acts iii. 23.

This passage has been already quoted, and it is noticed at p. 214.

(15.) Acts viii. 20. "Then Peter said unto Simon, Thy money perish with thee."

All the use Mr. White makes of this text is to show that "the term rendered *perish*" does not here "signify eternal existence in misery," which may be granted; but this is not the point before us.

(16.) Acts xx. 26. "Wherefore I take you to record this day that I am clear from the *blood* of all men."

An expression substantially similar occurs in chap. xviii. 6,—"Your blood be upon your own heads." Bloomfield observes that the words "are *strongly metaphorical*," and that by blood "is meant, not slaughter, but destruction in a figurative sense." And he adds, "This manner of speaking was usual, both with the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans." Some eminent critics trace the origin of it to the sacrificial action of placing the hand on the head of the victim.

(17.) Rom. i. 32. "Who, knowing the judgment of God that they which do such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them."

Mr. White thinks that "the language of the apostle becomes at once clear and satisfactory," if death be understood of the "destitution of immortal hope." It is to my mind quite as satisfactory, and indeed much more so, to take death in the general sense of punishment, as is done by the critics and commentators at large.

(18.) Rom. ii. 6, 7. "God will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honour, and immortality, eternal life." With this the author combines chap. vi. 23, "The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord." And then he adds, "In these passages immortality and death are declared to be the respective destinies of the righteous and the wicked."

The former of these passages has with me no weight: it is a clear case of either figurative use, or of hendiadys for immortal honour and glory. That even Mr. White is afraid to lay stress upon it is manifest from his joining a second text with it in order to get the idea of death, the absence of which in the whole context of Rom. ii. 7 is well worthy of being remarked.

The second passage—"The wages of sin is death"—allows of no question but this, whether the term death is to be literally or figuratively taken. To the literal meaning I object that it is not true in fact. From ver. 21, 22, it is evident that the apostle is speaking to the Romans of the consequences of *their own* conduct; but death literally taken descends by Adam's sin. There is, consequently, no escape from the necessity of a metaphorical interpretation in this case.

(19.) Rom. viii. 13. "If ye live after the flesh ye shall die; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live."

Everything here depends on the answer to the question—Is this passage literal or figurative? An insuperable hindrance to the literal interpretation of the phrase, "Ye shall die," might seem to arise from the fact that *all die*, whether they "live after the flesh" or not.

(20.) "1 Cor. iii. 15. "If any man's work abide which he hath built thereupon he shall receive a reward; if any man's work shall be burned he shall suffer loss."

Mr. White's argument from this passage assumes the literal "trial by fire" of Christian professors, "at the last great day;" which, I suppose, will scarcely be granted him. His citation from ver. 17, "If any man defile the temple of God him shall God destroy," is clearly a *non sequitur*, as appears from the context.

(21.) Gal. vi. 8. "He that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption."

On this passage Mr. White argues thus: the term corruption has two meanings, moral depravity and putrefaction; but the apostle cannot mean depravity, therefore he must mean putrefaction, and putrefaction is the "concomitant of death." Now I might remind him, that, according to a certain author whom he respects, putrefaction is not necessarily the concomitant of death, that event being simply the disjunction of soul and body. But to let this pass. It is enough to say that, whether men "sow to the flesh" or not, they all "reap corruption" in the sense of death. If corruption in any peculiar sense be reaped in consequence of sowing to the flesh, it must be something else.

(22.) 1 Tim. vi. 9. "But they that will be rich fall into temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition."

Mr. White contends for understanding the terms destruction and perdition of "literal death." I have only to repeat the remark, that in this sense of death *all* men suffer them.

(23.) Heb. x. 26–31.

Under this passage the author confines himself to arguing against "an eternal infliction of suffering," a subject which is not now before us.

(24.) 1 John ii. 17. "The world passeth away, and the lust thereof; but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever."

"The passing away of the world, and the abiding for ever of the

servants of God," says the author, "seem to establish the necessity of a literal interpretation of John's subsequent words, 'He that hath not the Son of God hath not life.'"

These "subsequent words," which the reader might suppose to occur in immediate sequence, are found in chap. v. 12, and in a totally different connexion. A necessity for understanding them of literal life, however, is alleged to arise from the declaration that "the world passeth away, but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever;" but a glance at the context will show how little the words are adapted to answer such an end. The sentiment begins at ver. 15:—"Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world . . For the world passeth away, and the lust thereof"—all its sources of pleasure are perishing and transient; "but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever"—he has sources of permanent and everlasting gratification.

(25.) Jude, ver. 7.

Under this text the author argues exclusively against the opinion of eternal suffering.

(26.) Rev. ii. 7. "To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God."

"What," says Mr. White, "was to be the consequence of this to Adam? Living for ever, Gen. iii. 22. What was, on the contrary, the opposite consequence of being deprived of the right to the tree of life? Mere misery? No: returning to the dust whence he was taken, 'for dust thou art,' said the Almighty, . . . 'and unto dust shalt thou return. So he drove out the man.' Therefore, we should argue, all who are not admitted to the tree of life by the second Adam, the life-giving Spirit, abide in death, the doom of the first."

(1.) The author is wrong in his facts. He can adduce no proof, either that access to the tree of life secured perpetual life, or that banishment from it forfeited perpetual life, in any other sense than the life of the body. The ground of his intended argument, therefore, slips from under him.

(2.) He mistakes an obvious figure of speech for a reality. He speaks as though in heaven there would be a real garden, and in the garden a real "tree of life," and as though the saved would eat of it. Does he not perceive that the representation is metaphorical, and that the natural things of an earthly paradise are employed but to shadow forth celestial felicity?

(27.) Rev. iii. 5. "He that overcometh, . . . I will not blot out his name out of the book of life."

"This implies," says Mr. White, "that it is there at present; but it refers to one which, by moral possibility, might not be there some day; consequently to a bad man—not to one whose name was written before the foundation of the world in the book of life of the 'Lamb which was slain,' which contains the names of the finally saved, Rev. xiii. 8. But the book of life in which all other names could be can be no other than the book of those who *exist;* not the book of those who are 'spiritual,' or 'happy,' but of those who are alive. Hence to be 'blotted from the book of life' is loss of existence."

Mr. White conceives that "the book of life" here spoken of "can be no other than the book of those who *exist;*" and that, consequently, "to be blotted out of it" is to suffer "loss of existence." The method by which he arrives at this conclusion, however, is far from satisfactory. He affirms that the declaration, "I will not blot out his name out of the book of life," refers "to a bad man." How can this be? One would have thought that in this case the Lord would have said, "I *will* blot out his name out of the book of life." But Mr. White reasons thus, "'I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.' This implies that it is there at present, but it refers to one which, by moral possibility, might not be there some day;" "consequently to a bad man." Here he evidently speaks of "the book of life" as the book of the *saved*, and admits that the name is *now* in it; thus directly contradicting his statement just quoted, that the book in which the name is entered "can be no other than the book of those who *exist.*" His language also implies, contrary to all sound doctrine and to his own expressed opinion, that the name of "a bad man" is "at present" in the book of the saved, although it "may not be there some day." If, however, it be there at all, it is both fair and necessary to regard the blotting out spoken of as referring to its obliteration *from that book*, rather than from the book of those who exist.

In truth, however, Mr. White has altogether mistaken the idea of the passage. "The book of life" is evidently the book, or roll, of the candidates for life, or of those who have made profession of their faith in Christ, and entered on the resulting warfare. The passage is an exhortation to constancy, as elsewhere—"Be thou faithful unto death." "He that overcometh . . . I will not blot out his name out of the book of life"—*i. e.*, out of the roll of candidates for life. The language implies that the roll will be corrected

hereafter by the issue of the struggle; so that the names of those who have been faithful unto death shall remain, and the names of those who have apostatised shall be blotted out. Of course, I take life here figuratively, in conformity with the structure of the whole passage.

(28.) Rev. xxi. 8. "But the fearful and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone, which is the second death."

Mr. White here quietly assumes that "a second death" is the penalty attached to the rejection of the Gospel, simply arguing against the idea of eternal suffering. This, however, is assuming the very thing which requires to be proved, and which for my own part I distinctly and emphatically deny. The phrase "the second death," as emblematically used here and elsewhere, establishes no such opinion.

I have now examined all the texts brought forward by the author, as "either openly, or by implication, or by 'undesigned coincidence,' bearing testimony to the correctness" of his assertion that literal death is the punishment of sin, and consequently the curse of the law. I must leave it for the reader to say whether he finds in them any proof; for myself I find none.

In the Appendix to his Reply to my Examination of Luke xx. 36 ("Who will Live for Ever?"), Mr. White adduces some further reasonings which it may be proper here to notice. Speaking, still in his erroneous manner, of "the death threatened to Adam *and to the sinner as 'the wages of sin,'*" and contending for a literal interpretation of it, he says—

"We are, of course, acquainted with those passages of Scripture by which the idea of a *moral* death is supposed to be established, but no attempt has been made to encounter in detail the reasonings in favour of a physical interpretation of the term. 'You hath he quickened (to you hath he given life) who were dead in (or, as Macknight correctly gives it, *dead by)* trespasses and sins,' Eph. ii. 1. 'She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth,' 1 Tim. v. 6. In this last passage the original is ζῶσα τέθνηκε, *living, is dead.* In both cases, it is submitted, the figure is in the tense, not in the meaning of the verb. An event yet future, by a very common form of speech, is vividly described as already present: just as, contrarily, a past state is described by a term having a present application, in the words, 'I saw *the dead* small and great stand before God.' Exactly in the same manner, I humbly conceive, Paul speaks in the

Epistle to the Romans:—'For I was alive without the law once, but when the commandment came, sin revived, and *I died*. And the commandment which was ordained to life I found to be unto death. For sin, taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it SLEW ME:' ἀπέκτεινεν, Rom. vii. 11. 'The letter KILLETH,' says the same apostle: τὸ γράμμα ἀποκτείνει, 2 Cor. iii. 6. Now are our opponents prepared to affirm that the verb ἀποκτείνω (translated *slew* and *killeth* in these two passages, and evidently employed by the apostle in explanation of *death* in each case) is capable of being tortured into several significations, physical, spiritual, and eternal? Can we say of a wicked man that he is morally *slain*, spiritually *killed*, as a descendant of Adam, and that he will be *slain* and *killed* to all eternity in the misery of hell? But if our opponents are not prepared to defend these extravagances of diction, it is necessary to abandon the entire theory of distinctions in the meaning of the term, and to adhere throughout the canon to a physical interpretation of the threatening of death."—White's "Who will Live for Ever?" p. 15.

The reader will perceive that Mr. White is here arguing for a literal interpretation of death as threatened to Adam, and against those divines who represent that death as physical, spiritual, and eternal; an argument which he pursues, certainly with a wonderful perseverance, because he assumes the death threatened to Adam to be the divine threatening against sin universally. Totally differing from him in this opinion, I have thrown aside all the reasoning which is founded upon it; and I should consequently excuse myself from noticing this passage were it not for a bearing which it indirectly has on the subject really before us.

If, for the sake of argument, I admit Mr. White's demonstration to be conclusive as against the opinion that the death threatened to Adam was physical, spiritual, and eternal death, I am not thereby obliged to accept the alternative which he assigns, and "to adhere *throughout the canon* to a physical interpretation" of that term. Although it may not have meant physical, spiritual, and eternal death, as pronounced in the ears of our first parents, it may yet by possibility be found somewhere in the Scriptures used in a sense not literal, but metaphorical. In proof of this let us only observe the shift to which Mr. White is driven by the attempt to maintain his position. He will have "a physical interpretation" of the term death, for example, in 1 Tim. v. 6:—"She that liveth in pleasure *is dead* while she liveth." And if any one should say, "Why, how can a person be physically dead, while at the same moment physically alive?"

his answer is ready: there is "*a figure in the tense;*" that is to say, the present tense is used for the future, so that *is dead* means *will die*. That this "form of speech" is "very common" is undoubtedly true, but it is never used without evidence, and is never to be assumed without a reason shown. Mr. White, however, shows no reason. But let us see how the text will read on this supposition:—"She that liveth in pleasure *will die* while she liveth;" or, to adopt the author's criticism, "living *will die*." Why, so she will whether she live "in pleasure" or not, and so will everybody else, so that the words thus read teach us nothing at all. And further, by this reading the verse is removed altogether from the sense required for it by the context. The apostle is delivering a precept respecting the distribution of the alms of the church. "Honour [provide for] widows that are widows indeed. Now she that is a widow indeed, and desolate, trusteth in God, and continueth in supplications and prayers night and day; but she that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth," 1 Tim. v. 3, 5, 6. The meaning of the passage obviously is, that a professing widow who passed an undevout life was not a suitable object of relief: "living, she was dead"—*i. e.*, although she might be in pecuniary straits, she had no proper title to be regarded as "a widow indeed." On this view of the context, it becomes plain that the term dead refers not to the future but to the present, and that its meaning consequently is not literal but metaphorical. Having thus said enough to vindicate my assertion of the possible occurrence of a metaphorical meaning of death in the sacred canon, I may content myself with further claiming a right on behalf of every passage to be examined according to its tenor and connexion.

The author subsequently refers to those discourses of our Lord "which," says he, "will be found extending, as a galaxy, through the heaven of the Gospel of John," and he puts the question thus:—

"We may say that the term *life* signifies, either the literal bestowment of immortality in body and soul, in the sense by us contended for, and to be conferred exclusively on the saints, or else it signifies one of these three things: first, the gift of immortality to the *bodies* of the righteous; or, secondly, the gift of *holiness* to their souls; or, thirdly, the gift of *happiness* to a nature already possessed of immortality in the soul," p. 16.

I adopt the last of these hypotheses, and proceed, therefore, to notice what is to be said against it.

"Neither in the last place," says Mr. White, "can it be that *happiness* was designed here, *apart from the gift of eternal existence* to the compound nature, for many passages are deprived of all congruous signification by such an hypothesis. 'Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness and are dead. This is the bread which came down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof *and not die*,' John vi. 47. 'This is the will of him that sent me, that every one that seeth the Son and believeth on him may have *everlasting life*, and I will *raise him up at the last day*,' John v. 40. To what purpose are these physical references, if the life intended were solely the *happiness* of a nature already immortal?" p. 17.

"To what purpose are these physical references?" This question contains the whole of the argument. And my reply to it is that they are metaphorical references,—figures of speech; and that they are consequently used without any incongruity in illustration of a life which is also metaphorical. That the physical references on which Mr. White lays so much stress are really metaphorical may appear from this consideration, that they are a part of a large series of similar references, which, if these be taken literally, must be taken literally also; but this will be found quite inadmissible. Take, for example, these words: "This is the bread which came down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof and not die." If *die* be interpreted literally, so also must *eat*, and so also must *bread*. Whence it will follow that Christ is literally bread, and that he must be literally eaten in order to impart a literal life. I argue on the contrary, that as Christ is not bread, and is not to be literally eaten, so the life which results from faith in him (for which the word eat is a metaphor), is not literal life, but happiness, for which the word life is a scriptural metaphor not unfrequently employed.

Before finally dismissing this part of the subject it will be proper to notice some other arguments of a general kind, by which Mr. White endeavours to determine the word death and its equivalents, when used to denote the punishment of sin, to a literal interpretation, p. 243 *et seq.* After an extended enumeration of the various forms of New Testament phraseology, he thus commences his observations.

"The most cursory observation of the series will suffice to demonstrate, that the great majority of the expressions are precisely similar to those which are used in the Old Testament in relation to the destiny of the wicked; and therefore, taken in their plain and literal

sense, [they] strongly corroborate the conclusion which has been already deduced, that the ungodly will be deprived of existence after enduring the degrees of suffering appropriate to their respective offences," pp. 243, 244.

I cannot pass without remark the terms in which Mr. White here expresses the conclusion which he deduces from the language alike of the Old Testament and the New, namely, "that the ungodly will be deprived of existence after enduring the degrees of suffering appropriate to their respective offences." It will be recollected that he has affirmed death to be "the whole curse of the law," and the separation of body and soul to be death. This therefore is what the Scriptures, if they sustain his position, ought to establish. According to his own statement, however, they prove something very different; namely, that the ungodly will first "endure degrees of suffering appropriate to their respective offences," and then "be deprived of existence"—neither of which ideas is comprehended in his conception of death, and consequently neither of them in the curse of the law. The Word of God as interpreted by himself totally destroys the fabric he has been rearing.

To pass on, however, to his proofs that the New Testament phrases in question are to be "taken in their plain and literal sense."

The first of them, as presented in the passage before us, is that they are for the most part similar to those employed in the Old Testament, a fact which is very true, but an argument which can have no weight unless the author's view of Old Testament phraseology be substantiated. It has already been examined by us and "found wanting." His second argument is put as follows:—

"*Supposing* the doctrine of our proposition to have been in the mind of Christ, what language could have been selected, generally speaking, more suitable for its popular utterance than that which has, with a marvellous uniformity, been selected and adhered to both by the evangelists and the apostles? For it seems to be highly probable that a merciful God, in bestowing a revelation upon a race broken up into many nations with different languages into which the Word of Life must needs be translated, would adopt, at least on the most important subjects in which the eternal welfare of all was concerned, that terminology and mode of expression throughout the whole canon of Scripture which should depend for its significancy upon *the plain and literal meaning of common words;* and not upon the peculiar figurative idiom (as is asserted by some) of a single tribe.

And therefore we infer that these terms in which the doctrine of future punishment is generally conveyed are to be taken in the ordinary sense which they bear amongst the various tribes of mankind, the sense of *literal destruction*," pp. 244, 245.

Here again Mr. White is contradicting and confounding himself. In p. 25 he strongly affirmed that the separation of soul and body was "the true scriptural idea of death," but here he contends for its being taken in the Scriptures in "the sense of LITERAL DESTRUCTION."

It does not suggest any very high idea of the force of his reasoning that it is founded on a mere probability. "It seems to be *highly probable*," says Mr. White, that the Bible would be written in such and such a manner. A slender basis for an argument!

But what, then, is the manner in which Mr. White deems it so "highly probable" the Bible would be written? A "terminology and mode of expression," he says, "which should depend for its significancy upon the *plain and literal* meaning of common words, and not upon the peculiar figurative idiom of a single tribe:" in other words, and divesting the idea of the anxious elaborateness of the author's phraseology, a mode of expression *not metaphorical*. Now, as probability resolves itself altogether into opinion, I must declare it in my opinion *highly improbable* that such a style should characterise the Scriptures. Every language employs figurative expressions, even on the most important subjects, and the most ancient languages the most abundantly. Figures are not incompatible with plainness of meaning, but may be auxiliary to it; and the propriety of the case dictates that men, even to the characteristic diversities of single tribes, should be addressed in their ordinary modes.

Why should we occupy ourselves, however, with any question as to the manner in which the Scriptures would *probably* be written? With the volume in our hands, this is readily convertible into a question of fact. I ask Mr. White, in what manner *is* the Bible written? Has he yet to learn that it abounds in fact with Greek and Hebrew idioms, and that it is more densely crowded with metaphors than any other book in existence, even "on the most important subjects"? Taking the fact as it notoriously stands, a conclusion directly opposed to that which he has deduced may without hesitation be drawn from it; namely, that it is

in the highest degree probable that the great issues of human destiny may be found expressed by figurative terms.

To Mr. White's hypothetical demand—"*Supposing* the doctrine of our proposition to have been in the mind of Christ, what language could have been selected more suitable for its popular utterance?"—I reply, that he shall have the terms in their literal sense, which is the sense of his "proposition," if I do not prove that a metaphorical sense belongs to them. If I do, of course after that he will not claim them.

What will the reader say, however, to this demand for literal interpretation, and to the notion of the improbable use of metaphorical terms in relation to future punishment, when I present to him the following passage from Mr. White's own summary of New Testament phraseology.

"The following figures are likewise used. Being burnt up like chaff, or like tares; blotted from the book of life; broken to shivers; trampled under foot, like savourless salt; ground to powder; thrown away like bad fish; cut down or plucked up by the roots, like a fruitless tree; sawn asunder; cast into a furnace of fire, with weeping, wailing, and gnashing of teeth; cast into prison until the debt is paid; deprived of the loan talent; cast into outer darkness; thrown down, like a house by a flood; beaten with many or with few stripes; the mist of darkness for ever," p. 242.

If Mr. White really will insist upon it, that the terms in which the doctrine of future punishment is conveyed shall be taken in the ordinary sense, that is, the literal one, what can follow but that the ungodly must hereafter be literally burnt up, broken to shivers, ground to powder, plucked up by the roots, cast into prison, thrown down and beaten with stripes, with other wonderful metamorphoses too numerous to mention?

Mr. White thinks that some ministers of the Gospel use in reference to future punishment an unscriptural phraseology, and avoid that of the Bible. Let those who are faulty amend; but it was surely premature for him to lay down such a general proposition as that which follows, *before* his examination of passages in detail.

"It ought to sink down into the heart of every student of the Bible," says he, "that the entire bulk of the writings of Paul, the grand 'teacher of the nations in faith and verity,' through all his Epistles, does not present a single instance of reference to the doom of the wicked in which the literal sense of the words is not consistent with, and confirmative of, a literal 'miserable destruction.' The

same thing may be said of the writings of Luke, his companion, of James, Peter, and Jude, and of the gospel and letters of John," p. 246.

I meet this extravagant assertion with a direct contradiction, and refer to the preceding investigation of the twenty-eight texts which Mr. White has adduced in proof of my opinion. This is nothing more than assuming the literal interpretation of Scripture in the mass, and determining the sense of particular passages without examination.

Mr. White then proceeds to notice the sentiments of those who cannot be content with an unvarying literal interpretation, as follows:—

"It is, however, well known to all that, notwithstanding these *primâ facie* arguments in favour of a literal interpretation of the terms death, destruction, &c., a figurative, or rather an opposite signification is nearly universally attached to them in the modern church. They are understood to convey an idea of the eternal existence of the wicked in torment, in a miserable alienation from God. The reasons alleged for this extraordinary conversion of their apparent meaning deserve our careful consideration," p. 249.

The author begins this discussion with a misunderstanding, which obscures, if it does not vitiate, his whole reasoning. His words are—"They [the terms death, destruction, &c.] are understood to convey the idea of an eternal existence of the wicked in torment." This assertion requires the more remark because it is of frequent occurrence throughout the volume.

I say, then, that I do not, and that I know of no persons who do, mean by the word death, as used to denote the future condition of the wicked, "*eternal existence* in torment." On the contrary, I use it to denote suffering exclusively. Not existence, for I assume on other grounds the existence of the sufferer; still less eternal existence. Nor do I mean by death *eternal* suffering, but suffering only, leaving the question of its duration to be determined altogether by other considerations. With a question so misstated arguments can hardly have a conclusive bearing.

Following this misunderstanding is a sentence, of the *animus* of which there is clear reason to complain.

"Of the principal supports of this method of interpretation, the first has ever been the supposed necessity of rendering the terms which denounce future punishment to the ungodly in such a manner as not to deny the doctrine of the immortality of the soul; but since

we have formerly seen that the Bible lends no sanction whatever to that representation of the nature of man, we cannot acknowledge any obligation to *evade the literal declarations of inspiration* derived from the weight of this argument," pp. 249, 250.

I have too high an opinion of Mr. White not to believe that, when the italics I have marked in this passage meet his eye, he will regret having written it. As to "the doctrine of the immortality of *the soul*," it is quite too much for him to say that he has ascertained anything concerning that, since he has chosen to speak exclusively of the immortality of *the man*, as body and soul united. In the immortality of the soul as apart from the body, it is difficult to say that he is not himself a believer.

"Secondly," continues the author, "it has been thought that several passages in our Lord's discourses require us to interpret the ordinary phraseology so as to preserve the impression of the everlasting existence of all mankind in happiness or in woe," p. 250.

These passages are, of course, those which relate to the eternity of future punishment, which are at present out of our contemplation.

"Thirdly, it has been considered that, inasmuch as the term life frequently stands for the conception of happy existence, therefore death may fairly represent the idea of a miserable existence for ever," *Ibid.*

This is a covert reference to the *Eclectic* reviewer of Mr. Dobney's Notes on Future Punishment; but as on this point Mr. Dobney has spoken for himself, and as I have elsewhere (p. 183) made the acknowledgment due to him, I need not further notice the matter here. I may observe, however, that Mr. White entirely misunderstands the reviewer's position and argument, and that out of this misunderstanding arises an adoption on his part of Mr. Dobney's assertion, in the following terms:—

"Life never signifies happiness apart from the notion of existence, and never loses its chief and prominent meaning of existence," *Ibid.*

And in his note, p. 165, giving the various meanings of the word life, we have the following definition and proofs:—

3. "*Happy existence;* not *happiness* alone but happy life. 'In thy favour is life.' 'Wisdom is a tree of life.' 'Now we live if ye stand fast in the Lord.'"

The first of these quotations is from Ps. xxx. 5:—"In *his* favour is life;" the slight error of quotation probably indi-

cates that the author trusted to his memory, and did not refer to the passage. He gives no reason, however, why life must be here understood both of life *and* happiness, but cites the place as though this were self-evident, which certainly it is not. On the contrary, from a perusal of the whole verse it seems clear that happiness alone is intended:—"For his anger endureth but a moment; in his favour is life: weeping may endure for a night, but joy cometh in the morning."

"Wisdom is a tree of life," is of course from Prov. iii. 18:—"She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her." But this is clearly a metaphor, and consequently not relevant. The same metaphor occurs chap. xi. 30—"The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life:" chap. xiii. 12, "When the desire cometh it is a tree of life:" and chap. xv. 4, "A wholesome tongue is a tree of life."

The third passage, 1 Thess. iii. 8, requires only to be read in its connexion to show that happiness alone is the idea intended to be conveyed:—"Therefore, brethren, we were *comforted* over you in all our affliction and distress by your faith: for now *we live* if ye stand fast in the Lord."

Mr. White seems to think that life cannot be used to denote happiness without also denoting existence, because happiness is necessarily a condition of a living being; but there is surely a fallacy in this. No doubt, unless a being lives it cannot be happy: when, however, you take the term life to denote its happiness, it ought to be only in circumstances in which its literal life is otherwise known, and does not require to be asserted; and using life to denote the happiness of a being otherwise known to be alive, it is evidently neither necessary nor proper to make it denote this fact also.

Our author emphatically says,

"That it [life] ever loses its proper radical meaning of existence has yet to be proved, and of course the burden of proof lies with the opposite party," p. 166.

Without admitting the justice of this, I accept the challenge, and adduce proof in the general assertion that every word used as a metaphor loses in such use its radical meaning. Will Mr. White adduce any proof in return, that "the proper radical meaning" of life is *conscious existence?* *

* See "Who will Live for Ever?" Note A. The primary meaning of life, as given by Mr. White himself (p. 165), is "*Vital existence* as distinct from the death or dissolution of *vegetable or animal structures.*"

For if that should turn out, as I believe it will, not to be the radical meaning of the word, there will then remain no pretence whatever for requiring that it should be conjoined with happiness when life is used in this sense, whatever may be the issue of an argument respecting the radical meanings in metaphors generally.

He further says, in the same note, p. 166—

"It has never been shown that death stands for a state of misery . . . apart from the idea of literal destruction."

It is not very easy to show this, I presume, to those who have made up their minds to insist upon the idea of destruction in every example. But in truth the question is not so much one of criticism as of rhetoric. It is one case of a large class, namely, of figurative or analogical terms, and it must be decided by the laws which affect the whole class. The question to be asked is, What takes place when a word is used figuratively? The answer is, that it is taken out of its literal meaning which no longer remains in it, and used in a different meaning, as freely and independently as though it was never used in any other. Whether this be or be not the law of figurative language let grammatical authorities decide. This is the battle-ground, and by the decision of the general question all particular cases must be governed. On this Mr. White has not said a word. Let me be allowed to refer the reader to the remarks which he will find on it in pp. 180–182.

We now come to the close of this long discussion, of which it will be proper to give in conclusion a brief recapitulation.

Mr. White lays it down that death is the curse of the law, and in corroboration of this sentiment he adduces many passages as showing that death in its literal sense is the punishment of sin. Now I assert on the contrary, that the Scriptures do not teach anywhere that literal death is the punishment of sin, nor, consequently, that it is the curse of the law.

To this I may add that the nature of the curse of the law is elsewhere stated with sufficient distinctness to preclude all doubt upon this subject. Thus the apostle tells us, Rom. i. 21, that "the *wrath of God* is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men." That the wrath of God should be literal death is not only not necessary, but not at all probable. Mr. White himself admits

that it will be the source of a large amount of suffering to the impenitent of a totally different kind; and I know not by what method it can be identified with death but by direct testimony to that effect, which is certainly not produced.

This point being determined, two other points of Mr. White's argument are also determined.

1. He elaborately argues the question whether the death threatened to Adam was anything more than death in its simplest idea, against those who have affirmed it to include death temporal, spiritual, and eternal, pp. 45–57.

As having myself affirmed this opinion in my earliest publication,* I am a party interested in this argument generally, and I may perhaps find reason to modify my sentiments in this particular. All that I have now to say, however, is, that the topic is irrelevant here. If the death threatened to Adam *had been* the curse of the law, it would have had bearing; but since it is not so, the tenor of that threatening is of no consequence to our argument at all.

2. He presently lays down the principle that the penalty of the Gospel is a second infliction of the curse of the law, namely, of death. Perhaps so, if death *were* the curse of the law; but, since this is not the case, no proof can be hence derived that it is the penalty of the Gospel.

CHAPTER VI.

ON HIS NOTION OF SACRIFICE.

Our author commences his second discourse by referring to the primeval custom of sacrifice, p. 75 *seq.*

Here he endeavours to make two points. He affirms that the rite of sacrifice teaches, first, that the punishment of sin is death; and, secondly, that the death which constitutes the punishment of sin is literal death. The latter of these positions I shall have no need to dispute with him, if I shall be successful in my endeavour to controvert the former.

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* Theology, or an Attempt towards a Consistent View of the whole Counsel of God.

After proposing the question,—"What were the truths conveyed to the minds of the sacrificers by the solemn rite of putting to death an animal through the shedding of its blood, and committing its body to the flames?"—the author extracts two passages from the writings of Dr. Pye Smith, giving with great propriety and beauty the answer. The ideas conveyed are in the first instance stated to be, "the desert of punishment, the substitution of the innocent, and the pardon of the transgressor." In the latter of these two passages, however, which contains a more extended enumeration of particulars, occurs the following sentence,—"That death, in all its tremendous meaning and extent *is the proper punishment of sin*," p. 78. In expressing a doubt of the accuracy of this statement, I shall be apparently* committed to a difference of opinion, not with Mr. White only, but with the learned and distinguished theologian whose words he has quoted; but I must nevertheless proceed. And there being no reasons assigned why the act of sacrifice should be held to show that death is the proper punishment of sin, I must pursue the direct course of submitting some on the contrary.

I argue, then, from the nature of sacrifice as a significant or symbolical action. Such it is expressly called by Dr. Smith, and such doubtless it will be universally admitted to have been. In it nothing was real, everything was representative. It implied that the offerer had sinned, but he was no part of the transaction; he merely stood by, and by some significant act, as by laying his hand on the head of the victim, acknowledged the reference of the rite to his case. The victim represented him; and, his offence being supposed to be transferred to the victim, its sufferings represented the punishment due to him. They exhibited his punishment, however, as by a symbolical act so in a symbolical manner; not intimating that it would, if personally inflicted, consist in his own death, but in something which the death of the victim might fitly shadow forth. As the whole affair was a group of shadows, I not only affirm that the death of the victim does not teach us that death is the proper punishment of sin, but I go further, and say that it teaches us the contrary. Death, if a shadow of anything, cannot be a shadow

* I say *apparently*, because I am far from certain that Dr. Smith would not on explanation agree with me.

of itself. It must in this connexion be taken to exhibit only a punishment of sin in some respects like itself; a punishment, for example, involving the loss of all happiness, as death involved the loss of all enjoyment to the animal slain.

Besides, the taking away the life of the victim did not constitute the whole of the sacrificial rite; to the completion of it there was yet necessary the placing of the slain body on the altar, and the consumption of it there by fire. This also was a symbolical action, or rather a part of a symbolical action, the slaughter and the burning of the victim necessarily combining to give the true idea of an expiatory sacrifice. This of course symbolized, as truly as death did, the punishment of sin; but what did it show that punishment to be? Death? I think not. It would be much more consistent to say suffering. For if the thing symbolized be supposed to be death, we shall then have a symbol of it composed of two parts (death and consumption by fire) one of which is *not* symbolical; an incongruity obviously fatal to such an hypothesis.

In summing up Mr. White avails himself of three scriptural references, to which I must briefly refer.

"We thus learn," says he, "to trace in all the vast effusions of the blood of bulls and goats practised under the ancient dispensations, and retained through a strong moral instinct throughout the pagan world, an instructive testimony to the desert of sin: 'The soul that sinneth it shall die.' We see a clear and vivid image of that malediction under which we were all born as 'children of wrath,' and which loudly proclaims that 'without shedding of blood there is no remission.'"

1. He denominates the rite of sacrifice "an instructive testimony to the desert of sin;" and adds immediately, "The soul that sinneth it shall die," as a scriptural confirmation of this sentiment. The total irrelevancy of these words will be manifest on consulting the context in the 18th chapter of Ezekiel, and has already been shown in the preceding chapter, p. 215.

2. "We see," he continues, "a clear and vivid image of that malediction under which we are all born as 'children of wrath.'" This phrase occurs in Eph. ii. 3, where the apostle teaches that the Jewish disciples "were by nature children of wrath, even as others." By this language, however, he is far from intending any "malediction" under which it may

be conceived that "all are born." Τέκνα ὀργῆς, the phrase literally translated "children of wrath," means persons *deserving* of wrath; and φύσει ("by nature"), therefore, cannot mean the condition in which we are born as under "malediction," but must be understood of our natural propensities, under the influence of which men fall early and universally into personal sin, and so become obnoxious to God's displeasure.

3. The sacrificial rite, the author tells us, "loudly proclaims that 'without shedding of blood is no remission.'" Upon referring to the connexion of these words (Heb. ix. 22), it will be manifest that the apostle is not enunciating a general truth derivable from sacrifice, and relating to the remission of sin to mankind; but that, on the contrary, he is merely making an affirmation respecting the true character of the Jewish ritual. The passage begins at ver. 18, and ver. 22 reads thus,—"And almost all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is no remission"—none, that is to say, under the law of Moses. The fact thus asserted the author of the Epistle immediately makes the basis of an argument.

CHAPTER VII.

ON HIS VIEW OF THE SACRIFICE OF CHRIST.

By a natural transition, although not in the order of the volume before us, we may now pass on to the redemption effected by Christ, of which our author treats at pp. 123 *seq.* He enters on this part of his subject by laying down his principal thesis in the following terms:—

"The DEATH of the Lord Jesus Christ was the means of our deliverance from the curse of the law," p. 125.

Under this general head Mr. White's observations are directed to prove that the death of Christ was literal death, and identical with the actual and original penalty of sin. Now, as in the preceding instances, so here it will not be necessary for me to engage myself with these subordinate

propositions, my intention being to assail that out of which they arise.

I object, then, at once, to the statement that "the DEATH of the Lord Jesus Christ was THE means of our deliverance from the curse of the law." I think the evangelical truth requires to be expressed in more general terms, to the effect that our redemption is owing, not to the death of Christ exclusively, but to his expiatory sufferings as a whole.

I open the question, therefore, of the existence of which Mr. White, although he has not noticed it, can scarcely have been ignorant, whether the expiatory sufferings of Christ consist solely in his death; or whether there are not some other elements requiring to be referred to this class of sorrows?

On this subject it has been held by some divines that *all* the sufferings endured by Christ in this world after the assumption of his public character were expiatory, and that the sum of them constitutes his great sacrifice of himself; and an elaborate discourse of President Dwight founded on this idea may be seen in his Theology, Sermon 56. So broad a view, however, is by no means necessary to my argument. Let me be allowed to ask, Are there *no* sufferings endured by Christ that can fairly claim to be reckoned expiatory, besides the simple "dissolution of his compound humanity," or the disjunction of soul and body? In a representation so narrow as this it hardly seems possible to include even his physical sufferings on the cross, or the reproach of "hanging on a tree;" still less the mental agony under which he cried, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" It would seem necessary, however, to go a little further back than this, and to take some account of his humiliation before the Jewish and Roman rulers, as well as of his awful sorrows in the garden of Gethsemane. What is Mr. White's view of this subject? Can any probable explanation of the anguish of Gethsemane be suggested, if we refuse to regard it as a part of the great expiation?

I confess myself quite unable to come to the conclusion that our redemption is effected by the death of Christ exclusively; nor do I think that any of the general reasonings hinted at by the author have weight. He lays down, for example, emphatically, this proposition:—

"As a personally sinless man, he [Christ] could not as the repre-

sentative of the race be called upon to undergo any other than the original sentence," p. 131.

On this assertion I offer the following remarks:—

1. That there is no force in it for the purpose for which it is made, unless the original sentence was death, which, as I have endeavoured to show, it was not.

2. That it supposes a much stricter representation of the human race by Christ than can be shown to exist. I have not yet seen those divines proved to be in error, who have maintained that the sin-offering of Christ was a grand expedient of the divine government, bearing relation not so much to the persons of mankind as to the public justice of God, and constituting a ground upon which mercy might be exercised towards the rebellious. On this view there is no need to suppose that Christ endured the original sentence at all, whatever it may have been.

3. That it leads to a difficulty by no means inconsiderable. For it is clear that, if Christ "could not as the representative of the race be called upon to undergo *any other* than the original sentence," he could not be called on to undergo *any more* than the original sentence; and from hence it will follow that he can have effected expiation for no transgressions but breaches of the law. Many sins are committed, however, which are not breaches of the law, as, for example, unbelief and others, which respect exclusively the dispensation of mercy; all these sins are consequently, on Mr. White's hypothesis, without expiation offered. Upon what ground can they be forgiven?

Mr. White suggests—indeed his hypothesis makes it necessary—that, since death was all the curse of the law required, it was immaterial in what manner Christ died; and he expressly affirms that "it might be by disease, or by age," p. 132. Is this credible? And can Mr. White have been driven to such a point as this without feeling himself on untenable ground? Did not the ancient rite of sacrifice require for the victim a *violent* death? Could the death of a victim by process of nature have been accepted as an expiatory offering? And is not Christ declared to have "put away sin by the *sacrifice* of himself"? Heb. ix. 26.

Mr. White endeavours to support himself by scriptural testimony.

"The words of the apostle," says he, "seem to be capable of no

other interpretation, Gal. iii. 14. 'Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; as it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree.' The construction of this sentence, and the quotation of one of the curses of that 'written law' under whose sentence we lay (the law of Moses viewed as a repetition of God's eternal law of morals), appear to render it indubitable that Christ did bear the curse of the law to which we are liable," p. 120.

It is clear, then, that, according to Mr. White's opinion, we are all of us liable to be "hanged on a tree," and not to this only, but to all the other curses of the law of Moses; that being "a repetition of God's eternal law of morals" "under whose sentence we lie." Not admitting the law of Moses to be what Mr. White represents it, I do not believe that such dangers attend our sufficiently unfortunate race. On the other hand it appears plain that, while the apostle speaks of sinners as under "*the curse* of the law," he says that Christ was "made *a curse* for us," and this by suffering a process of humiliation to which sinners are *not* exposed, namely, by "hanging on a tree."

It is quite true, of course, that Christ's death, taken in the simplest view, was a part and a most illustrious part of his atonement, although not the whole; and it is not at all unnatural that the sacred writers should have often used the term death as descriptive in the aggregate of the fact and its important concomitants, all which contribute to the one offering which "taketh away the sins of the world."

It may be asked, indeed, why, if death were neither the curse of the law, nor any part of it, did Christ die for us? The same question may be asked, however, respecting every other part of our Lord's expiatory sufferings, of no portion of which does it seem either necessary or possible to affirm that it was the actual curse of the law. Nor is it anywhere in Scripture affirmed that Christ underwent "*the curse* of the law."

What he suffered was "A curse." In fulfilment of this destiny he went through an extended course of humiliation and sorrow, which may be deemed to have been appointed for him by the eternal wisdom, not as constituting the original curse annexed to sin, but as a fitting equivalent for it. Accordant with this view is the declaration of the apostle, that Christ "humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross," Phil. ii. 8. The "death of the cross" seems to have been selected for the

august sufferer because of the ignominy specially attached to it by the Jews; and by this circumstance particularly the apostle makes good his declaration already cited, that Christ was "made *a curse* for us: for it is written" (he immediately adds, referring to Deut. xxi. 23) "Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree."

Mr. White thinks that his view of the sacrifice of Christ as consisting exclusively in his death, throws light on the Scriptures.

"This view of the life-giving death of Jesus Christ our Lord," he observes, "sets the doctrine of salvation by his *blood* in a remarkably beautiful and striking light. The 'sprinkling of his blood' is the pardon of sin. . . . 'The blood is the life thereof;' therefore the 'drinking of his blood' is the drinking in of the element of eternal life: 'for his flesh is meat indeed, and his blood is drink indeed,'" p. 135.

1. "The doctrine of salvation *by the blood* of Christ." Have we, then, two doctrines—the one a doctrine of salvation by the *death* of Christ, the other a doctrine of salvation by his *blood?* It seems rather that the doctrine is but one; death in the one case and blood in the other denoting precisely the same thing, namely, Christ's sacrifice of himself for us.

2. Even the scriptural phraseology—"redemption through his blood;" "the sprinkling of the blood of Christ," &c.—can receive little illustration from the author's notion of the great expiation: since he holds the death of Christ to have consisted exclusively in the separation of soul and body, which might (according to him) have taken place by age or disease, and consequently without any shedding of blood at all.

He observes—"'The blood is the life thereof;' therefore the 'drinking of his blood' is the drinking in of the element of eternal life; 'for his flesh is meat indeed, and his blood is drink indeed.'" I find much to complain of in this passage, which blends together such unconnected portions of Holy Writ.

1. "For the blood thereof is the life thereof," was the reason assigned by the Jewish legislator why the blood of a sacrificial victim should *not* be used as food; it was especially representative of the propitiatory power of the offering. What can warrant Mr. White to draw from this statement so remote a conclusion as that the blood of Christ is, in a nutritive sense, "the element of eternal life"?

2. The blood of a victim was not "the life thereof" in the sense of its being adapted to give life to another; which, nevertheless, is the sense in which the author speaks of the blood of Christ as "the element of eternal life."

3. The blood of Christ is apparently spoken of by the author, not as an expression for his atonement generally, but in its literal reality, as strictly antithetic to the blood of a piacular victim. Can it be thought for a moment that in *this* sense the blood of Christ is "the element of eternal life;" and that we actually "drink" it in order to live for ever? Yet what else does this passage mean? That we are said to be redeemed by *the blood* of Christ is doubtless true; but as, on the one hand, it is scarcely possible to take this expression as denoting less than the entire fact of his sanguinary death, so, on the other hand, it may with great propriety be regarded as comprehending the whole amount of his expiatory sufferings.

4. That Christ speaks of eating his flesh and drinking his blood (John vi.) is true; but this is when he has exhibited himself, not as presented to God in sacrifice, but under the figure of bread for the spiritual nourishment of mankind.

In a note Mr. White exhibits the application of his views "to the symbolic rite of the Lord's supper." He reckons it "very obvious" that this ordinance is "a standing testimony against the doctrine of natural immortality."

> "When we take bread as Christ's memorial," says he, "we receive his pledge of our everlasting existence in glory. 'The bread which I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.' Who would not respond to the invitation, 'Take it, and divide it among yourselves'?" p. 136.

On this I remark,—

1. That the passage cited from John vi., and so cited that the unwary reader might readily suppose it to have been a part of the institution of the eucharist, is unwarrantably applied to that ordinance. It not only has as it stands no relation to the supper, but it relates to an entirely different subject, namely, the reception of Christ by faith.

2. "When we take bread as Christ's memorial," it is not clear that "we receive his pledge" of any thing, the act being on our part simply commemorative of his death; still less that "we receive his pledge of our everlasting existence in glory," inasmuch as many who have so "taken bread," cannot be supposed to have gone to glory at all.

3. Here is another instance of the combination of the two ideas of existence *and* happiness under the term life,—"our everlasting existence in glory." My objections to this may be seen at pp. 180–182.

After two sentences not requiring particular notice, the author continues:—

"The death of the Lord Jesus being always placed in opposition to the impending *death* of man, we cannot suppose that the term has different significations in the two cases; and since the loss of 'a right to the tree of life' in Adam was followed by a 'return to the dust whence he was taken,' it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that He, at whose death the veil of the holiest (the type of Paradise) was rent asunder, has procured for us a literal, and not a metaphorical, participation of immortality," pp. 135, 136.

1. In animadverting on this passage, I in the first instance correct the closing expression of it. Instead of saying that Christ "has procured for us a literal, and not a metaphorical, participation of immortality," the author should have said, "a participation of a literal, not a metaphorical immortality." The correction is not without importance.

2. The assertion, that "the holiest" was "a type of *Paradise*" is inexact. The author no doubt means heaven; a region of which paradise itself was but a shadow.

3. But now for the argument. "The death of the Lord Jesus is always placed in opposition to the impending death of man." This is but another version of the doctrine that literal death is the whole curse of the law and the whole sum of the atonement; which doctrine, in both parts, I have endeavoured to disprove. Nothing follows, consequently, respecting the meaning of the term in the two cases.

4. Let us, however, admit the doctrine for a moment, and listen to what succeeds:—Since Adam's privation of access to the tree of life issued in his death, "it is impossible to avoid the conclusion" that Christ, by his death, has procured for us a literal immortality. In other words, Christ must be held to have procured for us by his death a literal immortality, because Adam died when he no longer had access to the tree of life. Can the reader see any force of argument in this? My difficulty is, not to "avoid the conclusion," but to find my way to it.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON HIS THEORY OF REGENERATION.

From the subject of redemption Mr. White proceeds to regeneration. This he affirms to be "the critical circumstance on which the salvation of every individual turns," p. 155. For the present I let this pass, but I must have a word with him about it hereafter. "In order to obtain an insight into the nature and results of this great change," he institutes an inquiry "into the scriptural doctrine upon the grounds and reasons for its necessity;" and after assigning as one of these grounds the appropriate fact of "the loss of the divine image in the character," he goes on to assign a second in the following terms :—

"It seems to be taught with equal clearness in the divine revelation, though but little remarked in modern times, that our mortality, or our loss of the prospect of immortality,* through the fall, is another principal ground for the necessity of the new birth," p. 164.

To this proposition I can by no means agree; but since the author adduces several texts of Scripture in support of it, I will give them a careful examination before I enter upon any general reasonings concerning it. He introduces his first class of texts in the following manner :—

"A striking confirmation of this statement is afforded by the remarkable name imposed upon us by the Spirit of inspiration, THE DEAD—signifying those who are under sentence of death; as when God said to Abimelech, 'Thou art but a dead man,'" p. 165.

This reference to the case of Abimelech is at once unnecessary and unfortunate. Unfortunate, because, upon turning to Genesis xx. 3, it is clear that Abimelech was not "under a sentence of death;" and unnecessary, because so obvious a

* I think this phrase remarkable. Our "mortality," then, according to Mr. White, is our "loss of the prospect of immortality," and nothing more. According to the same authority, however, our race never had any prospect of immortality, except by an act of obedience which was not rendered, and so in fact never any to lose. On the other hand, sin brought in *death*, our liability to which, and not the loss of a prospect we never had, surely constitutes our "mortality." What was there in the course of Mr. White's thoughts to cause this singular deviation from his own views?

fact as that mankind are "under sentence of death" must be readily granted, whether proved by scriptural citations or not. Neither the proof nor the admission of it, however, can be anything to his purpose, unless death be understood as the curse of the law. On the meaning of the appellation the author observes—

"Although it is undeniable that, whenever the race of man is represented as *dead*, there is a strong collateral reference to their sinfulness, misery, and alienation from the blessed God, it seems both natural and necessary to conclude from an examination of the evidence, that this term is employed with a special allusion to the originally denounced punishment of sin, the curse of the law—to that death which, as we have already seen, Adam incurred, a total and final cessation of the being of the humanity," p. 167.

I have here only to repeat what I have elsewhere endeavoured to prove, that death is not the curse of the law, or "the originally denounced punishment of sin;" the author consequently cannot but be labouring in vain. But I hasten to "an examination of the evidence."

The passages adduced by Mr. White are as follows:—

(1.) Matt. viii. 22. "Let the dead bury their dead."

"Here," says he, "the corpses (νεκροὺς) which the dead (νεκροὶ) were to bury point strongly to a literal interpretation: *i. e.*, 'Let those without the spirit of life bury the defunct. Let those who are as good as corpses bury corpses,'" p. 167.

On this I observe (1.) that Mr. White suddenly changes his phraseology. Just before he defined *the dead* to be those who are "under sentence of death," now they are those who are "without the spirit of life." And this is a change, not of phraseology only, but of subject also.

(2.) That this change of terms, whether made inadvertently or not, is required by the case, and might be deemed an exercise of controversial wariness. Mr. White could not throw the passage into the following form—"Let those who are under sentence of death bury the dead," since the whole race is so, and the words thus understood could convey no distinction.

(3.) That it is difficult to see what meaning the phrase "without the spirit of life" can have, if it differ materially from that usually employed, "spiritually dead." Expositors generally turn the passage thus:—"Let the spiritually dead bury the carnally dead;" *i. e.*, let those who have no religion attend to secular concerns: a piece of counsel perfectly

adapted to the circumstances of the party to whom it was addressed, and of the time in which it was given. Mr. White objects to this that it is "a play upon words;" but he must be perfectly aware that a habit of verbal association (which is all that "a play upon words" means) prevails to a considerable extent both in the scriptural and classical writers of antiquity. This is in fact, however, substantially his own interpretation.

(2.) Eph. ii. 1–5. "And you hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins. . . . But God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ, and raised us up, and made us sit together in heavenly places."

"Here," says Mr. White, "the death from which the Ephesians were delivered was one from which they were delivered when Christ was raised from the tomb, and one from which they were delivered 'together with him,'" p. 168.

If it is the meaning of this remark that the Ephesian converts were delivered from death *at the same moment* as Christ—"*when* Christ was raised from the tomb"—I need not say anything about so transparent a fallacy; what else the phrase cited may mean I do not know. The author's further object is plainly to intimate that the Ephesian converts were delivered from the *same* death as Christ, which "could be only literal death." I submit, however, that neither the Ephesian nor any other converts to Christianity were, or are in fact, delivered from "literal death." This therefore cannot be the meaning of the passage.

In truth, these words of the apostle connect themselves with the latter part of the preceding chapter; where he represents it as one of the objects of his prayer, that his brethren might know "what is the exceeding greatness of his (God's) power [or rather *grace*] towards those who believe, according to the working of his mighty power which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places," chap. i. 19, 20. After a considerable digression, he returns to this subject in chap. ii. 4, 5, where he tells us, that God's "great love wherewith he loved us" has been shown in making us who believe alive with Christ, in raising us up together with him, and in making us sit together with him in the heavenly places. Now I ask whether it is possible that these phrases, as descriptive (which they are) of the *present* privileges of

believers, can be literally understood? Is it not evident that the resurrection and exaltation of Christ are represented by the apostle as a pattern, *after the similitude* of which God has been pleased to fashion the spiritual privileges of his people?

(3.) 2 Cor. v. 14. "That if one died for all, then were all dead; and that he died for all that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose again." "Here," says the author, "the word dead must signify *the same thing* in the two clauses—'if one *died* for all,' and 'then were all *dead*;' else the adverb *then* is a mockery of the forms of reasoning," p. 168.

Since, however, the apostle is evidently speaking of Christ's death in expiation for sin, the sentence of death intended must be the curse of the law against the sinner: but this, as I have already shown, is not literal death, but the wrath of God, for which death is a metaphorical expression. The antithesis in the two clauses is rather substantial than verbal, the condemned state of man being opposed to the atoning sacrifice of Christ; and it is sufficiently preserved by attaching to the word death on one side whatever characterises man's condition of wrath, and to the same word on the other whatever entered into Christ's expiation. Instead of teaching anything respecting the exact nature of either atonement or condemnation, the apostle's phraseology adapts itself to these ideas as elsewhere scripturally ascertained.

The same remark is applicable to the last clause, which Mr. White presses into his service quoted in the following manner:—

"'That they which *live should not henceforth live unto themselves*, but unto him that died for them, and rose again.' Whence it appears," he adds, "that the life which they obtained by the death of the Redeemer was not essentially holiness or happiness itself, but a life which is to be stamped with those characters through a subsequent voluntary dedication of it to God," p. 169.

The author's quotation does not fully exhibit the antithesis of the passage. The apostle's words are—"He *died* for all that those who *live*." Life here, as denoting the benefit resulting from a personal interest in the death of Christ, must be understood on the same principle as death in the preceding clause, and consequently of deliverance from condemnation. In the subsequent use of the word in the phrase "live unto themselves" this idea altogether disappears, and

we have that of devotedness only. Should Mr. White be dissatisfied with this view, I ask him to *apply* his own. He must be understood to insist, "that the life which believers obtain by the death of the Redeemer" is their *life in this world*, since it is that which they are now to dedicate to God. Now they had the same life in this world when they were unbelievers, and would have had it still if they had not become believers. Besides, according to Mr. White himself, the life obtained by Christ is "life in the ages to come" after a "resurrection," p. 168.

Mr. White then proceeds to name the remaining passages in which the epithet *the dead* is applied to men, with this solitary remark—"In the same sense *therefore*"—that is in the sense of literal death—"we feel obliged to believe that the term is employed" in them. I observe on this—

(1.) That this mode of interpreting passages of Scripture in the lump is altogether unwarrantable and unsafe.

(2.) That, as his only ground for the assumption he makes is the presumed success of his preceding expositions, I may fairly conclude that by having shown their fallacy I have effectually disposed of the remaining texts. Let the passages, however, be examined. They are these :—

(4.) Rom. vi. 13. "Yield yourselves unto God as those that are alive from the dead."

That is, as those who were formerly dead but are now alive. Here the idea of literal death is out of the question.

(5.) 1 Tim. v. 6. "She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth."

This relates to the distribution of alms in the primitive church to necessitous widows; and the whole meaning is that a professing widow of undevout habits should not be held entitled to ecclesiastical charity. The idea of literal death has no place.

(6.) 1 John iii. 14. "We know that we have passed from *death* unto life, because we love the brethren: he that loveth not his brother abideth in *death*."

In this passage love to the brethren is declared to be an evidence of transition from a state of condemnation to a state of contrasted privilege; but whether the terms death and life, as here used, are or are not to be interpreted literally, there is no local evidence to show. It must be determined by the general discussion relating to them.

(7.) Rev. iii. 1. "Thou hast a name that thou livest, and art dead."

This relates to the church at Sardis, and would seem to convey no idea beyond that of its prevailing insincerity and decay. Literal death is altogether remote from the meaning of the passage.

(8.) 1 Peter i. 23, 24. "Being born again, not of corruptible seed but of incorruptible, by the word of God which liveth and abideth for ever; for all flesh is as grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of the field: the grass withereth and the flower thereof falleth away; but the word of the Lord endureth for ever. And this is the word which by the Gospel is preached unto you."

The passages which give to mankind the appellation of "*the dead*" being disposed of, this text is introduced with the observation that it "affords the strongest confirmation" to the preceding interpretation of them. The argument is this.

"It is obvious that in the 24th verse the apostle is giving a reason wherefore (διότι, *for*) we must be born again of the incorruptible seed of the word, which 'liveth and abideth for ever;' because, says he, 'all flesh is as grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of grass. The grass *withereth*, and the flower thereof *falleth away*.' It is evident, therefore, that he regarded man's *mortality and evanescence* as a ground for the necessity of regeneration," p. 170.

Now I think this is altogether a mistake. The passage begins, not with the 23rd verse, but the 22nd; and properly reads thus:—"Seeing ye have purified your souls in obeying the truth through the Spirit unto unfeigned love of the brethren, see that ye love one another with a pure heart fervently; being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever." The structure of the passage is evidently this. The apostle is assigning, not, as Mr. White says, a reason why they must be born again, but a reason why they should "love one another with a pure heart fervently;" and this reason is that the seed by which they had been born again (or the truth by obeying which they had purified their souls) was not corruptible but incorruptible—that is, not of transient but of abiding efficacy. The 24th verse is strictly an illustration of the power of divine truth to mould the heart of man in permanence, as compared with the transitory force of all other motives. "For all flesh is grass, &c.; but the word of the Lord endureth for ever."

(9.) John vi. 47–53 is finally cited by Mr. White as "in full accordance with" his "preceding doctrine." As the passage is somewhat long for quotation and does not require it, I content myself with saying that it is that in which Christ declares himself to be "the bread of life," concluding with—"Except ye eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of man, ye have no life in you." What the author means by saying that it is "in full accordance with" his "preceding doctrine" I can hardly make out to my own satisfaction. His "preceding doctrine" is that the necessity of regeneration is scripturally founded "on our mortality, or loss of the prospect of immortality, through the fall;" but I see nothing in this passage relating to that subject. If Mr. White merely means that life is here to be taken literally, this notion, of which however he adduces no proof, belongs to another place, and is remarked on elsewhere.

"These observations," he goes on to say,—but I really cannot tell which, his own or the passage of Scripture just quoted,—"'may enable us to attach their full meaning to our Lord's declaration to Nicodemus, John iii. 6,—'That which is born of the flesh is flesh,' is of a corruptible and perishable as well as of an animal nature. 'Marvel not that I said unto thee, ye must be born again.'"

On this I remark,—

1. So far as any preceding observations of the author go, they afford us no help at all in understanding this passage; he not having established a single proof that the Scriptures found the necessity of regeneration on our mortality.

2. This slight and merely collateral reference to so important a passage as that from which Mr. White has thus cut out a few words is unworthy of the subject. If the passage as a whole can prove anything to his purpose, why has he not gone into an exposition of it?

3. No reason appears for concurring in the meaning assigned by Mr. White—Ye must be born again because you are of a corruptible and perishable nature. That our Lord here refers to the physical attributes of man is an unsupported and most improbable assumption. I affirm, on the other hand, that he refers to man's moral character; and ask whether the requirements of the passage are not better met by understanding it thus,—Ye must be born again because you are morally corrupt?

Our author sums up his argument in the following terms:—

"Thus does the testimony of Scripture lead us to the conclusion that the necessity for regeneration is founded on the complex fact of man's moral depravity and mortality of nature. This fact is designated by the apostle Paul, 'the law of sin and death,'" p. 172.

Upon first reading this sentence it seems as though Mr. White had represented the apostle Paul as announcing "the complex fact," that the necessity of regeneration is founded on man's combined depravity and mortality: on a second glance, however, it becomes manifest that he merely describes the apostle as asserting the "complex fact" that man is both depraved and mortal; an assertion which might have been made by a thousand authorities, and in a thousand forms, without advancing a hair's breadth any theory concerning regeneration.

It is not certain, however, that the apostle's words do contain even this harmless announcement. What, for example, on such a view of them, could be the meaning of the word *law?* The phrase is separated from the verse in which it stands (Rom. viii. 2), and by a reference to which its true import will readily appear: "The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." "The law of sin," is evidently the inward impulse to evil spoken of in the preceding chapter (see ver. 23); and when the same impulse is said to be a law of death, the meaning is, I suppose, that by leading to sin it leads to death, in the sense in which that result is the punishment of sin—that is, not literally but figuratively. Mr. White adds,—

"It ['the complex fact' that man is both depraved and mortal] is also felicitously expressed in one word which conveys both ideas,—*corruption;* 'the bondage of corruption,'" p. 172.

This phrase is culled from Rom. viii. 21, where it constitutes part of the well-known and interesting passage beginning,—"The earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God," &c. The passage has given rise to great diversity of opinion. Taking "the creature" to mean mankind, "the bondage of corruption" *may* mean the liability of the race to death; but I see no way by which it can be shown to mean at the same time their moral depravity.

Having thus examined the scriptural testimonies brought forward by Mr. White, in support of his assertion that the

necessity of regeneration is founded in part on the mortality of mankind, and having seen that they do not sustain his appeal, I shall now proceed to adduce some arguments in opposition on general grounds.

First, if the necessity of regeneration rest on the two grounds stated by the author, the depravity and the mortality of mankind, it would appear that regeneration itself must be a twofold change, corresponding with the two objects which it must have in view. It aims both to correct depravity and to remedy mortality; two results of a nature so widely different one from another, that they can hardly be conceived of as effected by one and the same operation. The former supposes the exertion of a commanding moral influence, the latter an exercise of physical power. Regeneration, consequently, can no longer be regarded as *one* change, but as *two;* and the two operations are surely quite distinct enough to be distinctly considered and denominated. It is, indeed, as two that Mr. White subsequently represents it. It "consists," says he, "in a renewal of the divine likeness in the character, and, consequently upon that, in a restoration to the hope of immortality, or everlasting life," p. 172. Is it possible to accept this as a definition of the one change, regeneration?

This definition is more particularly worthy of remark on account of the singular mode in which the second part of it is expressed. Regeneration, Mr. White tells us, is "a restoration *to the hope* of immortality." Is it, then, merely "a restoration *to hope*"? Let us hear the author when elsewhere declaring the result of this blessed change:—

> "There seems to be the assured warrant of the Word of God for regarding those who have thus received the seal of the Almighty as having *entered into immortality;* as having become, through union with the Prince of Life, component parts of the immortal system of the universe," p. 186.

If, indeed, regeneration be a mere "restoration to hope," it is not necessarily either a change of character or a distinction of the righteous, for the Gospel brings *hope* to all.

Secondly, If the necessity of regeneration rest in part upon man's mortality, it must to the same extent be a process future and remote. For Christians are as yet living, and regeneration, in this half of it, cannot at all events take place until the resurrection. This seems to be the author's view

as expressed in p. 168, where he describes the life obtained by Christ as "life in the ages to come," after a "resurrection;" and he appears to find no difficulty in it, for he uses concerning it the following extraordinary language:—

"It is not necessary to suppose that any other than a moral change takes place *on earth* in the structure of the spirits of the saved," p. 185.

One reason why I have called this language extraordinary, is that it presents us with another idea of regeneration, differing materially from any yet afforded us. We are now informed that it is *a "change in the structure of the spirits* of the saved." Whatever this may mean, it is at all events something new. We have had regeneration described as "a restoration to the hope of immortality," and as "entering into immortality," both of these, however, as consequent upon "a renewal of the divine likeness in the character;" but now we are instructed that it consists, in both parts, of a "change in the structure of the spirit"—I say in *both* parts, because the author includes under it that which takes place "on earth," as well as that which takes place hereafter. Is it not necessary to ask Mr. White which of his definitions he really wishes to be taken? And to remind him that when he calls the future part of it a "change in the structure of the spirit" he quite overlooks the resurrection of the body?

The author, however, has evidently no clear idea of the term he employs. He speaks of a "*moral* change in the *structure* of the spirit." Now a "*moral* change" is not a change of "*structure*," but, as he himself expresses it, a change of *character;* and *vice versâ*, a change of structure is not a moral change. Which does Mr. White mean? Is regeneration in his view a change of *character*, or a change of *structure?* Or is it a kind of hybrid transformation, half one and half the other?

Whatever regeneration may be, the sacred writers invariably speak of it as taking place in the present life; and it is wholly without scriptural sanction to describe it as a change consisting of two transformations, one effected in this world and another at the resurrection of the just.

There is nothing in Matt. xix. 28—"Ye which have followed me, in the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel"—to authorize a

different conclusion; although Mr. White, without noticing the general difficulties of the passage (which has divided interpreters almost as much as any in the Bible), summarily determines it to relate to the resurrection, and calls it "the completion of the new birth unto holy and everlasting life," p. 218. Bloomfield gives his judgment that the opinion which our author adopts "is not well founded;" but even if it were, the word regeneration as used to denote the resurrection could be regarded only as a metaphor. The resurrection, moreover, is to comprehend "both the just and unjust," and can by no means be properly called "the completion of the new birth to holy and everlasting life." In whatever sense it will be a regeneration, it will be so to the whole race of man.

Thirdly, If the necessity of regeneration depend in part on man's mortality, to this extent regeneration must be a physical change. This is evident since mortality is a physical evil, and since, according to Mr. White, regeneration consists in a "change in the structure of the *spirit*," and includes the final reunion of body and soul at the resurrection, "the completion of the new birth." It is, however, a position difficult to hold. The author has previously stated that regeneration is "the critical circumstance on which the salvation of every individual turns" (p. 155); but is he prepared to say that the salvation of men turns upon the effectuation of a physical change? There is then an end altogether of our "second probation," and man is no longer "a candidate for immortality." It is implied in the very idea of a system of probation that the things required of the party to be proved should be within his power; and if the Gospel be, as Mr. White not only admits but maintains it is, a system of probation, it follows of necessity that the condition on which salvation under it depends cannot be an impracticability, and consequently not a physical change, which to man is an impracticability.

Mr. White himself, indeed, when speaking of man's "second probation," or his merciful probation under the Gospel, calls it a "probation of *repentance*," an idea which he seems quite to have lost sight of when he affirms regeneration to be "THE critical circumstance on which salvation turns." Is it not wonderful that he should have forgotten, even for a moment, how Paul "testified repentance toward God, and faith

toward our Lord Jesus Christ" (Acts xx. 21); how Peter preached, "Repent ye, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out" (Acts iii. 19); how Christ taught that "whosoever believeth in him should have everlasting life" (John vi. 40); and commissioned his disciples to the end of the world to say, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be condemned"? Mark xvi. 16. Supported by such authority, it cannot be perilous to assert that regeneration is not "THE critical circumstance on which salvation depends," but only one of several, and that it is necessary to salvation only in such a sense as may allow it to be associated with the rest. "He that believeth and is baptized SHALL BE SAVED."

Let me here be allowed to ask Mr. White what is strictly his idea of regeneration. Does he mean by it an act of God or a transformation of man? I think I run no hazard in saying that he means the former. I then ask him whether he can adduce any instance from Scripture in which the word is used in this sense? My own conviction, formed on no slight examination, is that in Scripture, and when used in relation to salvation, the word regeneration and its equivalents are always used to denote a moral change and not a divine act. Take for an example 1 Pet. i. 22, 23: "Seeing ye have purified your souls in obeying the truth unto unfeigned love of the brethren, see that ye love one another with a pure heart fervently; being born again, not of corruptible seed but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever." In this passage, "Ye have purified your souls" evidently expresses the same fact as "being born again;" while "obeying the truth" clearly indicates the mode in which "the word of God" had produced the change. And I think this is the uniform habit of the sacred writers. It is true that in systematic theology the term regeneration has a different sense, and that it there denotes an act of God on the sinner. I do not find fault with this, which has its use and convenience; but we have now to do with regeneration only as it is spoken of in the Sacred Oracles. In this view it denotes the great moral transformation which takes place in a man when he believes in the Lord Jesus, and may be regarded as nearly identical with conversion. In this sense it is no doubt necessary to salvation; but it is in this sense homogeneous with faith in

Christ, and inseparable from it. In the sense in which Mr. White uses it the term regeneration is by the sacred writers never employed.

After sketching in a just and forcible manner "the main outlines of the divine image restored in the regenerate man," Mr. White proceeds to lay it down that "on this great spiritual transformation human immortality depends;" and he endeavours to establish this proposition by several scriptural references, in the following manner:—

"Those who have experienced it ['this great spiritual transformation'] are declared in Scripture to have 'passed from death unto life,' and those who have not are said to 'abide in death;' on them 'the wrath of God remains' (μενει, John iii. 36), and they 'shall not see life,'" p. 185.

The phrase "passed from death unto life" occurs first in John v. 24, where certainly it has nothing to do with regeneration: "He that heareth my word, and *believeth on him that sent me*, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life." It occurs again in 1 John iii. 14:—"We know that we have passed from death unto life because we love the brethren;" and here also is the second phrase—"He that loveth not his brother abideth in death." Now this verse is not to Mr. White's purpose; because, even if this mention of brotherly love could be used as a reference to the "great spiritual transformation" generally, it is brought forward by the apostle merely as a point of evidence. He does not say, We pass from death to life because we are transformed; but because we are transformed "we know that we have passed from death unto life." Was the obviousness of this the reason why Mr. White did not quote the entire verse?

John iii. 36 reads thus:—"He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him." I ask here, whether the separation of the phrases cited by Mr. White from *faith*, to which they do refer, and the annexation of them to *regeneration*, to which our Lord makes not the remotest reference, is justifiable?

The author quotes one passage more, and this at full length. It is Rom. viii. 13: "If ye live after the flesh ye shall *die;* but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall *live*." My remark upon this is that it

proves nothing for Mr. White, unless he can show that the words death and life are used in their literal acceptation. Upon this point commentators are much divided, but, as the author has not gone into the question, so neither need I; I may observe, however, that all men literally "die," whether they "live after the flesh," or not.

In page 187 the author quotes the following verses from the same chapter:—

"If Christ be in you, the body indeed is dead because of sin, but the Spirit is life because of righteousness. And if the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you," Rom. viii. 10, 11.

Mr. White's comment on the words "the spirit is life because of righteousness" is—"THE SOUL has 'passed from death unto life' through regeneration, and has become immortal because of justification and sanctification." Now, not to insist that the idea of regeneration is thrust in here totally without warrant, I ask what has Mr. White to do with the immortality of THE SOUL? We have hitherto found him contending that the divine dispensations regarded man exclusively as *man*, or in his "compound humanity;" that the body is "fundamentally and properly the human nature;" that it "is considered as the formal subject of redeeming grace;" that "its resurrection is the physical object and basis of redemption;" and that, as death was the disjunction of soul and body without any reference to the subsequent condition of either, so life as restored by Christ is but the reunion, and immortality the endless reunion, of the dissevered elements for the reconstruction of "the compound humanity." Has Mr. White forgotten all this, that he now talks about "THE SOUL" passing "from death unto life," and becoming "immortal"? This language belongs to a totally different set of ideas from that on which he primarily proceeded.

CHAPTER IX.

ON HIS IDEA OF UNION TO CHRIST.

FROM regeneration our author proceeds to the kindred subject of union to Christ.

He introduces this topic by a notice of the union subsisting between Adam and his posterity.

"In the case of Adam," says he, "the universal law of generation involved his posterity in the moral consequences of his transgression, and obliged a transmission of his legal relationships to God and the universe. 'Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one,'" p. 192.

On this I observe—

1. This passage, Job. xiv. 4, is, I believe, universally admitted to be erroneously rendered. The proper translation is given by Mr. Good, as follows:—

"Who can become pure, free from pollution?
"No one."

2. To whatever extent either "his legal relationships to God and the universe" or "the moral consequences of Adam's transgression" descend to his posterity through him, this cannot be ascribed to "the universal law of generation," in which nothing is discoverable adapted to convey either legal relationships or moral consequences. It is much more natural to refer their descent in a given case to the operation of some specific arrangement, such as was evidently made with our first father in the garden of Eden; the basis of such an arrangement being found in the great "law of generation," and its end in the contingent issues of that peculiar probational dispensation.

3. Although the "consequences" of Adam's conduct, moral and physical, for good or for evil, might descend by virtue of such an arrangement and according to its tenor, I do not see how "legal relationships to God and the universe" would also descend. No one of his posterity could stand in the relation to God which Adam held as federal head of the race; while the relation to God which he held merely as man would of course be held also by all other men, not, however,

as descending to them from their first parent, but as arising out of the possession of the human nature.

Mr. White then goes on to show that three great evils have descended to mankind from Adam; namely, "condemnation," "corruption," and "*death*," pp. 192, 194.

In relation to this statement, I beg to ask him what is the distinction between "condemnation" and "death"? Death being, according to him, the curse of the law (and certainly the penalty of the Eden covenant), condemnation can be no other than our legal exposure to death, in agreement with his own words, p. 193. But what then does Mr. White mean when he says, that *death* descends to us from Adam? This is merely a short way of expressing our legal exposure to death, that is, our condemnation. The two terms describe one and the same thing; and the evils we inherit from the fall are not *three*, but *two* only—a legal subjection to death, and moral depravity. To speak of condemnation, corruption, *and death*, is to lose one's-self in words.

Mr. White now advances to the subject before him.

"The Lord Jesus Christ," says he, "has been constituted a second head for the human race, a second Adam; and the new birth, or *regeneration unto life, unites us to him in vital bonds*," p. 195.

I remark here—

1. That the phrase "regeneration *unto life*" is very singular. Does the author know of any other kind of regeneration? Or did the word *resurrection* at the moment confound him?

2. That Christ can scarcely be said to have been constituted a head "for *the human race;*" his federal character relating rather to the people eternally given to him, and afterwards believing in him. Indeed Mr. White cannot mean more than that Christ is head of the regenerate, since he says that regeneration constitutes union to him.

3. Union to Christ must be regarded as constituted, not by regeneration, but by faith. Union to Christ has two aspects: the one *virtual*, having reference to legal and judicial considerations, and resulting in justification; the other *vital*, having reference to the elements of character, and issuing in sanctification. The former is effected by faith as submitting to the righteousness of God (Rom. ix. 30), or to God's mode of justifying men; the latter is effected by

faith as working by love, and purifying the heart; Gal. v. 6, Acts xv. 9.

After this, the author goes on to say—

"From Christ we receive righteousness, or justification, in opposition to condemnation; sanctification, in opposition to corruption; *and redemption of body and soul to eternal life, in opposition to mortality*," pp. 195, 196.

It is now apparent what object was to be attained by the distribution of the evils inherited by us from the fall into *three*—condemnation, corruption, *and death;* since here are their pretty-looking counterparts, justification, sanctification, *and redemption.* The first trio, however, has been abolished, and consequently can afford no support to the second. Let us see whether it can stand by itself.

It is quite true that the apostle declares Christ to be "made of God unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption," 1 Cor. i. 30; and in its familiar association with this passage the whole strength of Mr. White's enumeration stands. But let us examine the use he makes of the word redemption. He speaks of "redemption of body and soul to eternal life as opposed to mortality." In further explaining his view of the term, p. 217 *seq.*, he admits that it comprehends "the recovery of all that we have lost in the first Adam," and he might have added, of all that we have lost by our own misconduct; but he proceeds immediately to *limit it to the resurrection of the body.*

"It is especially to be observed," says he, "that, in accordance with the doctrine which represents man as essentially a compound being having his characteristic image in the *body*, the inspired writers uniformly pass over in comparative silence the happy condition of the separate spirits of the faithful, and dwell upon the RESURRECTION as the true hope of the believer, the genuine and ultimate *redemption* of humanity," pp. 217, 218.

Now I observe—

1. That this is not fair. If by justification, sanctification, *and redemption*, he meant justification, sanctification, *and resurrection of the body*, he surely should have said so. He speaks, however, of "redemption of *body and soul.*"

2. That this is not consistent: because the resurrection of the body comes to all, "both the just and the unjust," and it is provided for, not by union to Christ, but by the general adaptation of the system of mercy to mankind.

CHAPTER X.

ON HIS REVIEW OF THE SCRIPTURAL EVIDENCE OF IMMORTALITY.

Mr. White repeatedly avows, and in a tone savouring of the triumphant, that there is not to be found in the Scriptures so much as a single declaration of the immortality of man. He even thinks the Bible "strongly opposed" to it. His reasons for this opinion are the following:—

1. "The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is never once explicitly delivered throughout the entire range of the canon of Scripture," p. 19.

On this I remark—

(1.) Our author has been searching for a doctrine which there is no chance of finding there; namely, the doctrine that man is "endowed with the sublime, the magnificent attribute of eternal existence," p. 21. If he had looked for the doctrine of man's natural immortality properly defined, he might perhaps have announced a different result of his labour.

(2.) I beg him to say whether Luke xx. 36,—"Neither can they die any more"—is not an explicit declaration of the undying nature of man. If, as he alleges, a single verse will satisfy him, is not this sufficient?*

(3.) If he means by explicit declarations dogmatical or strictly doctrinal ones, it may be questioned whether sufficient reason exists for expecting such in the Bible. Mr. White, indeed, asserts that,

"In every other instance, we obtain from the prophets and apostles clear and frequent enunciations of the doctrines they were commissioned to deliver, even of those which unaided reason was able to discover, as the existence of God, and the difference between virtue and vice," p. 20.

It is a new thing to me, however, to be informed that the Scriptures explicitly teach either the difference between virtue and vice or the existence of God. That they imply

* This was written before the appearance of Mr. White's pamphlet, and I prefer leaving it as it was written. My remarks on his Reply will be found in the present volume, p. 61 *seq.*

both, or speak in such a manner that both must be true, is certain; but if they explicitly teach these doctrines I must be indebted to Mr. White to say where. But how could he say that "we obtain *from the prophets* clear and frequent enunciations of the doctrines which they were commissioned to deliver;" when, if they were commissioned to deliver doctrines at all, it is notorious that their utterances in relation to Gospel themes were proverbially obscure? The apostles, it is true, used "great plainness of speech;" but neither their discourses nor their writings as preserved to us were characterised by systematic instruction, the Epistle to the Romans being, although a splendid, a solitary exception. After the model of the Great Teacher, to whom Mr. White in this instance makes no reference, they said and wrote principally what the circumstances of the moment suggested; and every careful reader of the New Testament knows that some of the most explicit statements we have of evangelical truth have arisen out of circumstantial suggestions. The Epistles to the Galatians and to the Hebrews we owe to the opposition of false teachers; and the vindication of the doctrine of the resurrection (1 Cor. xv.) to the same cause. Had Paul met with those who denied the immortality of the soul, we might have possessed an apostolical vindication of that doctrine also. The most probable solution of his silence is that every one he addressed believed it.

"How shall we explain the remarkable fact," Mr. White goes on to demand, "that neither prophets nor apostles have ever once employed this argument in dealing with the wicked?" p. 20.

That "prophets" ever had much to do "in dealing with the wicked" is far from being clear. Their chief commission was to the Israelites in relation to the requirements and sanctions of the Mosaic law; and to others they were not either expounders of the moral law or preachers of the Gospel. The topics suggested to the apostles—it may almost be said forced on them, by the circumstances of the time were of a different class: if they were addressing the Jews, they had to vindicate the claims of Jesus of Nazareth to be the Christ; if Gentiles, they had to show the vanity of idols and the claims of the living and true God. And that they did preach in this manner is manifest from the record, for proofs of which see the Acts of the Apostles *passim*.

"It is impossible to believe," continues Mr. White, "that those writers who are copious to an almost painful minuteness in the details of a ceremonial economy or of ecclesiastical arrangements, and in refutations of the cavils of every variety of heretical apostasy, should yet not have expended a line in defence of a truth which is liable to such deadly attacks, and which is notwithstanding asserted to be the very foundation of religion," p. 21.

This passage suggests several observations.

(1.) Mr. White mentions no writer who asserts that the doctrine of man's immortality is "THE foundation of religion." If any one has done so he has clearly indulged in exaggeration. It can be no more than one among several fundamental truths.

(2.) Its being a fundamental truth does not authorize any wonder at its not being explicitly taught, even if this be the fact; since other fundamental truths, such as the being of God, the responsibility of man, and a future life, are in like manner not explicitly taught.

(3.) Its being "*liable* to deadly attacks" constituted no reason why the apostles should defend it. They do not appear to have entered at any time on gratuitous controversy. They defend the truths that *were* attacked, not those which *might be* so.

(4.) That the apostles were careful to refute "every variety of heretical apostasy" they met with, is clear and satisfactory proof that they did not find any heresy on the subject of the immortality of the soul. The dispute between the Pharisees and Sadducees had been already settled by their Master.

2. Mr. White further notices, "as strongly opposed to the notion of the soul's immortality," "the style and tone adopted in the Scripture when speaking discursively of man's natural estate," p. 21. Then follow quotations from the 7th, 10th, 11th, 14th, and 40th chapters of Job, descriptive of the vanity of human life; after which the author continues :—

"Again, David and Isaiah re-echo the same humble strain,—'What is man that thou art mindful of him, or the son of man that thou visitest him?' 'All nations before him are as nothing, yea, less than nothing and vanity,'" p. 23.

The author says that this is "depreciatory language," and contends that the use of it is inconsistent with the supposition that the "ancient philosophers" who used it held any very high notions of "human dignity;" but in this observation he overlooks the true *animus* of the language he has

quoted. If it is "depreciatory of man," it is not of man considered in himself, but only as viewed in comparison with his Maker. This in the language of Isaiah is obvious:—"All nations *before Him* are as nothing, yea, less than nothing and vanity." In Psalm viii., as every reader will recollect, David argues from the vastness of the material universe:—"When I consider thy heavens, the moon and the stars, which thou hast ordained, Lord, what is man?"

The language of the Book of Job is depreciatory, not of man but of man's present condition, as shown in the brevity of his life and the calamities to which he is exposed. There is no argumentative force in these passages for the purpose for which they are adduced. That man's life on earth is short and miserable, goes not a step towards proving that he has no natural adaptation to exist for ever; while, on the supposition that he has such an adaptation, he is still marvellously chosen among the vast works of God for the attention lavished on him, and in comparison with his Maker is "less than nothing and vanity."

"If man be by constitution an immortal in his soul," says Mr. White, "the mortality of his body is an inconsiderable circumstance —rather a blessing than a curse," p. 23.

Is there any authority for this startling affirmation? Or is it merely matter of opinion?

3. Mr. White's last reason for deeming the Scriptures opposed to the doctrine of man's immortality is derived from the idea that the body, not the spirit, is "the characteristic nature" of man, an opinion which has been fully discussed in a preceding chapter.*

In an earlier portion of this volume† I have cursorily adverted to the fact, that the opinion of the immortality of the soul was not only extant but prevalent among the Jews in the time of our Lord, it being strongly asserted by the Pharisees with whom the bulk of the nation agreed, and denied only by the Sadducees with a few adherents. This fact, while it supplies an easy solution of some of the difficulties which Mr. White has raised, affords also an obvious and powerful argument for the truth of the doctrine so held: since, on the one hand, it is difficult to account for the

* Chap. ii. † See p. 173.

prevalence of such an opinion except on the supposition of its having been drawn from the fountain of truth; and since, on the other hand, it is equally difficult to account for the silence of our Lord respecting so material an error, if such he deemed it. In p. 116 *seq.* the author, fully acknowledging the fact as above stated, addresses himself to a solution of the problem which arises out of it.

After some observations on the existence of the Sadducees as a sect and their position with regard to the Pharisees, he thus proceeds:

"It is not too much confidently to suppose that the Sadducees had at least some plausible reasons for their opposition to the more powerful party; and that, although the latter both cherished and professed by far the most important portion of the truth, the former also maintained some ideas sufficiently compassed about with evidence to support their existence as a party, even amidst the intelligence of the age of Simeon, Onkelos, and Gamaliel.

"We venture therefore to conjecture that the Sadducees correctly determined against the Pharisaical doctrine of the immortality of the soul as unwarranted by the national Scriptures, and that this denial was the strength of their argument in attacking their adversaries. They saw clearly enough that the Old Testament nowhere inculcates either the abstract doctrine of human immortality, or that of the everlasting existence of the wicked; . . . and then mistaking the honest disproof of these doctrines for the disproof of a future existence for the righteous, from a false supposition that the two must stand or fall together, they did as much violence to the numerous texts which set forth the promise of 'eternal inheritance' to the people of God in order to make their theory complete, as the Pharisees did to those which declare the destruction and death of the wicked, in order to bear out their scheme of universal immortality. Thus the whole truth was divided between the two parties," pp. 119, 120.

I cannot but agree with Mr. White, that the Sadducees must have "maintained *some ideas* sufficiently compassed about with evidence to support their existence as a party;" but this attaches no probability to his conjecture that the denial of man's immortality was one of them. Nor is there either need or scope for conjecture in the case, since we know from history the nature of the great truth they held, particularly in opposition to the Pharisees. "The Sadducees," says Macknight,* "adhering to the Scriptures, *rejected the traditions of the elders*, which began under the Maccabees

* Harmony of the Gospels. Jewish Antiquities, ch. 3.

to be reckoned an essential part of religion. On the other hand, the Pharisees were zealous assertors of these traditions. Hence arose the furious and everlasting contentions between the two sects of which Josephus so often speaks." The power of the truth thus held by the Sadducees is quite enough to account for "their existence as a party." That "the whole truth" respecting immortality and retribution "was divided between" them and the Pharisees, is a supposition so purely gratuitous that it can scarcely possess any argumentative weight. Mr. White endeavours to obtain for it, however, a semblance of scriptural sanction.

"It is exceedingly remarkable," says he, "that our Lord did not show more favour to the one sect than to the other in the days of his flesh," p. 121.

Well, what of this?

"He repeatedly warns his disciples against the 'doctrine' of the Pharisees, as though he would choose his followers to receive all the elements of truth afresh from his lips; as though the truths which they taught were still adulterated with a large proportion of error," *Ibid.*

No doubt "the truths which the Pharisees taught *were* adulterated with a large proportion of error;" but it can hardly be made out that Christ "would choose his followers to receive *all* the elements of truth afresh from his lips." His method rather was to exhibit and rectify specific errors, as may be seen in Matt. v. 20 *seq.* That he warned his disciples against the "doctrine" of the Pharisees exclusively is not the fact. "Take heed and beware," said he, "of the leaven of the Pharisees *and of the Sadducees*," Matt. xvi. 6; and this is explained in the 12th verse, of "the *doctrine* of the Pharisees and the Sadducees."

Mr. White has in reserve, however, the most "striking" confirmation of his opinion; a case in which, "on a most important occasion," Christ "purposely omitted to teach the doctrine of immortality," "in a manner which seems to mark his reprobation of the tenet," p. 122. This is no other than our Lord's reply to the Sadducees, Luke xx. 27 *seq.*; in which, says our author, he "fetched his reply in favour of a future eternal existence from a consideration of what was involved in the relationship of *a God.*" Now, if this could be proved to be necessarily a gracious relationship there would be some force in the argument, but certainly God is

often in the Old Testament declared to be a God to those to whom he bore no gracious relation at all. Nor is it necessary to suppose such a relation here, since a relation of wrath will as well answer the purpose of the argument as a relation of grace. So far is it from being true that our Lord purposely spoke in a manner adapted to mark his reprobation of the doctrine of man's immortality, that he stepped out of his way as if on purpose to enter into the controversy then existing respecting it, and gave a most unequivocal testimony in its favour. For a further illustration of this important passage, however, I may again refer to "Who will Live for Ever?"*

I may close these remarks with a citation from p. 98 of the volume before us, in which Mr. White, speaking of the doctrine of a "resurrection unto life" as "cherished with unshaken confidence by at least all the better instructed members of the nation" in the time of our Lord, says—"From this well-established fact it may fairly be argued that the belief was of primæval antiquity; since no period can be assigned with any semblance of probability when the doctrine of a resurrection unto life first appeared among the Jews." If the doctrine of the immortality of the soul were, as the facts warrant, substituted for that of a resurrection unto life, would not the conclusion be equally sound?

In reviewing the texts which have been adduced on the affirmative side of the question before us, Mr. White notices the following:—

(1.) Gen. i. 27. "So God created man in his own image."

On this unquestionable and sublime prerogative he observes—

"The sense in which the phrase 'the image of God' is used by St. Paul, seems to indicate that the leading conception of Moses was moral similitude, a holy conformity to the eternal reason and almighty authority," p. 13.

I adopt this opinion: and then I ask Mr. White to develop the subordinate and remaining idea. The "*leading* conception of Moses," he says, was similitude of character or "conformity to the eternal reason;" a second, which the author names without distinguishing, was similitude of posi-

* "Who will Live for Ever?" Note C.

tion, or conformity to the "almighty authority;" but his language admits that there was at least one idea more. What was this? Can he avoid acknowledging it to be a similitude of *nature*, or a conformity to the divine intelligence and incorruptibility? This may be regarded as the just and natural meaning of the passage; since nothing can appear more reasonable than that, in the case of a being so highly distinguished in position and character, there should be also a corresponding peculiarity of nature. Can it be supposed that God would stamp the glorious image of his own holiness on a nature created for less than an everlasting existence?

(2.) Gen. ii. 7. "So God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul."

"It is undeniable," says the author, "that these words indicate some special dignity in human nature, distinguishing it from those animal races which 'the *earth* brought forth' at the command of the Almighty; but it is not quite so clear that this special dignity consisted in the immortality of the soul," p. 14.

I do not think this verse proves even so much as is here allowed, namely, "some special dignity in human nature." With Mr. White, however, I take the phrase "a living soul," (ψυχὴ ζῶσα) as simply equivalent to *a living being;* for just such Adam became by breath being imparted to his moulded but inanimate body. In many instances where ψυχὴ is most unhappily translated *soul*, it clearly ought to be rendered by the word person. It is repeatedly applied to the animal tribes at large, both human and brute: but while, on the one hand, it cannot avail to prove the superiority of human over brute nature, it cannot, on the other hand, establish the identity in *all* respects of the two. ψυχὴ is beyond question sometimes used to denote characteristics of man in which the brutes have no share.

"The apostle Paul," continues Mr. White, "adduces the text in question for the express purpose of drawing the most marked contrast between the first and the second Adam. He says (1 Cor. xv. 44) 'There is a natural (or an animal) body (ψυχικὸν), and there is a spiritual body. And so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul (ψυχὴν ζῶσαν); the last Adam was made a quickening (or life-giving) spirit (ζωοποιοῦν πνεῦμα). The first man is of the earth, earthy (χοϊκὸς, a man of dust); the second Adam is the Lord from heaven.' Thus we perceive that, instead of applying the term soul to the mind of man, the apostle refers it to his whole nature, *but with a special reference to the body*," pp. 15, 16.

I have marked in italics the last clause as open to objection. The only ground laid for it is the close connexion which the author assumes to exist between the 44th and 45th verses of 1 Cor. xv. A careful attention to the apostle's course of argument, however, will show that at the 44th verse he concludes the topic with which he had been sometime engaged (ver. 39 *seq.*). His declaration "there is a natural body and there is a spiritual body," is not meant to elucidate that which follows, but that which precedes it—"It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body;" and with this explanation, to which verse 46—"Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual"—is supplementary, he closes the subject. In the 45th verse the apostle introduces a new idea, and a fresh topic of argument. He then occupies four verses (vers. 45, 47, 48, 49) with a comparison between Adam and Christ under the notion of the first and the second Adam, or man, and stating his first point in the words of Moses—"The first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit;" or, better rendered, "The first Adam was a *living* person; but the second Adam is a *life-giving* person." The antithesis seems to lie wholly between the two ideas of *having* life, and being *able to communicate* life; no contrast being intended between soul and spirit. It is rather a case in which ψυχὴ and πνεῦμα are used for the same idea.

On this view of the passage, we lose altogether that apparent connexion on which the author has founded the sentiment to which I object, namely, that ψυχὴ is used by the apostle "with a special reference to the body."

Eccles. iii. 21. "Who knoweth the spirit of a man which goeth upwards, and the spirit of a beast which goeth downwards to the earth?"

On this passage Mr. White has the following remarks:—

"It is presumed that the expression 'goeth upwards' denotes, not merely survivance, which may be readily granted, but eternal immortality. A slight reference to the context, however, will show that Solomon, the wisest man (and not an Epicurean infidel, as some assert), is engaged in speculating upon the great similarity discoverable between mankind and the animal races; and he expresses the wish that God would undeceive them in the matter of their boasted essential immortality, and bring them to an humble sense of their true rank in the scale of creation," p. 16.

The reader will observe that we are still accompanied by the author's usual aggravation of the term immortality. He must speak of "*eternal* immortality," and of "*essential* immortality," neither of which is the real matter in question.

That Solomon is in the context "engaged in speculating upon the great similarity discoverable between mankind and the animal races" is true; but it is far from being true that, in the words quoted, "he expresses a wish that God would undeceive them in the matter of their boasted immortality." If indeed Mr. White believed it true, how was it that he did not insert this text among those by which he thinks the Scriptures discountenance the idea of man's immortality? p. 21 *seq.* Nothing could have been more directly to his purpose. In fact, however, the import of the passage is entirely different from that suggested. "The wisest man," after exhibiting several features of human life bearing a marked and striking similarity to that of the animal races, announces in the verse particularly before us one great point of dissimilarity and contrast, namely, that the human spirit "goeth upwards," or ascendeth on high, while the brute spirit "goeth downwards to the earth;" an explicit intimation of a future existence for man, as a fact not of dubious speculation, but of familiar knowledge. He then asks, "Who knoweth" this? Not in the sense of uncertainty, but in the sense of remonstrance:—"Who *considereth*" it? The words constitute a rebuke, not of man's arrogance in boasting himself immortal, but of man's folly in not being mindful of futurity.

At the same time that I thus differ from Mr. White's view of the passage, I cannot say that the text contains any explicit reference to immortality. That it teaches life after death he admits, and it is also plainly consistent with the idea of endless life; whether Solomon intended it of endless life, and whether the Jews of his day understood it so, must be determined by asking what their views of the future life were. If they conceived the future life to be endless, that is, without any natural limit (as there is reason to believe they did), they could scarcely have understood this reference to a future otherwise than of an endless existence.

Eccles. xii. 7. "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it."

Mr. White thinks that "'returning unto God' would either signify in Oriental language a lapse of the individual mind into the divine infinity, or, more probably, would refer to the spirit of life from God itself, as in Job xxxiv. 14." Solicitous to know something of this "spirit of life from God," let us turn to the place indicated. It is as follows:—

"If he set his heart upon man, if he gather unto himself his spirit and his breath, all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again unto dust," Job xxxiv. 14, 15.

The words referred to by Mr. White, I suppose, are—"his spirit and his breath;" but what foundation these lay for the doctrine of a "spirit of life from God" which on the death of man "returns to God," is by no means clear. The "spirit" of which Solomon speaks is doubtless the spirit or soul of man as distinguished from his body; the one "shall return to the earth, the other shall return to God."

As to this phrase, "the spirit shall return to God," Mr. White says "it would signify in Oriental language the lapse of the individual mind into the divine infinity;" and he thinks it so probable that this notion of pagan philosophy is here inculcated by Solomon that he suggests no other interpretation, but contents himself with saying that the words "do not explicitly teach the separate existence [of the soul] at all." This is surely very unsound exposition. If, on the one hand, it be admitted that the declaration, "the spirit shall return to God," *may* in Oriental language "signify the lapse of the individual mind into the divine infinity," it must be admitted, on the other, that there is no necessity for assigning to it that signification. There are undoubtedly purposes for which the human spirit may be supposed to "return to God" very far different from that suggested by the author, and no one who thinks that Solomon was instructed from above, or was even on a level with the wisdom of his age, will hesitate to believe that he had them in his view.

This passage, then, implying a future existence of man, implies also an endless one so far as the nature of man is concerned, for such was the idea of future existence universally entertained.

(4.) 2 Tim. i. 10. "Who hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel."

Differing from Mr. Dobney in his view of this passage, Mr. White makes the following remark:—

"It is affirmed that the apostle here teaches us that Christ *brought to light* the fact that all men are by nature immortal. But is it not the more natural interpretation that the Saviour *brought* life and immortality to a world which had lost it?" p. 18.

When the reader has recovered from his surprise at hearing the author say that Christ has brought immortality to the "*world*" he will observe that the alteration proposed—*brought*, instead of *brought to light*—is quite inadmissible. The word is *φωτίζω*; a fact which, one would think, Mr. White must at the moment have forgotten.*

CHAPTER XI.

ON HIS "SCHEME OF RELIGION."

In his concluding chapter Mr. White exhibits, as a leading recommendation of his views, the fact "that they constitute altogether A SCHEME OF RELIGION more intelligible to the ordinary moral understanding of mankind than the opinions which are generally entertained" (p. 290); and after a representation, somewhat in caricature, of what he con-

* Mr. White here adds some remarks on the position taken by the *Eclectic* reviewer respecting the interpretation of the word life.

"In every other instance," he observes, "the terms 'life and immortality' are understood by these writers to signify, not eternal existence, but simply eternal happiness; and it remains for them to exhibit the rule by which they forsake their usual interpretation in this case, and affix to the words of the apostle a literal signification. The figurative interpretation of the Scripture should at least be consistently carried out," p. 18.

Mr. White is not correct in his statement of facts. The *Eclectic* reviewer, who is the party referred to, did not require that "in *every other* instance" the words "life and immortality" should be understood to mean eternal happiness. He distinctly laid down the rule that these, like all words, should be understood literally unless cause could be shown for the contrary. By *this rule* he determined that in this passage they should be understood literally, and in this interpretation Mr. White evidently agrees. His postulate that "the figurative interpretation of the Scripture should be *consistently* carried out" means nothing less than this, that if in the Bible a word is *once* figuratively understood, it should be so *always*.

ceives to be usually held, he proceeds to announce his own system in the following terms:—

"That Adam was placed in Paradise on trial for the attainment of immortal life in his compound nature of body and soul—that by his sin he forfeited the prospect of immortal existence in blessedness, both for himself and for the race which should have proceeded from him—that therefore his name might have been justly blotted from the book of life, and from the records of the creation, in the day of his transgression, the gates of the universe thus closing against a numberless family of immortals. But that God who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he had loved us, gave us life again together with Christ, by whose grace we are saved; and raised us up, and made us sit together in the heavenly places; so that by faith in his blood the vilest of mankind may attain to the rank of the angels, and never die; while the penalty for rejecting the system of redeeming mercy is a second remediless infliction of death, accompanied by suffering proportionate to each man's character and deeds," p. 294.

This statement is in several points open to animadversion.

1. Such a summary should not have been interlarded with Scripture phrases, which of necessity both sides admit, and which consequently can prove nothing on either, but merely serve to provoke incessant questions of interpretation. It should have been framed in independent terms.

2. The word life is here used in the sense of "*existence in blessedness;*" against which I renew the protest I have already entered.

3. The assertion that Adam, "by his sin, *forfeited the prospect of immortal existence*," is destitute of either warrant or consistency. The Scripture testimony is that Adam, "by his sin," *brought death;* and this Mr. White, in many places, declares to be his own opinion also.

4. The first probation of the human race is represented as confined to Adam alone; in conformity, indeed, with some portions of the book, but in direct contradiction to others. Thus in p. 70, death is said to be "a doom awaiting every man *that doeth evil;*" and in p. 203, where Mr. White is discussing the doctrine of justification by faith, he largely insists on "the law of God" being universal in its dominion over the intelligent creation, and avers that *all* have sinned, and that consequently the whole world stands condemned. "The law," says he, "requires a perfect, spotless righteousness, and in the absence of that righteousness its curse descends," p. 204. There is much more in the volume to the same effect, and of undoubted scriptural truth. In the

summary of doctrine, however, not a reference is made to these matters. Nothing is intimated but that we suffer by the fault of our first parent; our condition, consequently, is left to be regarded as one of misfortune rather than of criminality, and repentance is a term wholly inapplicable. The necessary brevity of such a summary cannot be accepted as an excuse for this omission.

5. The sense in which the author introduces the phraseology of Ephes. ii. 4–6, "God, who is rich in mercy," &c., it is extremely difficult to ascertain. The only thing that is clear is that the words are not used in the sense of the apostle, and that they are therefore of no force as proof. To whom are we to refer the pronoun *us?* If to the saints (as in the Epistle), then the words lay no basis for universal hope; if to all men, in what meaning can they be true?

6. The use of the phrase, "the rank of the angels," is another instance of claiming from a passage (Luke xx. 36) a support which it will not yield. It is also a most infelicitous representation of the issue of faith in Christ, which, in fact, will raise men far above angels, and make them conformable to the Son of God, "the first-born among many brethren."

Of the alleged "second remediless infliction of death" as the penalty of the Gospel the author speaks more fully at an earlier part of the volume, in a passage which may be quoted as an appendix to his Scheme of Religion. His words are as follows:—

> "The punishment for rejecting the offer of mercy during the second probation of repentance we believe to be a second infliction of the original curse of death, aggravated in its character by all the prolonged and fearful torment due to wickedness which can thus insult the Majesty on high; a doom awaiting 'every soul of man' that doeth evil, with 'indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish' proportioned to his knowledge and his deeds. And since from this 'second death' there will be no redemption through a resurrection, the mighty power which, at the first infliction of the curse of the law maintained the soul in being, will no longer interfere to uphold its existence, but will destroy both body and soul in hell," p. 70.

As several ideas are grouped together in this paragraph, it will be advantageous, and even necessary, to subject each by itself to consideration.

The general import of the former part of it is that the punishment of those who reject the offer of mercy will consist of two parts, death and suffering, or, to put them in their

natural order, suffering and death; that suffering will be inflicted as due to the criminality of unbelief, and death as the original curse of the law, which will thus be inflicted a second time.

I may dismiss from my present consideration all that relates to death, as I have already done what is in my power towards proving that, literally taken, it is neither the punishment of sin nor the curse of the law. Mr. White's view, however, is open to some further remarks.

(1.) He affirms that the punishment of impenitence will be an infliction of *the curse of the law.*

What ground can be laid for this? The curse of the law is surely annexed to the breach of the law, but repentance and faith in Christ are not duties prescribed by the law, and the omission of them is consequently no transgression of it. Why then should the curse of the law be attached to impenitence and unbelief? To say that unbelief is criminal and will be punished is one thing, and is true; but to say that it will be punished *by an infliction of the curse of the law* is another thing, and requires proof.

(2.) He affirms that impenitence will be punished by a *second infliction* of the curse of the law.

But how can the curse of the law with any justice be inflicted *twice?* A second time upon those who have already suffered it once? The law is either to receive obedience or to inflict penalty; but this is the whole scope of it, and when its penalty has been inflicted on a sinner, surely it can neither demand nor warrant more. On what principle can it still hold a man in subjection, and inflict its penalty again?

(3.) He affirms that the punishment of impenitence will be, not only a second, but an *aggravated* infliction of the curse of the law.

Now the curse of the law must in justice be regarded as strictly defined in relation to breaches of the law; on what ground therefore can it be equitably aggravated? Or, being death, in what manner can it be aggravated? Something might be added to it, but, whatever this might be, it would still be something else and no part of the curse of the law.

(4.) He affirms that the punishment of impenitence will be a second infliction of the curse of the law, *aggravated by "prolonged and fearful torment."*

Here, if the curse of the law were really death, would be

the annexation to it of an element totally dissimilar to itself: the curse, death—the aggravation, torment. The want of homogeneity in these two elements deserves to be considered. There is no such difference of criminality as to lay any foundation for such a difference of punishment.

It is evidently for the confirmation of these views that the author has framed the concluding part of the first sentence in the passage I have extracted, in which he says that death is "a doom awaiting 'every soul of man that doeth evil,' with 'indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish,' proportioned to his knowledge and his deeds." Although the place is not named, this is obviously a quotation of Rom. ii. 6–9: and I remark on it—

(1.) That the entire passage, as will be seen by referring to the context, is remote from the doom of the impenitent, and consequently irrelevant to the subject in hand. It exhibits the sanctions, not of the Gospel, but of the law.

(2.) That, on his own view of it, the author does it injustice. According to him it ought to teach that "every soul of man that doeth evil" shall be punished with death *and* "indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish." The passage, however, teaches no such thing. "Indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish," constitute *the whole* punishment denounced; and if that punishment be literally death, these terms, instead of denoting anything added to it, can be nothing but metaphorical expressions for it.

In the second sentence of the paragraph I have extracted, the author provides for the disposal of the body and the soul, which, according to his definition of death, *may*, and as it now seems, *do* remain in separate existence after the supposed second death.

"Since, from this second death," says he, "there will be no redemption through a resurrection, the mighty power which, at the first infliction of the curse of the law, maintained the soul in being, will no longer interfere to uphold its existence; but will destroy both body and soul in hell."

On this statement I make the following remarks:—

(1.) The passage of Scripture to which the author covertly refers, yields him no support. It is Matt. x. 28; in which our Lord affirms, indeed, that God "is *able* to destroy both soul and body in hell," but not that he ever will do so, still less that his doing so is the destined mode of exit from the

universe for impenitent sinners. I believe this is not affirmed in any part of Holy Writ; Mr. White's theory, therefore, must be tried by its own congruities.

(2.) For the body it would not seem that any process of destruction can be necessary; since now, after death, it returns to corruption, and the author holds the bodies of the wicked to be at the resurrection as corruptible as now.

(3.) If, as Mr. White alleges, the soul after death would actually pass out of conscious existence without a gratuitous interference of divine power to uphold it in being, then there can be no need of a destructive process for the soul; since it is only for the Creator to refrain from such interposition, and its conscious being ends of itself. To destroy it "*in hell*" can be nothing in this case but an act of gratuitous severity, the occasion assigned for it being simply that there will be no further redemption.

(4.) According to Mr. White, the act of destroying the body and the soul is neither any part of the system of divine government, nor an act of retribution at all. The whole curse of the law is the act which separates these "component parts of our nature," and the same act, with various degrees of suffering prefixed, is the whole penalty of the Gospel. This, however, does not effect a perfect consummation, but leaves the somewhat awkward remainder of a human body and a human soul, although parted, yet living, and it is a question what God is to do with them. After the fall, because there was to be a redemption, and because he intended to raise the body, he kept the soul alive; but, in the Gospel retribution and after its complete infliction, merely because there is not to be a redemption he exterminates both. This is clearly, therefore, neither an act of retributive justice nor of providential equity, but of pure sovereignty. Yet this extinction of conscious being, especially in the terrific mode in which Mr. White supposes it will be effected, is undeniably the most awful act which can be conceived of in the whole divine administration. It goes far beyond that which may disjoin soul and body, or any torment which will be inflicted during their union; and the calamity which it must be held to constitute is the very last which ought to be inflicted gratuitously, or without corresponding and deep demerit.

CHAPTER XII.

CONCLUSION.

In concluding my remarks on the volume now before me, I am quite aware that I have not adverted to the whole of its contents. I indicated in the Introduction one portion of them to which it would not be *proper* for me to refer, that, namely, which relates to the duration of future punishment; and in the course of the work I have pointed out another to which it was not *necessary* for me to refer, namely, the argument respecting the nature of the death threatened to Adam. To these may be added the author's proofs of the primæval belief of a resurrection, his references to the intermediate state, his treatment of the moral basis of regeneration, and some other passages. I have not intentionally omitted anything bearing on the matter in hand; and I trust that a careful reader of Mr. White's pages will find no reason to complain of me on this score. The result of my animadversions I must leave to the judgment of others.

If, however, Mr. White deems himself to have made good his ground, that the doctrine of the immortality of man is not of divine origin and scriptural authority, it may at least be expected that he should give some explanation of its existence and prevalence in the world; and without making any formal effort of this kind, he briefly does so in a manner of which I will take notice before I close. He writes thus:—

"The prevalence of the opinion can be ascribed only (after making due allowance for hereditary prejudice) to the corrupt pride of a fallen nature, which invented the dogma in lands where the resurrection and the life were unknown," p. 33.

"It is a splendid fiction of philosophy, suggested by the tempter who at first beguiled Eve with the declaration, 'Ye shall not surely die,'" p. 19.

When I call to mind the modification I have had occasion to suggest in the idea of man's immortality on which the author has unfortunately reasoned, I scarcely know what opinion to form of the relevancy of these passages. Undoubtedly, some ancient philosophers held the opinion of the eternity of the soul as a portion of the Deity, and such an idea I can fully agree with Mr. White in describing as "a splendid

fiction," whether suggested by the tempter or not. The question to which I find no answer is, whether he would express a similar opinion of the doctrine that man has a natural adaptation to live for ever. Is this too a splendid fiction of philosophy, and a suggestion of the tempter? In default of information I must assume an affirmative answer.

Mr. White's scheme of explanation consists of two parts, each having its respective difficulties.

If, indeed, the doctrine of man's immortality be, as suggested, of *diabolical origin*, some of the difficulties which would attend a different hypothesis are avoided, inasmuch as it is conceivable that evil spirits might know the truth, and may be deemed probable that they did so. It is to be observed, however, that such an opinion is mere hypothesis, altogether unsupported by evidence of any kind. It cannot be represented as a single case of an established general fact; since it is very far from being proved—I do not know that the task has ever been attempted—that erroneous opinions at large on points beyond human knowledge have been communicated to mankind by Satanic agency, or by a sort of malignant revelation. Quite as much wanting is any proof of the specific fact. It is, indeed, unquestionable that the tempter said to our first mother, "Ye shall not surely die;" but it appears equally certain that this suggestion related exclusively to the impending menace of death which he wished to counteract, and not to the natural mortality of the soul. That upon a point so generally acknowledged to be beyond the discovery of human reason, namely, the immortality of the race, the devil was permitted to instruct man falsely, is a statement equally without proof and without probability. It is surely allowing enough to the author of evil, if we suppose him to exercise upon our race malignant influences of a different kind.

It remains, then, that we consider the doctrine of man's immortality as "*a fiction of philosophy*," that is, of the human mind.

It is not of the human mind simply, however, that our author speaks, but of the human mind in its depraved state; since he tells us that "the dogma" (a word, I suppose, intended to help the argument by an infusion of controversial bitterness) was "invented" by "the corrupt pride of a fallen nature."

When he affirms that "pride" invented the doctrine of human immortality, he doubtless means the human mind under the influence of pride. I have some difficulty, however, in determining the sense in which he uses the word "invented;" but I suppose it must be taken as synonymous with *fabricated.*

Now I think that no satisfactory reason can be assigned why man, because he is proud, should falsely think himself adapted to live for ever. Pride naturally exhibits itself in leading persons to appreciate more highly the attributes or possessions they have, but it is surely something beyond pride which induces persons to arrogate to themselves distinctions which they have not. Besides, to a proud, that is, to a wicked man, endless existence, unless it were on earth, has no attractions; whatever may be its physical magnificence, its intimate association with death, judgment, and retribution, clothes it on the contrary with most repulsive aspects. NOT to be immortal is rather the issue which a proud heart would desire; and the chance of not being so is the actual refuge in which many proud hearts always have been, and are at this moment, taking shelter from the truths and the terrors which haunt them.

If, therefore, the doctrine of immortality have been invented by the mind of man at all, it is with far greater probability to be ascribed to one to whom endless existence held out a prospect of endless happiness; to one whose conscience was peaceful, whose affections were pure, whose heart was lowly; in a word, not to a bad man, but to a good one.

When we come to speak of the views of a good man, however, invention, strictly speaking—that is, fabrication, is out of the question. A good man's mind is, *ex hypothesi*, well regulated, and his philosophy will contain no known falsehoods, however splendid. If the doctrine of immortality is traceable to such a man he must have believed it true.

The conclusion is that the doctrine of immortality is *not* a fiction of the human mind: for, on the one hand, such a fiction *would* not have been created by a bad man, and *could* not have been created by a good one.

This conclusion is strengthened by the difficulty of conceiving how "a fiction of philosophy" should have had so wide and lasting a prevalence as is clearly, after all deduc-

tions, to be ascribed to the doctrine of man's immortality. Mr. White refers it to "the power of hereditary prejudice;" but this is surely a very unsatisfactory explanation. Such a cause may account for the propagation of a sentiment from age to age when once it has become general; but it is totally inadequate to explain the process by which a fiction which must be supposed to have originated in a single mind can take hold of mankind at large, not in a single country alone, but (with trifling exceptions) in all countries.

The only supposition upon which such a conjecture could be sustained would be, that the fiction was generated in the infancy of the human race, and by the first progenitor of it, Adam; a supposition embarrassed by too many obvious difficulties for me to think that Mr. White would adopt it.

I should have thought it much more likely, that the author would have referred for an explanation of the prevalence of the opinion of man's immortality to the congruity which it has with other sentiments natural to mankind. It cannot be denied that the mind of man has been largely occupied with thoughts and feelings relating to a future life. Mr. White himself says in the volume before us, "We may grant to unaided reason that it can render the existence of the soul after death highly probable, and even morally certain," p. 12; and if (which I admit) "it is too much" to conclude that this is the same as *endless* existence, it is surely not too much to regard this feeling of the certainty of future being as congruous with the idea of endless being, and as eminently preparatory to its reception and power. It is because men are certain that they shall live after death, that they so readily imbibe the doctrine that they are adapted to live without end. Reason could not have assured them of it; but, being told them, it fully approves itself to reason.

That this is a just and natural explanation of the prevalence of the opinion of man's immortality I entertain no doubt, although Mr. White has not assigned it. I admit, however, that it would have been inconvenient for him to have done so, as its force lies in the implied truth of the opinion itself. No fabrication—no error, although not fabricated, can be supposed to commend itself so strongly to our rational and moral constitution.

To facilitate the practical conception of the generation of his supposed fiction, Mr. White suggests that it took place

"in lands where the resurrection and the life were unknown." A degree of obscurity attaches to this phraseology. It may denote lands in which the particular doctrine of "the resurrection and the life" was unknown, or, more generally, lands without the light of revelation. Subject to correction if I am mistaken, I adopt the latter as the more probable meaning.

It may be doubted, however, whether there are, or ever have been, any lands *wholly* without the light of revelation. That direct communication between God and man commenced at a very early period is a fact upon distinct record; and it is difficult not to suppose such communication to have been coeval with the rational existence of man himself. Much more, doubtless, must have been communicated to Adam than has been reported to us, and all that was communicated to him was of necessity disseminated through the world. And not only so. All that was known in the time of Noah, an age to which sixteen hundred years of divine revelations must have contributed materials of religious knowledge, has of like necessity been sown among the nations. Consequently, in whatever obscurity and with whatever corruption, the elements of revealed truth exist everywhere. Nay, more; revealed truth is the primary element, as revelation itself is the primary fountain, of all religious and moral systems, which are and must be modifications by the carnal heart of what God originally spoke. Much is lost, much is obscured, much is perverted; but grains of pure gold may yet perchance be found amidst the *débris* with which ages and transgression have loaded the stream of Time: and if there be found among human thoughts a few—a single one—which reason could not have ascertained, rather than ascribe it either to pride or to the Devil, I should think it more rational, and more truly philosophical, to trace it to A PRIMÆVAL REVELATION FROM HEAVEN.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE ARGUMENT AS CONDUCTED BY THE REV. GEORGE STORRS.

At Newcastle-on-Tyne, in the year 1844, was published a work with the following title: "An Inquiry, Are the Wicked Immortal? In Six Sermons, by George Storrs."

Upon reading this publication I find that it does not stand alone, but that it is a rejoinder to an opponent who had written a reply to a previous work of the author; it is consequently to be regarded as a part of a local controversy, and it may seem that a stranger ought not to interfere in such a case. A stranger in truth I am to the whole affair, these Six Sermons excepted, yet I am induced by three considerations to take some notice of the work: the first is that the view which it takes of the subject treated is sufficiently general and complete to render such notice of it not unfair; the second that the author complains of the small measure of attention bestowed by public writers on his antecedent effort; and the third that this specifically is recommended by Mr. White as "a cheap and useful publication."* I proceed, therefore, in the execution of my intention, stipulating only that I shall not be held responsible for anything that may have been said by the unknown opponent of Mr. Storrs.

The author thus exhibits "the question at issue, or the point in debate."

"The question is not whether the soul *can* be immortal, nor whether the souls of the righteous *will* be immortal—these points are admitted, and abundantly proved by the Bible: but the question is,

* Life in Christ, p. 287.

Will the wicked who live and die in their sins continue eternally, or without end, in a state of conscious being? Or, once more, Is the punishment God has threatened to sinners an eternal state of conscious being in misery? This involves the question of the immortality of the soul: for if all men can be proved to be immortal, I conceive it clearly follows from the Bible that the finally impenitent *will* be punished with eternal conscious being in misery," pp. 2, 3.

From the question as thus put, it appears that the chief design of the author is to construct an argument adverse to the opinion of endless suffering, and that he takes up the topic of man's immortality only as raised by the wider discussion. There is much, therefore, in the Six Sermons which it will not accord with my design to notice; but I shall endeavour to attend to everything in them relating to our proper subject, the natural immortality of man.

In the outset I beg the reader to direct his attention to what Mr. Storrs, in his statement of the question, so frankly admits as a point "abundantly proved by the Bible," namely, that "the soul *can* be immortal," by which he evidently means that it can live for ever. Now it is but saying the same thing in other words to affirm that the soul has an adaptation to endless existence, since it is only by virtue of such an adaptation that it can live for ever: but if this be so, the author is no adversary to the doctrine of man's natural immortality, which is precisely that which I have just expressed; on the contrary, he clearly holds it, and affirms it to be "abundantly proved by the Bible."

In p. 5 the author resumes that part of the paragraph above quoted, which states the question he means to discuss in the following terms:—

"Is it the will of God that wicked men . . . shall be immortal?"

On this mode of putting the question I observe—

1. That it raises an inquiry remote from the true point before us; an inquiry, namely, respecting positive endless existence, which is erroneously identified with natural immortality. Mr. Storrs has adopted that definition of immortality which has vitiated so many of the reasonings framed by other writers on this subject, and it will be found to vitiate his own. He tells us, indeed, that he uses the term immortal "in its commonly received meaning; *i. e.*, according to Grimshaw, exempt from death; and according to Walker, never to die, never-ending, perpetual," p. 17. The

definitions given in dictionaries, however, were not framed with a view to the niceties of controversy, and are consequently a very unsafe and insufficient guide. Of the definitions above cited the best is that given by Grimshaw, "exempt from death;" not liable to death would have been still better, as a close translation of the Latin from which our word immortal is derived: but when we are come so far, we want to know what death is, and whence it may arise; in order to this we want to know what life is of which death is the negation, and all this before we can perfect our notion of immortality. Upon this point I beg to refer the reader to my pamphlet, entitled "Who will Live for Ever?"

2. That "the will of God," which he assumes justly to be the source of man's immortality, may here be regarded in two aspects, the one relating to the past the other to the future—the former relating to what is already done, the latter to what is yet to be done. The author regards it in the latter view when he refers it to the will of God whether man positively shall live for ever; the advocates of man's natural immortality take it in the former view, and ask whether it was the will of God that man should be endowed with an adaptation to live for ever.

3. That the question is disadvantageously restricted to "wicked men." What we really have before us is the question of natural immortality, which necessarily relates to *all* men.

The author thus opens his argument:—

> "To commence. I call attention to what man lost by the fall. In order to understand this let us look at man prior to the fall. He was a probationer. For what? Not for happiness, for he had that in possession. Not for life merely, as he was in possession of that also. I conclude it was for eternal life," p. 5.

This is surely summary rather than conclusive argumentation. "Man," that is Adam, "was a probationer:" no doubt of it. "For what?" is a question to which revelation furnishes no answer, and which may well be deemed therefore of no great importance *to us*. The author speedily arrives, however, at a positive conclusion respecting it. He clears his way by two negatives. "Not for happiness," "not for life," for both these our first parent "had in possession." Certainly Adam was not a probationer for anything that "he had in possession," and consequently "not

for life" in the sense of existence (the author's sense of it), which I never knew any one to suppose; but as to happiness the case is not quite so clear. If Adam was in possession of a measure of happiness, it surely was not all the happiness of which he was capable, and he may well be supposed to have been put on probation for an increase of it, especially when regarded as the head and representative of a possible posterity. The author's way to his conclusion, consequently, is not open in reference to the two negatives which he himself has propounded; but he could not satisfactorily reach his conclusion even if it were. For if Adam were not on probation for either life or happiness, it would not follow that he must have been so for eternal life, that is, for the endless continuation of his existence, since there is no proof whatever that this is the only other alternative, or that it is even appropriate or possible as an alternative at all. On the contrary, there is direct evidence that, according to the system of the author, endless existence was not and could not be the benefit for which Adam was a probationer: for, as we have already seen, he admits that man was capable of living for ever, from whence it may be naturally inferred that he would have done so unless something had occurred to bring his existence to an end; but no reason appears why that should have been made the reward of man's critical probation which would have thus regularly followed from the endowments of his nature. The author continues: —

"I conclude it was for eternal life figured and set forth before his eyes by the tree of life, as death, the opposite, was set forth by the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Each of these trees I conclude was a sign; the one of life the other of death, not of man's body merely, but of the whole man," p. 6.

If the author alleges the significant character of the tree of knowledge as a proof of the significant character of the tree of life his intention clearly fails; since it requires first to be shown that the tree of knowledge had a significant character. Adam, however, does not appear to have learned anything from the tree itself. That the eating of it would issue in death he knew only because God had told him so :— "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," Gen. ii. 17.

The tree of life, however, may have been "a sign;" and there is a sense in which it may be admitted to have been a

sign of eternal life, or of uninterrupted continuance of being, inasmuch as the name by which it was called, and the use to which it was applied, as "a means" (according to Mr. Watson in a passage quoted by the author) "of sustaining the immortality of the body," might signify that, if disobedience were avoided, death, the natural destiny of the body, should also be avoided. But the author goes further than this, and represents the tree of life as a "figure;" a figure representing the endless existence of the soul, as well as "a sign" of the possible incorruption of the body.

In support of this view he quotes from Watson's Institutes several passages in which that distinguished writer speaks of the tree of life as "a kind of sacrament," "since there was then a covenant of works, 'this do and thou shalt live'—and, as we know, God has ever connected signs, seals, and sacraments with his covenants," p. 8. This is surely unauthorized and erroneous language, itself requiring support, if support can be found for it, rather than adapted to yield any. In no case, however, can our author gain anything from Mr. Watson; for that of which this eminent person takes the tree of life to be a figure is not an endless but "a higher life," "spiritual life here, and a higher and more glorious life in a future." This view is quite different from that of our author, who represents the tree of life as a figure of endless existence merely.

Failing the support of Mr. Watson, let us examine the arguments of the author himself.

The first of them is in the terms of a general proposition.

"Eternal life must depend upon the absence of evil; if evil is introduced death must follow," p. 6.

Understanding life and death, as the author clearly intends (see p. 17), of existence and extinction, and reading his assertion again, I ask, Why? And is so important a principle to be assumed without proof, and received upon the mere assertion of the author? This is quietly taking for granted the whole thing in debate.

The author's next argument is drawn from man's expulsion from Eden, and from the words "lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever," Gen. iii. 22.

"That is," says Mr. Storrs, "as clear as language can express it, the Lord God determined, or willed, that man should not be immortal

in his sin: or, in other words, in the day man sinned he lost all title to immortality, and was cut off from the tree of life; or, the sign that God had given him of eternal life was 'hid from' his 'eyes,'" *Ibid.*

This statement of the fact is defective. In the day that Adam sinned he did not merely lose "all title to immortality," or endless existence, but he became subject to death under the direct bearing of the threatening, "In the day thou eatest thereof *thou shalt surely die.*"

And besides being defective the statement is inaccurate. In order to lose a title to immortality, Adam must have antecedently possessed one. But did he possess one? And if so, how did he acquire it? Our author has laid it down that this was the very thing for which man was a probationer, and the acquisition of which was to reward his obedience. Consequently, such title having never been acquired it could not be lost.

That God had determined that Adam should "not be immortal in his sin" in the sense of corporeal existence, is doubtless true; not, as learned peculiarly from the words used on his expulsion from Eden, but rather from the previous and direct annexation of death to the violation of the precept enjoined. Our author, however, proceeds to assign several reasons why the loss of Adam's title to immortality should be held to relate, not to the body only, but to the soul also, or "to the whole man." Now as the loss itself is fictitious, the reasons might well be dismissed without notice; but, to use the most perfect fairness, let us hear them.

(1.) "That this loss relates to the whole man," says he, "and not to the body merely, I prove from the fact that the destiny of the body had already been announced," p. 6.

He here refers, no doubt, to that part of Adam's sentence, "For dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return," which had been pronounced before God declared his intention of expelling him from Eden lest he should live for ever. The author thinks that the former words contemplated the destiny of the body only, and that consequently the latter must have contemplated that of the soul. I do not see the force of this. Why might not both expressions have contemplated the destiny of the body?

(2.) "Besides," the author continues, "if it related to the body only, then there is not a particle of evidence in the transaction of pronouncing sentence on man by his Maker that any penalty was

threatened to the soul, or inflicted upon it. There is surely none in the context, and it appears to me that if the exclusion from the tree of life lest man should eat and live for ever does not relate to the soul, there is no evidence there that the denunciation of God against man affected anything but man's body," p. 6.

1. In this passage the author takes it for granted, as being too plain to require proof, that in God's dealings with Adam the penalty, death, "*was* threatened to the soul;" a very debateable view, and one for his proofs of which some parties engaged in this controversy, especially his eulogist and patron, Mr. White, would strenuously call.

2. He selects the phrase, "lest he should live for ever," as the only one capable of conveying such a meaning, and contends that, "if this does not relate to the soul," there is no evidence that the denunciation of God against man affected anything but man's body." What then is the meaning of the author's assertion in the same page that the tree of knowledge was to Adam "a sign" "of death, not of the body only, but of the whole man"?

3. He assumes, in further contradiction to his language just quoted, that death is restricted to the body, and cannot be regarded as affecting "the whole man;" since he will not allow even the direct menace, "Thou shalt surely *die*," to relate to anything but the body. Now what the author calls the death of the body is the death of the man. It is true this is not the extinction of the soul, or the cessation of its conscious being, the idea of which the author has elsewhere chosen to make the word death expressive; and hence his embarrassment. His conception of death requires to be rectified. Upon further inquiry I think he will find that it denotes, not a cessation of human existence, but merely a change in the manner of it.

(3.) "Again," says Mr. Storrs, "that that loss related to the whole man I prove from the fact that our Saviour, in his address to one of the seven churches of Asia, says, 'To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God.' How clear the reference, and how obvious that it is the whole man that is spoken of!

"But I wish to call attention further to the tree of life, to show that it related to something more than the body. In Rev. xxii. 2, we read thus:—'In the midst of the street of it, and on either side of the river, was there the tree of life,' &c. And at the 14th verse—'Blessed are they that do his commandments, that they may have right to the tree of life.' The reference here is too clear to be mis-

understood; no one will pretend that this relates to the body merely. By what authority, then, do they assume it with regard to the tree of life in Paradise?" pp. 6, 7.

Undoubtedly the passages quoted do not "relate to the body merely;" but this admission is quite consistent with holding the tree of life *in Paradise* to relate to the body, and not to the soul. This view of the tree of life creates no bar to the application of it, by way of metaphor (of which the passages quoted by the author are examples), to spiritual things; it is, on the contrary, the correct foundation of such a use, natural objects being the proper materials for the metaphorical illustration of spiritual things.

The arguments which I have thus far been considering are intended by the author to prove that the death threatened to Adam was the extinction of all life, or being, both in body and soul. He desired thus to lay a ground for inferring that, as the threatened death was extinction of body and soul, so the eternal life which he assumed to be promised to Adam consisted in the endless being of body and soul; but, the basis not being laid, the inference, of course, cannot be drawn.

For the sake of the argument, however, and in order to test those statements of the author which follow, let us suppose that the inference *can* be drawn, and the assertion be sustained, that endless existence in body and soul was the benefit for which Adam was a probationer. Now hear the author.

"Adam himself came short of immortality, and would ultimately have utterly perished, or ceased to be, had the seed of the woman not been promised. This truth, then, comes full into view, that there is no immortality in sin; or, in other words, God has willed that the wicked shall not have immortality," p. 9.

Now, waiving for the sake of argument the objections which lie against the premises here stated, it is obvious that they are much too narrow to support the conclusion drawn from them. That Adam would have ceased to be in consequence of eating the forbidden fruit, even if it be admitted as a truth, cannot be received as evidence that extinction would have followed sin universally; on the contrary, as I have elsewhere shown,* this act of disobedience had about it

* Page 211.

a peculiarity which entails a corresponding peculiarity in its penalty. Even if God had willed that Adam should not live for ever after eating of the tree of knowledge, it would not follow that a similar punishment must have been destined for "the wicked" at large. The author continues:—

"Adam being cut off from immortality, could not possibly communicate it to his posterity," p. 9.

1. This requires explanation. For I ask, Would Adam, then, have been able to "*communicate*" immortality to his posterity if he had fulfilled the condition of the Eden covenant? Upon the supposition that he would thus have secured a title to endless existence for himself, he would, as the representative of his race, have secured one for them also, and his failing to secure theirs is of necessity involved in his failing to secure his own; but what is the meaning of the word "*communicate*" in this connexion?

2. This is not a correct statement of the fact. In any sense in which Adam was "cut off," he was "cut off" not only from immortality but from life. He had subjected himself to *death*, which, having been brought into the world by his sin, has reigned over his posterity "from Adam until Moses," and from Moses until now. And this statement of the fact necessitates a larger inference than that which our author draws. He infers that immortality, or *endless* existence, is since Adam's transgression "to be had only in Christ;" but, if death be taken in his sense of "the extinction of all life," it ought to be inferred that *future* existence itself is to be had only in Christ: a conclusion which would comprehend both the righteous and the wicked.

In this place the author inserts a passage of which I cannot see either the object or the bearing. It is as follows:—

"I conceive that Adam's posterity in his loins when he sinned would never have come into conscious being, had it not been for the promised seed of the woman. Man after his apostasy was without hope; and being in despair, his situation must have been such as to cut off all pleasure or enjoyment, and so render him as incapable of propagating his species as the devils, till such time as his Maker gave him the cheering hope of a deliverer," pp. 8, 9.

I quote this singular passage only that I may not seem to neglect anything. If it have an object, all I can say is, *Valeat quantum valet.*

The author closes this part of his argument by quoting the well-known record, "That God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son;" which, of course, his opponents believe as firmly as he does, but which can prove nothing between us till the meaning of the principal term, life, is considered and determined.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE ARGUMENT AS CONDUCTED BY THE REV. GEORGE STORRS, CONTINUED.

I HAVE now considered the only regular portion of Mr. Storrs's argument. The remainder of it consists of fragments, under the general title of "Facts from God's Word for consideration;" and I can do nothing more than take a running notice of such matters as have a bearing, more or less direct, on the subject.

In p. 9, the author, after gravely announcing that "the word *eternity* occurs but once in the Bible," somewhat vehemently complains of ministers who "tell their hearers they are going *into eternity*," whereas, as he truly and solemnly affirms, *time* is not yet at an end; a reproof after which I hope the guilty parties will duly amend.

In p. 10, he tells us that "the phrase *eternal life* occurs nowhere in the Bible except in the New Testament, and is always spoken of the righteous; that it never has connected with it any qualifying terms, such as happy, blessed, or miserable, but *simply denotes life* in opposition to the death of the wicked;" that is, according to our author, existence as opposed to extermination. Mr. Storrs must consequently hold that existence as opposed to extermination is the whole gift of God through Christ. I commend this remark to the notice of Messrs. Dobney and White, who so strenuously maintain the contrary.

He adds, that "it is very common to hear people talk about a *happy* eternal life—a *blessed* eternal life—a *glorious* eternal life." I never heard either of these expressions; and

if the author has heard them I think he has kept singular company. Why, at all events, should *we* use them, who believe that the idea of happiness is here conveyed by the word life itself?

In p. 11 he lays down two rules for the interpretation of Scripture in the following terms:—

"1. That words are to have their primary meaning unless there is a clear necessity for departing from it.

"2. That words are never used to mean more than their primary signification, though they may be, and often are, used to signify something else."

In these rules I entirely concur, and I commend the second of them especially to the consideration of my brethren above named, for their guidance in the understanding of the word life. The author himself proceeds to apply it to the word death, of which he tells us "the primary meaning is the extinction of life," or as he elsewhere says in less equivocal language, the "extermination of being." I differ from this view, but may refer to what I have stated in "Who will Live for Ever?" Note B.

In p. 12, the author laments over the phrase "immortal soul," which, to his profound sorrow, is so commonly used in our pulpits. I sincerely hope my reverend brethren will hereafter express themselves in more "appropriate language." They really should not forget that "the Bible nowhere calls the soul immortal," and they should not "stare at" anybody (as Mr. Storrs affirms they do) "as though they thought him an infidel" for telling them so.

Then follows a criticism on Matt. xvi. 26.

"To say that when our Saviour said a man may 'lose his own soul,' he did not mean that he will come short of immortality, perish, or cease all sense and life, but only that he shall lose the happiness of his soul, is in my mind making sad havoc of the Word of God," p. 12.

Mr. Storrs's argument is that, as "that which is immortal cannot be lost," so the soul, if it really exists for ever, cannot be lost—that is, it must always be possible to find it; consequently, the soul in order to be lost must be exterminated. It must be admitted, at all events, that in that case it could not be found. But this is "making sad havoc of the Word of God." Does Mr. Storrs really think that Christ spoke of a man's *losing* his own soul, in the sense of his not being *able to find it*?

On Rom. ii. 7—"Those who seek for glory, honour, and immortality"—our author says truly that immortality "is brought to view as something to be sought after;" and he adds this piercing interrogation:—"Why, I pray, are men to seek for it if it is the inheritance of all?" p. 13. Certainly, men are not exhorted to seek for immortality *in the sense* in which it is "the inheritance of all;" but Mr. Storrs is aware that the same word may be used at different times in different senses.

The author further says on this passage that the apostle here represents immortality as "to be found alone in Christ." So far from this, the very words are that immortality is to be sought "by patient continuance in well doing;" a phrase much more expressive of obedience to the law than of submission to the Gospel, and determined by the connexion to this meaning.

The author next quotes Job iv. 17—"Shall *mortal man* be more just than God?"—as proving that "the whole man," "the soul as well as the body," is mortal, "because man's body is neither just nor unjust," p. 13. Doubtless *man* is mortal, that is, liable to death, or, in other words, to the cessation of his organic functions—no more. The author's conception of death as extermination of being, which gives all the apparent force to his observation, is unfounded and erroneous.

He next proceeds to Rom. viii. 10, on which he speaks thus:—

"Paul says, 'If Christ be in you the body is dead [*i. e.*, mortal, doomed to die] because of sin; but the spirit is life [why? because the souls of men are immortal? No: but] because of righteousness:' clearly implying that it is the righteousness, or having Christ in them, that makes their spirits immortal," pp. 13, 14.

I ask here by what authority the idea of immortality is introduced where the apostle is speaking simply of life? To this the author answers by means of the following phrase in the next verse—"shall *quicken your mortal bodies*"—thus:—

"That the meaning of the term *quicken* in this text is *to be made immortal* will appear if we consider that, if it signifies no more than the raising of the body from the dead, this will be done whether 'the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead' dwell in them or not; for 'there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and of the unjust,'" p. 14.

The observation here made is correct, and it affords, as the author suggests, a strong reason against understanding the apostle of the resurrection of the body; but it by no means justifies the extension of his language to the immortalizing of both body and soul.

The author alleges, indeed, that "the righteous rise to immortality, as saith Paul in 1 Cor. xv.; but the wicked rise to be condemned to the second death." But we cannot by any means regard Paul, in the 15th of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, as teaching that those of whom he speaks "rise *to immortality*," *i. e.*, to endless life. What he teaches is, that the *body* as raised will be immortal, that is, without seeds of a second corruption and decay; a doctrine as true, I conceive, of the wicked as of the righteous.

On what ground the author affirms that the wicked will be "condemned to the second death," he has not stated; but my view of this phrase, "the second death," and of the unwarrantable use made of it, may be found in this volume, p. 138.

In p. 16 we have the following:—

> "I shall attempt to show you that the death God has fixed as the wages of sin is not *immortality in misery*, but an actual extermination of being."

I draw attention to the misunderstanding which this passage exhibits of the views of the author's opponents. He makes us mean by death immortality (or interminable being) in misery; and on this supposition he founds some most touching and apparently convincing appeals. That the supposition is altogether unfounded I have elsewhere explained (p. 160); and I may here, therefore, content myself with saying that I understand by death, when used to denote the future condition of the wicked, not interminable existence, nor existence at all, but exclusively misery.

On the words die and death the author observes with great justice, that, "when these terms are applied to the soul in regard to the final result of a course of sin, we ought to have good evidence that they are not to be understood in their primary meaning before we depart from that interpretation," p. 19. This is the rule on which I have acted throughout, and I have only to request the reader to weigh the reasons which I have repeatedly assigned in this behalf.

After quoting several texts the author announces the following conclusion:—

"Death, then, as the apostle explains it, when applied to the punishment of the wicked at the judgment, is to perish," p. 19.

True; but *to perish* is as apt a word for metaphorical use as *to die.*

This passage follows:—

"'The soul that sinneth it shall die,' refers to its final doom. This will appear if we consider men will die, *i.e.*, leave this world, or state of being" [but Mr. Storrs holds death to be extinction of being] "whether they sin or not: nor can it refer to a violent leaving this world, as some suppose, for all persons do not die a violent death. I conclude, then, that it relates to the soul's final doom," pp. 19, 20.

Such waste of argument arises from taking words out of their connexion! Will the reader kindly refer to the commencement of the 18th chapter of Ezekiel, or to p. 215 of this volume?

The author next refers to another passage from the same prophet, ch. xviii. 23:—"As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked;" which he says "evidently looks to the same result, the final destiny of the wicked," p. 20. A reference to the connexion, however, clearly shows that this, like the former, relates to the temporal calamities affecting the Jews.

In p. 20 Mr. Storrs declares his conviction that he has "established the point that the wicked are not immortal," and he continues his discourses only under the general notion of answering objections. As these objections all relate to the author's opinion of the limited duration of future punishment, it is out of my province to notice the answers to them; but as I find here and there passages referring to the question of man's immortality, I shall direct the reader's attention to these.

In p. 26 the author puts the case thus:—

"Now what is the Scripture argument that the righteous and the wicked are not equally immortal? The Bible expressly declares that the righteous 'put on immortality,' that they have 'eternal life;' and it as expressly declares that the wicked Christ will 'burn up'—yea, that the Lord of hosts 'shall burn them up,' so that they shall be left 'neither root nor branch;' that they shall die, be destroyed for ever, perish, utterly perish, &c.

"If I wanted to make infidels, I would still maintain that the wicked will have an eternal conscious being, in the face of God's ex-

press declarations like those above. When a 'Thus saith the Lord' can be produced that as expressly asserts the immortality of the wicked as the language above does their extermination, then I may review the whole affair; but that cannot be done in my judgment."

I ought to observe that the doctrine of man's natural immortality is not (as here expressed) that man "*will have* an eternal conscious being," but that he is by creation *adapted* to it. The author's argument, however, derives all its apparent force from his assumption that the terms life and death, as descriptive of the future condition of saints and sinners, do and must mean existence and extermination; for if these may be taken to mean anything else it is completely set aside. Now that one of the terms, death, may be taken to mean something else I bring the author himself to prove, by quoting from p. 29 the following words:—

"The expression of our Lord, 'Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life,' shows that men are exposed to death. The only question with us in these discourses is to determine what that death is—whether it is eternal life in misery, or destruction of being. My position is that it is the latter."

Here the author clearly admits that the discussion cannot be terminated by merely citing the words of Scripture which denounce death on transgressors, since a question requiring settlement always remains, namely, "what that death is;" and thus he demonstrates the inconclusiveness of his own argument as stated above.

"The question with us in these discourses," says the author, "is to determine what death [as the punishment of sin] is: whether it is eternal life in misery, or destruction of being."

I accept this statement of the general question, but not that of its issues. Whether any person besides a certain nameless "doctor of divinity at New York," referred to by the author at p. 72, ever has maintained that death "means eternal life in misery," I know not; I have not met with any instances of it, and I suppose the allegation to be generally incorrect. By death, as the word is now before us, I mean misery; and consequently, the question must be expressed thus—Is death misery or extermination? This question the author has not in any manner taken up, or noticed; so that, of course, none of his arguments can be expected to bear upon it.

He takes for his own position that death means extermi-

nation. The only argument—on which, however, he strongly and repeatedly insists, as if to compensate for its being the only one—by which he endeavours to make this position good is that extermination is the literal and primary meaning of death. But this, I think, is an error. Death is a fact occurring so often before our eyes, and a word so often in our mouths, that it ought to be easy to ascertain what we mean by it. A tree dies; but what then has happened? Is anything exterminated? No. A certain mode of organic action has ceased; no more. A man dies; but what now has happened? Is anything exterminated? No. Again a certain mode of organic action has ceased; no more. The primary meaning of the word death, then, is the cessation of the functions of an organized substance; and when we speak of the death of a man, we mean to denote the fact, and nothing more, that the functions of the organized substance which entered into his constitution have ceased.

Assuming the correctness of this view of death as a fact, and of the meaning of the word death, I use it in the argument thus:—Mr. Storrs insists that death must be taken in the sense of extermination because this is the primary sense of the term; I reply that extermination is *not* the primary sense of the term, and that, consequently, no obligation whatever exists on this ground so to understand it.

We come, then, to this point, that extermination and misery are both of them analogical, or figurative meanings of the term death; and that it is to be ascertained which of these meanings is most suitable to the scriptural use of it in relation to the punishment of the wicked. Here, again, is a line of inquiry on which Mr. Storrs has not entered. If, indeed, I have correctly exhibited the primary meaning of death, the following rebuke, which the author intended for his opponents, falls with at least equal weight upon himself.

"The common method of making the terms life and death mystical, or figurative, *i. e.*, to mean something more and far different from what appears in the literal and obvious signification of the words, I conceive is unwarranted by the Scriptures, and tends only to throw confusion on the plainest subjects of the Bible, and also to take away the force and beauty of many otherwise clear and intelligible portions of God's Word," p. 71.

If this be so the author is clearly as deeply in fault as his opponents, since equally with them he adopts a figurative meaning of the term death.

Putting into competition, however, the two analogical meanings of death, extinction and misery, there is a statement of the author which may seem to demand a preference for the former; namely, that the future lot of the righteous is declared to be life—"not happiness, but life simply" (p. 72), and life eternal; that is, conscious being for ever.

Now the author here affixes the idea of conscious being to the word life as its literal or primary meaning, and so insists upon it. To this I reply that this is *not* the primary meaning of the term. Life (as I have fully explained elsewhere) is a word having primary reference to organized substances, and denoting strictly that condition of an organized substance in which its organic functions are maintained. When the word means conscious being it is only by analogy, or a figure of speech. If, therefore, life as the future lot of the righteous is to be taken in the sense of conscious being, it must be so taken only on account of the suitableness of such a sense. But such a sense is altogether unsuitable to the emphatic and comprehensive manner in which the word is used; and we are constrained to prefer the other analogical meaning proposed, namely, happiness. Is even Mr. Storrs prepared to say that in the following case, in which the word life is obviously used to denote the WHOLE of the gift of God through Christ, it can be satisfactorily taken in the sense of conscious being alone? "The gift of God is eternal LIFE through Jesus Christ our Lord," Rom. vi. 23. If he is, I must commend him to the discipline of my friend and coadjutor, Mr. Dobney. If he is not, then I ask him on what ground he can take death in the former part of the same verse—"The wages of sin is death"—in the sense of extinction?

The author's attempt to establish his position that death is extinction being unsuccessful, I ask him whether, upon the supposition that I will grant it him, he is willing to take the consequences of retaining it. Will he answer the following questions?

1. If death be extinction what is the condition of man after death? Does the soul continue in being or not? If it do, how can death be extinction? If it do not, how can he explain the scriptural references to an immediately future life?

2. If death be extinction, what are the origin and nature of man's future existence? Must not what is commonly

called a resurrection be in that case a new creation? And must not new-created beings be erroneously charged, if charged at all, with deeds of the present life, and made liable to judgment and retribution for them?

CHAPTER III.

ON THE ARGUMENT AS CONDUCTED BY THE REV. GEORGE STORRS, CONCLUDED.

THE only other branch of evidence presenting itself for notice is introduced by the author in the following manner:—

"I maintain that Christ and his apostles did teach the contrary of endless being in misery [*i. e.*, the extinction of the wicked], and that as clearly as language could make it. . . . I have read the New Testament carefully through, and noted down every text that speaks of the final destiny of the wicked, or that can be construed as referring to it. Let us look at these texts, and see if any language could well express more clearly and forcibly the utter extinction of the wicked," p. 46.

We have now to accompany our author through a long list of textual references, as follows:—

Matt. iii. 10. "Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down and cast into the fire."

"This language," says the author, "imports clearly an utter extinction of being, and nothing short." The passage, however, does not refer to "the final destiny of the wicked;" but must be regarded as having been fulfilled in a series of temporal calamities, inflicted on the Jewish nation in consequence of their rejection of the Messiah.

The same remark applies to Matt. iii. 12, as connected with Mal. iv. 1, and Matt. vii. 12.

Matt. v. 29, 30. "It is profitable for thee that one of thy members perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell." See also chap. xviii. 8, 9.

On this text the author says, "Let it be kept in mind that the term 'perish' signifies to cease to have existence." Not

so; the term perish, as here applied to an amputated limb, denotes only loss of power.

Matt. vii. 13. "Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction."

"Destruction," the author says, here "signifies to be consumed;" but he adduces no proof. I see no hindrance to understanding the word metaphorically, that is, of misery.

Matt. x. 28. "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell."

"I ask," says the author, "if this language does not clearly imply that God is able to kill the soul? And does it not as clearly affirm that he will kill, or utterly destroy, the wicked? I have no fear of the answer from the candid and unprejudiced."

I fear I must risk my character for candour with Mr. Storrs by my answer to these questions; but even at this risk I must say what I think. If it will be any satisfaction to him to receive the admission that God *can* "utterly destroy" the soul, I here freely offer it to him; not, however, as founded on this text, but as arising out of the general and self-evident truth that God can destroy whatever he has made. As to this text, it does not appear that the word kill is used in the sense of extinction in relation to either the body or the soul; but, whatever may be the meaning of the declaration that God "*can* kill the soul," the passage clearly does *not* affirm, as the author alleges it does, that God "*will* kill the wicked." The whole verse is a warning addressed by Christ to timid disciples under circumstances of persecution.

Matt. xiii. 40–42. "As therefore the tares are gathered and burned in the fire, so shall it be in the end of this world: the Son of man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity; and shall cast them into a furnace of fire, there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth."

"How is it possible," says the author, "for words more clearly to denote an utter destruction of being, accompanied with the most bitter anguish?"

To my mind these words exhibit a very different idea. Fire is, in my view, a much fitter emblem of suffering than of extinction, since fire *destroys* nothing; and that it is to be taken as an emblem of suffering in this place appears from the last phrase, which tells us that "*there*"—in the "furnace of fire"—"shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth."

Matt. xvi. 25, 26. "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it," &c. "For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"

"Here," says Mr. Storrs, "is a loss of life, of the soul itself. It could not be a loss of the soul if the soul continues in being," p. 48.

This is the fallacy we have met with before, of supposing our Lord to speak of losing the soul, or life, in the sense of not being able to *find* it. Loss is here to be understood in the sense of privation. To lose life is to be deprived of it, or no longer to possess it; and to lose the soul (if it be of the soul that ψυχὴ should be here understood) must of necessity be a figure of speech, most properly regarded as denoting, not the cessation of its being, but the privation of its well-being.

Acts iii. 23. "Every soul which will not hear that prophet shall be destroyed from among the people."

"This language," says the author, "cannot relate to destruction in this world, nor, as some suppose, to a violent destruction from this world, unless it can be shown that all who have refused to hear Christ have been thus destroyed. But this cannot be done, for the unbelieving Jews have existed on earth to this day. It must therefore relate to a destruction yet future."

What the author means to prove by asserting that "the unbelieving Jews have existed on earth *to this day*" I cannot tell; certainly, the unbelieving Jews of *that* day have disappeared long ago. The passage, however, is out of bearing, as being merely an accommodation to the Messiah of language directly applicable only to the Jewish prophetic system; see p. 214.

Acts viii. 20. "Thy money perish with thee."
2 Pet. ii. 1. "Bring upon themselves swift destruction."
Ver. 12. "These, as natural brute beasts made to be taken and destroyed, shall utterly perish."

1. I cannot omit remarking that the last-cited passage is, I know not for what cause, mangled in the quotation. In its place it reads thus:—"But these, as natural brute beasts made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil of the things which they understand not, and shall utterly perish in their own corruption," 2 Pet. ii. 12.

2. The place does not refer to "the final destiny of the wicked" generally, but to special punishments awaiting the troublers of the early Christians, who, acting a part worthy only of irrational animals in speaking evil of what they did

not understand, would by merited judgments be driven from the church, as wild beasts are "taken and destroyed" for the security and tranquillity of mankind.

"At the 17th verse," the author continues, "he [the apostle] says of certain wicked characters—'to whom the mist of darkness is reserved for ever.' This expression to my mind carries the idea of a total destruction. As light is sometimes put for life in the Scriptures —for example, 'The life was the light of men'—so darkness is put for death; and 'the mist of darkness for ever' I conceive implies an utter extinction of being."

Again I confess myself unconvinced. No evidence is produced that, in Scripture, "darkness is put for death," or indeed light for life, the passage cited being no example of such an usage. The phrase rendered "the mist of darkness" should rather be rendered "a prison of darkness," or "an excessively dark dungeon;" a mode not unusual of representing Tartarus, or hell.

2 Pet. iii. 7. "Perdition of ungodly men."
Ver. 9. "The Lord is not willing that any should perish."
Ver. 16. "Wrest the Scriptures to their own destruction."

"I ask my candid hearers," says the author, "if it were not for the trammels thrown around our minds by tradition, if we should ever give any other interpretation to these texts than the plain, obvious one, of destruction of being?"

I reply to this question with what candour I may, that considerations of great weight determine me to understand the terms on which he relies as various forms of expression for "the wrath of God," which is declared to be "revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men," Rom. i. 18.

James i. 15. "Sin when it is finished bringeth forth death."
Chap. v. 29. "Shall save a soul from death."

Here the author breaks forth with some warmth in the following terms:—

"How can a man in his senses," he exclaims, "maintain that a soul is deathless with such testimony before his eyes? And why should we submit to this mystifying the plain language of the Holy Spirit to keep alive an old theory, which cannot live in the light of a literal construction of Scripture language, and when no good reason can be given for departing from the literal meaning?"

To this energetic appeal I reply:—

1. That the author himself does not take the word death in its "literal meaning." Why then should we?

2. That when we say a soul is deathless we do not contradict the testimony that death ensues from sin, because the word is used in a different sense; in the former case it denotes an adaptation to endless existence, in the latter it denotes the wrath of God.

1 John ii. 17. "The world passeth away and the lust thereof; but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever."

"The inference," says the author, "is irresistible, that the wicked will not abide for ever."

There is at least one proof that this inference is not irresistible, namely, that I actually resist it. The apostle's meaning is that good men have permanent sources of enjoyment, and therefore need not look to a world which presents only evanescent pleasures. See ver. 14,—"Love not the world," &c. See also p. 223.

Rev. xx. 14, 15. "And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death. And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire."

Chap. xxi. 8. "But the fearful and unbelieving . . . shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone; which is the second death."

"That is," says the author, "they experience the pains of the second death, a death of soul and body, or of the whole man," p. 50.

How Mr. Storrs arrived at his conclusion that "the second death" is "a death of soul and body," he has not been kind enough to explain. The apostle says, that "the second death" is "the lake of fire;" and both of these are manifestly symbols of an awful divine judgment.

Jude, ver. 6.

From this passage, which relates to "the angels which kept not their first estate," the author makes out to his own satisfaction "the utter destruction of the devil;" but as this conveys no instruction respecting the doom of wicked *men*, it is totally irrelevant to his subject.

Ver. 13. "Jude," says our author, "speaking of certain wicked characters, says, 'Wandering stars, to whom is reserved the blackness of darkness for ever.' The figure here used," he continues, "denotes an utter, total, and eternal obscuration. No language scarcely could be conceived of that would more forcibly denote the utter destruction of the wicked—the destruction of their being itself, so that they appear no more for ever."

This is not merely overstraining a metaphor, but altogether mistaking it. The phrase "to whom is reserved the black-

ness of darkness for ever," does not refer to any "obscuration" awaiting "wandering stars," but constitutes a metaphor entirely distinct. It is, in fact, the same as we had before, from 2 Pet. ii. 17, and it has been already explained under that passage.

On the book of Acts generally the author speaks as follows:—

"We have not a particle of evidence in the Acts of the Apostles of the truth of the common theory of the eternal conscious being of the wicked, the very place where we should expect to find it if anywhere in the Bible, because the apostles addressed the most wicked men; but we hear Paul saying to the most wicked Jews, 'Seeing ye judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life,'—not everlasting happiness, or happy life. And the same wicked characters he cautions to beware lest they 'perish.' Why did he not thunder in their ears eternal conscious being in torments, if he believed it? Surely the subjects he addressed were as fit for such a state as any men well could be, for they 'contradicted and blasphemed.' But so far as punishment was concerned, the apostle seems to have had no stronger language than 'perish,'" pp. 51, 52.

There is no doubt of the fact that Paul used the terms life and perish; but the question really raised by the author in this extract is in what sense Paul used these words, and in what sense his hearers would understand them. There was, no doubt, a meaning in which they were then currently used and understood; and there is strong historical evidence that it was in that age the habit of all parties to use life not for existence, but for happiness; and perdition not for annihilation, but for suffering.

Rom. i. 32. "They which commit such things are worthy of death."

Chap. ii. 12. "As many as have sinned without law shall perish without law."

Chap. vi. 21–23. "For the end of these things is death. . . . For the wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord."

"Here," says the author, "the apostle . . . denounces death upon them. How strange he had not told them they had deathless spirits! What force there must have been in his words in that case!!"

"Denounces death." True, but in what sense? Of extermination, or suffering? This is the question.

Chap. vii. 24. "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

This passage has no relation to "the doom of the wicked."

Chap. viii. 6. "To be carnally minded is death."
Chap. viii. 13. "If ye live after the flesh ye shall die."
Chap. ix. 22. "Vessels of wrath fitted to destruction."
Chap. xiv. 15 and 20. "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died. . . . For meat destroy not the work of God."

This does not relate to "the doom of the wicked."

1 Cor. i. 18. "The preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness."
Chap. ii. 17. "If any man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy."
Chap. viii. 11. "Shall the weak brother perish?"
Chap. xv. 18. "They that are fallen asleep in Christ are perished."

This does not relate to "the doom of the wicked."

2 Cor. ii. 15, 16. "A sweet savour of Christ, in them that are saved and in them that perish. To the one we are the savour of death unto death; and to the other the savour of life unto life."

All the preceding passages but the last Mr. Storrs quotes without remark, as relying merely on the impression which the *words* may make, without any investigation of their meaning; but he follows the last of them with a fervent exclamation in the following terms:—

"Can anything be plainer? . . . Who would ever dream that the apostle meant by such language eternal conscious being to the wicked, if he had not been *creedized* into it?"

"Creedized?" Perhaps so; but who is to be judge in this matter? Is Mr. Storrs warranted to mount into the judgment-seat, and thus flippantly to arraign the motives of his brethren?

Gal. vi. 8. "He that soweth to the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption."

"Corruption, not immortality," says the author; as if any one had ever imagined that immortality would be the result of sowing to the flesh!

Phil. i. 28. "An evident token of perdition."
Chap. iii. 18. "Whose end is destruction."
1 Thess. v. 3. "Sudden destruction cometh upon them—and they shall not escape."
2 Thess. i. 8, 9. "Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord."
Chap. ii. 10. "In them that perish."
Heb. vi. 8. "That which beareth thorns and briers is nigh unto cursing, whose end is to be burned."

"Is there anything left of thorns and briers after they are burned?" asks Mr. Storrs. Had he looked at his Greek Testament, he would have seen that the ground, not the thorns and briers, is to be burned, and that there are many reasons for supposing that a salutary rather than a destructive process may be intended. The passage exhibits, not the doom of the wicked, which is his subject, but a warning to professors against apostasy.

Heb. x. 26. "Fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries."
Chap. x. 31. "We are not of them that draw back unto perdition."

"Thus closes up the apostle's testimony," says the author, after enumerating these texts. He adds, "It is astonishing to me that I ever believed the common notion of the eternal conscious being of the wicked. In the language I have quoted is there not a sufficient refutation of that notion?" p. 53.

A most abundant refutation, if the apostle used the word death, or perdition, in the sense of extinction; but if not, no refutation at all. This Mr. Storrs has neither proved, nor attempted to prove, by any other means than the erroneous assertion that the continuance and the cessation of conscious being are respectively the meaning of the terms life and death.

In conclusion the author says—

"I believe I have now gone through with an examination of every text in the New Testament that directly relates to the subject, except a few which are parallel to those which I have examined in Matthew."

This is not quite correct. The author led us to expect "*every text* that speaks of the final destiny of the wicked, or that can be construed as referring to it," p. 46; but he has clearly omitted several texts of this class. For example:—

Matt. iii. 7. "The wrath to come." This phrase is repeated in 1 Thess. i. 10.
Chap. vii. 23. "Depart from me, all ye that work iniquity."
Chap. viii. 12. "Shall be cast out into outer darkness." See also Matt. xxii. 13, and xxv. 30.
Chap. xxi. 44. "Whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken, but on whomsoever it shall fall it will grind him to powder."
Mark viii. 38. "Of him shall the Son of man be ashamed." See also Luke xii. 8, 9.
Luke xii. 47, 48. "Shall be beaten with many stripes . . . with few stripes."
John iii. 36. "The wrath of God abideth on him."
Rom. i. 18. "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all unrighteousness and ungodliness of men."

Chap. ii. 6, 8, 9. "To them that are unrighteous and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath: tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil."

The omission of this passage is eminently remarkable, because the author has selected phrases from the immediate connexion of it.

I will not for a moment harbour, still less insinuate, the thought, that the author has omitted these or other passages with a dishonest intention. I notice merely the fact that, while promising to note *all* the texts in the New Testament which relate to the final destiny of the wicked, he has really enumerated none but those which represent it in one aspect, namely, by death or its equivalents. He has thus at all events failed to do justice to the argument, whatever in the state of his own mind may have been the cause of it.

I may add that the views of the destiny of the wicked given in the unquoted texts decidedly affect the interpretation of the terms on which he lays so exclusive a stress. If there is any word which may fairly claim to be understood literally in this connexion, it is the term WRATH, as used by the Lord's forerunner, John iii. 36, and by the apostle, Rom. i. 18,—"The WRATH OF GOD is revealed from heaven." Highly expressive terms also are "indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish" (Rom. ii. 7–9), evidently including the entire punishment of sin, yet savouring nothing of extermination. In addition to this, the quotations I have adduced exhibit no less than five metaphors strictly expressive of suffering and not of extinction.

I conclude my examination of the Six Sermons by observing that, if the author had succeeded in showing that extermination is the destiny of the wicked, he would have proved nothing against the doctrine of man's natural immortality as defined and defended in this volume, but rather would have added confirmation to it. Enough for me to affirm, what Mr. Storrs tacitly allows, that man will live for ever *unless* God should annihilate him in punishment of sin. If this be true, however, endless existence cannot be, as the whole class of writers I am opposing contend it is, the gift of God through Christ.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE ARGUMENT AS CONDUCTED BY THE AUTHOR OF FIVE LECTURES AT BRISTOL.

THE work on which I am now about to make a few observations consists of Five Lectures delivered at the chapel in Alden's Court, Broadmead, Bristol, in the months of January and February, 1843, and published in the following year. It is entitled "Thoughts on the Popular Opinion of Eternal Punishment being synonymous with Eternal Torment, and whether this latter doctrine be or be not consistent with the Scriptures of God." My attention was directed to it by Mr. White's commendatory notice of it in "Life in Christ," p. 287. With the question as stated in the title I have, according to the plan I have laid down for myself, nothing to do; and I shall accordingly confine my remarks to what the author offers on the topic of man's immortality. Much, indeed, of what he says on this subject has already come under review in the preceding pages; so that I hope I shall be regarded as doing all that the case demands, if I notice at large principally what is new.

The author falls into the usual mistake in his definition of IMMORTALITY, of which he speaks as synonymous with positive eternal existence, or eternal life (see p. 38); so that he also, like the writers already noticed, misses the mark.

Of DEATH his definition is as follows:—

"To perish and be destroyed probably mean utter destruction, or absolute annihilation of all the powers and uses of the thing so destroyed." And thus:—"Again I say, in all common sense, and in every language, death is the extinction of all life, sensation, consciousness, and power, whether applied literally or figuratively," p. 41.

The author, then, does not believe in conscious human existence after death, nor, strictly speaking, in the resurrection of the dead. What he perhaps would call resurrection must be a new creation.

The principal point made by the author is in his definition of LIFE; and in order to introduce the reader to this I proceed at once to the fourth Lecture, which is on "the Final Reward."

This Lecture is founded on two passages of Holy Writ, selected, as it would seem, to present the two great alternatives *life* and *death*. For the former we have Rom. ii. 5–12, 16:—"God, who will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory, honour, and immortality, *eternal life;* but to them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath." And for the latter, since the apostle's language is inconveniently "vague" for the author's purpose (as he himself acknowledges, p. 40), we have Jer. xxi. 8:—"And unto this people thou shalt say, Behold, I set before you the way of *life*, and the way of *death*." Not to detain the reader by any question as to the applicability of these passages, I enter immediately on the author's treatment of the first alternative, "eternal life."

On the phrase "eternal life," the author writes as follows:—

"Does it ever occur to us," says he, "to ask *what* is eternal life? Not *where* is it, but *what* does the phrase intend? We are used to understand it as though the words were eternal bliss, or eternal joy. Perhaps a commentator tells us that the Hebrews were accustomed to use the word life for blessedness, and by an abundance of parallel passages will confirm it. So far so good. But the question still recurs, how did it come about that such a sense is put upon the word? For life and blessedness are not in themselves identical phrases, or synonymous expressions," p. 36.

Nothing can be more fair, or more fairly put, than this question. And I answer, that I understand the word life in this connexion of blessedness rather than of conscious being, not arbitrarily, but because in my judgment the connexion requires it. To me it is not satisfactory, not consistent with the general tenor of Scripture, to say that endless conscious existence is the great hope of the Gospel; such endless conscious existence (as the author expressly admits) being in itself neither happy nor miserable, and, by possibility, profoundly calamitous. Perhaps, however, a different view may afford satisfaction to the author. Let us hear him again:—

"Life, in the Bible, especially when taken in connexion with futurity, means exclusively the existence of a sentient being, and eternal life its eternal existence. In promising this, therefore, as the peculiar reward of the righteous, it destroys the notion of the soul's immortality by the root. For it clearly, and in my judgment unanswerably, follows—1st, That no others have eternal life [endless

conscious existence] at all; and secondly, that the righteous have it only as the peculiar gift of Jesus, not inherently or by nature, but by grace," p. 37.

Undoubtedly, the author's conclusions "unanswerably follow" if his premises be allowed; but this will require, to say the least, a little consideration. Let the reader look at it again:—"Life, in the Bible, especially when taken in connexion with futurity, means *exclusively the existence of a sentient being*, and eternal life its *eternal existence*,"—this, and "exclusively" this, always, and invariably.

Now I beg to ask in the first place, what Mr. White and Mr. Dobney will say to this? The one of these writers emphatically denies contending for "existence merely" under the name of eternal life, and insists on the meaning of "happy existence;" and the other, it will be recollected, takes similar ground. The definition of this term life lies at the basis of the whole argument; and either the author before us is wrong throughout, or the writers I have named are so.

I would next ask the author whether in making this assertion he is consistent with himself.

1. It is inconsistent with his admission respecting the customary use of life for blessedness among the Hebrews; of which he says "So far so good."

2. It is inconsistent with a passage in the first Lecture, in which, after asserting "that Christ and his apostles propose to believers the special privilege of eternal existence, thereby most plainly denying that the wicked shall have any eternal existence," he adds—"not but, under special restrictions, life and death, as well as other terms, *may be figuratively used.*" And he immediately adduces three New Testament examples, p. 9.

I may safely conclude, then, that the author is wrong in his declaration that "life, in the Bible, means *exclusively* the existence of a sentient being." It is sometimes "used figuratively," and by possibility *may* be so in relation to the future condition of the righteous. Indeed, this may be asserted as a fact, since one of the instances cited by the author is Col. iii. 3:—"Ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God." It is true that the author puts figurative uses "under special restrictions," but this is quite right, and I shall be as jealous of them as he.

Thus happily escaping from the bonds of the "exclusive" system, we have the question again before us, whether, when used to denote the future condition of the righteous, life can be satisfactorily understood of conscious existence merely?

On this point the author himself seems to have no difficulty. "Christ and his apostles," says he, "propose to believers the special privilege of eternal existence," p. 9; but I agree with Mr. White and Mr. Dobney in thinking that this is too contracted a view of the word as the Scriptures use it in this connexion. Let the following passages be considered :—

John iii. 16. "God so loved the world as to give his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have *everlasting life*."

Rom. vi. 23. "The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is *eternal life* through Jesus Christ our Lord."

1 Tim vi. 12. "Lay hold on *eternal life*."

Tit. i. 2. "In hope of *eternal life*, which God that cannot lie promised before the world began."

It seems undeniable that the term life is here employed to denote the *whole* "gift of God through Christ," and that, consequently, it cannot be restricted to conscious existence merely. If the contrary were maintained, it must be on the supposition that life is only one of many benefits resulting from the death of Christ. In this case, however, it cannot but be deemed singular that it should so often and so prominently be mentioned alone; especially since it would have been so easy to have joined a second term to it, and to have spoken of *life and happiness*. The power of life to stand as a single term for the whole of the benefits of salvation, depends altogether upon its being used as a figure.

The author thinks that his position "is confirmed, not only by numerous single texts, but by the whole phraseology of each Testament," p. 37.

1. He refers to the passages which declare "corruption, destruction, perishing, or consuming and vanishing away, to be the portion of the wicked;" a class of passages which have been sufficiently noticed in a preceding page, 215 *seq.*

2. He refers to 1 Tim. vi. 16 :—"Who only hath immortality," adding the following comment :—"It does not say none but God has *happy* immortality, but that none has immortality at all; *i. e.*, as I understand it, and as common sense bears out the inference, inherently, or essentially." Clearly; but,—

First, No one has supposed that immortality should be taken in the sense of happiness *when applied to God.*

Secondly, Man, although not immortal after the manner of God, that is, "inherently, or essentially," may yet be immortal in a sense proper to his created nature.

3. "Immortal souls, immortal creatures, a never-dying soul," says the author, "are terms nowhere applied to human beings in God's book," p. 37. But of what importance is this, if the ideas be there? There are many phrases—"common sense," for example—in these Lectures which are not "in God's book."

4. He proceeds—"Christ is emphatically called 'the eternal life, who was with the Father,' 1 John i. 2; and again, 'In him was life, and the life was the light of men,' John i. 4; and once more, Paul calls Christ 'our life,' Col. iii. 4. And yet we would fain persuade ourselves that we, corrupt, sinful, dying, mortal creatures, have in ourselves an inherent principle of life, even immortality! Fain would we be a little god (*deuster quidam*, as Cicero expresses it), and usurp to ourselves that which is the peculiar prerogative of the Divine nature!" p. 38.

That such reasoning can prove nothing against the doctrine of man's natural immortality defined as an adaptation to endless being, must be obvious to all.

5. "The word life," continues our author, "occurs more than one hundred times in the New Testament; and wherever it refers to the world to come, it is uniformly spoken of as something divine, either as possessed by Jehovah alone, or as communicated by him through Jesus to his saints," p. 38.

Allowing this to be as stated, what does it prove? The usage in relation to man is perfectly consistent with the supposition, that the natural endless existence of the whole race was a fact admitted and assumed; the word life was, consequently, free to be adopted as a metaphor for the *happiness* of the righteous.

6. "The same observation," he finally says, "applies to the idea of immortality, or incorruptibility. It is something superadded to the nature by the special gift of Jesus." In proof of this is adduced—

1 Cor. xv. 53, "This mortal must put on immortality;" to which the author adds—"as the effect of Christ's resur-

rection." The effect of Christ's resurrection, however, according to the Scriptures, will be to secure the resurrection of "*the dead*, both of the just and of the unjust," to *all* of whom there is reason to believe the declaration will apply, "THE DEAD shall be raised incorruptible," 1 Cor. xv. 52.

What the author means by immortality, or incorruptibility, being "something superadded to the nature," I am quite at a loss to understand.

When the author, having disposed of eternal life, comes to treat of the other part of the Final Reward, and wants the idea of DEATH, he admits that the apostle's phraseology in Rom. ii. 6, "indignation and wrath," is "*very vague;*" but he instructs us that it is determined to mean death by Jer. xxi. 8. Now a reference to the context of this verse shows immediately that it was addressed to the Jews when Jerusalem was besieged by Nebuchadnezzar, and that it had no other object than to recommend the inhabitants to go out to the Chaldean army. Can scriptural knowledge be advanced by such interpretation as this?

I do not find anything further in this work requiring notice.

CHAPTER V.

A CHAPTER OF CONTRADICTIONS.

I DO not enter on the subject I have indicated in the title of this chapter because I think it of any considerable argumentative value, since it can amount to no more than an *argumentum ad hominem;* and I do not know that I should have made it so prominent here, had it not been for the aptitude which one of the writers in this controversy, Mr. White,* has exhibited to its employment as a weapon of war. My principal design now is to show that the weapon, whatever may be its power, is in the hands of both parties,

* See "What was the Fall?" and the early part of White's "Who will Live for Ever?"

and is consequently capable of doing mischief, if that be worth while, to either.

The five authors whose works have now been successively under review, have written with a common *animus*, and sought to arrive at a common conclusion. They all advocate a limited duration of future penal suffering, and oppose the natural immortality of mankind, affirming immortality to be the gift of Christ to his followers. It might seem likely, therefore, that there would be, not only a considerable similarity, but a near approach to unity, in the ground they would occupy and the course they would pursue. Let me now put this not unreasonable supposition to the test, by setting before the reader a few extracts exhibiting the views of the respective writers on some principal topics.

No term in this discussion is more important than LIFE, and it is evident that very much must depend on the meaning attached to it. Now in reference to this term the authors are divided, three against two, by conflicting interpretations. Mr. Dobney and Mr. White are for understanding by it *happy existence;* the authors of Christ our Life, and of the Lectures at Bristol, with the Rev. G. Storrs, *existence only.*

Thus Mr. Dobney, in replying to the *Eclectic* reviewer:—

"And as to life being generic and inclusive. Suppose it to be conceded, what philological or even dogmatical objection would then lie against understanding it thus? Life is a term generic and inclusive; and means,—(1.) Existence literally; conscious being, without which, of course, no other good can be possible; and,—(2.) Happiness; because generally life is esteemed of the highest value. So that the most valuable endowment of man, without which he could have no other, is well chosen as the term by which to set forth the whole sense of happiness; and thus the word life may mean continued [conscious?] *existence made happy,*" p. 186.

And thus also Mr. White, in a tone of greater confidence:—

"Life frequently stands for the conception of *happy existence.*"
"Life never signifies happiness apart from the notion of existence, and never loses its chief and prominent meaning of existence," p. 250.

In direct opposition to these writers are three of their fellow-labourers. Hear the author of the Lectures at Bristol:—

"Life, in the Bible, especially when taken in connexion with futurity, means *exclusively the existence of a sentient being,* and eternal life its eternal existence," p. 37.

To the same purport Mr. Storrs maintains that life, as the future lot of the righteous, denotes "*not happiness, but life simply*," p. 72.

"The phrase eternal life," says he, "occurs nowhere in the Bible except in the New Testament, and is always spoken of the righteous; and it never has connected with it any qualifying term, such as happy, blessed, or miserable, but *simply denotes life*, in opposition to the death of the wicked," p. 10.

And the author of Christ our Life, after quoting John iii. 16, indignantly exclaims,—

"What would the writer of a dictionary of Scripture terms say is the meaning of 'everlasting life' in this passage, according to the rules of sound and honest interpretation? That, being contrasted with 'perish,' it must be understood literally," p. 22.

This imputation of want of honesty does not come amiss from such a quarter on Messrs. Dobney and White, who have themselves been somewhat too free with similar imputations.

Next to life, the word DEATH has a prominent place in this controversy, and would seem to need, in order to become the subject of a common argument, a common definition. But here again the authorities differ.

The author of Christ our Life, although he does not present his readers with any formal notion of death, evidently means by it annihilation. Thus in arguing on the threatening, "Thou shalt surely die," he says,—

"We are bound to take the words as Adam himself would have taken them. He had been just constituted 'a living soul,' and to him the sentence would have been understood as though God had said to him, Live to me or *cease to live*. . . . It may indeed be objected that Adam did not die, did not *cease to exist* on the day he transgressed," p. 11.

And in afterwards arguing on the death of Christ, he insists on its having been "literal death, *a ceasing for ever to live*," p. 17.

After the same tenor Mr. Storrs favours us with the following express definition:—

"The primary meaning of the term death is the *extinction of life*," p. 11.

And subsequently, when about to reason on the nature of death as the penalty of sin, he says,—

"The only question with us in these discourses is to determine

what that death is; whether it is eternal life in misery, or *destruction of being.* My position is that it is the latter," p. 29.

The author of the Five Lectures holds the same opinion. Having affirmed that to die is to perish and be destroyed, he goes on to say,—

"To perish and be destroyed properly mean *utter destruction*, or *absolute annihilation* of all the powers and uses of the thing so destroyed, and ought so to be understood until scriptural cause can be shown why they should not," p. 41.

Mr. Dobney proclaims a similar conviction in terms of still greater strength:—

"The very words," says he, referring to the declaration 'Thou shalt surely die,' "would seem to shut us up to the idea that *utter destruction, cessation of existence, return to* that *nothingness* out of which divine power had called him, was the death threatened to our first father in case of transgression," p. 120.

How very far Mr. White is from feeling himself "shut up" to any such idea, is evident from the unsuspecting simplicity with which he propounds his own definition of death in his note to page 166. After having defined life, he thus proceeds:—

"Death, on the other hand, stands for—
"1. The loss or destruction of vegetable or animal life.
"2. The state of condemnation to such literal death.
"3. Danger of death," &c.

The idea of annihilation obviously never came within his contemplation. Neither indeed did he then recollect his own grand definition of death previously given, and laid with so much care at the basis of his argument. This is as follows:—

"The union of body and soul constitutes a living man, and when this harmonious conjunction is dissolved the *man* is no more; he is dead; the dissolution of the compound nature being the destruction of the humanity, without any reference to the destiny of the component portions of it. *This is the true scriptural idea of death, the dissolution or separation of the parts of our nature,*" p. 25.

In proceeding to refer to the topic of scriptural interpretation, I must be prepared to allow that five thinking men could hardly be expected to take perfectly similar views of so large a number of texts as are introduced into this discussion. I will therefore select only one passage; but that is a leading one, on which agreement might be reasonably expected. It is 2 Tim. i. 10:—Christ, "who hath abolished death, and

brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel." On this passage I present to the reader first the sentiments of the author of Christ our Life.

"It is to be observed," says he, "that 'life and immortality are brought to light,' *not, as often asserted, in contradistinction to the comparative obscurity of Old Testament revelations:* 'Who hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light;' namely, by his resurrection as 'the first-begotten from the dead,' and 'firstfruits of them that slept,'" p. 4.

Let us now hear Mr. White, who takes a substantially similar view.

"It is affirmed," says this writer, "that the apostle here teaches us that Christ brought to light the fact that all men are by nature immortal. But is it not the more natural interpretation that the Saviour *brought* life and immortality, that is, immortal life, to a world which had lost it?" p. 18.

This "more natural interpretation" Mr. Dobney quietly repudiates in the following terms:—

"I by no means adduce this text to prove that Christ is the bestower of immortality, but am *quite satisfied with the ordinary interpretation*," p. 162.

I shall notice but one more point in which these zealous co-operators in a common argument do not agree: I refer to the rules of rhetoric.

Thus, for example, speaks Mr. White:—

"Life frequently stands for the conception of *happy existence*," p. 250.

This position is defended by Mr. Dobney with much valour against the *Eclectic* reviewer, in the following terms:—

"Against this it is laid down, as though it were an indisputable axiom, that the word must have one of two significations, and cannot have both: it must be interpreted either literally, and so mean existence only; or figuratively, in which case the literal sense is altogether excluded. *I reply by denying the soundness of the principle, which almost seems made for the occasion*," p. 187.

Let the Rev. George Storrs instruct Mr. Dobney whether, in this somewhat furious onslaught, he has not shown more valour than discretion.

"It is a truth," says Mr. Storrs, "from which we are not to depart without the clearest evidence, that words are *never used to mean more than their primary signification*, though they may be and often are used to signify *something* else," p. 11.

I shall say nothing to aggravate the impression which cannot fail to be produced on the reader's mind by the perusal of these extracts. I do not even wish it to be very strong, since I do not wish to draw from the serious amount of contradiction I have exhibited among these writers any inference to the disadvantage of their common argument. I only wish to make manifest the fact that it is not on one side only that contradictions are to be found, and that, if use can be made of them at all, it may be done by both parties. I covet the happiness of laying down the principle, that no want of agreement among the advocates of truth ought to be allowed to inflict a disadvantage on the cause of truth itself. That may yet be true which no man has succeeded in proving, and it may be true notwithstanding that, of all who have attempted to prove it, no two have ever agreed.

CONCLUSION.

In concluding this extended examination I offer a few observations.

It must be admitted to be a great infelicity in the argument of these writers against human immortality that they have none of them argued against it in the sense in which it is held—in the only sense in which it ever has been generally held.

Mr. Dobney puts the question in these terms: "Is immortality the absolute and inalienable portion of man?" p. 147. Mr. White contradicts the notion that man "*must* live for ever," p. 190. Mr. Storrs sets before himself the question in the following form:—"Is it the will of God that wicked men . . . *shall be* immortal?" p. 5. The author of the Five Lectures speaks of immortality as synonymous with "positive eternal existence," p. 38. A seeming exception to this remark, indeed, occurs in the case of the clergyman of the Church of England, when he undertakes to prove that "man is not by creation, or natural constitution, immortal;" but, as he indicates no mode of the termination of human existence but being "finally destroyed" by an act of God's penal justice, it is clear that he also is arguing against the notion of man's *certain* endless existence, p. 112. And against this doctrine of the certain endless existence of man these writers all argue, on the ground that death, in the sense of extinction of being, is the divinely-allotted punishment of sin.

This, however, is not the doctrine which I advocate, or which has ever been generally maintained, as is fully shown at p. 51 *seq.* of this volume. What is affirmed is that God created man with a nature adapted to endless existence—in other words, the natural immortality of man.

Now it is evident that, as against this doctrine, the argument of these writers has no force whatever. Even if I admit in the most unqualified manner the conclusion that extinction of being is the punishment of sin, this conclusion supplies no proof that man was not created with a nature adapted to endless existence. If none go out of existence but those who are put out of it by a punitive act of their Maker, this rather confirms than impugns the idea that, apart from such punitive act, or according to their nature, even the wicked would exist for ever.

What should be demonstrated if the doctrine of man's natural immortality is to be put aside, is not that there will be a *penal*, but that there will be a *natural* termination of human existence. It is only on this latter supposition, indeed, that immortality can be regarded as the gift of Christ to his people, since on the former they would live for ever by their nature. On the supposition, however, of there being a natural termination of human existence, all that is said respecting a penal termination of it is obviously out of bearing, since God can hardly be supposed judicially to kill those who, if left alone, would, perhaps as speedily, die of themselves. Such an act could at the utmost affect only the time and the mode of their extinction.

That human existence has a natural period of termination has not only not been proved by any of the writers I have been reviewing, it has not been asserted, or indicated in the slightest manner as their belief.

And if the idea were to be gravely brought forward, something would be necessary to support it which no Christian writer yet has had the courage to attempt. When and how the body dies we know; but can any information be afforded us—can even any plausible conjecture be put forward—as to the time and manner of the soul's extinction? If it is to exist hereafter, and yet is not by its nature to exist for ever, at what period, and by what process, is it to perish? If a natural termination of human existence is on Christian grounds to be maintained, it seems to me reasonable that such questions should be asked, and necessary that they should be answered. I do not know, however, either that the Scripture has been supposed to throw any light upon them, or that any conjecture even has been hazarded concerning them by any writer. In the total absence of scriptural

information or plausible suggestion, it seems impossible to affirm the doctrine of the natural mortality of the soul. This, in my judgment, is a negative proof of the soul's natural immortality, a doctrine which, in default of any other, seems to stand of itself. At all events, the field is entirely open to the scriptural and other arguments by which, in the first portion of this volume, the doctrine of man's natural immortality has been maintained.

It may seem surprising that so many writers, and these writing independently one of another, while all of them professing to assail "the popular idea," should all of them have so entirely misapprehended it; it is not difficult to discern, however, the stone over which they have stumbled. They have come upon the question of man's immortality, not in the way of direct inquiry, but as a question collateral to another investigation. They have been engaged on the subject of future punishment, and in particular on the question of its endless duration; and, having taken up the idea that death, in the sense of extinction of being, is the punishment of sin, they conclude, with manifest justice on their premises, that the wicked will not be actually immortal. The question whether man was naturally immortal, and so would have lived for ever if his existence had not been penally cut off, has not come before them, and they have accordingly said nothing that bears upon it. Let me be allowed to recommend writers—these, or any other—who may hereafter handle the subject of man's immortality, to take it up in the sense in which it is held, and, before entangling themselves with cognate topics, either to affirm or to deny the original adaptation of man's nature to permanent existence.

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ON

THE DIVINE INSPIRATION

OF

THE SCRIPTURES.

A Lecture delivered at the Chapel of Stepney College

ON THE OPENING OF THE SESSION,

SEPTEMBER 18TH, 1850.

WITH NOTES.

A LECTURE.

Beloved Brethren,

Called upon unexpectedly, and at a very short notice, to accept the responsibility of this annual service, I avail myself of a discourse recently delivered to my own congregation.* The subject is the Divine Inspiration of the Scriptures; and I shall endeavour to give the treatment of it here the character, not of a sermon, but of an academic prelection. Neither the subject nor the mode will, I trust, be deemed unsuitable to the present occasion. They are certainly not unsuitable to the times.

I am quite aware of the slender justice which can be done to so large a theme within a space so narrow as that of a single lecture; but I am not without hope that, by directing my attention mainly to those points which are now most prominently before the public eye, I may say a few words not wholly without utility.

The importance of the doctrine of the Divine Inspiration of the Scriptures cannot be overrated. In religion it is all-important. It is fundamental. It is the ground of that lofty claim to our regard which the Scriptures prefer, and of that reverent submission and happy confidence with which we accustom ourselves to peruse them. It is the vital element of their authority and power. It gives strength to our conviction of the truths they teach, animation to the affections they inspire, and glory to the prospects they unfold. Take this away, and you rob the Bible of its life, of its very being, as distinct from the mass of human literature. It can no longer speak terror to the guilty conscience, or peace to the smitten one; it can no longer

* Note A.

inspire faith triumphant in conflict, or joy unspeakable in the anticipation of heaven. It is thenceforth no more to us than Plato's Dialogues, Pascal's Thoughts, or Milton's Paradise Lost; and nothing is left for us, in relation to things eternal, but to wander every man in the blindness and folly of his own imagination. Yet such is the unspeakably calamitous condition to which some persons would reduce us! Assuredly, it would be a less mischief to extinguish the sun, and to rob mankind of the light of day.

There are two ways in which the doctrine of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures, which has shared largely in the hostility directed in all ages against evangelical truth, has been assailed. The one of these is direct, and consists in denying the fact asserted: the other is indirect, and consists in lowering the signification of the terms in which it is declared.

It is not my present intention to notice the former of these modes of attack. I now speak as accepting the fact of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures on the testimony of the Scriptures themselves; and I confine myself on this point to a cursory glance at one of the testimonies which they actually supply.

I.

"All Scripture is given by inspiration of God." Such is the declaration of the apostle Paul in his second Epistle to Timothy, iii. 16.

The meaning of the word "Scripture" in this passage is clearly determined by a reference to the preceding verse, in which the apostle congratulates Timothy in these terms:—"That from a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus."* No doubt these "Holy Scriptures" were the writings of the Old Testament. And that the writings of the New Testament may, and must, be associated with them, is to be inferred from the mode in which they are spoken of in the New Testament itself. Thus, Peter, speaking of the epistles of Paul, says, "Even as our beloved brother Paul also according to the wisdom

* Verse 15.

given unto him hath written unto you; as also in all his epistles, speaking in them of these things: in which are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other Scriptures, unto their own destruction."* The circumstance to be here observed is, that Peter speaks of Paul's epistles by the term "Scriptures," and that he strictly identifies them with "the other Scriptures," thus placing them on a level with the writings of the Old Testament. It appears from hence to have been plainly understood in the primitive church, that the writings of the Old Testament did not constitute the whole body of Holy Scripture; but that, on the contrary, others were to be added to them, and such as were in course of production in the days of the apostles. From the language employed by Peter, it can hardly be doubted that the inspired writers of that period knew the position they occupied, and were well informed of the fact that they were giving existence to "the other Scriptures," which, with those of the Old Testament, should complete the canon.

Entirely congruous with the language of Peter is the phraseology of Paul. "All Scripture," says he, "is given by inspiration of God." Some critics, indeed, have suggested a reading of this text which would not allow the word "all" to apply to the whole body of Scripture, but to a part only. It now reads thus:—"All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." The proposed reading would be, "All Scripture given by inspiration of God is profitable for reproof," &c.: as though it had been Paul's intention to say, by implication, that some portions of the Bible were inspired, and that others were not. It is enough to say, however, that, while this criticism has been regarded by some of the most eminent divines who have sanctioned it as not leading to a different sense from the common reading,† it has been condemned by the soundest scholars. "It has been shown," says Bloomfield, "that the passage admits of no tolerable exposition, except upon the common interpretation; and in this," he adds, "as the construction requires it, as the context admits it, and the sense it yields is more determinate, I must finally acquiesce."‡ When the apostle

* 2 Pet. iii. 15, 16. † Note B. ‡ Bloomfield's Critical Digest, *in loco.*

therefore says, that "all Scripture is given by inspiration of God," we take him to mean the whole body of Scripture, the entire writings of the Old and New Testaments.*

But what, then, is the meaning of divine inspiration? On this question a large and important portion of the current controversy on this deeply interesting subject now turns. The fact of inspiration being admitted, attempts are made to lower beyond all endurance the signification of the terms in which it is announced; and against this indirect mode of assailing the doctrine of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures it is important to be on our guard. I shall at once proceed, therefore, to remark briefly on the inadequate notions of inspiration which are now advocated, and afterwards to open at greater length what, for my own part, I deem a just and satisfactory idea of it.

II.

The inadequate notions of inspiration which are now more or less extensively advocated, are reducible to three forms of expression.

1. The first represents it as consisting in *mental elevation.* Thus, according to Akermann, inspiration "is a vivifying and animating operation on the spiritual faculty of man, by which its energy and capacity are extraordinarily heightened, so that his powers of internal perception discern things spread out before them clearly and distinctly which at other times lay beyond his sphere of vision, and were dark and hidden."† Mr. Davidson more briefly says, that inspiration "was a brightening up to an unusual degree of all the faculties."‡

2. The second represents it as consisting in *moral purification.* According to Mr. Morell—if from a writer characterized by so little clearness of thought any quotation can safely be made§—inspiration consists in having our "inward nature perfectly harmonized to the divine, and freed from the

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* Note C.

† Akermann, as quoted by Archdeacon Hare, Mission of the Comforter, vol. ii., p. 500.

‡ Davidson's Introduction to the New Test., vol. ii., p. 78.

§ Note D.

distorting influences of prejudice, passion, and sin." "Let there be a due purification of the moral nature," says he, "a perfect harmony of the spiritual being with the mind of God, a removal of all inward disturbance from the heart, and what is to prevent or disturb this immediate intuition of divine things?"*

3. The third represents it as consisting in *spiritual illumination;* by this phrase referring to the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, by whom all true Christians are enlightened, and so "taught of God." This seems to be the idea of Twesten, when he says, in an elaborately abstract phraseology which seems to have been mistaken by many for deep thinking, that "inspiration coheres with the general Christian self-consciousness."† And thus, also, we are told by Dr. Bushnell, that "all the workings of the spirit are inspirations," as truly as those in prophets and apostles. "Christian character itself," he adds, "and all its graces, are forms of inspiration."‡

Respecting these views it is an obvious general remark, that they all reduce the idea of inspiration to a point of extreme insignificance and worthlessness. It is, according to them, no more than pertains to every man of either fervid mind, pure morals, or genuine piety. Instructors of this class may, and do, address us in such terms as these: "O yes! the Bible is inspired, no doubt of it; but so are many other books. And the sacred writers were inspired, but so is every man of genius, so is every man of goodness, and so is every sincere Christian. Inspiration is, consequently, a prerogative of the commonest kind; one which all may hope to enjoy, nay, one which all do occasionally enjoy." Now really, to admit such a view of divine inspiration as this—a view of it with which the veriest infidel may well indeed be satisfied—would be to give up everything in it that is valuable. Were this all, nothing would be affirmed in the doctrine worthy of a moment's contention. The entire notion might as well be abandoned at once.

It may be generally remarked further of these cognate

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* Morell's Philosophy of Religion, pp. 151, 186.

† Twesten, as cited from Hase by Morell, in his Philosophy of Religion, p. 190. Note E.

‡ Bushnell's God in Christ, p. 324.

views of inspiration, that they fall as far short of the scriptural claim as they do of human necessities. What, if these views be true, is to be thought of the emphatic assertion prefixed to so large a part of the writings of the Old Testament,—"Thus saith the Lord,"—but that it is a wicked and impudent falsehood? Or what of the quiet but confident declaration of the apostle* respecting a large part of the contents of the New Testament, "We have the mind of Christ"?

Let us, however, notice these views more particularly.

1. According to the first of them, divine inspiration is "an operation on the spiritual faculty of man, whereby its energy and capacity are extraordinarily heightened; so that his powers of internal perception discern things which at other times lay beyond his range of vision, and were dark and hidden."

Now it certainly cannot be denied that the faculties of most men are at some periods brighter and more apt to effective exertion than they are at others; but it surely is not to be supposed that *every* such augmentation of conscious energy amounts to a divine inspiration. Excitements of this class differ infinitely in degree, and it would undoubtedly be necessary to possess some means of ascertaining when the altitude justly to be called inspiration was attained; some kind of electrometer, by which the degree of elevating influence should become externally palpable. How else could its results become trustworthy? Yet on this vital point we have no guide, but are left in utter darkness. The inspiration alleged needs a second inspiration to ascertain its existence.

Let us suppose, however, that the proper altitude is reached, and that the perceptive powers of some favoured individual of our race are duly heightened, we ask, What can he then discern? How far can he penetrate into the regions ordinarily so "dark and hidden"? How much is "the range of his vision" enlarged? Can he see into the mind of God, and disclose to us the "deep things" thereof? He cannot. An apostle declares, that "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man the things which God hath prepared for them that love him."† Of what use,

* 1 Cor. ii. 16. † 1 Cor. ii. 9.

then, in the case before us, is the enlargement of his vision? The mind of God in relation to his treatment of a guilty race is precisely the thing which it is necessary for us to know, and of this our boasted seer can tell us nothing.

But again, let him see what he may, we ask, Upon what authority can he give utterance to his perceptions? Simply upon his own. *He* perceives, or thinks he perceives, such and such things; but who knows that he is not played with by his own imagination, that what he perceives is truth, and that he perceives it in its just proportions? Heightened as his powers may be, he still may be mistaken. What we want, and what inspiration really professes to supply, is the voice of one who cannot be mistaken.

2. According to the second defective view of inspiration which we have under notice, it consists in a process of moral purification. "Let there be a due purification of the moral nature," says Mr. Morell, "and what is to prevent the immediate intuition of divine things?"

Does Mr. Morell, then, we ask in return, really suppose that the "immediate intuition of divine things" is possessed by every man whose moral nature is duly purified? We know, indeed, and readily admit (if it be an admission of any worth) that depravity obscures the mental vision, and that holy truth is much more clearly seen, and more promptly appreciated, by a holy mind; but there is surely a limit to this improvement of the vision. Purity cannot be supposed to confer the power of seeing *all* things. Mr. Morell asks, with great naïveté, "What is to prevent it?" Simply, that some of them are out of sight. The mysteries we want to discern "have been hid in God from the foundation of the world," even counsels of eternal love, in the adoring contemplation of which an apostle breaks out into strains like these: "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord?"* Ay, that is the question; "Who hath known the mind of the Lord?" Pure morals? How are they to help a poor blind mortal to see into the heart of God? "What man," says the apostle, "knoweth the things of a *man*, save the spirit of man which is in him?"† And if moral good-

* Rom. xi. 33, 34. † 1 Cor. ii. 11.

ness does not enable a man to see into the heart of his fellow-man, how should it enable him to penetrate the infinite profound of his Maker's bosom? "Even so knoweth no man the things of God but the Spirit of God."*

3. According to the third idea of inspiration, it is one with the gracious illumination vouchsafed to all sincere Christians. "All the workings of the Spirit," we are assured by Dr. Bushnell, "are inspirations;" and he blames the degenerate Christians of modern times for allowing themselves to entertain an idea of inspiration which divides them from apostles and prophets.

The consequences of this notion, however, condemn it at once. For it does one of two things. Either it reduces the words of the sacred writers to a level with the words of all saints, since all are alike inspired, or it elevates the words of all saints to a level with those of the sacred writers. The former of these consequences would deprive the Scriptures of all pre-eminence and authority; the latter would give equal authority to the entire mass of ecclesiastical legends and traditions. Neither of these consequences is admissible; and the premises, therefore, are false.

But, in truth, there are essential and obvious differences between illumination and inspiration. The former involves holiness, the latter does not. Inspiration has been actually given to unholy men, as in the case of Balaam,† and of Caiaphas;‡ the two elements, consequently, must be essentially distinct. Besides, illumination abides, inspiration is transient; illumination admits of degrees, inspiration, according to its mode, is always perfect. They cannot be identical.

Our conclusion, then, both on a general and a particular examination of these notions of inspiration, is, that they fall immeasurably short of that which is required, whether to meet our necessities, or to satisfy the scriptural claim. Not these things, either or all of them, but something more —much more—must be intended by the declaration, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God." How much more, it will be our next business to inquire.

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* Note F. † Numb. xxii. 23. ‡ John xi. 51.

III.

In endeavouring to arrive at an exact idea of the process denoted by the phrase "inspiration of God," we have to encounter considerable difficulties.

One of these difficulties arises from the term employed in the original language. "All Scripture," we read, "is *given by inspiration of God.*" To this phrase one Greek word corresponds—*θεόπνευστος*; an adjective which is formed from *Θεός*, God, and *πνέω*, to breathe, and which some writers have (without much advantage, perhaps) transferred, so making the apostle to say that "all Scripture is *theopneustic.*" It may, however, be literally translated by the English compound, *divinely-inspired;* or, better still (since the word inspire has received a technical meaning which creates an illusion) by the more thoroughly English compound, *divinely-breathed.* The affirmation before us, then, will be, "All Scripture is divinely-breathed." Now we have here a metaphor; a word not directly, but indirectly or figuratively, significant. Literally, God does not breathe; and when it is said that Scripture is breathed by him, we learn nothing directly of the nature of the process intended; but we are left to use our best judgment in gathering from the metaphor a just and satisfactory meaning. Thus regarding the word, we may fairly derive from it the general ideas that Holy Scripture is the result of a divine operation, that this operation is analogous to breathing, and that it comprehends the whole process, whether simple or complex, by which Scripture is produced. From the word alone we cannot, I think, learn more.*

A second difficulty in the way of correctly understanding this expression arises from the nature of the process of which it is descriptive. As concerning this the metaphorical term, divinely-breathed, teaches us nothing, so an impenetrable mystery is thrown over it from two sources. On the one hand, it is an operation of God, all whose operations, natural as well as supernatural, are wrapped in mystery; and, on the other hand, it is an operation totally alien from our own experience, so that we have no help from our consci-

* Note G.

ousness towards a conception of it. Whether even inspired men knew much about it we cannot tell, but we, who are not inspired, do not, and cannot, know anything.

Under these circumstances we are thrown upon the Sacred Scriptures themselves, as constituting A FACT which must, as far as explanation is possible, explain its own character. They claim to be inspired writings; and we are laid under the necessity of examining them for such indications as it may be possible to obtain of the nature of the inspiration they claim. Taking this view of the matter, we may advance a few steps by means of some general observations.

First. With respect to the fact of divine inspiration, the Scriptures are far from standing alone. Admitting them to be the only inspired *writings* the world ever saw (a point by no means either certain or probable), they certainly do not constitute the only exemplification of inspiration itself with which mankind have been familiar. There has been much *spoken* inspiration, of which numerous examples are to be found, both in the Old Testament and the New. Quite apart from the inspiration of the scriptural narrative, is the living inspiration which forms part and parcel of the facts narrated; as in God's communication to Adam and Noah, to Moses and the patriarchs, to Israel in the minor messages of the prophets, and to the Christian churches in apostolic times. The Bible, then, is only part of a larger and more comprehensive system, and of a system which was in practical existence, and in frequent operation, through the whole of that portion of the world's history during which that volume was in process of formation. It does not stand out from the divine administration as a thing by itself, but it is merely a portion of that which was continually going on, and it differs from the rest only in the accident of being committed to writing—a circumstance affecting nothing but its convenience and usefulness as a permanent record.

Secondly. Our inquiry, then, into the nature of divine inspiration as it appears in the Bible, may be expanded into an inquiry after the same element as exhibited from the creation of the world, and throughout the whole period of biblical composition. Now, when we look at the scriptural facts which are adapted to aid us in this investigation, we find that inspiration, thus historically developed, consisted essentially in the communication of God's mind to men,

either for their own guidance, or for the purpose of further communication to others. It can be scarcely necessary to cite examples; but for the sake of perfect clearness a few shall be given. "Now the Lord said to Abraham, Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred."* "The word of the Lord came unto Nathan, saying, Go and tell my servant David, Thus saith the Lord, Shalt thou build me an house for me to dwell in?"† "As they ministered to the Lord and fasted, the Holy Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them."‡ "The Spirit of the Lord spake by me," said David, "and his word was upon my tongue."§ "For he whom God hath sent," said John of the greater prophet who followed him, "speaketh the words of God."‖ And of his own teaching Christ himself declared, "I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, he gave me a commandment what I should say, and what I should speak."¶ Nor does Paul express himself in different terms: "For this cause also thank we God," says he, "without ceasing, that when ye received the word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of man, but, as it is in truth, the word of God."** Many examples might be adduced, but these are more than sufficient to show that inspiration, during the biblical period, was a system of divine communication to man. The modes employed were various—voices, visions, dreams; but the general fact is expressed with perfect correctness by the apostle, when he says, "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners *spake in time past unto the fathers* by the prophets, hath in these last days *spoken unto us* by his Son."††

Now, such being the general character of inspiration, as currently developed through the ages of scriptural writing, it is just and necessary to infer that inspiration in the Scriptures themselves must be substantially the same thing. It is a mode by which God communicates with man. By it God speaks. Inspired writing is the word of God.

Thirdly. While we have thus to maintain on the one hand that all Scripture is, *in some sense*, the word of God, it

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* Gen. xii. 1. † 2 Sam. vii. 4, 5. ‡ Acts xiii. 2.
§ 2 Sam. xxiii. 2. ‖ John iii. 34.
¶ John xii. 49. ** 1 Thess. ii. 13. †† Heb. i. 1, 2.

does not seem possible to maintain, on the other, that all parts of the sacred book are the word of God *in the same sense*. We cannot take even a cursory view of the Bible, without perceiving that its contents are widely diversificd. In some parts, for example, we find the Lord commissioning his prophets to foretel the changes of empires, and in others we meet with circumstantial narrative, or epistolary familiarities. Let us set specimens of the two classes side by side.

I take the first from the opening verses of the fortieth chapter of Isaiah. "Comfort ye, comfort ye my people, saith your God. Speak ye comfortably to Jerusalem, and say unto her that her warfare is accomplished, that her iniquity is pardoned: for she hath received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins."

Compare with this a few verses out of the second Epistle to Timothy, iv. 11, 13. "Only Luke is with me. Take Mark, and bring him with thee: for he is profitable to me for the ministry. And Tychicus have I sent to Ephesus. The cloak that I left at Troas with Carpus, when thou comest bring with thee, and the books, but especially the parchments."

I cannot, in the face of such a contrast (which is of constant and striking occurrence), agree with those writers who hold the opinion that only one element is to be recognized in inspiration. If these widely-dissimilar passages have something in common, by virtue of which they may both be called the Word of God, they have surely so much difference that the sense in which they are so cannot be one and the same.

Nor is there anything in the testimony which the Scripture bears to its own inspiration which leads to a conception of that process as necessarily simple, and without diversity. On the one hand, the word *θεόπνευστος* is perfectly vague; nor is its meaning at all defined, either by any variety of connexion in which it is employed (since it occurs nowhere in the Scriptures but in the passage quoted), or by its classical use.* On the other hand, inspiration, as historically developed, was undoubtedly characterized by a considerable diversity of modes, as explicitly recognized by the apostle in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews in regard to

* Note H.

the ancient economy, and as not less plainly manifested in the primitive church by the multiform gifts of the Spirit with which they were endowed. "Now there are diversities of gifts," says Paul, "but the same Spirit. For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit; to another faith by the same Spirit; to another the gifts of healing by the same Spirit; to another the working of miracles, to another prophecy, to another the discerning of spirits, to another divers kinds of tongues, to another the interpretation of tongues; but all these worketh that one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will."* With this ample diversity of inspiration in the living system, it cannot be so culpable, or so pernicious, as some writers would make it, to conceive of inspiration as embodied in writing under some forms of diversity also.

Fourthly. We are thus again thrown upon an examination of the Scriptures themselves, in order to ascertain under what modifications the general fact of their divine inspiration may there appear. In this matter, also, the holy books must be their own interpreters, and to such an examination I shall accordingly proceed.

IV.

The contents of the sacred volume are very various; but, generally speaking, they may be arranged under the following heads.

1. *Narrative:* including the historical books of the Old Testament, with the Gospels and Acts in the New.

2. *Didactic:* as the book of Job, the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and, generally speaking, the Epistles.

3. *Prophetic:* a class in which the prophetic books of the Old Testament naturally arrange themselves, together with the Apocalypse.

4. *Devotional:* of which the Psalms and Canticles are the obvious and principal examples.

5. *Circumstantial:* under which may be placed some of the minor Epistles, and the more familiar portions of the larger ones.

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* 1 Cor. xii. 4, 8–11.

When we contemplate this diversified matter with a view to satisfy ourselves what modifications of the general process which we call divine inspiration may be congruous with it, what we have to do is to assign to each characteristic portion a mode of divine operation; neither less, on the one hand, nor more, on the other, than may appear requisite for its production. Upon a candid survey, three modes appear to be indicated, of which I begin with the lowest.

First. No portion of the inspired writings can be regarded, I think, as resulting from less than a *communication of divine wisdom.**

This idea is obviously applicable for the most part, if not universally, to the narrative portion of Scripture. In the composition of this, the sacred writers sometimes relate transactions of which they were personally cognizant; as Moses in the greater part of the Pentateuch, and Joshua, Ezra, and Nehemiah, in the books which bear their names respectively. In other instances, where they had not personal cognizance of the facts, they had recourse to existing documents, or other means of information, either of a more public or a more private kind. The former of these processes is indicated in express terms by the compilers of the books of Kings and Chronicles; and the use of both can hardly be questioned in relation to Genesis, Judges, Samuel, Esther, and Ruth. The evangelical history, both of the Gospels and the Acts, appears to partake of a mixed character. In relation to compositions of this class generally, however, a communication of divine wisdom would appear to be at once necessary and sufficient; and its office would be to guide the writers in ascertaining the trustworthy sources of information, in selecting the particulars to be recorded, and in determining the manner and spirit of the record. In the last two respects, it must be manifest to every careful reader of the Scriptures that their narrative portions have been composed under some very extraordinary guidance; since no similar narratives are to be found within the whole compass of human literature.

The view of inspiration which I am thus applying to sacred narrative, does not forbid the minor variations which are so copiously found whenever two or more accounts are

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* Note I.

given of the same occurrence, whether in the New Testament or the Old. Ample scope for these must undoubtedly be afforded by any idea of inspiration which is properly applicable; and the general term, wisdom, would seem to allow a sufficient latitude.

To the narrative portion of Holy Writ may be added another to which the idea of inspiration now before us may be applied, namely, a large part of the didactic. The didactic portion of the Scriptures may be distinguished into two kinds; that which consists in the record of truth before unknown, and that which consists in the use for instruction, precept, or argument, of truth already known. With respect to the latter, an influx of divine wisdom would appear to be all that could be required or supposed. The books of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Job, and large portions of the Epistles (so Peter, speaking of Paul's Epistles, says he wrote "according to the *wisdom* given unto him"*), may be arranged under this head. To the same class may be assigned, also, under a somewhat modified view, the Levitical institutions; and to these portions of Holy Writ may be added the devotional likewise, except in so far as they may partake of the nature of prophecy.

Nor is there any difficulty in including within this department of inspiration what I have called the circumstantial portion of the Scriptures. I know how tauntingly it has been asked, whether Paul was inspired on one occasion to direct Timothy to "use a little wine for his stomach's sake," or on another to ask him to bring him his cloak:† but surely grounds are not wanting on which the congruity of such details with divine wisdom may be affirmed. To say nothing of the unwarrantable assumption involved in making ourselves judges of their usefulness, it might be enough to speak of their harmony with the species of composition to which they are attached. It would seem strange to admit that God might engage persons to communicate his mind by letters, and yet to require that he should withhold them from the introduction of the circumstantial details which would constitute the natural proofs of their genuineness and reality. Had this been done, we should doubtless have heard of

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* 2 Pet. iii. 15. † 1 Tim. v. 23; 2 Tim. iv. 13.

another, and certainly a more plausible objection, founded on the fact.

Before quitting this head, I may mention that the idea developed in it derives some sanction from the use of the term *Θεόπνευστος* by Phocylides, a Greek writer of the age of Adrian. He speaks of *τῆς δὲ Θεοπνεύστου σοφιῆς λόγος*, "a discourse of divinely-imparted wisdom."*

Secondly. It is only for a part of the Bible, however, that the idea of inspiration as consisting in a communication of divine wisdom is sufficient: the *communication of divine knowledge*, or a process of divine revelation, must, to a great extent, have been included.

This view is of necessity supposed with respect to both facts and truths not previously known to the writers. We have in the Scripture clear cases of the communication of facts by God to men, whether for their own use, or the use of others. Here is an example. "And the Lord said unto Ahijah, Behold the wife of Jeroboam cometh to ask a thing of thee for her son, for he is sick."† In the case of Elisha this kind of communication seems to have been to a great extent habitual, since, in observing the sorrow of the Shunamite, he said to Gehazi, "Let her alone, for her soul is vexed in her, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not told me."‡ To these may be added an instance from the New Testament. "While Peter thought on the vision, the Spirit said unto him, Three men seek thee."§ We do not know that some portions of the Scripture narrative were not thus supplied to the writers.

In relation to the prophetic portions of Scripture, however, there can be no question. The knowledge of future events is not competent to man; and, if sacred prophecy be anything more than an artful and wicked juggle—an imputation against which I am not now concerned to defend it—it must be the expression of knowledge derived directly from heaven. Such, indeed, is the express testimony of the Scripture itself. "For prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."‖

With respect to the great doctrinal truths contained in

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* Phocylidis Poem. Admon. l. 122. † 1 Kings xiv. 5. ‡ 2 Kings iv. 27. § Acts x. 19. ‖ 2 Peter i. 21.

the sacred book, also unknowable unless revealed, they must of course have been communicated originally, and in many cases to the scriptural writers personally, by direct information from God. Such is the general statement:—"God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit."* Paul states in express terms that this was the case with the whole of his own evangelical knowledge. "I certify you, brethren," says he, "that the Gospel which was preached of me is not after man: for I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ."† And there can be no doubt that the other apostles, and not a few besides them in the primitive church, enjoyed to a greater or less extent a similar privilege. He spoke for more than himself, when he said with so much confidence, "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of his glory in the face of Jesus Christ."‡

It appears to be this process of the communication of knowledge from God to man by which Akermann is especially scandalized. Inspiration being thus conceived, persons under it are, according to him, "like so many drawers, wherein the Holy Ghost has put such and such things; so that their recipiency, with respect to the Spirit inspiring them, is like that of a letter-box."§ The meaning of this is that man must not know more than he can *see*. You must never *tell* him anything, the ear being too much like a letter-box to be employed in the communication of knowledge. Why, the greater part of every man's knowledge consists in what he has been told. Take away from Akermann himself all that has been put into his "letter-box," and you will leave him in a condition of most pitiable ignorance.

Thirdly. There are yet portions of the sacred volume which imply both more than a communication of wisdom, and more than a communication of knowledge; they necessitate the supposition of a process, which I know not how to call by any better name than that of *divine indwelling*, or *possession*.

The cases to which I refer are those in which the Spirit

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* 1 Cor. ii. 10. † Gal. i. 11, 12. ‡ 2 Cor. iv. 6.
§ Akermann, as quoted by Archdeacon Hare, Mission of the Comforter, vol. ii., p. 500.

of God seems to have availed himself of the rational and physical powers of a man, for the purpose of putting into human language thoughts which even the person employed to conceive and to utter them did not understand. This must obviously have been the case with those gifted persons who, in the primitive church, spoke in unknown tongues, and needed an interpreter,* and with the apostles at large and their companions, on the memorable day of Pentecost.† It must have been the case also with the prophets when uttering some of their predictions, as is expressly stated concerning Daniel.‡ Nor can we resolve into any other element that "testimony of Jesus," which, as "the spirit of prophecy,"§ pervaded so large a portion of the ancient Scriptures. In part, indeed, the seers of the olden time comprehended the scope of the words they uttered; but they seem to have been also conscious that there was one dwelling within them whose views went much farther than their own, and who breathed at once conceptions into their minds, and strains into their lips, concerning a "great salvation" yet undisclosed. "Of which salvation," says the apostle Peter, in language pregnant with meaning and instruction, "the prophets inquired and searched diligently, who prophesied of the grace that should come unto you; searching what, or what manner of time, the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow. Unto whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves but unto us they did minister the things which are now reported unto you."‖

I have ventured to call the process I am now speaking of *divine possession*, because of an analogy which I am not unwilling to think it bears to the possession of human beings by evil spirits, as in the instance of demoniacs. As some of these cases are narrated in the Gospels, the indwelling demon seems for the moment to supersede the man, to think by his intellectual power, and to answer by his tongue. "What is thy name?" said Christ to one of them; and he received the answer, "My name is Legion, for we are many."¶ After some such manner it is clearly not impossible that the Creator-Spirit may dwell in the creature he has made, and

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* 1 Cor. xiv. † Acts ii. ‡ Chap. viii. 27; xii. 8.
§ Rev. xix. 10. ‖ 1 Peter i. 10–12. ¶ Mark v. 9.

cause his mind to conceive, and his lips to utter, things of which he has either no understanding, or a very partial one, but which, nevertheless, may be a treasure of precious truth for future ages. So spake the unsuspected spirit of prophecy by the tongue of Caiaphas, when he gave his opinion that it was expedient that Christ should be slain. "This spake he not of himself: but being high priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation; and not for that nation only, but also that he should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad."*

Within the three ideas which have been mentioned, everything involved in the general notion of divine inspiration may, I think, be comprehended. One or other of them will be found applicable to every part of the sacred writings. In one or other of these ways—that is, either by wisdom, revelation, or possession, there is not a line which may not be said to be divinely inspired.†

The only question in relation to this part of our subject that demands further consideration, is, whether, in each of these senses, Holy Scripture can be affirmed to be the Word of God. As to the second and third of them, the answer is obvious, and is immediately given; and as to the first, there would not appear to be any just ground of hesitation. What is written under such an influx of divine wisdom as determines the sources from whence the matter shall be drawn, the selection of the particular facts, and the manner in which they shall be recorded, may safely be reckoned to be the Word of God. It is as if God had written it with his own hand.

V.

The position which I have thus taken on this long and widely-controverted subject, I have taken on independent grounds. I have thought my own way to it, and I have expounded my views without any explicit reference to those who have gone before me. It will now be proper, perhaps, that I should in a few words indicate the relative bearings of the ground I have chosen.

In the first place, I am far from agreeing with those who,

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* John xi. 51, 52. † Note K.

with Augusti and others abroad, and Parry and others at home, represent inspiration as partial,* and confine it to the matters of religious sentiment which the Bible contains. The havoc which would be made in our Bibles by this scheme, is equally without warrant and beyond endurance. Instead of "all Scripture being given by inspiration of God," according to this view much less than half of it is so; and the inspired portion is so mixed—I might rather say confounded—with the uninspired, the wheat with the chaff, that the process of winnowing must be one of incredible difficulty and hazard. How great this difficulty is, may appear from the fact that the advocates of this scheme are at no agreement among themselves. Parry claims inspiration for "every sentiment that constitutes a part of Christian doctrine or duty,"† while Augusti limits it to "the fundamental articles of our faith;"‡ and no one knows who is to determine either the one or the other.§ Yet some eminent foreign divines are at this moment devising a "formula" for "distinguishing Holy Scripture from the Word of God"!‖ "If God would open the windows of heaven, then might this thing be."

In the second place, I do not adopt the distinction which has been taken between inspiration and revelation. This distinction is stated by Dr. Pye Smith, in his Scripture Testimony, in these words:—"The communication from God to a mortal of knowledge which could not be, or had not been, obtained in any other way, by his immediate influence on the human mind, is revelation. The qualifying of a recipient of revelation to communicate the revealed knowledge to his fellow-creatures, with perfect certainty and accuracy, is inspiration."¶

I cannot accept these definitions. The word inspiration ought, I think (as I have already hinted), to be taken as expressive of the whole process—one, although not simple, from which the Scriptures have resulted. "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God." Now of this process, revelation, or

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* Note L.

† Parry's Inquiry into the Nature and Extent of Inspiration, p. 28.

‡ Augusti's Institutes, p. 89, as quoted by Morell.

§ Note M.

‖ See the Papers by Tholuck, in Evangelical Christendom for 1850, p. 211.

¶ Smith's Scrip. Test. (ed. 1837), vol. i., p. 62. This distinction is adopted by Morell; Philosophy of Religion, p. 150.

the communication of divine knowledge to men, is evidently a part; that is to say, revelation is a mode of inspiration.

I may with the greater confidence object to this distinction between inspiration and revelation, inasmuch as it is clearly incommensurate with the facts. Inspiration, we are told, is "the qualifying of a recipient of revelation to communicate revealed knowledge." According to this, no man can be inspired but "a recipient of revelation," nor anything be communicated by inspiration but "revealed knowledge." Yet Dr. Smith is obliged to allow the possibility of matters not revealed being communicated by inspiration. Such a thing, he says, "is credible."* I know not why he should have hesitated to say that this thing is true, and to adapt his definition to the fact. Inspiration and revelation cannot be placed in direct antithesis; they do not cover the same ground.

In the third place, I differ from those who, after the Helvetic Confession,† insist on the absolute simplicity of inspiration, and affirm it to involve the idea of revelation in all portions alike of Sacred Writ.‡

One obvious objection to such an idea, viz., that many things recorded by the sacred penmen were previously known by them, is overborne by divines of this class, by the somewhat courageous assertion that all such facts were made known again to the writers, for the purpose of scriptural record; "a position open" (in the language of La Mothe, an English writer of the 17th century) "to very smart objections," among which the multiplication of unnecessary miracles involved in it is not the least.§ But even if this solution were allowed as to facts, could it be assigned as to feelings? The sacred writers often express their feelings; as Paul, when he says, "I rejoiced greatly that your care of me hath flourished again."‖ Supposing it to have been revealed to him that he had received supplies from Philippi, was it also revealed to him that he had "rejoiced" on this account? One would think such a thing much better known by consciousness—certainly its appropriate evidence—than by revelation.

No one more vehemently asserts the absolute oneness of

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* Note N. † Notes O and P. ‡ Note Q.
§ Note R. ‖ Phil. iv. 10.

inspiration than Dr. Carson;* but all his reasonings on this subject are vitiated by an assumption that a definite idea of the nature of inspiration is supplied by the word employed to denote it. If this had been the fact, his obvious course would have been to have given us a translation of *Θεόπνευστος*; which, however, he has (I believe) nowhere attempted.

That no definite idea is conveyed by the scriptural term, even in the opinion of the writers of this class themselves, is manifest from the choice which they have made of a word to express their own idea of inspiration. "It is one thing," say they; "it is suggestion, suggestion always, and suggestion only."† Do they mean, then, to say, that *suggestion by God* is the idea conveyed by *Θεόπνευστος*, and that the words of Paul might be rendered, "All Scripture is divinely-suggested"? Even the ardour of Dr. Carson has not carried him so far. Here, consequently, the scriptural phrase is substantially abandoned, and a different word is chosen; and one expressing an idea certainly not less unscriptural than the word.

The word suggestion, as synonymous with inspiration, is not less infelicitous than unscriptural. It is not applicable to the facts. The idea of suggestion is at once too little for some passages, and too much for others; and the word is thus totally inadequate to the purpose for which it is employed.‡

In the fourth place, while maintaining the diversity of mode which may be conceived of under the generic term inspiration, I have not adopted the subordinate terms which have been currently employed. I have not, after Doddridge, Henderson, and others, spoken of an inspiration of excitement, elevation, superintendence, direction, &c. All I have to say about these terms is, that I do not like them. I think they are not adequate, not felicitous. And this, since they are not divine, is enough to say about them. I have preferred others; whether they are more adequate or more happy, those who please to consider them will determine for themselves.§

In the fifth place, in speaking of divine possession as one

* Carson's Theories of Inspiration, p. 102.
† Gaussen's Theopneustia, p. 312.
‡ Note S. § Note T.

mode of inspiration, I do not find that I have any precursor. According to the historical view of the subject recently given by Tholuck,* the highest idea of inspiration hitherto formed has been expressed by the term revelation. But as, on the one hand, I have not sought originality, so neither, on the other, am I afraid of singularity.† Whether the fact of inspiration, as it lies before us in the Bible, does not fairly suggest, and even necessitate such a conception, is a question which every reader of that book may decide for himself.

VI.

There remains yet one important question, to which I have thought it best to reserve a separate consideration. It relates to the *verbal* inspiration of the Scriptures, and may be thus stated:—Are *the words* of the Bible inspired? Although I am not unaware of the difficulties incidental to this question, nor of the differences of opinion which have prevailed, and still prevail, respecting it; I answer without qualification, that, according to my view of inspiration, *they are.*

I do not, of course, affirm the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures in the sense in which, after the Swiss formula, it is held by Haldane, Carson, and Gaussen, as a dictation or infusion of words to, or into the writers, or as "an influence externally producing expressions."‡ Differing as to the nature of inspiration itself, we must necessarily differ as to the manner in which the words of Scripture are affected by it; and I am quite prepared for a scornful rejection, by writers of this class, of my affirmation as worthless.§ Nevertheless, it may have its importance. There is a wide interval between the sacred penmen having had every word dictated to them, or infused into them, by the Holy Spirit, and their having been "left to the common use of their faculties." A middle path may be safer than either of the extremes.

That the words of Scripture must be in some sense divinely inspired, may appear, I conceive, from such considerations as follow.

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* See Evangelical Christendom for 1850, pp. 210, 248. † Note U.
‡ Gaussen's Theopneustia, p. 335. § Note V.

1. I advert in the first place to some difficulties which attend the total denial of it.

First. On the theory which denies the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures, we are to believe that the ideas of the Bible are divinely inspired, and that the words are not. It becomes then necessary, and even indispensable, to distinguish clearly between the words and the ideas; since between them there is the wide and momentous difference that exists between the inspired and the uninspired. But how is this to be done? Can it be done at all? If we cast away the words, where are the ideas? In what manner can we arrive at the ideas, but by a careful consideration of the words in which they are expressed? Or, supposing the separation to be possible, by what rule is it to be effected? If by none, then is this delicate but all-important operation abandoned to the infirmities and caprices—to say nothing of dishonesty—of individual judgment. But a rule there must be: yet where is it, or in what manner is it to be ascertained? The Bible itself exhibits no such rule (as, indeed, it acknowledges no such distinction), nor can any authority less than divine supply the deficiency. And thus one revelation becomes useless for the want of a second.

Secondly. Since, on the theory in question, we are to believe that the ideas of the Scripture are inspired, but that the words are not, it has been the province of the sacred writers, by their human wisdom alone, to transfer into language matter divinely supplied to them without words. Now this is surely a vast undertaking, and must involve many chances of incorrectness, inadequacy, and unfaithfulness. No translator of the thoughts of God out of one human language into another is to be implicitly confided in; how much less a translator of them out of the celestial dialect (so to speak), in which, without words, they have been breathed into his heart? If a communication from God have come to us through the inevitable and complicated hazards of such a process, where any longer is its claim to authority or confidence? We have either no trustworthy communication *from God*, or we have a communication *in the words of God.**

2. I observe, in the second place, that, according to the

* Note W.

three modifications of the general fact of inspiration which I have suggested, there is no difficulty in the conception of a verbal inspiration. In relation to this question the Bible seems naturally to divide itself into two portions, the one comprehending such passages as were written by divine possession or revelation, the other consisting of passages written under the influence of divine wisdom alone. With respect to ideas uttered under divine possession, or acquired by divine revelation, it would seem to be obvious, and it is, I believe, generally admitted, that the words as well as the ideas *must* be from God.* Whatever theory may be adopted concerning the original formation of language, or the abstract possibility of separating it from thought, it is certain that language has become the established medium of thought, as well as of expression, among mankind; and that it is a medium which God, who instituted it, has honoured by condescending continually to employ it. That there ever has been a revelation from God to man otherwise than in words, or in symbols suggestive of words, is utterly without either proof or probability. Even when Paul was rapt into the third heaven, he heard "words," although they were "unutterable"—ἄρρητα—the repetition of them being either forbidden or impossible.

If, then, the Bible, so far as it is a revelation, is admitted to be verbally inspired, the field of inquiry is narrowed materially. We have now only to look at such parts of it as imply no revelation, and to ask whether they also are verbally inspired. And when it is called to mind that the inspiration under which they were written is conceived of as an influx of divine wisdom, difficulty seems to vanish; since the selection of words by a writer is clearly as much within the province of wisdom, as the selection of matter, authorities, or method. The wisdom which guided the selection of the matter and the manner may, without any difficulty, be regarded as guiding also the selection of the words.†

3. It ought to be enough to settle this argument, however, that the Scriptures themselves give no intimation of a distinction between the words and ideas of the sacred writings, and that the inspired writers do not in a single instance recognize it. On the contrary, in making their quotations

* Note X. † Note Y.

one from another, they as freely lay a stress upon the letter of a passage, as on its spirit. An attentive reader of the Scriptures will find numerous instances of this. I will cite one only for illustration. "For both he that maketh expiation, and they for whom expiation is made* are all of one; for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren: saying, I will declare thy name unto my brethren, in the midst of the congregation will I sing praise unto thee."† The apostle here quotes Psalm xxii. 22, not for the sake of its general sentiment, but exclusively for the sake of the word "brethren," from the occurrence of which the whole of his argument in the place is derived. This use of the letter of Scripture, if the words had been held uninspired, would have been impossible. In this case arguments so construeted could have had no force, but must have exposed those who used them to an easy, and even a triumphant refutation.‡

4. But, finally, it would not appear that we are left without express scriptural testimony on this important subject. I present for consideration two passages.

1. The declaration of Paul concerning the whole of his evangelical ministry and writings: "Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth."§ Here may be observed a distinction drawn by the apostle between the "things" which he taught, and the "words" in which he taught them; a most favourable opportunity, certainly, for his informing his readers (if the fact were so) that the former were inspired, and the latter were not inspired. Instead of this, however, he pointedly affirms, not only that the things he taught were of God, but that the "words" in which he taught them were, not the "words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth."

2. The declaration of our Lord respecting the entire Scriptures of the Old Testament: "Verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled."‖ The phrase, "one jot or one tittle," here employed, is singularly forcible. "Jot" is an abreviation of Iota, the name of the letter i in the Greek alphabet, and the smallest letter in that alphabet

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* Note Z. † Heb. ii. 11, 12. ‡ Note A A.
§ 1 Cor. ii. 13. ‖ Matt. v. 18. Note B B.

as in our own; the meaning, therefore, is, that not a single letter, even the smallest letter, of the law shall fail. The word "tittle" carries the force of the phrase still further, a tittle being a part of the letter, as the dot placed over our small letter i. The declaration, consequently, is emphatic in the highest degree. "Verily I say unto you, not the smallest letter, not a particle of a letter, of the law shall fail, till all be fulfilled." Why? But because every letter and every tittle, and much more every word, is a constituent part of the Word of God.*

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* Notes C C and D D.

NOTES.

Note A. Page 331.

The service had been, at an early period, undertaken by the Hon. and Rev. B. W. Noel, M.A., and the fulfilment of his engagement was prevented by the illness of one of his children, for the benefit of whose health a tour on the continent was recommended. Sincerely sympathizing in the universal sentiment of regret on account of Mr. Noel's absence, and more especially on account of its cause, I readily consented to supply, according to my ability, his lack of service. The discourse, of the substance of which I have availed myself, was preached to my own people, at Devonshire Square Chapel, London, on the morning of July 28, 1850. It was preached also at Cavendish Chapel, Ramsgate, on the 11th of August, and at Ebenezer Chapel, Margate, on the 18th of that month. Having had thoughts from the first of committing it to the press, I the less reluctantly consented to prepare it for delivery in circumstances to which I may (without presumption, perhaps) hope I was providentially led, and in which it might acquire an adaptation to more extensive usefulness.

Note B. Page 333.

Among these divines stands pre-eminent Dr. Pye Smith—whom to name is to eulogize—who, in his Scripture Testimony, with his characteristic, if not sometimes excessive candour, writes as follows:—

"It appears to me impossible to establish from the Greek text alone, so as to preclude all fair objection, either side of the agitated question, whether θεόπνευστος agrees immediately with πᾶσα γραφὴ, or is (as it is translated in the common version and in many others) a part of the predicate."

He then gives his general view in the following terms:—

"It is evident that the apostle, in ver. 16, resumes distributively what he had before advanced collectively: so that 'every writing

divinely inspired' is a description by which the apostle designates *each and every one* of the writings comprised under the well-understood collective denomination, τὰ ἱερὰ γράμματα, *the holy writings.* Timothy, and every contemporary Jew or Christian, needed no explanation of this phrase. They knew it, as one of the most common terms of usage, to denote the γραφαὶ, *writings*, or *Scriptures*, to which the Lord Jesus was in the habit of referring, as to the ultimate divine authority (*e.g.* Matt. xxii. 29; xxvi. 54; Luke xxiv. 32), the searching of which he enjoined (John v. 32), and which it is impossible to suppose, with any shadow of reason, that he did not design to use in the sense in which he knew that all his hearers would understand him; namely, as expressive of the whole sacred canon of the Jews, for to them 'were entrusted the oracles of God' (Rom. iii. 2). The general tenor of the New Testament most clearly recognizes, under these descriptions, the whole *received* Scriptures of the Jewish nation: and, when a particular passage is cited, it is usual to refer to it in the singular number: ἡ γραφὴ, ἡ γραφὴ αὐτὴ, and ἑτέρα γραφὴ, *the writing* or *Scripture, this Scripture, another Scripture* (John xix. 24, 37; Mark xii. 10).

"Thus the passage before us, though we adopt that construction of θεόπνευστος which Unitarians generally approve, furnishes the strongest testimony to the *inspiration* of each and every of the books of the Old Testament."—*Smith's Scripture Testimony* (ed. 1837), p. 32.

Note C. Page 334.

This point is very well treated by Dr. Dick, in the following passage (on 2 Tim. iii. 16):—

"It has been affirmed that the verse should be rendered thus:—'Every writing divinely inspired is profitable;' and it is thus converted into a general proposition which does not vouch for the inspiration of any particular book, and leaves the question undecided what books are inspired. This makes it a proposition which communicates no specific information, and is as superfluous as it would be to tell us that the sun gives light. It would never have entered into the mind of any man to suppose that a book really inspired was of no use. But, although we should admit the translation, it goes further than its authors intended; for while it was their design to destroy the evidence arising from the words in behalf of the inspiration of the Jewish Scriptures, they still bear explicit testimony to it. The apostle had mentioned them in the preceding verse, and he now adds —'Every inspired writing is profitable;' evidently assigning the reason why these Scriptures were able to make Timothy wise unto salvation. It was their inspiration which made them profitable for doctrine, reproof, correction, and instruction in righteousness. We can conceive no reason for the mention of inspired writings in this connexion, but to attest the inspiration of the books of the Old Testament. Thus the translation turns out an abortive attempt to weaken or overthrow the authority of the Jewish canon. That it is a mistranslation anybody will see on consulting the original—

πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος καὶ ὠφέλιμος. The conjunction καί, which connects θεόπνευστος and ὠφέλιμος, clearly shows that both adjectives belong to the predicate of the proposition, and that πᾶσα γραφὴ alone is the subject. No example can be produced where two adjectives are thus joined, of which the one belongs to the subject and the other to the predicate. Had Paul meant to express the idea which these critics attach to his words, he would have left out the conjunction, or perhaps have substituted the verb of existence, ἐστὶ, as a copulative: —πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος ὠφέλιμος, or πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστός ἐστιν ὠφέλιμος. This, then, is the proper translation—'Every writing is divinely inspired, and is profitable;' that is, every one of the writings referred to in the preceding verse, under the designation of the Holy Scriptures. And thus he asserts the inspiration of all the books contained in the sacred volume of the Jews."—*Dick's Lectures on Theology*, vol. i., p. 189.

The same view is given by Storr and Flatt, in their *Elementary Course*, translated by Schmucker, vol. i., p. 242.

Note D. Page 334.

It may be allowed, perhaps—perhaps it may be expected—that I should justify the censure implied in this language.

In his work on the Philosophy of Religion, Mr. Morell has two chapters, one on Revelation, and a second on Inspiration; and he promises "a rigid analysis and a clear elucidation," p. 123. In his endeavour "to determine what is the essential element in the idea of a revelation from God," he represents it as consisting of two parts: on the one hand, "a process by which knowledge is communicated to an intelligent being;" and "on the other hand, a process by which this same intelligent being becomes cognizant" of what is communicated, p. 124: in briefer terms, a mode of instruction, and "a mode of intelligence." Here in the outset is an error, palpable in itself, and the parent of much subsequent confusion. "A revelation *from God*," "the essential idea" of which he professes his intention to ascertain, evidently cannot consist of the two parts Mr. Morell has assigned to it. It may be a mode of instruction, but it cannot be a mode of intelligence. As a revelation, it is, in his own terms, "*from God;*" and it cannot consequently consist of anything *in man*. Revelation is, in truth, a mode of instruction, and nothing more; and such he himself states it to be in a subsequent page.

Having thus put into his definition of revelation an idea which does not belong to it, Mr. Morell proceeds immediately to throw overboard the other and only appropriate part of it. He lays it down that revelation signifies simply "a mode of intelligence," and devotes the whole chapter to showing what mode of intelligence it is. It is "a form of intuition," p. 142; "a process of the

intuitional consciousness," p. 141. "The act of revelation," it is declared, "is always a case of pure intuition," p. 145.

But let us now mark the manner in which he sums up the argument of this chapter. "Thus then," he says, "we see that in the whole process of revelation God has made use of the fixed laws and natural processes of the human mind. Knowing, as he does far better than ourselves, what is necessary to bring mankind to a due appreciation of his own divine will, he has instituted a series of means by which the world should be gradually awakened to a sense of heavenly and eternal realities. In this awakening all revelation essentially consists," p. 141.

In these few lines we have two ideas of revelation, the one not compatible with the other, and neither of them compatible with the definition already given. Revelation is first a process of God; then a condition of man; and this condition an "awakening," in which "all revelation essentially consists." Yet we have been before told, that "the essential idea of revelation" is "a mode of intelligence," and that it is "always a case of pure intuition."

Still more contradictory to this definition of revelation is that which he gives of it in the commencement of the following chapter. We are there told that "revelation, in the Christian sense, indicates that act of divine power by which God presents the realities of the spiritual world immediately to the human mind," p. 150. The author here returns to the idea of revelation as "a process by which knowledge is communicated," just mentioned in the beginning of the first chapter, and then—totally disregarded.

So much for revelation. Of inspiration he gives us his general idea at the close of the first chapter, in the following terms. Acknowledging that the intuition of divine things by the human mind results from certain supernatural "agencies, by which its power of vision was strengthened to behold them," he says, "The *state of mind* which we suppose to exist as consequent upon these special divine arrangements, this is what we designate by the term inspiration," p. 146; and accordingly, in the commencement of his chapter on inspiration, he speaks of it as "a power of recipiency," p. 151. In the same page, however, he uses the following language: "Inspiration denotes that especial influence wrought upon the faculties of the subject, by virtue of which he is able to grasp these realities in their perfect fulness and integrity," p. 150. Here he introduces a new idea. Inspiration is now "*an influence* wrought upon the faculties of the subject" of it. This phrase, "an influence wrought," evinces the confused state of the author's mind, in which two ideas were darkly struggling for the mastery. "An influence wrought," is mere jargon. The meaning must be, either an influence exerted, or an effect wrought; and the author, not having a clear conception of what he would say, jumbles both these ideas unintelligibly together. The correct idea, doubtless, is that inspiration is *an effect* "wrought

upon the faculties of the subject" of it; we shall see immediately, however, how the word "influence" came to be employed.

On the next page he writes as follows: "We must regard the whole process of inspiration as involving a faculty elevated supernaturally to an extraordinary power and susceptibility; indicating, in fact, an inward nature so perfectly harmonized to the divine; so freed from the disturbing influences of prejudice, passion, and sin; so simply recipient of the divine ideas circumambient around it; so responsive in all its strings to the breath of heaven, that truth leaves an impression upon it which answers perfectly to its objective reality," p. 151. In this passage we have inspiration, which has hitherto been defined as a "state of mind," and "a power of recipiency," represented as a "*process*," leading, indeed, to a certain state of mind, but not consisting in it; and hence the need of the word "influence," as denoting the agency by which "the process of inspiration" is effected. The idea of inspiration is thus altogether changed. It did mean a "state of mind" in man; it now means the divine operation or "process," by which that state of mind is produced. This abrupt shifting from the subjective to the objective is adapted to throw the whole discussion into confusion.

But we have yet a third definition of inspiration. After spending a few pages in refuting erroneous opinions, the author says, "We recur to the definition already proposed, which regards inspiration as consisting in *the impartation of clear intuitions of moral and spiritual truth* to the mind by extraordinary means," p. 165. Here, it is obvious, we have an idea widely different from both of those already mentioned. According to this view, inspiration does *not* consist, either in a state of the human mind, or in the process by which such state may be produced; but it has relation to "intuitions"—that is, perceptions—"of truth," and consists in "the impartation" of them. Mr. Morell's statements are not only diverse, they are contradictory. The definition which he now gives of inspiration nearly resembles the former half of his definition of revelation, as given in the first chapter, and adopted as its whole definition in the second. With this, indeed, it is in terms almost identical. Revelation, we were there told, is "a process by which knowledge is communicated," or "the act by which God presents the realities of the spiritual world immediately to the human mind;" and inspiration, we are now told, "consists in the impartation to the mind, by extraordinary means, of clear intuitions of moral and spiritual truth." Where is the difference? So little, however, did the author perceive the novelty of his last definition of inspiration, that he innocently talks of *recurring* to it, as though it had been given from the beginning!

I think I should not use language too strong, if I were to call these two chapters a mass of confusion and contradiction. Mr.

Morell assures us that there must be a controversy in England respecting our fundamental religious ideas. Be it so: but let him be assured, in return, that without some more "rigid analysis," and some more "clear elucidation" than this, no such controversy can be made conducive either to the interests of truth or to the honour of those who engage in it.

Note E. Page 335.

The whole passage is as follows:—

"Inspiration, as a derivation of Holy Scripture from divine causality, coheres with the general Christian self-consciousness, which was only more original and more perfect in the first mediators of the revelation."—Translated from the German, as quoted by Morell, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 190.

Note F. Page 338.

It is not, in truth, for the production of any such effects that Mr. Morell looks to the inspiration for which he pleads. He considers "the divine ideas" to be "circumambient around" every man (p. 151), and to be readily and fully cognizable by every man, when "the power of intuition" is raised to "its pure and integral state" (p. 186). We wish the language here employed had been somewhat less poetical. We should like much to know more about these "divine ideas," what they are, and whence they come, and in what manner they are "circumambient around" the minds of men. "Circumambient" means surrounding, or encompassing. Are we then really to conceive of "the divine ideas" as substantial entities, floating in every direction through space? Or what else are we to conceive, as intended by this singular language?

First. What are "the divine ideas"? I suppose they are God's ideas, or sentiments. But does the phrase mean *all* these ideas (so that God has never had *any* secrets), or only some of them? And if only some of them, which? And are those which we are most deeply interested in knowing among them?

Next. In what sense can it be said that these ideas (whatever they may be) surround us? Are God's ideas of any kind known to us unless they are expressed, as some, for example, are, by his natural works and providential government? Does Mr. Morell confine himself to these? Or has he a conception of a way in which other of God's ideas may become known to us without being expressed? Or does he know of a method by which they are expressed, other than as communicated in the Bible? And if he means this last, is it not a strange way of expressing so mo-

mentous and welcome, but familiar a fact, to say that thus "the divine ideas are circumambient around us"? And would he not have done well to have taken some further notice of such a fact, as somewhat closely connected with the subject of his work, the Philosophy of Religion?

I put these questions without meaning to be sarcastic. The passage is, I think, among the most extraordinary instances in human language of words without meaning.

Note G. Page 339.

Gaussen, in reference to this phrase, makes use of the following language. The Scripture, he says, "is so far the word of God, as to be represented to us as uttered by the divine breath, in the same manner that the words of a man are uttered by the breath of his mouth."*

Whether any injustice is here done to the author by the translator I cannot say, as I have only the English edition; but taking the language as it is, it is surely far from satisfactory.

1. When the Scriptures are said to be theopneustic, or divinely breathed, it is not correct to say that they are represented as "*uttered*" at all. The thing spoken of is *writings:* the writings are divinely breathed. There is no reference to speech; but merely to some divine operation which gave a specific quality to the written document.

2. If the reference had been to speech, it must have been figurative. It could not have been correct to say that the Scriptures were represented as "*uttered by the divine breath;*" since this supposes breath to be understood in its literal sense, which, in reference to God, who does not breathe, is impossible.

3. It is hardly conceivable that, if utterance by the divine breath had been intended, it should have been "*in the same manner* that the words of a man are uttered by the breath of his mouth." This is ascribing to the Almighty, not only breath, but actual organs of speech, a human mouth. It must have been written without consideration.

4. It is altogether without propriety to regard the term breath, as applied to God, as an emblem of speech. Its scriptural usage suggests totally different ideas. When the Lord made man of the dust of the ground, he "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life," Gen. ii. 7. "There is a spirit in man," says Elihu, "and the inspiration (breath) of the Almighty giveth him understanding," Job xxxii. 8. "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth," Psalm xxxiii. 6. "By the blast of God they perish, and by the breath

* Theopneustia, p. 370.

of his nostrils are they consumed," Job iv. 9. "He shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked," Isa. xi. 4. "Then shall that Wicked be revealed, whom the Lord shall consume with the breath of his mouth, and destroy with the brightness of his coming," 2 Thess. ii. 8. "He breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost," John xx. 22. These passages make it manifest that the term breath refers not to utterance, but to energy. When speech is intended, the word employed is mouth, or tongue, the true organ of speech.

Note H. Page 342.

Strong reference is made by Dr. Carson to the important aid to be derived from the classical use of the word θεόπνευστος. "It would have been much more useful," says he, remarking on the definition of Dr. Dick, "to exhibit the meaning of the word, with any illustration that might be afforded by the use of it in Greek writers. The ὕπνοι θεόπνευστοι, or *inspired dreams*, of the heathen, would have given us a more precise idea of the term than the most abstract definition."—*Carson's Theories of Inspiration*, p. 213.

No better reply to this can be given than is supplied by the following passage from the pen of Dr. Henderson:—

"The word occurs nowhere besides in Scripture; nor has it been found in any of the earlier Greek writers, on which account it has been conjectured that it was formed by the apostle, in order more definitely to express what he had to teach respecting the divine origin of the sacred writings. That it may have originated with him is certainly not impossible; yet, if it be found in heathen writers who flourished in or shortly after his time, and who cannot with any degree of probability be supposed to have had any knowledge of his writings, it would seem more natural to conclude that it was used by them in common, as already existing in the language. Now it does occur in Phocylides, or rather in the poet who wrote under his name in the reign of the Emperor Adrian, when describing the superior wisdom communicated by the gods, with which that which was merely human was not for a moment to be compared. Plutarch also, who wrote much about the same time, speaks of θεόπνευστοι ὀνείροι, or such dreams as were obviously of supernatural origin; such as were so very extraordinary in their character, that they could not be referred to the class of common oneiric phenomena with which we are more or less familiar, but must be attributed to divine inspiration."—*Henderson on Inspiration*, pp. 18, 19.

Dr. Henderson gives in a note the words of Phocylides, but without reference. They are to be found in the *Poema Admonitorium*, l. 122.

. . . . . Λόγος δ' ἔρυμ' ἀνθρώποισι·
Τῆς δὲ θεόπνευστου σοφίης ἀριστόν.

So small is the aid to be derived from classical use in this case. Yet of one half of this both Haldane and Carson appear to have been uninformed, since they both refer to the ὕπνοι ἐνύπνιοι exclusively, and omit the passage which would have been much more to their purpose. What illustration is to be derived from the pagan notion of inspired dreams I must profess myself at a loss to discover.

Note I. Page 344.

But what, then, is wisdom? To this question I answer as follows:—

1. Generally, wisdom is ability to act in our proper sphere (or to do what it is competent to us to do), in the best manner.
2. Specifically, wisdom, in relation to a given object, is ability to effect that object in the best manner.
3. Divine wisdom is God's ability to do all things in the best manner.
4. Divine wisdom, imparted to man for a specific purpose, confers an ability to effect that purpose divinely well, or as well as God himself, in their circumstances, and with their knowledge and means of knowledge (for no addition to these is implied in the case), would have done it.

Note K. Page 349.

The question may be thus summarily stated.

The writings which claim to be inspired contain matter of three kinds. The first is matter previously known to the writers; the second is matter previously unknown to the writers, but thoroughly understood when written; and the third is matter not, or only partially, understood. For these three kinds of matter we want three modifications of the general idea of inspiration, and no more: by what names we call them is a mere question of words.

Note L. Page 350.

"When it is said that Scripture is divinely inspired, it is not to be understood that God suggested every word, or dictated every expression. It appears from the different styles in which the books are written, and from the different manner in which the same events are related and predicted by different authors, that the sacred penmen were permitted to write as their several tempers, understandings, and habits of life directed; and that the knowledge communicated to them by inspiration upon the subject of their writings was applied in the same manner as any knowledge acquired by ordinary means. Nor is

it to be supposed that they were *even thus* inspired in every fact which they related, or in every precept which they delivered. They were *left to the common use of their faculties*, and did not upon every occasion stand in need of supernatural communication; but whenever, and as far as, divine assistance was necessary, it was always afforded." —*Bp. Tomline's Elements* (ed. 1843), vol. i., p. 17.

"The authors of these books were occasionally inspired."—*Tomline*, p. 19.

"Writings, of which a part only is inspired."—*Tomline*, p. 18.

Note M. Page 350.

This is distinctly avowed by Bishop Tomline, in the following terms:—"If it be asked by what rule we are to distinguish the inspired from the uninspired part of these books, I answer, that no general rule can be prescribed for that purpose."* The bishop argues that, with respect to historical statements, such discrimination is unimportant; but even if this were admitted, the same cannot surely be said of doctrinal statements. To be able to divide the chaff from the wheat in this matter must be of the very last importance; and yet it is, by the bishop's own confession, impossible.

Dr. Tomline seems to think that he can atone for his abandonment of the inspiration of the Scriptures, by affirming their truth. He allows them to be "free from material error;" and says—

"We cannot suppose that God would suffer any such errors as might tend to mislead our faith, or pervert our practice, to be mixed with those truths which he himself has mercifully revealed to his rational creatures, as the means of their eternal restoration," p. 18.

Certainly, we cannot "suppose" any such thing. But according to this view of the matter, the truth of the Scripture is as partial as its inspiration. Everything in the Bible that is not "material," may be false; everything, indeed, not in history alone, but both in doctrine and precept, which does not "tend to mislead our faith or pervert our practice," all this may be false. What reliance, then, can be placed on even the truth of that which is mixed up with such superabundant liabilities to error?

It is nothing to the purpose, however, to admit that the Bible is true. It is one thing for a book to be true, and quite another for it to be inspired. And what is claimed for the Scriptures is not their truth only, but their inspiration. "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God." To abandon their inspiration, and to content one's-self with affirming their truth, is treachery to the Gospel and to the spiritual interests of mankind.

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* Tomline's Elements of Theology (ed. 1843), vol. i., p. 22.

Note N. Page 351.

The whole passage stands thus:—

"That which was not communicated by revelation, but which a person might have previously known by any of the providentially appointed means of acquiring information (such as personal observation, bearing a part in transactions, memory, tradition, conversation, written documents, or public notoriety), might be the matter appointed by God to be conveyed to others: in which case the due selection of the matter, and the faithful transmission of it to others by speaking or writing, would be the object of inspiration (though without revelation), as well as in the former case of inspiration resting upon revelation.

"In an extended plan of a divine dispensation, such as the Mosaic or the Christian, *it is credible* that occasion would be found for the exemplification of both these cases."—*Smith's Scripture Testimony*, p. 35.

Note O. Page 351.

It is observable that the Helvetic Confession uses the word *Theopneustic*,* so leaving open the whole question respecting the nature of theopneustia, or inspiration. It is clear, however, from the writings of that period, that inspiration was understood by the divines who attached themselves to that Confession as meaning the revelation of matter and the dictation of words. The assertion of this extreme view led, by a not unnatural recoil, to the more emphatic assertion of its extreme opposite, as in the Five Letters on Inspiration, ascribed to Le Clerc, and published in 1790. A similar occurrence has a second time taken place, in the controversy which has sprung up of late years in the bosom of the evangelical body in Geneva. Prof. Gaussen having come forward as an advocate for the inspiration of the Scriptures, in his interesting and instructive work entitled *Theopneustia*, he has taken, as was to be expected, the high ground of the Helvetic Confession, and he has been speedily followed by M. Scherer, who seems to have passed over to the entire denial of the doctrine. In these circumstances, Dr. Merle d'Aubigné has delivered a discourse on occasion of the General Meeting of the Evangelical Society of Geneva, touching on the same subject.† The more

* "Tum quoad consonas, tum quoad vocalia et puncta ipsa sive punctorum saltem potestatem, et tum quoad res, tum quoad verba, Θεόπνευστος."—*Formula Consensus Helvetici*, 1675.

† Dr. Merle d'Aubigné's Discourse is given in three consecutive numbers of the *Archives du Christianisme*, July 13 and 27, and Aug. 10, 1850.

direct bearing, indeed, of Merle d'Aubigné's discourse is against a form of mysticism which has appeared, and which wholly sets aside the Scriptures by transferring the inspiration they claim to the breast of every individual. He gives, nevertheless, a summary view of the doctrine of inspiration, and a view which is of the more importance, since it has been formally and enthusiastically adopted (according to the *Christian Times*) by the first Synod of the United Evangelical churches in France, held at Sainte Foy on the 28th of August last. There is nothing new in the doctrine as thus laid down. It is the usual Swiss doctrine, that God both gave the ideas and dictated the words of the whole Scripture. That I do not hold this doctrine I have already stated; and I must now add, that I most sincerely regret that a stand so nobly made for the inspiration of the Scriptures, should be made for a scheme of inspiration which I am convinced cannot be maintained.

The mode of argument adopted by Gaussen and Merle d'Aubigné is the same, although not expanded by both to an equal extent; and I shall devote a few lines to exhibiting what I conceive to be its essential fallacy.

In this argument the Bible is brought forward in the mass as a revelation:—"*La revelation existe, qui est la Bible.*" Then it is shown that revelation must be from God, both in its ideas and its words; from whence it is inferred that the proper and exclusive notion of inspiration is that of imparting both ideas and words. The argument next affirms that the whole Bible is inspired, and then concludes with the inference, that throughout the whole Bible the Holy Spirit has both given the ideas and dictated the words.

Now my quarrel here is solely with the conception of inspiration, which I take to be erroneous, and the manner in which it has become so is by no means obscure. It lies *in bringing forward the Bible in a mass as a revelation.* To assert this is to use the word revelation in a very loose manner, and with a latitude quite incompatible with clear thinking, or conclusive argument. Strictly speaking, *the Bible* is not a revelation. It *contains* a large and infinitely precious amount of revealed truth—in one word, a revelation; but it contains much more. We affirm, at least, that the Bible contains a large quantity of matter which, being known to the writers, did not require to be revealed, and was not revealed: and if our brethren do not admit this, here is the point where our difference arises, and where our discussions must commence.

Let our brethren hear us, and give consideration to our words. They affirm that the ideas and words of the whole Bible must have been given by the Spirit, because it is a revelation; and we agree with them that, *in so far as the Bible is a revelation*, its ideas and words have been given by the Spirit. The only ques-

tion, then, between us is, whether there be any part of the Bible which is not a revelation, any matter in it which was recorded of personal knowledge or consciousness, without having been revealed? If they will take the negative side of this question, and make it good, they will bring us to their position; only let them remember that they must not reason in this case from a foregone conclusion respecting the nature of inspiration itself, since that is one of the points involved in the issue.

If, on the other hand, they should see their way to the admission that some part—it matters not how little—of the Bible was not revealed, then the way will be still further open to a modification of the idea of inspiration itself. Hitherto the argument has stood thus:—Inspiration must consist in the giving of both ideas and words, because all inspired matter is revealed. But now we suppose it to be admitted that some inspired matter was not revealed; and the new question arises, What was inspiration when the matter was not revealed? I have given my opinion that it was a communication of divine wisdom. Will our brethren now give theirs?

Note P. Page 351.

It is the Helvetic notion of inspiration which has acquired the designation of the mechanical, or organic scheme. Whence the term mechanical has been derived I do not know; but that the word organic is fairly applied may appear from the following citation from Gaussen:—

"Without pretending in any manner to explain how the Holy Spirit could dictate the thoughts and words of the Scriptures (since the knowledge of this mystery is not given to us, nor required of us), what may be recognized in this divine work?

"Two things—first, *an impulse;* that is to say, an influence upon *the will* of the men of God, to move them to speak and write: and, secondly, *a suggestion;* that is to say, an influence upon their *understanding* and *organs.* To produce, in the first place, *within* them, ideas more or less elevated of the truth which they were on the point of promulgating; and then *externally producing expressions* the most divinely adapted to the eternal mind of the Holy Ghost."—*Theopneustia,* p. 335.

The use of the word "organs" in this definition (borrowed probably from older writers) clearly warrants the system being called the organic system. In Mr. Morell's notice of it under the name of the mechanical system, he mentions as the three principal forms under which it has appeared, that it supposes a new faculty, a verbal dictation, and a specific impulse. The last two of these are in Gaussen's definition, but not, I think,

the first. Dr. Henderson calls this an "antiquated hypothesis;"* but the recent movement at Geneva shows it to have some vitality in it still.

Mr. Morell clearly does the subject injustice, however, when he quietly assumes that there is nothing between this and what he is pleased to patronize as the dynamical theory. He has wholly disregarded in his work what may be described as the Lutheran and later English doctrine, and has thus invalidated the entire discussion which he has so elaborately conducted. For, when he comes to the support of the dynamical theory, his single argument is, that the mechanical theory will not account for certain characteristics of the Bible—its progressive morality, its minor discrepancies, and its canonical reception—and that the dynamical theory will. Suppose we admit this, then we say that there is another theory, which he has not examined, and which may, perhaps, supply equal facilities.

This is not the only observation, however, to which the evidence adduced by Mr. Morell in support of the dynamical theory of inspiration is liable.

It is as a whole scanty and deficient. The reasons are but three; and they are literally these, that the theory *will account* for the alleged impure morals of the Old Testament, and the discrepancies and defects of Scripture narrative and discussion, and the general reception of the canonical books. The theory really will account for these astounding phenomena, and consequently it must be true. Why, not to repeat the observation just now made, that it is possible some other theory may account for them equally well, we cannot help asking in our simplicity, Is this all? Is there no attempt to show that a higher potency of the human understanding (in affirming which to be inspiration the dynamical theory consists) is adequate to the discovery of divine secrets, and that its more elevated efforts can give to the perceptions of men authority as the mind of God? Is there no attempt to show that the theory can account, not merely for the alleged imperfections of the Bible, but for its glorious excellences, and that it is consistent with the veracity of its oft-repeated claim to be the words of the Most High? To these, and many other questions of this class which crowd upon the thoughtful reader of Mr. Morell's pages, the only answer is, No. No such evidence is adduced; perhaps none could be found.

Further, the evidence, such as it is, is not properly available. Mr. Morell has blended the two questions of inspiration and canonicity. Now the latter has no real connexion with the former. It is, for the most part, purely an historical question, and rests upon totally different evidence from that which determines the question of inspiration.

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* On Inspiration, p. 65.

Finally, the evidence which is applicable has no conclusive power. It presents two difficulties to the advocates of the mechanical theory, but it does no more. Mr. Morell knows very well, or ought to know, that the advocates of that theory believe these difficulties can be surmounted; and, at all events, no party can be expected to abandon a theory which they judge to have strong positive support, because some difficulties remain which they are not able to remove.

Note Q. Page 351.

"We cannot but conclude that inspiration, so far as it relates to the inditing of the sacred oracles, *is but of one kind.* . . . . . The expression seems to imply nothing short of the idea, that the whole sacred volume is from God; the *writers received both their sentiments and words from the Holy Spirit.*"—*Frazer's Essay on Inspiration*, in the second volume of *Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion*, p. 446. Edinburgh, 1835.

Note R. Page 351.

Referring to matters previously known by the sacred writers, he says: "'Tis clear that a new suggestion was absolutely useless. And as we ought not at any time to have recourse to miracles but in a case of necessity, we should violate that maxim by affirming that the Holy Ghost suggested and whispered into the ears of the apostles what they knew before."—*La Mothe's Inspiration of the New Testament Asserted*, 1694.

Note S. Page 352.

The want of judgment shown in the selection of this term has struck other writers. Thus Dr. Dick:—

"This kind of inspiration has been called the inspiration of suggestion. It may be deemed of little importance to dispute about a word; but suggestion, seeming to express an immediate operation on the mind by which ideas are excited in it, is of too limited signification to denote the various modes in which prophets and apostles were made acquainted with supernatural truths. . . . . This degree of inspiration, in strict propriety of speech, should be called revelation; a word preferable to suggestion, because it is expressive of all the ways in which God communicated new ideas to the minds of his servants. It is a word, too, chosen by the Holy Ghost himself to signify the discovery of truths formerly unknown to the apostles."—*Dick's Lectures on Theology*, vol. i., p. 199.

It is humbling, after reading so judicious a remark as this, to turn to this writer's definition of inspiration, and to observe how it violates his own canon. "Inspiration," says he, "is an influence on the understandings, imaginations, memories, and other mental powers of the sacred writers, by which they were qualified to communicate to the world the knowledge of the will of God."* This definition violates his own canon in two respects. In the first place, it represents inspiration as an operation on the mind, which is the very reason why he objects to the word suggestion; and, in the second place, it will not in any way comprehend the idea of revelation, which he proposes to substitute for suggestion.

Note T. Page 352.

It will be obvious to the reader, that I differ from writers who have used the terms superintendence, elevation, &c., in classing all the ideas conveyed by them under the comprehensive term, wisdom. In so far, I might be regarded as merely reducing to greater simplicity a system which had been unnecessarily and undesirably complex. But I go much further. On the one hand, wisdom is more than superintendence, elevation, &c. On the other hand (and this is by far the most important difference), I maintain inspiration in its lowest degree to be a communication of *divine* wisdom. I recoil from such words as excitement, or elevation, in this connexion, because they denote merely an increased potency of the human faculties; and I cannot but agree with Carson and others of that school, in their assertion that this is not inspiration. Divine inspiration is (to keep the metaphor) the breathing of God (in some sense) into man. In its lowest sense, the communication to man (for the time and the object contemplated) of divine wisdom; in the next degree, the communication to man of divine knowledge; and in the highest degree, the communication to man (for the time and for the purpose) of the divine personality or indwelling.

Note U. Page 353.

I would not be understood as setting up any claim to originality, which, upon such a subject, would seem to have little to recommend it. I have simply said that "I do not know" whether I have any precursor in the view I have given. Upon consulting the few commentators I have by me on the passages referred to, I do not find it taken by them; but it is doubtless to be found somewhere or other among theological writers, if it have any

* Essay on Inspiration, p. 21: Lectures on Theology, p. 193.

ground of probability at all. Even if held, however, as a point of biblical interpretation, it does not appear to have been incorporated by any writer into the general idea of inspiration. Tholuck, in his recent historical papers of the doctrine of inspiration,* states that "inspiration in the widest extent of the notion" is maintained in the Helvetic Confession, and by the doctors of the Reformed church; this "widest extent" being that the ideas were given, and the words dictated, by the Holy Spirit. A *less* comprehensive idea of inspiration has been held by many, as by the Lutheran and later English divines generally, but a *more* comprehensive one nowhere appears. Doddridge, with many after him, speaks of superintendence, and other degrees ascending up to revelation; but beyond revelation no one seems to have risen. "Inspiration in the highest sense," says Parry,† "is the immediate communication of knowledge to the human mind by the Spirit of God." Elsewhere he adopts the terms suggestion and superintendence. Whitby speaks of suggestion and direction.‡ Mr. Jordan, of revelation and guidance.§

After all, if my view is original, I am quite willing to admit that this is an argument against it, rather than in its favour; I cannot, however, relinquish my right to think for myself.

Note V. Page 353.

A specimen of such rejection may be found in Dr. Carson's treatment of Dr. Dick.‖

It is a great misfortune, and, as it strikes me, a singular characteristic of this controversy, that the positions taken in it have covered so vast a space of ground, and have been of such endless diversity, that it is scarcely possible to stand—quite impossible, unless you place yourself at one or other of the two extremes—in a position in which you shall not have to fight with antagonists on both sides. Thus I have been in agreement with Lutherans and Helvetians alike, in contending against the modern emasculating notions of inspiration; but now the *entente cordiale* has ceased, and I have to defend myself no less resolutely against some of them. In particular this infelicity affects that part of the discussion which relates to verbal inspiration. This has been asserted in so high a sense, that the enemies of inspiration have made a strenuous, not to say a successful assault upon it; and because some of the devoted advocates of inspiration cannot assist

* Evangelical Christendom, for September, 1850, p. 270.
† Parry's Inquiry, p. 28.
‡ See Preface to his Paraphrase on the New Testament.
§ See his remarks on Tholuck's papers in Evangelical Christendom.
‖ Theories of Inspiration, p. 204.

in defending this extreme position, they are harshly charged "with surrendering a post to the enemy." And hence, practically, these writers come rather to be identified with adversaries in resisting an unwarrantable pretension, than with friends in vindicating well-defined truth. In this manner Dr. Henderson, in his valuable work, has a whole Lecture against verbal inspiration, as though he totally denied it; when, as is plain from the passage cited below, he argues against verbal inspiration only on the theory of inspiration itself which he disclaims, and that, *on his own theory*, he maintains the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures as distinctly as any one. It is to be recollected, however, that while this modified scheme of verbal inspiration is not enough to satisfy the school of Swiss divines, it is much more than is conceded to us by adversaries on the other side; and thus, besides showing higher ground to be untenable, we have to maintain our own.

The passage above referred to from Dr. Henderson is as follows. Speaking of the rigid sense in which the advocates of verbal inspiration in the Helvetic notion of it understand the word inspiration, he says:—

"Remove this restricted acceptation, and invest the word with the whole extent of meaning which the phenomena of Scripture require, and there will be no absurdity in maintaining that a discourse may be inspired, though the single terms of that discourse may not have been *directly imparted* to the writer. According to the doctrine laid down in a former lecture, the penmen of Scripture wrote under an influence so exerted, as to secure the proper deposition of those matters which were to be transmitted in writing for the benefit of mankind."—*Henderson on Inspiration*, p. 416.

This is nothing short of maintaining verbal inspiration in the sense in which Dr. Henderson understands inspiration itself. And Dr. Dick takes similar ground, as appears from the following passage from his writings. Having spoken of the obvious verbal inspiration of some parts of Scripture, he goes on to say:—

"With regard to other parts of Scripture, consisting of histories, moral reflections, and devotional pieces, I would not contend for the inspiration of the language in the same sense. It is reasonable to believe that the writers were permitted to exercise their own faculties to a certain extent, and to express themselves in their natural manner. At the same time, when we consider the promise of Christ to his disciples, that when they were brought before kings and governors for his sake, it should be given them in that hour what they should speak;* and recollect the affirmation of Paul, that he and the other apostles used not the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost taught,† we cannot suppose that, when they were

* Matt. x. 19. † 1 Cor. ii. 13.

most at liberty, they were in no degree directed by a secret influence in the selection of words and phrases."—*Dick's Lectures*, pp. 203, 204.

This part of the subject is well treated by Dr. Leonard Woods, of the Theological Seminary, Andover, United States, in his Lectures on the Inspiration of the Scriptures, chap. v. He states his general view in the following terms:—

"The general doctrine of inspiration, understood in any proper sense, seems clearly to imply that the divine influence which the prophets and apostles enjoyed must have pertained, in some way, to the manner in which they communicated divine truth. For can we suppose that God moved his servants to write a particular doctrine or fact, and yet did not influence them to write it in a suitable manner? —that, after prompting them to communicate something of consequence, he so abandoned them that they were liable—as every man without divine assistance is—to fall into mistakes, or to make the communication in a manner less proper in itself, and less agreeable to the mind of God, than some other?"—*Woods' Lectures on Inspiration*, p. 70.

Note W. Page 354.

According to Mr. Morell, inspiration, in the sense in which we speak of it—inspiration as a communication to us of the mind of God—is not needed. "Why," says he, "should we be perpetually craving after a stiff, literal, verbal infallibility? *Christianity consists not in propositions—it is a life in the soul.*"* This is a pregnant affirmation. It means much, and embodies a principle the influence of which is to be traced throughout Mr. Morell's discussion of the subject. A few sentences may not be ill bestowed on the examination of it.

I am not going to begin this examination by denying that Christianity is, in one view of it, "a life in the soul;" but I demur to this being assigned as the only view of it. There is surely an objective, as well as a subjective Christianity; a Christianity without the soul, as well as a Christianity within it; an external Christianity, of which the internal presupposes the existence, and to which it constitutes a response.

Admitting, then, that subjective Christianity is—since Mr. Morell pleases to call it so—"a life in the soul," I ask, what is objective Christianity? It does not consist in propositions, says Mr. Morell. Very well. That is the *negative* (of which more hereafter); but what is the *positive* idea of objective Christianity? On this point our author says nothing. It is for me, then, to speak: and I affirm that Christianity, objectively considered, is a peculiar method of divine administration towards mankind.

* Philosophy of Religion, p. 183.

God's method of saving sinners by Jesus Christ, that is Christianity—the objective or external Christianity, to which the subjective or internal Christianity, the "life in the soul" which the appreciation of it calls forth, corresponds.

Well, then, even objective Christianity "consists not in propositions." Surely not; no one ever supposed such a thing, although a philosophical writer has thought proper to contradict it. But objective Christianity is *made known* in propositions. For example: "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." This is a proposition by which, and by many such like, objective Christianity, or God's method of mercy, is made known to men.

And not only are propositions the way in which Christianity is actually made known to men, they constitute a necessary means to this end, and the only means by which it can be accomplished. Mr. Morell, indeed, asserts that "words—the most precise words—can never convey a clear religious conception to an unawakened mind;" and while one is pondering the import of this mysterious language, he helps us to his meaning by saying—"No logical precision of language and definition is needed in order to waken up intuitions." No, perhaps not "*logical precision* of language and definition;" but "*language*," Mr. Morell, surely "*language*" "is needed in order to waken up intuitions" on subjects which can be known by no other means, and language in the form of "propositions," and none the worse for "logical precision." As to the assertion that "words can never convey a clear religious conception to an unawakened mind," I think it absolutely untrue. Words are the means of conveying conceptions in all other cases, and why not on subjects religious? As to their not conveying "clear conceptions to an unawakened mind," the conveyance of religious conceptions by words to unawakened minds is precisely the method which God has instituted for awakening them, and the only method which it is competent for man to employ towards his fellows. If it is necessarily fruitless, man's labour is vain, and God's appointment absurd. But that it is not necessarily fruitless is manifest from the facts, as patent, not only in the case of enlightened men, but in the case of unbelievers themselves; for Christianity cannot be rejected unless it is understood.

Although, therefore, Christianity does not "consist in propositions," the knowledge of it among men necessitates the use of propositions, as the only medium of its diffusion: and it is, consequently, of the utmost importance to have "a literal and verbal infallibility" in the propositions employed, at once to convey to us the facts of the divine method, and to waken up in us the intuitions and emotions appropriately corresponding to them.

But let me now ask, on the other hand, why should Mr. Morell dislike "a literal and verbal infallibility" in the Scriptures; and,

shutting his eyes to the objective aspect of Christianity, concentrate all his regard on the subjective, the "life in the soul"? The reason evidently is—and it is no breach of charity to say so—that he recognizes in Christianity no fixed character. He conceives of it as constantly undergoing a change, advancing in a line of perpetual progress, and, in a word, moving onward with the age. Yes! Mr. Morell is really a man of the movement, if not in politics and economics, at least in religion. The proof of it is close at hand.

"The New Testament," says he, "contains the conceptions of men who lived and walked with Christ; who drank at the fountain-head of truth; whose religious consciousness was awakened and elevated by special and extraordinary agencies; who must be regarded, therefore, as coming nearer to the mind of Christ than any other men can do to the end of time. Hence their minds possessed a canonical authority for the succeeding church: they give us the first clear impressions from the divine antitype; they appear all fresh from the heavenly mould; and our highest wisdom as Christians is, first to get our minds into the closest communion with them as regards the real elements of divine truth, and *then to develop those elements by all the light which succeeding ages will afford.*"

I draw the reader's particular attention to the closing lines of this paragraph. "Succeeding ages," then, will, in the opinion of Mr. Morell, "afford light" for developing "the elements" of divine truth bequeathed to us by the apostles. The reader will scarcely credit it, perhaps, but the meaning really is, that the development of religious truth is constantly progressive, that the "ages" of men become successively wiser in the things of God; and that even apostolic doctrine is to be modified according to the advancing illumination of the human intellect. In accordance with this view, he describes the books of the Old Testament history as merely presenting us with "facts in the religious life of a people, facts in *the progress of the human mind towards a loftier view*," p. 179. "We see," says he, "their religious consciousness dissected and portrayed; there are its excellences and defects; there its struggles with evil, and aspirations after truth; there the course of its development from age to age; there, in a word, *the spirit of humanity on its pathway to Christian light and love*," p. 169. "*Herein lies their inspiration*," says he (p. 179), not that they tell us anything from God, but that they portray to us the religious history of mankind, as the Spirit of God may be supposed to have wrought in them. Mr. Morell thus seems to conceive that the Holy Spirit is the author of at least all the more considerable religious exercises of the human mind; that he is carrying the race through a continuously progressive course of divine knowledge; and that every generation, while deriving something old from its precursors, is to develop something new for itself. No wonder that an "infallible" inspiration does not

suit him. In such a course as he imagines the human race to be running, he cannot allow of a stationary point. In ancient times "the spirit of humanity" was "on its pathway," and the same "spirit of humanity" is "on its pathway" still. We, instead of looking back to the apostolic age as a focus of divine light from which our own illumination is to be continually renewed, are also to go onward, and "develop the elements of divine knowledge" recorded in the New Testament "by the light which succeeding ages will afford." That is to say, we are to correct the doctrines of Paul and Peter, of James and John, by the speculations of Strauss and Hegel, of Emerson and Carlyle.

As further evidence that no injustice has been done to Mr. Morell by the view above taken of his position, I introduce the following quotation from the last of his Four Lectures on the Philosophical Tendencies of the Age. Speaking of our "great fundamental religious conceptions," he says:—

"For the truth and adequacy of these we must appeal to the religious consciousness of mankind—the religious consciousness, I mean, enlightened by all the aids and influences, natural or revealed, which lie open to us from so may sources. The truth which Christianity has to develop lies potentially in the word, just as the plant, or tree, lies concealed in the seed: but as the seed must come in contact with the warmth of heaven and the moisture of the soil ere it can produce the flower and the fruit, so also must the germ of truth contained in the inspired records of the apostolic church come into contact with the activity of thinking minds, and the warmth of loving hearts, before that which is but a germ in the word becomes a living and practical reality in the world. The human consciousness is the soil in which these germs of truth vegetate and grow; it is at once the instrument and medium of its development; and to it, consequently, we must appeal as the great authority which can alone solve, in the course of time and by the effort of labour, the great controversies which for so many centuries have agitated the world. As the religious consciousness of humanity, prompted and refined by all divine aids, becomes more perfect and more pure, in that proportion shall we find controverted points thrown into new relations; apparent contradictions merged and reconciled in higher principles; and the great tide of human thought rolling all things, even the most apparently paradoxical, onwards and upwards to the light of day.

"The appeal to human consciousness at large is open, however, to one objection; namely, this, that if this *sensus communis* (which is assumed as the supreme judge of truth) be perpetually growing and expanding, then the *standard* of truth must be ever varying. Centuries ago that standard could not have been what it is now; centuries hence it will have made an equal progress. Now, to obviate this objection, we at once admit that the standard of truth to man does vary; that it is progressive, and consequently that we are unable to say that we have carried our philosophy to the highest point, and attained the full measure of [religious] truth which is accessible to man. Humanity, we assert, is in progress; the standard of truth, the universal

human reason, is in progress; truth itself, viewed subjectively, and in relation to man, is in progress. The fact, therefore, that our test varies, so far from being an objection, is only a surer indication of its reality. Had we now a fixed test [of religious truth] humanity would outgrow it; that which would serve for one age would not be suited to the next; or, if it were, then human [religious] knowledge must be confined within certain attained dimensions, where it would grow stiff and dead, losing all its vitality in stagnation, and consequent decay." *Morell's Four Lectures*, pp. 176, 177.

How, entertaining the view here developed, the author can have fallen into the inconsistency of asserting that "the apostles came nearer to the mind of Christ than any other men can do to the end of time,"* it might, if Mr. Morell's writings were characterized by consistency, be difficult to say. It is, however, too much *more suo* to excite surprise.

Note X. Page 355.

Passages to this effect might readily be cited from various authors; but I content myself with a single example.

"That to a certain extent, verbal inspiration, or the inspiration of words, took place, is not denied. In recording matters immediately spoken with an audible voice by Jehovah, or by an angel-interpreter; in giving expression to points of revelation which entirely surpassed the comprehension of the writers; in recording prophecies the minute bearings of which they did not perceive; in presenting views of truth, or enacting institutions, which belonged to a different economy, and to which there was nothing analogous in preceding dispensations; in short, in committing to writing any of the dictates of the Spirit which they could not otherwise have accurately expressed, the writers were supplied with the words as well as with the matter."—*Henderson on Inspiration*, p. 390.

Note Y. Page 355.

In this sense Dr. Pye Smith himself maintains verbal inspiration, and Dr. Carson admits the validity of it. Remarking on Dr. Pye Smith's observation, that "the divine influence on the mind of the writer would as certainly guide the rational faculty of expression to the adoption of the best and most suitable terms, as if the words were dictated to a mere amanuensis," Dr. Carson makes the following express admission:—"If the divine influence on the mind of the writer has certainly guided the rational faculty of expression to the adoption of the best and most suitable terms and phrases, *then the terms and phrases of Scripture are all given by God.*"—*Carson's Theories of Inspiration*, p. 104.

* Philosophy of Religion, p. 183.

Note Z. Page 356.

I depart in this instance from the common rendering, not from a love of singularity, but on account of its palpable inaccuracy. A reference to any good lexicon or commentator, or even a glance at the connexion of the passage, will show at once the true meaning.

Note A A. Page 356.

I am aware that the New Testament writers do not always make their quotations from the Old with verbal accuracy; and so far as this circumstance may be supposed to create a difficulty in reference to the view of verbal inspiration I have adopted, I make on it the following observations.

First. The apparent number of such verbal differences will be considerably reduced by a regard, 1, to intentional corruptions of the Hebrew text; 2, to various readings; 3, to the imperfection of biblical learning.

Secondly. The idea of verbal accuracy is, to a great degree irrelevant; since quotations from the Old Testament by the writers of the New were always made *in* a translation, and very often *from* a translation. They wrote, not in Hebrew, but in Greek; nearly half of their citations from the Old Testament were made from the Greek translation of it then extant, the Septuagint; and those which they made from the Hebrew must have been translated by themselves into the Greek language.

Thirdly. Verbal accuracy, even as it may be conceived of in a translation, was in many instances not required by the design with which the quotation—often to be rather called an allusion—was made.

Fourthly. Verbal accuracy, that is to say, a close translation of the original, will be found in all cases in which stress is laid upon words.

On this subject I refer the reader to an excellent chapter in Horne's Introduction, vol. ii., chap. 9.

Note B B. Page 356.

My use of this passage is, of course, liable to question. It appears to me, however, that the language of the seventeenth verse determines the reference of the term law in the eighteenth, not to the preceptive parts of the ancient Scriptures, but to the writings of the Old Testament at large. "Think not that I am come to destroy *the law or the prophets:* I am not come to destroy,

but to fulfil." The emphatic use of the phrase "jot or tittle" cannot, I think, be taken to mean less than *every particle of the meaning* of the Old Testament Scriptures. In many cases the alteration of a jot or a tittle might effect a very material alteration in the meaning likewise.

Note C C. Page 357.

As these sheets are passing through the press, the October number of Evangelical Christendom comes into my hand, containing a paper by Mr. Jordan on the same subject. It consists of some remarks on Gaussen's Theopneustia (now reprinted with the title, given to it by the English publisher, "It is Written") suggested by a recent perusal of that work, and "a Theory of the Verbal Inspiration of Scripture." On the second portion of this paper I offer a few remarks.

1. I am happy to agree with Mr. Jordan in his general position, that "no theory of inspiration can be right, which is not based upon the fact of its being verbal." My reasons for this are assigned at some length in the preceding Lecture.

2. I am constrained to differ from him in his assertion that "the extraordinary form of inspiration is strictly analogous to the ordinary influence of grace—that is," says Mr. Jordan, "of inspiration." He thus holds two kinds of inspiration; one the ordinary, consisting of the "influence of grace," or the renewing operation of the Holy Spirit; the other the extraordinary, consisting of the miraculous influence by which the faculties of man are employed for the expression of the mind of God. He tells us that this doctrine is taught, first, by the Church of England, and, secondly, by the apostle Paul. The order, perhaps, is a matter of taste—but let that pass. All that he quotes Paul as teaching us on the subject is, that "it is God who worketh in us to will and to do of his good pleasure" (Phil. ii. 13); which, I submit, is not at all to the purpose. He then quotes the tenth article of the Church of England, and more particularly two collects, in which the word inspiration is used of the gracious influence of the Spirit. Upon this point I have only to ask Mr. Jordan two questions. The first is, whether he means to adduce the formularies of the Church of England as proof in a scriptural discussion, and to say that "the influence of grace" *is* inspiration, because the Book of Common Prayer calls it so? The second is, whether he really thinks that the compilers of the Book of Common Prayer really meant to teach any such thing, or whether he does not rather understand them as using the word inspiration in a loose and indeterminate sense? The latter, I confess, is my opinion; but, even if the former were the fact, the authority of the document is with me, and with many more (as Mr. Jordan must well know), absolutely null and void.

3. I am not satisfied with the term "guidance," as expressing the second part of his view of inspiration. The passage on which he rests its adoption is John xvi. 13: "When he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he shall *guide* you into all truth;" or more properly, "into the whole truth." Now, the object to which the guidance here promised is directed, is "*the truth;*" and it thus fails of the purpose for which Mr. Jordan has quoted it, which is to place it at the basis of a theory of *verbal* inspiration. By an antagonist to his views it might, I think, be fairly said, that the passage affirms nothing concerning the inspiration of words; but that, on the contrary, it would be fully satisfied by asserting the inspiration of ideas. The sense is, in my judgment, much nearer to what Mr. Jordan, in common with myself, designates revelation, than to what he means by guidance, although I do not think that even this is its exact meaning. I would rather place it by the side of a fact which we have stated in Luke xxiv. 45: "Then opened he their understanding, that they might understand the Scriptures."

The term being thus without scriptural authority, I am free to confess that I do not think it adequate to the facts. Of course, the meaning of the term may be heightened for a particular purpose, till it may be made to convey the whole idea of inspiration; but, as generally used, I think divine guidance is *not* divine inspiration. I conceive persons may be under divine guidance, who nevertheless are not inspired.

4. I cannot concur in Mr. Jordan's mode of "explaining the manner in which the Holy Spirit has given a verbal inspiration." He says it is by "appropriation:" by which he means that the Spirit "appropriates to his own purpose" the party inspired. There is no doubt of this as a fact; but what does it explain? There is something imposing in the word "appropriation," but it is mere appearance. To appropriate a person, in the sense here intended, is merely to make use of him: and to what extent does it "explain the manner" of inspiration, whether verbal or otherwise, to say that it is effected by the Spirit's making use of a man for the purpose? The question still remains, *what use* the divine agent makes of him, and in what manner he acts upon him?

It appears, further, that Mr. Jordan's assignment of appropriation as the *modus* of inspiration is as superfluous as it is fruitless. He denies dictation; and the proper antithesis to this is, not appropriation, but guidance, which he adduces distinctly in its place. When he has said this, it seems to me that he has done. Gaussen says that inspiration consists of revelation and dictation; Mr. Jordan, that it consists of revelation and guidance, and there is an end of the matter. In what manner God effects either of these results is a question which Gaussen has expressly declined to take up; and Mr. Jordan would do better to imitate his discretion.

Note D D. Page 357.

It is not till I am despatching the last proofs to the printer, that I see the Biblical Review for January, 1850, and the notice of Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament which it contains. I feel bound to offer on one part of this article a few remarks, after the citation I have made from the work itself in the preceding Lecture.*

The reviewer makes an attempt to identify the view of inspiration entertained by Dr. Davidson with that which has been advocated by Dr. Henderson and Dr. Pye Smith. They are, says he, "*substantially* (the italics are his) the same." I must confess that I read this sentence with surprise; an emotion which I cannot but think that all the eminent men whose names are implicated must feel in common with me. The reviewer, in proof of his assertion, and as his only proof, goes on to state that "they all agree in rejecting the doctrine of verbal inspiration;" which in a certain sense is true, but which also in a certain sense is false, and which, if it were wholly true, would not establish the identity affirmed to exist.

The doctrine of verbal inspiration is twofold. Some authors mean by it the dictation of words to the writers by the Spirit of God; others mean by it the selection of words by the writers under the influence of wisdom imparted by the Spirit of God. Now it is against the doctrine in the former, which may be called the Helvetic notion of it, and against this exclusively, that Dr. Pye Smith and Dr. Henderson argue: the doctrine in the second sense of it they not only do not reject, but they both hold and advocate it, of which sufficient evidence is adduced in notes V and Y, now in the reader's hand. Dr. Davidson certainly rejects the doctrine of verbal inspiration in its first form, and therein he agrees with Pye Smith and Henderson; but he rejects the doctrine in its second form also, and therein he differs from them.

If, however, the resemblance in this respect had been perfect instead of partial, this would not have established an identity of views on the subject of inspiration at large. Writers who reject the doctrine of verbal inspiration in both forms, and so far agree, differ widely on other parts of the subject; from Parry and Bishop Tomline, to Michaelis and Morell.

Nor is such a difference between Pye Smith and Henderson on the one hand and Davidson on the other a mere possibility, it is a fact. Dr. Davidson, indeed, nowhere formally treats the subject of inspiration. The passage which both the reviewer and myself have cited bears directly on the question whether inspiration was

* See page 334 of this volume.

abiding or transient; and only incidentally is there dropped in it the phrase which serves as a definition of inspiration itself: "It was a brightening up of all the faculties to an unusual elevation." We must be content, therefore, with this, since it is all that the learned professor is pleased to tell us of his views on the subject; and we may be thankful that it is so simple and intelligible. But let any man compare this with the chapter in which Dr. Henderson treats of the nature of inspiration, and with the remarks at large of Dr. Pye Smith, and he will be at no loss for evidence that the writers are far asunder.

That the alleged resemblance is not perfect, indeed, the reviewer seems to be aware; since he cautiously says that the views of these writers "are *substantially* the same." All I can say upon this matter is, that I totally differ from him. I think that Dr. Davidson's views are "*substantially* the same" with those of Morell and Akermann, that they involve an abandonment of all that is valuable in the entire doctrine of inspiration, and that the tendency of the paper in the Biblical Review to allay suspicion and prevent investigation is most infelicitous. That Dr. Davidson is indebted for this courtesy to the position he holds, I cannot for a moment suppose; but, in my judgment, his position greatly aggravates the mischief of his departure from the truth, and lays upon all writers who ask or enjoy the public confidence a more solemn obligation to watchfulness and warning.

NOTE.—The following papers, which appeared in the *Baptist Magazine* for 1850, are here inserted on account of their close connexion with the subject of the preceding Treatise.

DIVINE INSPIRATION NOT A DYNAMICAL PROCESS.

THE divine inspiration of the Scriptures is a fact of vital importance in Christianity, and it is of vital importance to the Christian that it should be not erroneously conceived. I submit, therefore, a few thoughts on one of the modes in which it has lately been represented. The divine inspiration of the Scriptures was, we are told, a dynamical process.

Let us in the first place clearly understand this proposition.

The word dynamical is formed from the Greek word δύναμις, which signifies power. A dynamical process, therefore, is one in which the power of the party acted on is increased; and when it is said that inspiration was a dynamical process, the meaning is that it consisted in increasing the power of the sacred penmen to discern and record the matters contained in the Bible. In the words of Professor Davidson, the inspiration of the sacred writers was "a brightening up of all their faculties to an unusual elevation;" or, according to Mr. Morell, it was just such an invigoration of the mind as is experienced by men of genius (poets, for example) when kindled by the passionate contemplation of some exciting theme. In this view of divine inspiration I cannot concur, and I reject it for the following reasons.

1. Because it is a mere hypothesis, and is nowhere stated in Holy Scripture, either in express terms or by implication.

2. Because it is a purely gratuitous hypothesis; there being already in the Holy Scriptures a view given of their inspiration authoritative and satisfactory. "GOD, at sundry times

and in divers manners, *spake* in times past to the fathers by the prophets" (Hebrews i. 1).

3. Because it is an hypothesis devised to obviate an alleged difficulty which has no real existence. If inspiration be not dynamical, it is said, it must be mechanical. But this is not true. Inspiration may be neither the one nor the other. Indeed, mechanical it cannot be, since mechanical action can take place only among mechanical powers, which, in the case of communication between a creating and a created mind, are wholly wanting. The alleged difficulty would seem to rest on the extraordinary and inadmissible assumption, that intelligent communication between God and his rational creatures is impossible.

4. Because, as an hypothesis, it is not capable of explaining the facts to which it relates. No brightening up of the faculties, for example, to an elevation however unusual, can account for the foretelling by men of distant events, which is one of the results of divine inspiration as presented to us in the Scriptures. Man's knowledge of the future is necessarily very limited; and yet the whole course of time, with all its wonders, has stood open to the eyes of the inspired seers. Besides, the predictions of the prophets were sometimes unintelligible to themselves, which could not have been the case if they had been the mere conceptions of their own minds. It was thus with Daniel, chap. viii. 19; and of the whole mass of evangelical prophecy the apostle Peter speaks in the following terms: "Of which salvation the prophets have inquired and searched diligently, who prophesied of the grace that should come unto you: searching what or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow" (1 Peter i. 10, 11). Now an hypothesis which will not explain the facts for which it is adduced is evidently false and worthless.

5. Because it is inconsistent with any part of the Bible being "the *word of God.*" For if, even in its sublimest portions, it has resulted from a mere brightening up of the human faculties, it clearly can be nothing more, whatever may be its truthfulness, than the *word of man.* In how many instances, however, the Scripture proclaims itself to be "the word of the Lord" it must be quite unnecessary for me to say. What inspired men thought of their testimony, and

how it was received by converts in the first age of Christianity, appears sufficiently from the following declaration of the apostle Paul, addressed to the Thessalonian disciples: "For this cause also thank we God without ceasing, because, when ye received the word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men, but, as it is in truth, the word of God" (1 Thess. ii. 13). Nothing short of "the word of God" can form an adequate basis for the faith and hope of man.

6. Because it is inconsistent with the manner in which the Scriptures of the Old Testament were treated, both by Christ and his apostles. They constantly referred to these inspired records as *having authority*, which it is quite inconceivable they should have done, if these documents had contained the mere conceptions and utterances of men in an elevated state of mind. Paul and Peter, James and John, could have gained no corroboration for statements of their own, by merely citing the fact that other men had entertained similar views five hundred or a thousand years before; and least of all can we conceive of our adorable Lord, the Incarnate Wisdom, as gravely sustaining his instructions by props so feeble. It seems certain that *they* must have regarded the ancient Scriptures as traceable to some higher source than the mind of man, however its faculties might have been brightened up—and doubtless they were right.

7. Because it assumes that all the objects ever seen by inspired men are within the natural scope of the human understanding. For the brightening up of man's faculties cannot, of course, be regarded as enlarging their natural scope, but only as enabling them to command whatever may be within it. Consequently, to have seen all that is recorded in the Bible by means of such a process, supposes that the whole was originally within the sphere of vision, although some parts might not have been seen till the eye was brightened up. Now when the profound and sublime contents of the Bible are considered, it seems impossible to accept the conclusion that all this is naturally discoverable by man, and requires nothing more than a brightening up of his faculties in order to arrive at it. It was the faith of the apostle Paul, at least, that "the things of God knoweth no one but the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. ii. 11).

DIVINE REVELATION NOT A MODE OF INTELLIGENCE.

"REVELATION," says Mr. Morell, necessarily signifies "a mode of intelligence," "a mode or process of intelligence," "a process of the intuitional consciousness."*

I have quoted these several phrases because I wish the reader to be satisfied that I have not availed myself of a slip of the pen, or misrepresented the writer's real meaning. That the sentiment he thus expresses is both important in itself, and of most momentous bearing, must be evident at a glance; or, if this were at all doubtful, it would be demonstrated by the fact, that the author infers from it "that the Bible cannot, in strict accuracy of language, be termed a revelation." I shall need no apology, therefore, for offering on it a few remarks.

1. If revelation be a mode or process of intelligence, it is no longer divine, but human. For the intelligence referred to by Mr. Morell is the intelligence of the human mind, which, of course, in all its modes and processes, must be human still. Revelation, however, is declared to be a process, not of man, but of God; as it is written, "GOD *hath revealed* them unto us by his Spirit" (1 Cor. ii. 10).

2. If revelation be a mode or process of human intelligence, it is no longer something directed *to* man, but something taking place *in* him; since all modes and processes of human intelligence are necessarily within the mind itself. The Scripture declares, however, as in the passage just cited, that revelation is a process directed *to* man, and therefore external to him.

3. If revelation be a mode or process of human intelligence, there is then a certain other process left without a name, and one for which a name is certainly required. The divine act of communicating truth otherwise unknowable to

* Philosophy of Religion, pp. 124, 125, 141.

man—this, which has long and familiarly been called revelation, if it is no longer to be called so, by what term is it henceforth to be designated? It is undoubtedly an act of infinite importance and excellency, and cannot be suffered to be obliterated, by a false assumption of its name for something else, from the category of spiritual things.

4. In truth, however, in calling revelation a mode of intelligence, Mr. Morell entirely overlooks the essential nature of revelation itself, and amuses himself with one of its conditions. "For a revelation at all to exist," says he, "there must be an intelligent being on the one hand adapted to receive it; and there must be on the other hand a process by which this same intelligent being becomes conscious of it." Doubtless: but this very statement clearly implies, that neither the intelligent being, nor any process of intelligence of which it is capable, is the revelation itself. Yet, because a revelation *implies*, or, as Mr. Morell says, "indicates," a process of intelligence in the reception of it, he strangely leaps to the assertion that the process of intelligence is the revelation itself. A more obvious and transparent fallacy could scarcely have been fallen into by any writer pretending to reason, and it is especially surprising in a writer of such high philosophical pretensions as Mr. Morell. That the natural and just idea of revelation had really presented itself to his mind is evident from the very first sentence he has written on the subject, which is as follows: "The idea of a revelation always *implies* a process by which knowledge is communicated to an intelligent being." If he had said a revelation *is* such a process he would have expressed the exact truth. How, after being so near it, he could have glided off into the fallacious notion that revelation is not a mode of communication, but a mode of intelligence, is almost unaccountable.

We can now dispose satisfactorily of his grave and frightful inference "that the Bible cannot, in strict accuracy of language, be termed a revelation." The Bible, undoubtedly, is not a process of intelligence; but a method by which knowledge otherwise unattainable is communicated to intelligent beings it certainly is, and one in all respects worthy of the high and glorious name it bears—a discovery of the mind of God to man.

STRICTURES ON SOME PASSAGES

IN THE

REV. J. B. BROWN'S "DIVINE LIFE IN MAN."

INTRODUCTION.

I AM not going to write a critique on Mr. Brown's Sermons; I excuse myself, therefore, from all general remarks upon them, eulogistic or otherwise. My object is simple and well defined. Upon some passages in these Sermons I propose to offer a few strictures. The passages are these:—

I.

"The attempt to establish a fundamental distinction between a father's method of government and a ruler's has done much mischief, and for a century and a half has exercised a most debasing influence on theology. The idea that as a father God sustains one set of relations to men, and as the ruler of the universe another—that the key to certain manifestations is to be found in his love, while others can only be explained by his justice—could only satisfy an age in which the real foundations both of divine and human order were obscured," p. 26.

II.

"Now this loss of power, which is life, is what befell Adam by his own act at the fall. . . . Spiritually, the manifold faculties broke loose from the will, which in the spiritual man is the organ of power. Sense, fancy, intellect, desire, affections, assumed an independent activity. The will struggled for mastery in vain. Passion broke loose from its powerless hand and paraded itself in murder, desire in impious lust, intellect in godless arts and inventions, force in the tyranny of the sword. The will, born to rule, like a poor crownless king, became the sport of factions. Tossed upon the rebellious surges of its disordered state, weak, weary, and desperate, it fought a losing battle during all the dreary ages till the advent of the Redeemer; then, gathering all its strength for one last outcry, it flung itself at the foot of the cross," p. 78.

III.

"But, in the name of all that is vital and holy, let us get rid of the notion that justification, be it what it may, is a kind of legal fiction, an agreement of God with himself to regard and treat a human being as something other than what he is really and substantially in his sight," p. 117.

IV.

On Romans xii. 1,—"I beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is your reasonable service,"—which is the text of his sixth sermon, Mr. Brown says:—

"This text presents to us the central claim and appeal of Christianity" (p. 143). "I have shown you that it is the first step into life. Life for MAN begins when he presents himself a living sacrifice to God," p. 170.

In noticing these passages, I shall, of course, have occasion to refer to other portions of Mr. Brown's volume; I shall strictly confine myself, however, to the subjects here indicated. I beg it to be understood only, that I must not be held to agree with everything on which I am silent.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

"THE attempt to establish a fundamental distinction between a father's government and a ruler's," says Mr. Brown, "has done much mischief, and for a century and a half has exercised a most debasing influence on theology. The idea that as a father God sustains one set of relations to men, and as the ruler of the universe another—that the key to certain manifestations is to be found in his love, while others can only be explained by his justice—could only satisfy an age in which the real foundations both of divine and human order were obscured," p. 26.

From this passage it appears that Mr. Brown is displeased with two things: first, with the distinction which has been drawn "between a father's government and a ruler's;" and secondly, with the application of this distinction to theology. To take these in their order.

With respect to the first, the question, of course, is, Is the distinction which has been drawn "between a father's govern-

ment and a ruler's" founded in fact? Do, or can, a parent and a magistrate act on the same principles, and adopt the same measures? The question is one of common life, and the answer must be supplied by observation of what is continually taking place around us. Look first at any well-ordered family, and watch both the principles and the methods of fatherly rule; then go into a police court, and pursue a similar course of observation. The two scenes are assuredly very far from being identical. The father possesses an unlimited discretion, the magistrate is bound to the administration of law; the father is restricted to disciplinary chastisement, the magistrate may have to inflict destructive punishment; the father must always consider the good of the child, the magistrate has to regard the well-being of the community; the father may yield much to pity, the magistrate must inflexibly administer the law. Here are surely obvious differences between paternal and magisterial rule, and differences of sufficient magnitude to warrant the assertion of a fundamental distinction. Or, if this be not evident, let the experiment be made. Let a few fathers begin to act on the principles and rules of the magistracy, and a few magistrates on the principles and rules of parents; and then we shall soon see the fruits of abolishing a distinction which is so pleasantly said to be without a difference.

From the last phrase in the paragraph on which I am commenting—that in which Mr. Brown intimates his opinion that, in the present age, "the foundations of both divine and *human* order" are obscurely understood—it may seem that magistracy, as it now exists among men, is in a condition not satisfactory to him. He expects that all human governments will hereafter become paternal, and that the magistrate and the father *will be* actually one; a cheering indication of which consummation he seems to see in the multiplication of penitentiaries, and the extension of the reformatory system. As he merely hints his opinion on this subject, without either investigation of principles or adduction of evidence, it is sufficient for me to express an opinion of a contrary kind. Without assuming the perfection of human legislation as it now exists, I do not believe that such a consummation will ever arrive. The anticipation of it is, in my view, a piece of palpable Utopianism.

Mr. Brown objects, however, to the application of this dis-

tinction to theology, on which he says it has "exercised a most debasing influence." Postponing the consideration of this charge for the present, let the theological question be adverted to. Now I readily admit that the distinction between paternal and magisterial rule should not be applied to theology without cause shown; and I take upon myself at once the responsibility of showing the cause required.

Of course, the paternal relation is far more agreeable than the magisterial, and the inclination on all hands will be to make it the exclusive basis of the divine administration towards man, if, upon trial, it be found adequate to sustain such a burden. The question, then, takes the following form: Can the administration of God towards mankind—the whole and every part of it—be explained on the supposition that he sustains to them the paternal relation only?

I am willing to answer this question in the first instance, by drawing illustrations from what is admitted by Mr. Brown himself.

1. Mr. Brown acknowledges the federal relation of Adam to his posterity. "We recognize," says he, "the law of headship which God has established in humanity, whereby Adam, by his own act, has placed his race in new and sadder relations to nature and to the Lord. This fact of the headship of Adam," he adds, "must be recognized by any honest observer;" and then he cites, as illustrative of its influence, the well-known language of the apostle (Romans v. 18), "By the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation" (p. 13). Let me be allowed reverently to ask whether this transaction can be explained on the exclusively parental hypothesis? Was it like a father to frame such an arrangement? Or could any father now honourably do a similar thing? I think not.

2. Mr. Brown acknowledges the exposure of mankind as sinners to the wrath to come. He thus writes:—

> "The consideration of our personal character, tendency, and destiny, is a most fundamental consideration with all of us; and to persons of strongly-marked character and experience there will be a crisis in which this question will assume the form of an escape from deadly peril, from eternal and intolerable pains. Hell is a reality, and his spiritual life has no very deep springs who has not felt himself, with agony of spirit, in danger of the judgment, and that his first and most pressing need was that of a deliverer from the wrath to come," p. 134.

Is this, then, I again ask, like a father? To place before

his children a course of prescribed action, their failure in which should subject them to "eternal and intolerable pains"? Again I say, I think not.

3. Mr. Brown teaches that mankind have not sinned voluntarily, but against their will, and in spite of its most strenuous efforts. "The true history of heathendom," says he, "is not, as we are too ready to believe, the history of man's struggle to be as sensual and devilish as possible; it is rather the history of a struggle not to be so, an energetic resolution not to be so, ending, for want of that power of God which man has forfeited, in a dark night of despair and death" (p. 81). He regards fallen man as a being "manifestly godlike in the scheme and composure of his being; knowing it, and struggling to live up to it, yet falling back into the slime and gloom of the nether abyss,—the strong swimmer, swept from the shore which is still in sight, and borne by the resistless currents to the whelming sea. It is a sight of unspeakable piteousness," p. 84.

Verily, I think so. And is this, too, chargeable on a father's love? And is it still a father who ordains that sin so nobly striven against should be productive of "eternal and intolerable pains"? I think not.

4. Mr. Brown admits that there has been an "atonement offered for the sin of the world" (p. 114), by "the awful expenditure of the agony of Christ," in order that God might be "righteous" in forgiving it (p. 118). Again, then, I ask, whether this is like a father? Can we conceive with approbation of any father pursuing a similar course? I think not.

I could be well content to let the argument rest here, but it would not be fair to the Bible, or to the subject, that I should do so. I therefore select from the Holy Oracles some other aspects of the divine ways towards men, in order to inquire whether these also can be ascribed to parental love.

1. I begin with the following citation: God "will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honour, and immortality, eternal life; but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath" (Romans ii. 6–8). Is this like a father? Can we conceive of a parent bringing up a family on such a principle?

2. Let the reader accept another quotation. "For we

must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in the body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad" (2 Cor. v. 10). Is this likewise an arrangement of fatherly love? In the next verse the apostle who wrote it calls it "the terror of the Lord."

3. Take a third passage. "Seeing it is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you; and to you who are troubled rest with us, when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power" (2 Thessalonians i. 6–9). Is this also like a father? and can such an infliction as this be brought within the scope of the household discipline?

4. Permit one more citation. "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit on the throne of his glory, and before him shall be gathered all nations; and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats; and he shall set the sheep on his right hand, and the goats on the left. . . . Then shall he say to them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matthew xxv. 31–33, 41).

Once more I ask, is this like a father? And will the supposition that God holds to mankind an exclusively parental relation serve to account for, or to explain, the portions of his administration which I have here adduced? The question supplies its own answer. No man who is a father could do such things as these, or anything approaching to them, without atrociously violating all parental obligations, or without incurring the abhorrence of the whole human race, and his own.

I hold it to be a matter of necessity, therefore, that, for the satisfactory understanding of God's ways towards man, we should seek for some additional analogy; or, in other words, that we should look for some other human relation which may be assigned to God, and according to the rules of which his conduct may be more satisfactorily interpreted.

Under these circumstances, none presents itself more naturally, or seems more likely to be at once just and useful, than the magisterial relation. Perhaps God may have been pleased to found on the basis of his fatherly sovereignty a system of moral government—of government, that is to say, by precept, motive, and reward; to constitute himself a king, and to govern men, as his subjects, by holy laws and righteous retribution. For the present, and for the purpose now before me, I may suppose this has been done; and then I may ask the question, whether the problems which are insoluble on the parental hypothesis can be solved on the magisterial.

For the most part, it is obvious that this can readily be done; there being, I think, but one exception—that, namely, arising from Mr. Brown's supposition that men do not sin voluntarily; a case in which one hardly sees how even a righteous governor could inflict any punishment at all. I shall find hereafter, however, an opportunity of inquiring whether such a case really exists.

An habitual regard to this distinction would not only be useful in the understanding of Scripture, it would also be an important aid in theological controversy. In opposition to what I believe to be the scriptural doctrine of atonement for sin, no argument is more promptly or more confidently adduced than the incongruity of such a fact with God's parental relation to mankind. Now, for my own part, I entirely admit this alleged incongruity, and, if I believed that God held to mankind no other than a paternal relation, I would at once abandon my present views of the atonement; I have, however, no such belief. I affirm, on the contrary, that, besides being a father, God is also a moral governor, and on this relation I base the doctrine of the atonement. To me, consequently, it is no argument at all to say that such a doctrine is incongruous with the fatherhood; the real question to be discussed with me is, whether God is or is not a moral governor—a question, let me be permitted to say, which would be more convincingly treated by a little sound reasoning, than by a curt denunciation.

It were a pity if the process of ascribing to God a twofold relation towards mankind, the one parental and the other magisterial, necessary as it is to help our more satisfactory interpretation of his ways, should be productive of "a

debasing," or any other injurious influence upon theology. As Mr. Brown has not opened his mind further on this subject, I am unable to conjecture what illustrations of this alleged infelicitous influence he would adduce; I can only say, therefore, that, for my own part, I hold the distinction between the parental and magisterial relations to be deeply founded in nature as well as in fact, and the joint ascription of these two relations to God to be at once just to him and invaluable to us—throwing an important light on aspects of his ways towards man otherwise awfully dark, and materially reducing the insoluble element of mystery still, doubtless, to be found in his sovereign and inscrutable arrangements. In my judgment, it is for want of the distinction between the parental and magisterial, or, in other words, between the personal and official character of God, that so much of the New Testament is to many persons perplexed and obscure; and I cannot but wish that it may be more fully understood, and more extensively applied, by all students of theology.

NOTE.

I TAKE the opportunity afforded by this edition of my Works, to remark briefly on Mr. Brown's reply to this argument. In his Preface to the second edition of his "Divine Life in Man" he refers to it in the following terms:—

"The criticism with which my doctrinal positions have been assailed fails to touch me, because it supposes me to ignore principles which I have earnestly asserted and steadfastly maintained. The statement of my most candid reviewers comes to this: 'There is something beside the father's relation to us in God. He is lawgiver, ruler, judge; the administrator of the law on whose integrity the system of the universe is hanging, which he may not imperil, whatever be the tenderness of his fatherly heart.' If I failed to see all this, I should deserve the severest judgment. Nothing seems to me more opposed to the true spirit of the Gospel, than the view of God's fatherliness which makes him incapable of administering judgment, and inflicting its sentence on the rebels against his love. I regard the divine fatherhood as essentially inclusive of all which is pleaded for by those who seem to seek to discover diversities, and develop oppositions, in him who, weak as may be our grasp of the great fact, is one.

"God is one: there must be one relation which is essential and all-inclusive: and when I find the Lord, in the Gospel of St. John, declaring that he has come to reveal the Father, and see him in the whole Gospel unfolding that revelation, holding fast the name even

when he speaks of judgment (John v. 19–37), I cannot doubt that he intends us to regard the Father as the essential name of God in his relation to our souls—as that out of which his rule and his judgment spring."

The latter of these passages contains the scriptural argument by which Mr. Brown attempts to maintain his position. He finds his doctrine, he thinks, "in the Gospel of St. John," and he gives us two references, which require to be examined.

The first of these is vague, being without chapter and verse; but I suppose—I have nothing but conjecture to guide me—that the passage referred to is John i. 18: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." In these words, according to Mr. Brown, our Lord declares "that he has come to reveal the Father." Now to me it is evident that this is *not* our Lord's meaning. It is "God," whom he tells us "no man hath seen," whom he has come to "declare," or, if Mr. Brown likes the word better, to "reveal:" the phrase "the Father," which is used in the verse, refers, not to mankind, but exclusively to our Lord himself, and is eminently appropriate to the preceding phrase, "the only-begotten Son," by which he designates himself. That Christ came to reveal God as "the Father" of the whole human race, is an arbitrary and groundless assumption.

Mr. Brown's second reference is to John v. 19-37, where he finds our Lord "holding fast the name [Father] even when he speaks of judgment." Now, it is quite true that the phrase "the Father" is continually in the lips of our Lord throughout this passage, but there is no evidence whatever that it expresses God's relation to mankind; on the contrary, it is clear, in my judgment, that it has reference to our Lord himself exclusively. It everywhere means "my Father," or "his Father," and is a mere example of euphony. If Mr. Brown had commenced his citation at ver. 17, instead of ver. 19, he would have exhibited proof of this. Ver. 17 reads thus—"*My Father* worketh hitherto, and I work:" immediately after this the discourse changes to the third person, and our Lord speaks of "the Son," and "the Father," evidently meaning *his* Father, the pronoun *his* being omitted for the sake of euphony—an expedient the advantage of which any reader will find who will read the passage aloud with the pronoun everywhere introduced. In ver. 30 our Lord resumes the first person: "I seek not mine own will, but the will of *the Father* who hath sent me:" the meaning of the phrase here being, as I think evidently, "my Father."

Mr. Brown sees Christ "in the whole Gospel" of St. John "unfolding the revelation" of God as the Father of the human race; but, as he has said nothing to assist the vision of his readers in this matter, his sight can be of service only to himself. It certainly is not so that I read John's Gospel.

The evidence thus entirely failing, I cannot come to Mr. Brown's conclusion to regard "the Father as the essential name of God in his relation to our souls." No doubt, as he affirms, "there must be," between God and man, "one relation which is essential and all-inclusive;" and it is sufficiently obvious, I think, what that relation is. It is that of the Creator to the creature: a relation clearly "essential and all-inclusive," and forming a basis upon which any other relations approved by sovereign love and wisdom may rest—whether paternal or rectoral, of the father or the ruler.

The other part of Mr. Brown's reply appears in the form of a concession. "I regard the Divine Fatherhood," says he, "as essentially inclusive of all that is pleaded for" by those who affirm God to be "lawgiver, ruler, and judge." He conceives fatherhood in God, then, to include what certainly is not included in fatherhood among men; and the whole matter in dispute is thus reduced to a question of words, to the meaning of a name. Is fatherhood a name denoting an essential attribute of Deity, having its own peculiar features? or is it an essentially human relation, applied to God by way of analogy, and intended to ascribe to him what is appropriate to the relation as known among men? Mr. Brown seems to entertain the former, I should maintain the latter, of these views. Human fatherhood assuredly cannot be conceived of as including the ideas of law and judgment; and, if Mr. Brown is determined to conceive of the Divine Fatherhood as doing so, he must of necessity derive these ideas, not from the analogy of human affairs, but from some other source. From whence does he derive them? Not, I think, from the Scriptures; and there is no other source which can give them authority. An arbitrary conception of God, such as this plainly is, as it has no warrant, is entitled to no weight. If, on the other hand, the Divine Fatherhood contains only the elements of human fatherhood, then it remains that the ideas of law and judgment must be suggestive of some other relation, or illustrated by some other analogy.

CHAPTER II.

ON MAN'S NEED OF SALVATION.

"THE loss of power, which is life," says Mr. Brown, "is what befell Adam, by his own act, at the fall. . . . Spiritually, the manifold faculties broke loose from the will, which in the spiritual man is the organ of power. Sense, fancy, intellect, desire, affection,

assumed an independent activity. The will struggled for mastery in vain. Passion broke loose from its powerless hand and paraded itself in murder, desire in impious lust, intellect in godless arts and inventions, force in the tyranny of the sword. The will, born to rule, like a poor crownless king, became the sport of factions. Tossed upon the rebellious surges of its disordered state, weak, weary, and desperate, it fought a losing battle during all the dreary ages till the advent of the Redeemer; and then, gathering all its strength for one last outcry, it flung itself at the foot of the cross," p. 78.

That which I first notice in this passage is the assertion that "what befell Adam at the fall" was "the loss of power."

I am far from calling in question the more general proposition, that from the fall there resulted to the moral condition of man a grievous deterioration; I raise a question only as to the nature of this deterioration. Mr. Brown says it was "the loss of power." My objections to this view are these:—

1. The loss of power is also the cessation of responsibility. Power and responsibility are, as I understand them, correlative terms, the use made of power being precisely that for which a party is held responsible, and the possession of power, consequently, being necessary to the existence of responsibility. The one is, as I suppose, precisely proportionate to the other: "To whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more" (Luke xii. 48). Whether Mr. Brown holds that the responsibility of man ceased with the fall, I do not pretend to say; but it is to me quite clear that God has held men responsible from that time to this, and that he holds them so still. If not, "how shall God judge the world?" I cannot, therefore, think that what befell man at the fall was "the loss of power."

2. The loss of power involves further the impossibility of sin. Sin, in the most general conception of it, is wrong-doing; but no one can be held to do wrong who has not the power of doing otherwise than he does. If he have no such power, but acts under constraining or over-mastering influences of any kind, his action may be mischievous, and he may be unfortunate, but he cannot be wrong. Unless there be power, therefore, there can be no sin; and, however much the conduct of man may be to be deplored, if he be, as Mr. Brown represents him, powerless—the victim of influences which he cannot control—to charge him with sin is unjust and absurd. Yet Mr. Brown holds man to be a sinner; and so, assuredly, does his Maker.

If, then, I refuse the notion that what befell man at the fall was "the loss of power," and yet admit that a grievous moral deterioration did accrue to him, it is now my turn to answer the question, What was it? To this I answer, It was the alienation of his heart, or his affections, from God. He no longer loved supremely his Maker, but himself. The chief engagement of his affections towards God I conceive to be man's original spiritual life, or state of holiness; and the extinction of this state of the affections, or the generation of a dominant self-love, I hold to be his spiritual death. Into this state Adam fell, and in this state his posterity are found.

This view assuredly assigns a sufficient mischief to the fall, but it involves no loss of power. The regulation of his affections is man's great business, and he is put in possession of an apt and adequate machinery for the purpose in the structure and relations of his rational faculties. If he does not effect this, it is because he neglects the processes and exercises of thought to which the affections both naturally and inevitably yield. Man's power in this respect consists in the divinely-established relation between his understanding and his heart, which relation certainly is not broken by the fall, and which obviously exists in every man until the dreadful calamity of insanity destroys entirely the rational existence.

A second point which I notice in the passage now under consideration is the view which Mr. Brown takes of human iniquity as involuntary—and, indeed, more than involuntary. Man, it seems, has in all ages sinned against his will. So far as the will is concerned, he has "struggled for mastery," and, strange to say, struggled "in vain." Nay, so weary was a rebellious race of its "losing battle," and so eager for a holy deliverance, that, on "the advent of the Redeemer, gathering all its strength for one last outcry, it flung itself at the foot of the cross."

I must confess that I have read this passage with profound astonishment. Making all allowance for the stilted character of the phraseology, it seems to me a most unscriptural account of the world's iniquity. Let it be confronted with a few declarations of Holy Writ:—

Job xv. 14–16. "What is man, that he should be clean? and he which is born of a woman, that he should be righteous? Behold, he putteth no trust in his saints; yea, the heavens are not clean in his

sight. How much more abominable and filthy is man, which drinketh iniquity like water?"

Psalm xii. 3, 4. "The Lord shall cut off all flattering lips, and the tongue that speaketh proud things: who have said, With our tongue will we prevail: who is lord over us?"

Psalm xiv. 2, 3. "The Lord looked down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if there were any that did understand, and seek God. They are all gone aside, they are all together become filthy: there is none that doeth good, no, not one."

Luke xix. 12, 14. "He said therefore, A certain nobleman went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom, and to return. . . . But his citizens hated him, and sent a message after him, saying, We will not have this man to reign over us."

Romans i. 18–21. "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness; because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse: because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened."

Romans i. 28. "And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind."

Romans iii. 10–18. "As it is written, There is none righteous, no, not one: there is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no, not one. Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they have used deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips: whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness: their feet are swift to shed blood: destruction and misery are in their ways: and the way of peace have they not known: there is no fear of God before their eyes."

Romans viii. 7. "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be."

Col. i. 21. "And you, that were sometime alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled."

Such is the testimony of Holy Writ, and similar passages might be greatly multiplied; but these may be safely left to produce their own impression. They are obviously far from sustaining the metaphor of the strenuous but baffled swimmer; on the contrary, they clearly indicate the case of one who swims with the stream. How, with such language before him, Mr. Brown could pen his description, is to me a mystery. As to his poetical conception of a weary world flinging itself at the foot of the cross, I would simply ask, Who was it that erected the cross, and nailed the victim upon it? During the whole of his ministry on earth, it was the

touching lamentation of Jesus, "Ye will not come unto me, that ye might have life" (John v. 40); and the characteristic aversion of mankind to the Gospel for more than eighteen hundred years has continuously demonstrated the prevalence of a similar spirit. Who has believed it, but those whose hearts divine power has brought into captivity to the obedience of faith?

It is true, indeed, that, in confirmation of his view, Mr. Brown cites scriptural authority. He refers to the latter part of the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, quoting it at length as "the deepest piece of moral philosophy which the world's literature contains," and quietly assuming, as though the point had never been doubted, that it relates to human nature at large. Mr. Brown, however, must know that his view of this striking and important passage is far from being generally held, at least among evangelical divines. For my own part, I agree with those who conceive the apostle to be describing, not the nature of man, but the experience of a Christian. It is somewhat too hard, in the face of all other Scriptures, to suppose all mankind to be saying with truth, "I delight in the law of God after the inward man." "This," says Doddridge, "is so sure a trace of real piety, and is represented in Scripture as, in this view, so decisive, that, if it be supposed a true representation of the character, we must surely allow it to be that of a truly good man, whatever lamented imperfections might attend it."* Mr. Scott also uses on the whole passage the following language:—"Such things are spoken as are true of none but real Christians, and the whole is actually verified in their experience."†

I now go on to observe that, if Mr. Brown's representation of the moral condition of man were true, it would be suicidal, and destructive of his own position.

If, as according to him, sin is involuntary, wherein can it be culpable? An involuntary offence can be no just occasion of displeasure, either to a father or to any one else; and, if displeasure may at the moment have been excited, on this explanation it invariably passes away. The whole element of culpability in any action lies in its having been wilfully done; otherwise it is an accident or a misfortune, to which

* Family Expositor, *in loc.* † Scott's Commentary, *in loc.*

no blame is to be attached. And the reason of this is obvious. It is the will which, in every action, expresses and represents the man; what he does not do willingly he cannot be said morally to do at all. Now by this principle, assuredly, our conduct towards God must be estimated. If we sin wilfully, we are, of course, blameworthy; but if we sin involuntarily, what fault can justly be found with us?

Yet Mr. Brown speaks in the usual strong terms of sin as deserving both blame and punishment, telling us that "hell is a reality," and that an "atonement for the sins of the world" is necessary. Both these things we verily believe; but we do not see how Mr. Brown can believe them. Are men, then, to be sent to hell for involuntary acts? And is it in atonement for involuntary acts that the world has witnessed "the awful expenditure of the agony of Christ"?

The force of the argument, however, is not yet exhausted. According to Mr. Brown, men sin not only involuntarily, but against their will. "The will," says he—that is, of course, the man—has "struggled for mastery," and that nobly too. "Knowing that he is godlike," he has been "struggling to live up to it." He has, indeed, struggled "in vain," so that his efforts have not been crowned with success; yet they have been in themselves truly admirable. They have been directed to the highest end, namely, "to live up to" the "godlike scheme and composure of his being;" and they have been both strenuously made, and resolutely sustained, like those of a "strong swimmer," who, if he is ultimately "swept from the shore" which he would fain have reached into "the whelming sea," has at least the satisfaction of reflecting that it was "by resistless currents" that his efforts have been overcome. Such is the picture drawn by Mr. Brown in page 84, and not at all overcharged by me.

And yet Mr. Brown tells us that the heavenly Father, instead of approving and applauding this noble effort, is displeased with his children's conduct, allots a hell for its punishment, and appoints the agony of his Son to be borne in expiation of it! If any of my readers should exclaim, Is this credible? I reply only, Read for yourselves. I wish to my heart it were untrue. Assuredly, however, if Mr. Brown will have sin to be the punishable thing which he makes it to be in one page, it cannot be the involuntary thing he makes it to be in another.

But Mr. Brown's representation of sin, I further observe, not only ought not to be true—it cannot be true. His philosophy of human nature is at fault. As the consequence of the fall, he tells us, "the manifold faculties broke loose from the will, which, in the spiritual man, is the organ of power. Sense, fancy, intellect, desire, affection, assumed an independent activity." I cannot accept this as a correct statement of the fact.

"In man," says Mr. Brown, "the will is the organ of power." I do not think so. As far as I understand human nature, the seat of power is in the feelings, including the affections on the one hand and the moral sentiments on the other—or, in fewer words, in the heart and the conscience. The affections are liable to irregular excitements, and require to be kept in order; which purpose is served by the conscience, a faculty gifted with supremacy, and always faithful to its light. It is, in my view, therefore, quite a mistake to say that the will is "the organ of power," and that it is "born to rule." The will, or the faculty of volition, simply stands between the heart, in which impulses are generated, and the active powers, on which they are expended; and it acts only as it is acted upon—a mere vehicle of communication.

If this be the philosophy of the case, it must be wholly incorrect to say that "the manifold faculties broke loose from the will." They never were under the custody of the will, but of the conscience; and the true statement of the matter is, that the affections have broken loose from the conscience, and deviated into irregular action in defiance of its appointed control. In permitting this man is wrong; the government of his affections being his great duty in this world, and a duty for the effective discharge of which he is provided with sufficient instruments.

It is quite true that man's impulses to sin are resisted by something within his own bosom: this, however, is not the will but the conscience, which, by its moral judgments, condemns the actions towards which the ill-excited passions impel us. Thus the will is simultaneously acted upon by two forces, and urged in opposite directions; whence arises a conflict—not, however, in the will, but either in the heart, as when opposing passions contend with one another, or between the passions and the conscience, which contradicts

and claims to control them. Then we too often do things which we do not approve, and may do sometimes things which we really "would not;" the settled and ruling purpose of our minds (which is indicated by this phrase) being occasionally frustrated by the transiently prevalent influence of passion or of temptation.

Mr. Brown's conception of "the manifold faculties," "sense, fancy, intellect, affection," assuming "an independent activity"—an activity, that is to say, independent of the will—is a pure fiction. Passion, he tells us, brings forth its fruit in murder, desire in lust, intellect in arts, and force in tyranny, without any concurrence of the will, and in defiance of its resistance. Strange and wonderful spectacle! Here is a whole life acted out without the aid, and in opposition to the struggles, of one of the principal faculties of man, and of that which, according to Mr. Brown, is "the organ of power"! It is a wicked life, to be sure; but I do not see why the same thing might not happen to a holy one, or why we should not have deeds of benevolence, purity, devoutness, and generosity, on the same principle as is here assigned to murder, lust, ungodliness, and tyranny.

The truth is, doubtless, that every human act involves volition, or the operation of the will, none being possible without it. Among the various and often conflicting impulses generated within the breast, the will obeys that which is strongest at the moment, and so fulfils its appointed and appropriate function.

If, therefore, it were true that "power unto salvation is the cardinal need of man" (p. 84), it would not consist in any reinforcement of the will, but in a change of the affections. It is the heart that wants setting right. Man loves his sins, and therefore practises them; what he needs is to be taught and made to hate them.

I object, however, to the sentiment itself, and deny the proposition that "power is the cardinal need of man."

It cannot be so, first, because he already possesses power in every sense in which it is requisite, whether to keep the law, or to obey the Gospel. Neither of these requires anything but the right government of the affections, and this is man's proper province. Both of these are commanded by a just and holy God, who would never call for an obedience which it was beyond his creature's power to render. To

deny such power to man is to place the divine administration out of the pale, not only of the benignity of fatherhood, but of the equity of magistracy.

It cannot be so, secondly, because, if more power were given to man, it would be of no advantage to him. Mr. Brown evidently thinks that man, if he could, would return to God; and that giving him power, therefore, would secure this end. The true statement of the fact, however, is, that man will not return to God, though he can. He is now voluntarily, and of his own preference, far from God; and, if more power be given him, he will only go farther away. He may be compared to a criminal who is flying from justice. Already he runs fast; what does he want to bring him back? More power? Well, give it him; and now he only runs the faster. He really wants to be made to love the law he has broken, the community he has wronged, and the government he has disobeyed. When he does this he will return.

It cannot be so, thirdly, because there is an antecedent and more obvious need. As a sinner, man is exposed to wrath, and his first need is to be delivered from it. This, in his more lucid moments, Mr. Brown himself sees and admits. Thus he says, "Hell is a reality; and his spiritual life has no very deep springs who has not felt himself, with agony of spirit, in danger of the judgment, and that *his first and most pressing need was that of a deliverer from the wrath to come*" (p. 134). I have placed the italics by which the concluding phrase of this sentence is marked, because I wish to direct the reader's special attention to them. Whether Mr. Brown would draw any distinction between man's "first and most pressing need" and his "cardinal need," I do not know; I am content, however, with his phraseology. "A deliverer from the wrath to come is man's first and most pressing need." Yes, assuredly so; not only because the danger is imminent, but because deliverance from it stands first in the order of evangelical benefits. If power were given to man, and he were to employ it in the cultivation of holiness (I make the supposition for the sake of argument), even this could avail him nothing so long as he remained under condemnation.

After such an admission, it may fairly be reckoned surprising that Mr. Brown should say, as he does emphatically, at the commencement of his fourth sermon, "Power is the broadest characteristic of the Gospel" (p. 76). Surely it

ought not to be so. If man's "first and most pressing need" is "a deliverer from the wrath to come," the first and "broadest characteristic of the Gospel" ought to be—must be—the announcement of such a deliverer. And blessed be God, it is so. It tells us how God sent his Son into the world, "even Jesus, who delivered us from the wrath to come" (1 Thess. i. 10). That in the Gospel there is also power is undoubted; but of this hereafter.

CHAPTER III.

ON JUSTIFICATION BY IMPUTED RIGHTEOUSNESS.

"In the name of all that is vital and holy," says Mr. Brown, "let us get rid of the notion that justification, be it what it may, is a kind of legal fiction, an agreement of God with himself to regard and treat a human being as something other than what he is really and substantially in his sight," p. 117.

It is, of course, of the doctrine of justification by imputed righteousness that Mr. Brown speaks in these terms. His language, undoubtedly, is expressive of strong dislike to it, a feeling not the most favourable to a satisfactory discussion of it; but I will endeavour to weigh in just balances the argument which he evidently thinks so decisive.

It is with Mr. Brown a fatal objection to the doctrine of justification by imputed righteousness, that it supposes "a kind of legal fiction, an agreement of God with himself to regard and treat a human being as something other than what he is;" a conception in his view too monstrous to be argued against, and fit only to be cried down indignantly "in the name of all that is vital and holy." Will Mr. Brown permit me to tell him, that an equal amount of energy expended on clear and cogent reasoning might have done more good than all this virtuous indignation, which, upon me at least, is only thrown away?

Mr. Brown knows very well that the doctrine he impugns is part of what he calls the "forensic notion of justification;" and that this (to use his own language) "rests upon the

conception of the character of God as a ruler." That it should be unacceptable to him, therefore, since he repudiates this conception of the character of God, is no matter of surprise; rejecting the one, he, of course, rejects the other. If, however, he wishes to say anything argumentative about it, it is clearly necessary that he should for the moment forget his own position, and assume that of his opponents. He does not believe that God is other than a father; very well, let that pass. I, however, do believe that God is also a moral governor; and Mr. Brown, if he will argue with me concerning anything that belongs to this system, must begin by supposing, for the sake of argument, that it is true.

Let it, then, for the sake of argument, be supposed that God does hold to man the twofold relation of father and moral governor; is it *then* any matter of complaint that, in his capacity of moral governor, he should employ "a kind of legal fiction," and "regard and treat a human being as something other than what he is"? I readily admit, and hold as strongly as Mr. Brown, that this would be altogether improper in God as a father; but is it improper in him on the supposition of his being a ruler and a judge?

Is there any essential enormity in a "legal fiction"? Scarcely so. Legal fictions, I believe, are far from being unknown in legal proceedings, and are sometimes found useful, if not necessary, to the proper conduct of them; and if not objectionable in human proceedings, why so in the Divine? If it be said, "O, but God is not a judge," I reply that this is not pertinent, since it has just been agreed, for the purpose of the argument, to suppose that he is so.

And if there is nothing objectionable in a legal fiction generally, is there anything objectionable in that particular kind of legal fiction which consists in regarding and treating a man as other than he is? Suppose, for example, the case of one person arrested and imprisoned for debt, and another proposing to liquidate the demand in his stead: does not a judge readily allow of the intended kindness? Or suppose the case of one person mulcted to a certain amount for a certain offence, and another proposing to pay this penalty: is not this also allowed? And are not these cases in which the innocent is treated as if he were guilty—that is to say, as other than he is?

Would it be improper if the principle here undeniably

acted on were to be extended to other—say, to more serious criminal cases? In a case, for example, in which the penalty of an offence was not fine, but imprisonment; if the fine might be paid by another, why not also the imprisonment borne by another? And if the principle might be unobjectionably acted on when the penalty of crime is imprisonment, why not when it is banishment, and even death? It may be said, "But this would not be expedient," and I admit the importance of this consideration, of which I will treat presently; but as yet I am speaking only of the principle involved, which is in all cases one and the same, and which, if not objectionable in some of them, can scarcely be held to be so in others.

In coming to the consideration of expediency, it may be observed that it is a great thing to have succeeded in reducing the question to this form. The question of principle, then, is determined in my favour, and nothing but a question of expediency remains: in other words, the judicial treatment of a man as other than he is is not improper in itself, only it requires to be carried out in an expedient manner—in a manner, that is to say, which shall be consistent with judicial righteousness, and conducive to the true ends of government. Unless it can be so done, undoubtedly it ought not to be done; but if it can, all ground of objection to it vanishes.

It seems to be the opinion of Mr. Brown that, in the judicial proceedings which are supposed to be pending in relation to mankind, the legal fiction by which Jesus Christ shall be regarded and treated as if he had committed their iniquities cannot be so arranged as to be consistent with the vital character of Christianity, or conducive to the interest of holiness. "In the name of all that is vital and holy," says he, "let us get rid of this notion." Now I say at once that, if I had the same opinion, I would oppose the doctrine of justification by imputed righteousness as strenuously as he; I think, however, that he entirely misunderstands its bearing, and so hates it without cause.

It is quite true that a legal process by which the punishment of an innocent person instead of the guilty should be permitted, may, in its details, be so arranged as to fail of the objects which require to be kept in view; so, for example, as to allow the offence committed to be thought lightly of, to foster an expectation of repeated criminality with similar

impunity, and to restore the offender to society in a spirit ready to avail himself of such a licence. Such would, doubtless, be the result, if the person suffering the penalty were destitute of social dignity, if he suffered less than the full penalty of the law, or if the condition on which the availableness of his sufferings was made to depend did not involve an effectual reformation of the offender. But these are by no means the necessary elements of the case. The details *may* be very differently arranged, and, by the exercise of legislative wisdom, in such a manner as to obviate all contingent evils, and to secure the utmost possible good. If, for example, the person who suffers be of high social position, so that his voluntary submission to the operation of the law shall do it distinguished honour; if, innocent though he be, he drink the full cup of judgment due to the transgressor; and if the condition prescribed to the transgressor be one which involves an entire and radical change of his feeling towards the government, it would seem that the transaction might be safely effected.

Now it cannot be necessary to say that these, and other similar conditions, characterize in the most distinct and striking manner the supposed substitution of Christ for mankind, and the justification of those who believe in him by the imputation of his righteousness to them. By reason of his infinite dignity as the Son of God, his voluntary subjection to its penal action highly "magnifies the law, and makes it honourable;" in dealing with him for sinners, God "spared not his own Son," but fully "made his soul an offering for sin;" and the terms on which the release of the transgressor depends being faith in the name of Jesus, or a heartfelt submission to God's method of dealing with him in Christ, a vital germ is thus created of future love and obedience. To me, therefore, it seems that the legal process of justifying a sinner, or of regarding and treating him as righteous though he is not, by imputing to him as though it were his own the righteousness of another, even of Christ Jesus, upon his acceptance of this act of grace, is at once as expedient in practice as it is unobjectionable in principle. It is a case in which, to use the words of an apostle, God "hath abounded towards us in all wisdom and prudence" (Ephes. i. 8).

I know it is commonly objected to the doctrine of justification by imputed righteousness, although Mr. Brown, pro-

bably through necessary brevity, has not expressly adduced the objection, that actions and character cannot be transferred. The objection is true, but irrelevant. It is true that actions and character cannot be transferred; but it is true also that the doctrine of justification by imputed righteousness does not suppose the transfer of either actions or character. Actions and character cannot be transferred; but *their consequences may*, without any violation of the nature of things, and under a system adapted to such a process. Under a legal and judicial system, for example, one man may commit an offence and his punishment may be transferred to another. This is all that the doctrine of justification by imputed righteousness supposes; not a transfer of actions or character, which cannot be, but a transfer of their consequences, which both can be and *is* before our eyes. The complete idea of such a transfer as a judicial process involves the conception of substitution, or of a change of places as before the law, between the offender and the person who bears the punishment due to him. The righteous must be regarded as occupying the place of the sinner, in order that he may be treated as the sinner; and the sinner must be regarded as occupying the place of the righteous, in order that he may be treated as righteous. This, as I understand it, is the whole mystery of the imputation of our sins to Christ, and the imputation of his righteousness to us.

Mr. Brown objects to this statement that it destroys "the vital meaning" (p. 137) of the passage of Scripture which he has taken for his text from Romans i. 17: "The just shall live by faith." "That is the basis," says he, "on which the doctrinal structure rests" (p. 138). I cannot but think that Mr. Brown has made a mistake in taking this quotation from the Old Testament as "the basis on which the doctrinal structure" of the way of salvation rests. The words had originally no such reference, nor does it appear that the apostle used them for any other purpose than that of remote collateral illustration. They are to be found in Habakkuk ii. 4, and the following is Doddridge's note upon them:—"The prophet Habakkuk, speaking of the destruction to come upon Jerusalem by the Chaldeans, observes how different the behaviour and states of good men and bad men would be. *The sinner's heart would be vainly lifted up* to his destruction, while trusting to his own wisdom and power (and

accordingly princes and people became the sacrifices of this foolish self-confidence), whereas *the righteous*, the truly good man, would *preserve his life by believing* the divine declarations, and acting according to them. And thus, under the Gospel, 'he that believes shall live.'"* The point here illustrated is simply the instrumentality of faith; not at all either the antecedent condition of guilt, or the subsequent condition of deliverance.

Mr. Brown is earnestly and justly jealous, lest the faith by which we are justified should be found inoperative for the practical purposes of the Christian life. He objects to the statement "that God agrees, on account of the righteousness of Christ, to treat as righteous those who choose to submit to a condition which he imposes," as expressing a doctrine which has no vitality in it (p. 137); forgetting, as it would seem, that the condition imposed—faith—is one which necessarily involves the reconciliation of the rebel to the government, and the restoration of the traitor to his lost loyalty. "With the heart," says the apostle, "man believeth unto righteousness," or justification (Romans x. 10); and he speaks of faith as that "which worketh by love" (Gal. v. 6).

I cannot agree, however, in Mr. Brown's representation, that faith, regarded "as a vital apprehension of the work of Christ, and the establishment of a spiritual union with him as the Redeemer," constitutes a ground "in virtue of which God *sees us and deals with us as we are* in him," and so regards us as righteous because we are righteous (p. 137). This seems to be his idea of justification, but I must confess it is not mine. It seems to me to be confounding justification and sanctification together, and so obliterating a distinction which ought to be strongly maintained. Doubtless, when spiritually united to Christ we are in a sense holy, and so, no doubt, God sees us—this is our sanctification: we were, however, not merely unholy, but also under condemnation; and if we are not so now, it is not because our faith has made us holy, but because it has given us an interest in that arrangement of divine mercy by which the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us—this is our justification. Here are clearly two things; a change of state, and a change of character.

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* Family Expositor, *in loc.*

Even with the view just stated, however, Mr. Brown is not satisfied. He only believes that, with this conception, we are "*on the right track*" for understanding "the writings of St. Paul." And how long and how hopeless this "track," in his view of it, is, appears from the following language, which he uses in p. 115, immediately after quoting Romans iii. 19–26: "The true nature of this atonement, that is, the way in which it is to be conceived of as laying the basis of the sinner's justification before God, is likely to have much light shed upon it by the discussions of the next few years." This icy passage chilled my very heart when I read it, and it makes a still more painful impression now I write it. During the eighteen hundred years that the New Testament has been in our hands, it seems "the true nature of the atonement" has never yet been understood, and neither Mr. Brown nor any one else knows when it will be so; our brightest hope is that, "during the discussions of the next few years," this all-important subject "is likely to have much light shed upon it." Alas! for the generations which have walked in darkness! Alas! for ourselves, to whom not only the Oracles of God are so unserviceable, but to whom even "the discussions of the next few years" are likely to be of so little advantage! Death, judgment, and eternity! where, in the meantime, are ye?

Most fervently do I thank God that, to my mind, no such obscurity hangs over the glad tidings of salvation; to me the declarations of prophets and apostles are at least as plain as the disquisitions of theologians, and much plainer than many of them; nor, whatever may be their real value, can I regard these as indispensable, in the case of truths of which it is characteristic to be hidden from the wise and prudent and to be revealed unto babes. With unwavering confidence I hold the doctrine of justification by imputed righteousness, and I hold it both as an essential part of the Gospel, and as vitally connected with salvation.

That this doctrine is adapted to awaken man's deepest impulses, and to command his active powers, cannot, I think, be doubted by any one who fairly considers its bearing. It presents an aspect of grace unparalleled, an aspect to which love of the most devoted ardour is, on a believer's part, the natural and the only possible response; and all the world knows that love is the master-passion of mankind.

If, however, according to Mr. Brown, it be held that this is a powerless Gospel, let us see what resources are to be found in that by which it is to be superseded.

"Salvation," says Mr. Brown, "*is* [*sic*] a deliverance—an escape from death and hell. Salvation *is* [*sic*] the possession of a complete and imperishable bliss. But there is that in it which underlies both these conditions, and through which alone they can be completely realized; and that is the complete unfolding of the divine life in the soul, the recovery by the soul of that vital force which in its rudiment man lost in Eden, and which in its maturity man regains in Christ," p. 136.

I merely advert, in passing, to the inverted order (as it seems to me) in which Mr. Brown here places our "deliverance from death and hell" and "the unfolding of the divine life in the soul"—in other words, our justification and our sanctification. According to him, we are to be first sanctified, then justified. I judge rather that we are to be first justified, then sanctified; and that the faith which has first justified afterwards purifies us. But chiefly I take occasion from this passage to inquire how Mr. Brown's Gospel is to generate in man's heart the "vital force," or power, which is his great desideratum. There is power in the Gospel, he affirms; and he indicates four sources of it. Let us examine them.

"The first element of the power of the Gospel," says he, "is the Gospel doctrine of sin." He then quotes, as "the Gospel doctrine of sin," Rom. vii. 12–21, repeating the quiet misapplication of the passage on which I have before remarked. Allowing this misapplication, however, where is the power? In its teaching two things: first, that sin "is not of God," but "the independent, self-originated act of the free-will of the creature;" and, secondly, that "sin is an alien thing in man," and "is not the necessary out-growth of [his] freedom." So men learnt that sin "might be conquered, and that it ought to be conquered;" and, "when they read Romans vii.," they "aroused themselves to defy the devil." Delightful! But did they? Who did? And does Mr. Brown actually know this for a fact?

"The second element of the power of the Gospel," says Mr. Brown, "lies in the atonement offered for the sins of the world which it proclaims." Then, after quoting Romans iii. 19–26, he thus opens this "mighty element of power." "Man,"

says he, "strange and incredible as it may seem, is jealous of the honour of the divine law. He has that within him which bears witness to God, and which cannot rest on that which is not also sufficient in God's sight. In vain had the Gospel—'God forgives'—been preached, if man had not been able to see that it is righteous and godlike in God to forgive."

My reader pauses, as I have done, on this wonderful passage. "Man is jealous for the honour of the divine law." Why, then, does he violate it so incessantly, and trample it under his feet? He could never have believed that God would forgive, "if he had not been able to see that it is righteous in God to forgive." Why, then, have so many men, and enlightened men too, advocated the efficacy of repentance without atonement? And why should not all men do it, if they believe, with Mr. Brown, in God's absolute and exclusive fatherhood? Has a *father* anything to do with law, or with righteousness, or atonement? Man, however, is so commendably "jealous of the honour of the divine law," that the moment he sees it provided for he finds "a mighty element of power." He may be conceived of, without extravagance, as leaping for joy. As for the apostolic notion of "casting down imaginations," and "bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ," it is, according to this, a pure fiction, if not a libel.

"The third element of the power of the Gospel," says Mr. Brown, "is the doctrine of the incarnation." And he immediately explains—"I speak not here of the incarnation as giving effect to the atonement, as attaching an infinite meaning to the obedience and sacrifice of our Lord. I mean, under this head, to speak of the incarnation as casting a flood of light on man's condition and destiny." He then quotes John i. 1–12, and adds, "That Word was power. Man was pining for the fulfilment of the promise. . . . And when he lived and died on earth who bore all the credentials . . . the world woke up to life, because it understood that thenceforth the interest of God and the interest of humanity, the hope of God and the hope of humanity, the life of God and the life of humanity, were one." And again—"Wonder not that the worn-out world rose up with a glow of immortal strength and youth on its brow, when the Lord of life, the Victor of hell and death,

came down to dwell with it, and to link it on, by his incarnation, to the zones of eternal glory." "The zones of eternal glory;" where are these? And "the glow of immortal strength and youth on the brow of the worn-out world," who saw it? As for Jesus of Nazareth, we know that, when he came to live in it, the world rose up in unappeasable hatred, and hung him on a tree.

"The Gospel," says Mr. Brown once more, "was a power unto salvation, because it opened heaven to man's spirit." This dark world "was lit up for man by him who 'abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light by his Gospel.'" And men so readily availed themselves of the celestial illumination, that they "battled against dishonesty, paganism, tyranny, or lust," "with a divine heroic force." "Noble heroism!" Only, if this were really the case, why did the last of the apostles testify, "We know that the whole world lieth in the wicked one"? (1 John v. 19.)

And these, according to Mr. Brown, are the elements which constitute the Gospel a power, "the power of God unto salvation"! It teaches, first, that sin is not at all of God, and not necessarily of ourselves; secondly, that God can righteously forgive; thirdly, that this world "cannot be a devil's world;" and, fourthly, that there is a future life. And these are the teachings which are to renovate mankind! Rather a thousand times give me the discarded and hated doctrine of justification by imputed righteousness! Rather a thousand times let me proclaim the grace of the incarnate God, who "bore our sins in his own body on the tree," and testify of that perfect righteousness which, signally approved by the Judge of the whole earth, "is unto all, and upon all them that believe"!

CHAPTER IV.

ON SELF-SACRIFICE.

"THIS text," says Mr. Brown," "presents to us the most central claim and appeal of Christianity" (p. 143). "'And now I beseech you, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is your reasonable

service.' I have shown you that it is the first step in life. Life for MAN begins when he presents himself a living sacrifice to God," p. 170.

The text quoted in this passage is the first verse of the twelfth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and is the subject of the sixth discourse.

Of this discourse I make in the outset this direct complaint, that throughout it the text is misapplied. I do not speak now of the meaning of it—let this remain for future consideration; but, whatever be its meaning, it is misapplied. In other words, Mr. Brown represents it as addressed to persons to whom the apostle did not address it, and who were not in his contemplation when he wrote it. Mr. Brown says it "presents to us the most central claim and appeal of Christianity." He regards it, consequently, as an appeal to mankind at large, and to every man in virtue of his manhood; and as such he treats it throughout. In the lips of the apostle, however, it was an appeal to "brethren," that is to say, to brethren in Christ, or fellow-believers in his name. That this was the case in point of fact can admit of no question, since the entire letter of which it is a part was written, not to an indiscriminate company of people, but to those who were "beloved of God, called to be saints" (Romans i. 7). And it can scarcely be needful to insist on the importance of observing this distinction in relation to all the matters which the letter contains. If the precepts be taken to apply to mankind universally, so must the privileges be; and if one of either, then the whole.

Mr. Brown, then, has misapplied his text; a serious fault in a preacher on any occasion, and a very serious one on this: for a grave error either results from it, or is countenanced by it—namely, the conception of self-sacrifice as the first duty of man, and the "central claim of Christianity." What may be exactly intended by the word "central" in the last phrase I do not know, but I presume I shall not err in substituting the word *first* for it; since that which constitutes man's first duty must constitute also the Gospel's first claim. "The presenting ourselves a living sacrifice is the first act of a true man's life" (p. 152). Now, admitting that self-sacrifice is both the duty of man and a claim of the Gospel, I hold explicitly that it is neither the first duty of man as a sinner, nor the first claim of the Gospel. The first call of the Gospel to mankind is, "Be ye reconciled to God"

(2 Cor. v. 20), and to obey this is man's first duty. It is not until he is "justified by faith," and has "peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ," and so has "access into the grace wherein [believers] stand" (Rom. v. 1, 2), that he hears anything about presenting himself a living sacrifice, or, indeed, any other form of moral duty.

The ill effect of this inversion of things which have a natural and necessary order is very considerable, and may be noticed in several particulars.

In the first place, it presents the claim of Christianity to self-sacrifice in a manner which distorts the aspect of the Gospel itself. This is declared to be "good tidings of great joy," and to bring to wretched victims of sin and heirs of wrath news of a blessed deliverance. It is its primary glory that it answers the question which man has the first and most urgent need to put—"What must I do to be saved?" And its prompt and characteristic answer is, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved" (Acts xvi. 30). According to Mr. Brown, however, "the central claim and appeal of Christianity" is a demand for immediate and total self-sacrifice! Is not this "another Gospel, which is not another"?

In the second place, it presents the claim of Christianity to self-sacrifice at a time when no motives are in operation which can lead to a compliance with it. If the claim were made a secondary instead of the primary one, and presented to a heart not only reconciled to God, but filled with gratitude for his delivering mercy, it would be in the nature of things that it should prevail; but what can its success be when presented to a heart as yet under the dominant influence of self-love, and not awakened to the value of that salvation the experience of which is to be the grand, and, in comparison, almost the only, spring of its consecration?

In the third place, it presents the claim of Christianity to self-sacrifice in a manner which renders every attempt to comply with it an effort of self-righteousness. I quote at length the following passage:—

"Now, mark you, our highest and holiest relations begin when we make the sacrifice of the whole heart of selfishness to God. As the man who dares to enter the shrine of sacrifice in the relationships of life, finds new springs of joy of which the selfish worldling is ignorant and destitute, so he who will enter this field of Christian experience, and sacrifice his self-will in its very root to God's, opens up a foun-

tain of perennial bliss and glory at which a man may drink and be satisfied for evermore." . . .

"There is no hearty good cheer for a man, and no assurance that it shall be well with him, till he has laid self bound on the altar, and has taken up meekly and patiently a new idea of life, though it be represented by a cross. 'I will try by grace to be a partaker, not of a selfish human, but of a divine nature. I will pray that I may become like Christ,'" p. 154, 157.

And this altogether antecedent to, and irrespective of, any act of submission at the cross of Christ, or of acceptance of his atoning blood and justifying righteousness. Self-sacrifice in such an attitude would be nothing short of the construction of our own righteousness. Totally different was the temper of Paul, when he said, "What things were gain to me, those have I counted loss for Christ. Yea, verily, and I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus our Lord; for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but dung, that I may win Christ, and be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith" (Philippians iii. 7–9).

In the fourth place, it presents the claim of Christianity to self-sacrifice at a period when, if it were accomplished, it could not be accepted. Man as a sinner is under condemnation and wrath, so that nothing that he does can be accepted of God until his person is first accepted; and this can be only through the mediation and righteousness of Christ, accepted and submitted to by him. This being wanting, even on the supposition of any real devotedness being manifested towards God, it could find no gracious acceptance with him, who, although approachable by the guiltiest, is approachable only through a Mediator.

As Mr. Brown has misapplied his text, and thus, to its no small injury, misrepresented the Gospel, so, in my opinion, he has misunderstood its principal phrase, "a living sacrifice."

"Let us avail ourselves," says he, "of the light which is shed on the nature of sacrifice by the term which is here employed, 'a living sacrifice'" (p. 149). "The truth of the Gospel suffers much confusion through interpretations which are borrowed from the law. Christ is the expositor of Moses. The Jewish system can only be understood by the light of the redemption which is by Christ Jesus. But we

are prone to believe that we can understand Judaism by itself, and must use its conceptions to unlock the mysteries of the Gospel" (p. 150).

This, if I mistake not, is another instance of the inversion by Mr. Brown of the natural and scriptural order of things. He would admit, I suppose, that the Hebrew ritual is typical. Now it surely is the business of the type to explain the antitype, not of the antitype to elucidate the type. Of two mysteries, also, it would seem natural to use the less to throw light upon the greater, and not the greater to aid the interpretation of the less. If, indeed, "Christ is the expositor of Moses," and "the Jewish system can only be understood by the light of the redemption which is by Christ Jesus," then "the Jewish system" must have been unintelligible, not only for a very long period, but for the whole of that period of the world's history which it was mercifully intended to enlighten. If the first light that ever broke upon it emanated from the cross of Christ, then it became intelligible exactly when its usefulness was exhausted, and itself was on the eve of extinction. This, I think, is hardly to be supposed.

As to making "Moses the expositor of Christ," and using "the conceptions of Judaism to unlock the mysteries of the Gospel," this was the method of the Lord's forerunner, when he exclaimed to his Jewish auditors, "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world" (John i. 29); and it was also the method of the apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews—examples which I am constrained to suppose Mr. Brown must have forgotten when he denounced our present proneness to imitate them. As to making "Christ the expositor of Moses," it is a thing entirely without precedent, I believe, among inspired writers, and without example, I also believe, among uninspired interpreters until now. If we are to have a school of theologians of this class, Mr. Brown is, so far as I know, the first light of his school.

But let us see what comes of making Christ the expositor of Moses. "Let Christ explain sacrifice," says Mr. Brown. "Is it related most closely to death, or to life? Ask him who was a living sacrifice" (p. 151).

Now, in the first place, this is an unscriptural view of Christ, who is nowhere in the Bible said to have been "a living sacrifice." That he exercised a spirit of intense and

absolute devotion to his Father's will, and so may be said metaphorically to have made himself a living sacrifice, is doubtless true; but this is not the scriptural use of the term sacrifice as applied to Christ. Here are examples: "Even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us" (1 Cor. v. 7). "But this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, for ever sat down on the right hand of God" (Hebrews x. 12). The fact in our Lord's history here denoted by the term sacrifice is clearly his agony and death, and only these.

And, in the second place, even if Christ had been a sacrifice in any other sense than that of his agony and death, there is nothing in the circumstances of the Hebrew sacrifices for sin of which this fact could have afforded any illustration. In these was the death of the victim, nothing more; nothing to which the devoted life of Christ could be taken to bear even the remotest analogy. The taking away of the life, or the shedding of the blood, constituted the whole of the expiatory fact; "For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul" (Leviticus xvii. 11).

"I have no criticism to offer on Jewish sacrifices," Mr. Brown goes on to say, "but this: God loves not, and cannot love, the blood of bulls and goats." Yet God appointed the blood of bulls and of goats to be shed; and for the purpose for which he appointed it—namely, a typical act of expiation—must be supposed to have regarded the shedding of it with complacency. "Death," says Mr. Brown, "pleases him not, but life." Why, then, did he require the death of so many victims, unless there was a purpose which life could not answer, and for the attaining of which death did please him more than life? Or, if death did not please him, what was the life which did so? It could not be the life of the victim, for this was taken away: but, according to Mr. Brown, it was the life of the offerer. "The life which was busy about the sacrifice was the element in which he took pleasure, the will which had become submissive, the spirit which had become penitent, before the altar stained with blood" (p. 151). On this I remark, that this quiet substitution of the offerer for the victim is entirely unwarranted, and out of keeping with the institution of sacrifice. I remark also, that the law of sacrifice took no notice of, and the

acceptance of sacrifice did not depend upon, the penitential feeling of the offerer. And I remark further, that in the principal sacrifices for sin, as the daily lamb, for example, there was no offerer whose feelings could be called into exercise, the officiating priest only being concerned. Here, then, was no "life" for God to be pleased with—death was the whole fact; and with this, if with anything, God must have been pleased.

"Sacrifice," says Mr. Brown, "is not the casting away of anything—the extinction of a life. God gains not by such expenditure." I submit on this assertion, that whether "God gains" or not by any "expenditure" which he requires, is scarcely a question to be entertained by us; but that sacrifice was "the extinction of a life," is to me plain from the Old Testament; not, indeed, "the casting away" of life, but the putting it to its most precious purpose of expiation for sin. Instead of saying with him, "the true sacrifice must be a living one," I must maintain rather that "the true sacrifice" is a life taken away; and that, when a life spared is called a sacrifice because it is devoted, it is simply a metaphor, the meaning of which is that the life in question is as entirely devoted to God as if it had been presented on the altar of expiation. Such a sacrifice is called "a *living* sacrifice" just because it is not a true sacrifice, and in order to make it more evident that the word is figuratively employed.

"Christ," says Mr. Brown, "brings out the meaning of sacrifice: Abraham bound Isaac on the altar—Christ bound himself. He took the very core, the spinal cord of humanity, and offered it a living sacrifice; and then, having made himself obedient unto death, entered into life for evermore" (p. 151). "Christ took the spinal cord of humanity, and offered it a living sacrifice." Forgive me, dear Mr. Brown, but what *is* the meaning of this? I have pondered it till my inability to understand it distresses me; and I turn for relief to the New Testament, where I read as follows:—"If the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh [availeth to the expiation of ceremonial offences]; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" (Hebrews ix. 13, 14.)

With the writer of this Epistle, I make "Moses the expositor of Christ," and hold it to be his "precious blood" that "cleanseth from all sin." I hold also, that "the first step in man's true life"—the first required by God, and the first to be taken by man—is to accept the salvation of God by the exercise of faith in his Son; and when this step is taken, let him be besought, "by the mercies of God," to present himself a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is his "reasonable service."

CONCLUSION.

I OFFER no apology for these Strictures, since the matter on which they are made is before the public. I have written them with a feeling of perfect respect towards Mr. Brown, and I trust nothing inconsistent with that feeling has escaped from me. I submit them respectfully to my brethren in the ministry and in "the kingdom and patience of Christ," deeply feeling the importance of the subjects to which they relate, and not without hope that they may be deemed worthy of serious consideration. To my own conviction, I am pleading for vital evangelical truth—for the truth of God and for the souls of men. I speak because I would fain contribute somewhat, however little, to withstand what I take to be the first open inroad into English Evangelical Nonconformist churches of a theology fatally deficient in the truth and power of the Gospel. Whether this, or any similar system may have privately diffused itself to any considerable extent, I neither know, insinuate, nor conjecture; but assuredly I should regard the prevalence of it as a mischief of the gravest character, and, whether I am heard or not, I cannot but lift up my voice against it. It is true I am now an old minister, and perhaps I ought, as is said to have been pleasantly suggested by some fast spirit of the rising generation of divines concerning old ministers in general, to be "hung up in God's armoury," as the armour of ancient heroes is in the

Tower; but words of truth and soberness may find a response, if breathed even from the verge of the grave.

The aspect of the times emboldens me. It is not now, dear brethren, above all times it is not now, when "the end" must be so near, and when so many cheering tokens of revival enkindle our hopes, that a perversion, or even a dilution of the truth as it is in Jesus should find welcome or entrance among us; and I trust in God it will be given to us to "contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints."

STRICTURES ON SOME PASSAGES

IN THE

REV. J. H. GODWIN'S CONGREGATIONAL LECTURE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Congregational Lecture of 1859 was delivered by the Rev. John H. Godwin, Professor of Biblical Exegesis—or Interpretation—in New College, London, on the subject of Christian Faith; and in the spring of the present year it has made its appearance from the press. I am not going to review it as a book, nor in any way to treat it as a whole. Nor am I going to say what I think of Mr. Godwin himself. I am simply about to offer strictures on some passages in his book which seem to me unscriptural, so seriously unscriptural as to require animadversion. As to the Author, that I think it worth while to enter into controversy with him is one of the highest marks of respect that I can show him; and it shall be my endeavour—I hope it will be my successful endeavour—that not a word shall escape from my pen inconsistent with this sentiment.

In proceeding with my task, I shall not pursue the order of the Lectures, but that of the topics which I intend to notice. One of these is treated in the notes, and others occur incidentally about the middle of the volume; my mode of dealing with them, however, will, I hope, cause no confusion, but contribute rather to clearness of arrangement.

If I have sometimes quoted the original language of the New Testament, and given my own translation, it is not in order to parade my small knowledge of Greek, but because Mr. Godwin has set me the example (no doubt, a good one), and lest, if I did otherwise, it might be supposed that, in this respect, he possessed an advantage over me.

LONDON, *June* 13, 1862.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE RELATION OF ADAM TO MANKIND.

THIS topic, which is clearly the first in order to be noticed, is but very remotely connected with the subject of

the volume—Christian Faith—nor is it, indeed, referred to in the Lectures themselves; but, from the citation at p. 241 of 1 Cor. xv. 45, occasion is taken to write a note upon it. This is note H, p. 337.

Mr. Godwin begins by saying, that "the relation of the first Adam to the whole human race is a subject of much interest," in which I entirely agree with him; but I do not agree in the view that he takes of it.

"It is supposed by some," he says, "that the Bible gives *the reason* for the present state of mankind in the account which it gives of the fall of Adam. But this appears to be simply a narrative of *the commencement* of sin. The sin of Adam stands at the beginning of the history of mankind; but it is not said to be the *cause*, or the *reason*, of the subsequent character and condition of all his descendants. It is not again mentioned in any part of the Old Testament. It is not once alluded to in any of the discourses of our Lord. It is referred to by only one of the apostles; and by him it is only noticed incidentally, to illustrate what he teaches respecting Christ," pp. 337, 338.

It is quite true that the relation of Adam's sin to the condition of his posterity is not opened in the scriptural narrative, and that, among sacred writers, it is treated only by the apostle Paul, in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. In this part of Holy Writ, however, *it is* treated with considerable fulness and precision; and Mr. Godwin is scarcely prepared to lay down the rule that what is only once stated in Scripture may be passed by with disregard. That the apostle introduces it "to illustrate what he teaches respecting Christ" is also true; but, to my mind, this is an evidence that the doctrine which he propounds was currently known and believed, for on no other supposition could it have afforded an illustration of the Christian system.

"The statements, descriptive and narrative," the writer continues, "which are made respecting Adam and Eve are also made respecting their children. In the sentence recorded in the book of Genesis they are plainly referred to as *representing* the human race; what is said of Eve being said for all women, and what is said of Adam being said for all men. The same representative character is attributed to them in our Lord's discourse respecting the indissolubleness of marriage. What was said of them might be said of all. The sentence of death mentioned by St. Paul appears to be that which is recorded in Scripture, and the representative character which he assigns to Adam appears to be founded on actual resemblance. This might be inferred from the history, and from the words of our Lord. The children of Adam would be like him, and therefore what was appointed for him was appointed for them also," pp. 338, 339.

Mr. Godwin here admits that the Scriptures exhibit Adam as "the representative of mankind;" his conception of representativeness, however (let the reader forgive the coining of a word for the occasion), is extremely slender. "A man may be the representative of others," says he, "because he is like them, being a specimen of the class," p. 340. According to this view, Adam was no more representative of mankind than any other man, since every man is, as truly as he was, "a specimen of the class;" and thus the representative character of Adam vanishes altogether.

Adam, however, was the first man, and so might be taken as representative of all other men, just as the first butterfly might be taken as representative of all other butterflies. "The representative character" was "founded on actual resemblance." "The children of Adam would be like him." The principle which is here implicitly laid down is of undoubted truth in relation to the *natural* characteristics of created beings, but surely it ought to be confined to these. No doubt, every deer will have horns and hoofs, and every man will possess rational powers; but you cannot affirm that all deer will pursue the same track in the forest, or that all men will adopt the same course of life. Mr. Godwin, indeed, says, that "what is *sufficient to account* for the choice" of the first man "is *sufficient to account* for that of others." Yes, if they make a similar choice; but the actual choice of the first man affords no proof that all who follow will choose the same. That the children of Adam would be like him in sinning, was a result for inferring which not a shadow of ground existed in the natural resemblances which bound them together.

Adverting more particularly to the passage in the fifth of Romans, Mr. Godwin says:—

> "The apostle only states, what is stated in the book of Genesis, that the single sin of one was the occasion of the *sentence* of death—the death which is seen to be the lot of all men; but the separate sins of all men are mentioned in connexion with this as the reason for *death*," pp. 339, 340.

This piece of criticism is to me very unsatisfactory. It is quite true, as Mr. Godwin points out, that the apostle says "death hath passed upon all men because all have sinned," *εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*: it is obvious, however, that this must be taken in a qualified

sense, since, taken strictly, it is not true. Actually, none of mankind sin but those who become moral agents; and if there be any sense in which those who do not become moral agents sin, or are held to have sinned, it can be only because, under some divine arrangement, the sin of another is reckoned to them; in which case it is clearly the sin of another, and not their own sin, which is to them "the reason for *death*," and not merely "of the *sentence* of death." And it will be strange if the sin of another be the reason for death to one part of mankind, and their own sin be the reason for death to the rest. To such a notion, indeed, the language of the apostle seems expressly opposed: Δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος —"By one man sin entered into the world, and *by that sin* death." Such, I think, is the fair force of the article as here employed.

In the same page Mr. Godwin puts the case thus:—

"Mortality is the lot of all men because all sin who are moral agents; and it became the law for the whole race when the first man sinned," p. 340.

Let me here be permitted to ask, which of the conflicting authorities are we to accept? The apostle, who tells us that "death passed upon all men because *all have sinned*"; or Mr. Godwin, who says, that "mortality is the lot of all men because *all sin who are moral agents*"? *Both* of these assertions cannot be true.

Undoubtedly, mortality "became the law for the whole race when the first man sinned;" but will Mr. Godwin tell us *why* it did so? As to those who would become moral agents and sin, it *might*, perhaps, be "a sentence anticipating the future," but it could not be so with respect to those who, not becoming moral agents, could not sin. To them the *reason* for death must have been Adam's sin, not their own; and if Adam's sin was the *reason* for death to them, why may it not have been so to the rest of mankind?

Mr. Godwin notices the phrase in Rom. v. 19, ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν, and very justly objects to the translation of the English version, "were made sinners." He proposes to read, "were set down wicked;" I would rather read, "were reckoned sinners"—but let this pass. What, however, can be the ground of the following observation?—

"The whole context shows that the reference is to the sentence of death *occasioned* by the sin of one, which was a *sign* of the sins of many," p. 349.

"A *sign*"? The case, then, according to Mr. Godwin, is this: Adam's sin was "a sign" that all his race would sin, and therefore they were, by anticipation, treated as sinners, and sentenced to death. To this view I offer two objections. First, no such fact was in the future of which Adam's sin could be a sign, since a large part of mankind would not sin. Secondly, there is no ground on which the sin of Adam could be regarded as a premonition of the sin of all mankind. It is involved in their nature as rational and voluntary agents that he might sin and they might not sin.

There is something revolting, it may be added, in the conception of "a sentence of death by anticipation." It does not exalt our idea of the wisdom and benevolence of God to represent him as saying to a nascent race—"The first of you has sinned, and I see by this that all the rest of you are going to sin, and therefore I sentence you all to death beforehand." An equitable judge might at least have waited until the offence had been committed before the doom was pronounced.

My conclusion, then, is, that, when the apostle says that in consequence of the sin of the first man the whole race were reckoned sinners, and, in respect of the sentence of death, were treated as such, his language implies the existence of some divine arrangement as a basis on which such a proceeding could equitably rest. Adam was not merely as a sample of the race, or even as the first of the race, a representative in natural properties of all who should follow; but, as the first of the race, he was placed in a special relation to the whole, and made the representative of the whole before God, and in reference to his dealings. In a word—to use an old, but now well-understood theological phrase which I have hitherto avoided—Adam was made of his race the federal, or covenant, head; a capacity in which he acted for the race, and in consequence of his holding which the race was to be treated, and was treated, according to his behaviour.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE NATURE, CONSEQUENCES, AND PUNISHMENT OF SIN.

THESE subjects are incidentally treated by Mr. Godwin in his fourth Lecture—On the Forgiveness of Sin; in the order of these Strictures they fall most naturally to be noticed here.

Speaking of the nature of sin, he justly marks the broad distinction between natural and moral evil, the latter necessarily implying intelligence and choice; and then proceeds:—

"Human beings alone, as they advance in life, become capable of foreseeing the future, of discerning their common nature and mutual dependence, of apprehending the presence and perfections of God. They have some knowledge of these objects, and see something of their comparative worth. They cannot but know that the good which belongs to the whole of their existence exceeds what belongs only to a part—that what belongs to society exceeds what belongs to themselves—that what belongs to the Infinite Creator exceeds what belongs to any creature. Their course and condition are not fixed for them by any circumstances. They are left to choose for themselves, to some extent, what they will do, and what they will be. The superior good which they discern would be always chosen, if the inferior were not at first more easy and pleasant. But this is generally the case; and appears to be needful, not only for the probation of men, but for the development of their moral nature. They feel that their inclinations tend to the inferior, and that they can readily choose accordingly. But they are conscious that they need not follow their inclinations; they can choose in accordance with them, or in opposition to them, for the superior is offered to their choice. They see that to choose the higher and greater good is right, and that to choose the lower and less is wrong. Every man's conscience tells him, that to choose according to present inclination, disregarding his own future welfare, the welfare of others, the government of God—is wrong," pp. 127, 128.

"Such," says Mr. Godwin, "appears to be the nature of sin." And such, according to him, is the mode of its origination and its universal prevalence in a race of rational beings born upright—for it must be recollected that Mr. Godwin does not allow mankind to be fallen, or naturally corrupt. Certainly he has a difficult problem in his hands; let us observe carefully how he arrives at the solution of it.

Mankind, according to this philosophy, are beings capable, to some extent, of discerning their own interest, both as

"foreseeing the future," as "discerning their common nature and mutual dependence," and as "apprehending the presence and perfections of God." "Good" of various degrees of "comparative worth" is presented to them, and the whole affair is a choice between degrees of good. There is no question of right or wrong. Men are simply placed in the presence of a "superior" and "inferior" good—a "higher and a greater good," and a "lower and less;" and between them "they are left to choose for themselves."

I cannot think this a just view, either of the primary condition or of the moral nature of man.

Not of man's moral nature. Man is surely made capable of something more than an appreciation of the "comparative worth" of the various aspects of "good" which are presented to him, so as to discern "the higher and the greater good" from "the lower and the less;" yet this is the only prerogative which Mr. Godwin assigns to him above the brute. According to him, man has no natural sense of right and wrong, no original appreciation of obligation or duty. If he has a conscience, all that it tells him is that "it is right to choose the higher and the greater good, and that to choose the lower and the less is wrong."

Not of man's primary condition. Men, we are told, "are left to choose for themselves." But are they not *under obligation* to choose aright? To choose God their Creator for their portion and their end; and this, not merely as "the higher and the greater *good*," but as the highest and most imperative *duty*? If, indeed, obligation and duty be not original elements of man's condition, it is hard to see how they can come into existence at all. Mr. Godwin informs us that men "*see* that to choose the higher and greater good is right, and that to choose the lower and less is wrong;" but I must be permitted to think that men's perception of right and wrong depends on something very different from the mere comparison of advantages. To choose a superior good may be wise, and to choose an inferior good may be foolish; but, to a rational being of sound mind, *no more*. When men's consciences speak of *right* and *wrong*, it is assuredly in relation to something which they *ought*, or *ought not*, to have done, without reference to the balance of advantages.

Men being thus set to choose between a superior and an

inferior good, Mr. Godwin has next to deal with the fact, that all who choose at all choose amiss. This melancholy result he accounts for by saying—"The superior good which they discern would be always chosen, if the inferior were not at the first more easy and pleasant."

Now I will, for the moment, raise no question of the truth of this representation, but will look at the case as it is thus exhibited. God has placed before men two degrees of good, one superior and one inferior, for their choice; but the inferior is "the more easy and pleasant," and this to such a degree (although Mr. Godwin qualifies the assertion by the phrases "generally" and "at first") that the difference has practically determined the choice of the whole race to the inferior good—not a single individual, out of all the multitudes of mankind, having chosen "the higher and greater good." And this in a race of unfallen, uncorrupted beings! Can this be the result of a wisely-balanced appeal?

Mr. Godwin assures us that such a process "appears to be needful, not merely for the probation of men, but for the development of their moral nature." Now I confess that, to me, such a method seems to make no appeal to man's moral nature at all. The only question raised by it is a question of greater or less advantage, and the appeal made is to his selfish nature exclusively. I could understand that there was an appeal to man's moral nature if *right* were on one side and ease and pleasure on the other; but Mr. Godwin's scheme is no moral probation at all, it is merely a test of men's wisdom or folly.

I have a full conviction, however, I may now add, that Mr. Godwin's representation is not true. I admit that, to a race of degenerate and depraved beings, such as I hold mankind to be, inferior advantages, if to be attained in a way more "easy and pleasant," might seem preferable to superior ones requiring more arduous pursuit; but in a race born upright, and having suffered no degeneracy, I cannot conceive it to be so. Surely perfect uprightness would be associated with genuine wisdom. Mr. Godwin, however, believing man to be upright, represents him as universally a fool. And then, having described him as a fool, he calls him a sinner!

For myself, I find a safer guide to an understanding of the true nature of sin in the words of the apostle (1 John iii. 4),

ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία—"Sin is contrariety to law." I hold law, moral law, to be in its obligation coexistent with man as a rational being; and voluntary contrariety to this law, in every form and degree of it, is sin. The tenor of this obligation is summarily expressed by our Lord in what he calls "the first and great commandment," namely, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength;" and out of this primary obligation are naturally evolved the secondary ones, of a proportionate love to ourselves and an equal love to our neighbour. Sin, therefore—the opposite of this—is voluntary estrangement from God, with all its fruits; and it is sin because it violates the great obligation by which man's heart and life ought to be ruled.

Having discussed the nature of sin, Mr. Godwin asks, "What are its consequences?" And he gives to the question the following answer:—

"The first consequence of sin is the condemnation of conscience." The wrong chooser "looks on himself with censure and aversion; and his remorse is indefinitely increased by the consideration that, as he condemns himself, so he must be condemned by others—by all good beings who know what he is, and therefore by the all-seeing and ever-righteous Judge. . . . Other consequences follow." He will find "that he has the worse portion when he might have had the better. . . . Besides this loss, sin invariably does an injury to the minds of men. . . . Besides the consequences which come from within, there are those which come from without—from the nature of society and the world in which we live," pp. 130, 133.

Admitting that the results enumerated are "consequences of sin," I cannot satisfy myself with the place here assigned to one, and that the most important of them—"the wrath of God." I do not think that "the *first* consequence of sin is the condemnation of conscience." Swift, indeed, is this inward judgment; but, swift as it is, the judgment of God is before it, and of this judgment the voice of conscience is the echo, not the precursor. Nor can I concur in the sense in which the word "condemn" is here used. The sinner "condemns himself," that is, "he looks on himself with censure and aversion;" and in this sense he feels himself "condemned by others," whether by "good beings," or by "the all-seeing and ever-righteous Judge." No doubt "the all-seeing and ever-righteous Judge" looks on a sinner "with censure and aversion;" but this is surely a gravely defective

representation of the consequences of sin so far as God is the author of them. A much higher authority than Mr. Godwin instructs us that God "will render to every man according to his deeds; *θυμὸς καὶ ὀργὴ, θλῖψις καὶ στενοχωρία*—indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil," Romans ii. 6, 9. To call this "looking on sinners with censure and aversion," after the manner of "all good beings," is not only most unwarrantably to attenuate the language of Holy Writ, but to ignore entirely the judicial system to which condemnation, strictly speaking, belongs.

The punishment of sin Mr. Godwin conceives under two aspects: the one comprehending such consequences of sin as "may be the result of causes and laws belonging to the present system;" and the other such further consequences of sin as may be the result "of other agencies." Of the former he gives the following enumeration:—

"If we consider what is involved in the condemnation of conscience, in the fulfilment of every wrong choice, in the corruption of a spiritual nature, in separation from the good and association only with the bad, in outward disorder and desolation like that which is within, in the consciousness that the favour of God might have been received and enjoyed for ever, and that it has been rejected and lost for ever," p. 136.

His conception of the latter he opens in the following manner:—

"The Bible plainly declares that there will be, after this life, a revelation of the righteous judgment of God on all who continue in sin," p. 136.

Mr. Godwin's idea appears to be that, in the day of judgment (for to this period the phrase he has quoted from Rom. ii. 5 refers), there will be a fresh and further announcement of God's anger against sin: as he assigns no reason for his opinion, however, beyond the scriptural phrase which he quotes, it will be enough for me to say that the passage from which he has taken it yields him, in my view, no support. The phrase *ἀποκαλύψις δικαιοκρίσιας τοῦ Θεοῦ* (which Mr. Godwin has *not*, with his usual scholarship, cited from the original) means, not any fresh discovery of wrath from God, but the discovery of his righteousness as a judge in the punishment which he had before announced, and will then be inflicting. There seems to me, I confess, no ground what-

ever for thinking that anything further in the way of the punishment of sin will be announced "after this life" than is announced now; rather, on the contrary, should all such announcements be made during the present life, which forms the exclusive period of their disciplinary operation. What remains for "the day of wrath" I conceive to be only the full execution of the present threatenings.

The result of Mr. Godwin's view is to cast into the shade as unintelligible all those awful passages of Scripture which describe the future punishment of the wicked; "the Bible," he says, "does not teach us how this will be." Alas! this trifling with "the terror of the Lord"!

I do not, with Mr. Godwin, regard the *consequences* of sin at large, however painful, as constituting its *punishment*. I think the punishment of sin consists in one single element, "the wrath of God;" or, to use a different phrase, a sense of God's anger. As I understand the nature of man, God has so constituted it that the sense of his favour is its highest happiness, and the sense of his anger its deepest anguish. This is the link which binds a rational creature to the Creator, and lays the basis of moral government. For good conduct here is a vast fountain of appropriate and adequate reward; and for evil conduct here is an equal supply of appropriate and adequate punishment. No other element is wanted to constitute either punishment or reward; the pleasure and the pain resulting from these respectively unspeakably surpassing all other sources of gratification or suffering. These also have a most direct and distinct relation to good or ill desert, and, by means of them, every man can be rewarded precisely "according to his deeds." The various figurative representations which the Scriptures contain are, according to my interpretation of them, vivid and forcible exhibitions of the modes in which these two elements may be applied; and I think there is sufficient experience in this world of the power of both, to forewarn us of their aptitude to constitute the heaven and the hell of the world to come.

In a subsequent page Mr. Godwin proposes to show "why sin is punished." On this subject he uses the following cautious language:—

"The proper end of all human punishment, whether domestic or political, is the prevention of further wrong, both in those who have done wrong, and in those who might otherwise be led to do wrong.

. . . *May it not* be the reason for punishment under the divine government?" pp. 143, 144.

I have said above that this language is cautious; I should rather say that it is timid. Does Mr. Godwin, then, *not know* why God punishes sin? Or has he an opinion about it which he is afraid to express, that he can only insinuate it by a question? For myself, I answer to his question distinctly, No.

Without disputing his theory of *human* punishment, there is at least one reason why the prevention of further wrong should not be deemed the end of *divine* punishment, namely, that the end is not attained. The contrary is, not only extensively, but universally, the fact. Not in a single instance, so far as we are informed, has the anticipation of divine punishment prevented further wrong-doing; it is hard, therefore—I should say it is impossible—to conceive that this was the reason, or end, of it. There cannot be, under the administration of a Being of infinite benevolence and wisdom, so vast a mass of utterly waste and fruitless suffering. God's denunciations of wrath against sin constitute an instrument of equitable probation for mankind, as moral agents under a system of moral government—no more.

We are not left, however, to this kind of argument. The language of Scripture on this subject is sufficiently plain. In Romans ii. 6 we are told that, in the final judgment, God "will make retribution to every man according to his deeds," ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ. And elsewhere the same apostle says, τοὺς γὰρ πάντας ἡμᾶς φανερωθῆναι δεῖ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ βήματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα κομίσηται ἕκαστος τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, πρὸς ἃ ἔπραξεν, εἴτε ἀγαθὸν εἴτε κακόν. "We must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive recompense for the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad," 2 Corinthians v. 10. According to these statements, the moral government of God is a system of retribution for human conduct, "whether it be good or bad"—retributive reward and punishment. Nothing is here intimated of a design to prevent further wrong.

The conception, however, that the punishment of sin is an act of retributive justice does not find favour with Mr. Godwin. He thus argues in opposition to it:—

"Others have supposed that the holiness of God, or retributive justice, requires punishment simply because there has been sin. But the divine justice is not so described in the Bible. It is said to ensure the punishment of those who continue in sin, but it is not said to require punishment merely on account of past sins," p. 142.

The first of these sentences is to my apprehension so obscure, that I repeat it with the addition of a few words, in order to make clear at least the sense in which I understand it:—

"Others have supposed that the holiness of God, or retributive justice, requires punishment [so that punishment will be inflicted] merely because there has been sin."

What follows thus becomes a direct argument against the notion that the punishment of sin is an act of retributive justice:—

"But the divine justice is not so described in the Bible. It is said to ensure the punishment of those who continue in sin, but it is not said to require punishment merely on account of past sins."

I almost stand aghast at this statement. An apostle teaches us that "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against ALL ungodliness and unrighteousness of men" (Rom. i. 18); and it follows, therefore, that his justice requires the punishment of all sins; not, indeed, before they are committed, but not the less because they are "past." By an artifice in his choice of words—the introduction of the word "*ensure*"—Mr. Godwin does much towards confusing the minds of his readers. It is true that, under the dispensation of mercy, divine justice does not "*ensure*" the punishment of all who commit sin, but only "of those who continue in sin," forgiveness being promised on repentance; but the question here does not relate to *ensuring* punishment, but to *requiring* it, and this divine justice does concerning all sin committed, whether continued in, or not. That this requirement may be modified by repentance is a fact; but it is a fact not relevant to the argument in hand.

Mr. Godwin then proceeds to argue by analogy from the recognized duty of Christians, as prescribed by Christ. We "are taught by Christ," he says, "never to punish merely on account of wrong," p. 142. This is true, but the intended analogy does not hold. Mr. Godwin forgets, as it would seem, that retribution is no part of human duty or prerogative, while it is a function appropriate to God. Ἐμοὶ ἐκδίκησις,

ἐγὼ ἀνταποδώσω, λέγει Κύριος. "Retribution belongs to me; I will repay, saith the Lord," Romans xii. 19.

If, after this discussion, I resume the question, Why is sin punished? I answer, Because the character and attitude of God require it. As a Being of infinite holiness, and as a Ruler of inflexible righteousness, he must punish sin. His glory in both respects would be tarnished if he did not.

CHAPTER III.

ON FAITH.

In his first Lecture Mr. Godwin discusses the nature of Christian faith; and the point which he here makes is that faith, as the instrument of salvation, is not belief, but trust.

I entirely agree with him in affirming that saving faith is not a purely intellectual exercise, and that, when Christ is its object, the exercise itself is trust. I think, however, that the phrase trust *in* Christ is preferable to the phrase trust *to* Christ. The former better expresses a personal confidence; the latter seems to involve the notion of something entrusted. I trust *in* you: I trust this *to* you. So Ephes. i. 12, 13, "Who first *trusted in* Christ."

Exception also may be taken to Mr. Godwin's remark (p. 17) that "we do not now speak of believing *to*, or *in*, or *on* a person." Whether to believe *to* a person was at any time an English phrase I do not know, but to believe *in* a person is a current English phrase at the present day, and it means to have confidence.

I think further that belief is sometimes more than an intellectual exercise, and that such belief also is saving. On this subject let the following passages be considered:—

Mark xvi. 15, 16. "Go ye, therefore, and preach the Gospel to every creature: he that *believeth* and is baptized shall be saved, and he that *believeth not* shall be condemned."

2 Thess. ii. 13. "God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and *belief of the truth*."

2 Thess. i. 10. "When he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and admired in all them that *believe* (because our *testimony* among you *was believed*)."

1 John v. 9, 10. "If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater; for this is the witness which he hath testified of his Son. He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself; he that *believeth* not God hath made him a liar, because he *believeth not the record* that God gave of his Son."

In these passages the way of salvation is exhibited in the form of a proclamation made, or a testimony borne; and men are to be saved by believing it. Here, however, believing is not a mere exercise of the intellect—it is a belief with feeling, a *cordial belief* of the truth: as the apostle says, καρδίᾳ γὰρ πιστεύεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην· "With the heart man believeth unto justification," Romans x. 10.

There is also, it appears to me, a third meaning in which the sacred writers employ the term faith as the instrument of salvation; as, for example, where, in Romans xvi. 26, the apostle tells us that the way of salvation had been made manifest to all nations, εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως· "for *obedience of faith*." The way of salvation was, of course, made manifest to all nations for faith—that is to say, that faith might be exercised in it; and the faith thus to be exercised is described as an act of obedience. The same idea discovers itself where (Acts vi. 7) we are informed that "a great company of the priests, ὑπήκουον τῇ πίστει, obeyed the faith:" the phrase "the faith" being here necessarily understood of the way of salvation itself, and the obedience spoken of being the exercise of faith under another name. The same word is used as a synonym for faith in 2 Thess. i. 8, where the apostle speaks of some who "*obey not* the Gospel," τοῖς μὴ ὑπακούουσι τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ.

The key to this phraseology I suppose to be, that the way of salvation is here conceived of as a process of divine administration to which obedience is the proper response; as a process of moral government, namely, and of legislative authority.

Mr. Godwin, indeed (p. 42), requires that Jesus Christ should be regarded as exclusively the object of faith, and that the passages which mention faith in connexion with any other object "should be understood *in accordance* with those which speak of the faith that saves as having for its object the person of Christ." I cannot say that I understand this mode of dealing with Holy Writ. No doubt, under all forms of representation and expression, the sacred writers intend

substantially the same thing; but Mr. Godwin surely means more than this. Does he mean to set aside all forms of expression but the one he has chosen?

Having selected the person of Christ as the object of Christian faith, Mr. Godwin, in his second Lecture, enters at much length on a description of his person as the Son of Man, the Son of God, the Giver of Life, &c. What I am most struck with in this extended description is the absence of customary and familiar theological terms, which gives rise to a degree of uncertainty whether by new phrases, or by old phrases in new connexions, the writer really means the old things. I have tried not to allow myself to be the victim of mere phraseology; but I cannot divest myself of a feeling that, to a serious extent, the great truths of the Gospel *are not here*. The following passage is an example of what I mean:—

"The righteousness of Christ, which is the foundation of our hope and the means of our salvation, must be the righteousness of God, for all that he did was according to the will of the Father. The righteousness of God may be partially seen in all his ways, but it is most fully revealed to us in the righteousness of his Son. And therefore, because it is not the righteousness of a perfect man, but the righteousness of God, it is the means of redeeming men from all iniquity, and the reason for the forgiveness of all their sins—it is the bringing in of universal and everlasting righteousness," p. 59.

How sweet and satisfactory all this sounds! But what is the real meaning of it? It is very pleasant to read—"the righteousness of Christ is the foundation of our hope." Why, so it is, the righteousness of Christ when, as our substitute, he fulfilled the law and bore its penalty for us; this, however, is not the righteousness of which Mr. Godwin is speaking, but (as the context shows) Christ's personal righteousness, which, however necessary and glorious, *is not* "the foundation of our hope."

Again, "the righteousness of Christ" is said to be "*the means* of our salvation." What I hold is that the righteousness of Christ is the *meritorious cause* of our salvation. Whether Mr. Godwin intends the same thing I will not undertake to say; but the word *means* clearly conveys the idea of an *instrumental cause*.

Further—"the righteousness of Christ must be the righteousness of God, for all that he did was according to the will of the Father." Undoubtedly, all that Christ did

"was according to the will of the Father," but I cannot see how it follows that therefore Christ's righteousness was "the righteousness of God." If the writer wishes here to avail himself of the phrase—"the righteousness of God," as used by Paul, it is fair to observe that Paul's reason for it, and meaning in it, is very different from Mr. Godwin's.

"The righteousness of God is most fully revealed to us in the righteousness of his Son;" but, if so, this does not make Christ's righteousness to be the righteousness of God, but only the medium of its manifestation.

"And therefore, because it is not the righteousness of a perfect man, but the righteousness of God, it is the means of redeeming men from all iniquity, and the reason for the forgiveness of all their sins—it is the bringing in of universal and everlasting righteousness." Passing without further notice the mistake on which the conclusion rests, that the personal righteousness of Christ is "the righteousness of God," I observe that, if it were true, it affords no apparent ground for the conclusion itself. If the righteousness of Christ *were* the righteousness of God, why, or how, should it therefore be "the means of redeeming men from all iniquity"? or be "the reason for forgiving men all their sins"? or "bring in universal and everlasting righteousness"? That all this may be done by the righteousness of God in the sense of God's method of justifying sinners through faith in Jesus Christ, and by imputing to them his righteousness wrought out as their substitute, I can understand, and I believe; but Mr. Godwin neither says it nor intends it.

Here is another example of similarly pleasing, but illusory language:—

"Because of obedience unto death he received dominion over men, power to deliver from punishment, to save from sin, to redeem from death. Whatever was requisite that the forgiveness of sins might be a righteous act under a government of absolute rectitude, was supplied by the sacrifice of Christ," p. 63.

It is not a scriptural statement that Christ "received dominion over men, power to deliver from punishment, to save from sin, and to redeem from death," "because of [his] obedience unto death." A reference to Philipp. ii. 8, where only this phrase occurs, will show the apostle's meaning in it to be widely different. He says merely that Christ's personal humiliation was followed by personal exaltation. That he

was ever "exalted to be a Prince and a Saviour" arose from his fulfilment of the law in the stead of sinners.

And why must Mr. Godwin be so extremely cautious as to the ground on which alone "the forgiveness of sins" can be "a righteous act" under the government of God? "Whatever was requisite," says he, as if he was treading on burning coals—"*whatever was requisite*" for this end, "was supplied by the sacrifice of Christ:" but he says nothing of expiation for sin, of satisfying divine justice, or of magnifying the broken law. Are we really growing so philosophical as to ignore these things?

In treating of the Causes of Faith (Lecture III.) the language of Mr. Godwin is still perplexing and unsatisfactory. After exhibiting in detail what he calls the natural—but what I should rather call the instrumental—causes of faith, he thus proceeds:—

"But our knowledge extends beyond these secondary causes. Wherever there is faith in Christ, there will be the humble and grateful acknowledgment that this good, from first to last, is the gift of God. If our existence and all our capacities are from him—if all objects and occasions that in any way contribute to our welfare depend on his creative and disposing power—if we have no good but what we have received from him—then our trust in his Son Jesus Christ must be from him—it must be the effect of his will, the result of his purpose, the expression of his love. . . . Special favour has been shown to those who have faith in Christ; but their obligations would not have been less if the same favour had been bestowed universally. Opportunities of instruction, means of improvement, influences conducive to truth, virtue, and piety, have been given to them which have not been given to all. . . . And if it were not so, there would be no cause for boasting, but the same reasons for humility and thankfulness. In choosing the highest good, they only yielded to a divine persuasion, drawing them to receive what God would give them, and to become what he would make them," pp. 90, 91.

It is certainly satisfactory that Mr. Godwin so explicitly asserts that faith is the gift of God, but the grounds from which he infers this are noticeable. Of the three which he specifies, the first two (with the alteration, perhaps, of a single word) would equally authorize the inference that our wickedness, as well as our goodness, must be from him; namely, that "our existence and all our capacities are from him," and that "all objects and occasions that in any way contribute to our welfare depend on his creative and disposing power." These topics are here, therefore, clearly irrelevant.

That "we have no good but what we have received from him," is an argument to the point, an argument entirely just and conclusive; but it does not avow—perhaps it only conceals—a belief in that deep and universal corruption of human nature on which, in my view, the assertion rests.

In illustrating the "special favour" which "has been shown to those who have faith in Christ," Mr. Godwin takes a view which is but very partially sustained by experience, and not at all by the Word of God. It is far from being true of believers in Christ at large that they have enjoyed pre-eminent external privileges; in many cases the very contrary is the fact, while amidst equal privileges there is a wide diversity of result.

The phrase in this passage which most perplexes me, however, is that which occurs near its close. "In choosing the highest good they only yielded to a divine persuasion." How many times this phrase—"*a divine persuasion*"—has passed through my thoughts; and always with an inquiry, not yet satisfied, What can be the meaning of it? To persuade, according to Johnson, is to "influence by argument or expostulation"—a process, indeed, in which the Divine Being condescends to engage by his revealed Word and his preached Gospel; but this cannot be intended here. It is in addition to all outward means that Mr. Godwin speaks of "a divine persuasion," as something "drawing" "those who trust in Christ" "to receive what God would give them." Can Mr. Godwin convey a clear idea—has he himself a clear idea—of this "persuasion"? He knows that some of us believe in the exercise of a *divine influence*, not at all of the nature of persuasion, but direct and effectual on the heart of man; and I ask, did he avoid the word influence because he wished to ignore, or covertly to repudiate, this sentiment?

A little further on Mr. Godwin notices the question—"Why the motives which influence the choice of some do not influence the choice of others? And especially, why, when the voice of God is heard, some obey and others disobey? It has been maintained," he adds, "that all such differences in human choice must be attributed to the divine will" (p. 100). It has, but from that opinion I am as far removed as he; yet I cannot go with him all the length of the following passage:—

"We can assign no other reason for the inefficacy of what has been

done for the good of many than their own will; according to the words of Christ, 'Ye will not come to me that ye may have life.' We can assign no better reason for the giving to some more than is given to others than the willingness to use rightly the good received in common with others," p. 108, 109.

It is with the last sentence that I disagree. I object to it upon two grounds. The first is, that it ascribes to man what cannot belong to him. Mr. Godwin himself has emphatically affirmed that we have no good but what comes from God. Now a "willingness to use rightly" privileges vouchsafed is unquestionably something good; it must consequently have been given as a special favour, and it cannot, therefore, be the reason for the gift of those special favours of which itself is one.

My second ground of objection to the statement of Mr. Godwin is, that it derives from the creature a reason which can be worthily found only in God. Even if there were in any a "willingness to use rightly" privileges vouchsafed, how infinitely small a "reason" it would be for the vast mercies which follow on it! Far more grand is the view of the apostle, when he says—"Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ Jesus; according as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace," Ephesians i. 3–6.

CHAPTER IV.

ON FORGIVENESS OF SIN.

A REPEATED perusal of the fourth Lecture, which discusses this subject, has produced on my mind a painful impression of the scantiness and inefficiency with which the evangelical aspects of it are treated. Respecting the forgiveness of sins we are elaborately told that "nature suggests it as possible"

(p. 122), that analogy shows it to be "reasonable" (p. 121), and that "Scripture reveals it as certain" (p. 122); but we are nowhere told that it is an act of infinite grace, nor are the aspects of sin which so marvellously illustrate the grace of forgiveness anywhere set forth. The only phrase which approaches this topic is the following:—"Surpassing the highest hopes of men is the revelation of the mercy of God given to us in his Word," p. 122.

The following is the only sentence which relates to the important subject of the mediation of Christ:—

"That the mediation of Christ is the means by which God imparts to men the forgiveness of sins, is a truth plainly stated in the Sacred Scriptures, and confirmed by Christian experience," p. 140.

Not a syllable is said of the infinite holiness of God, which renders mediation necessary, nor of the glorious characteristics of the Saviour, which render his mediation prevalent. Some strange idea of the mediation of Christ itself, indeed, seems to lurk in two of the expressions here employed; first, in its being said to be "the *means* by which God imparts to men the forgiveness of sins," and next, by its being said to be "confirmed by Christian experience." Has the mediation of Christ, then, *no* influence but upon the heart of man?

In a similarly unsatisfactory manner Mr. Godwin treats the great expiation. His words are these:—

"Our Lord spoke of his death most frequently in connexion with salvation and eternal life; but he also referred to it in connexion with forgiveness. He said that *his blood was shed for the remission of sins.* And so the apostles taught. *We have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins,*" p. 119.

But not a word is said concerning the reason why the shedding of the blood of Christ was requisite, or the nature and efficacy of the expiation effected thereby. The whole result of this marvellous operation of divine wisdom and grace is summed up in the cold and freezing phraseology, that in it "there is all that is requisite to secure the salvation of men, and to render this result, in every respect and relation, *reasonable and right*," p. 141.

Further on Mr. Godwin takes up the question, Why is sin pardoned? And he says, "To understand why sin is pardoned, it is needful first to understand why it is punished;" and he thus sets forth his position, in a passage which brings us back for a moment to a subject which we have already treated:—

"If punishment were required merely by the wrong which had been [done], we cannot see how anything could take its place; and forgiveness would seem to be impossible. But, if it be appointed as a means for the prevention of wrong and the promotion of right, we see that something else may be, for this end, equally and more effective; and so forgiveness becomes possible," p. 145.

The idea in the former part of this passage is repeated in the same page, in the following terms:—

"It is not easy to see how . . . retributive justice can be satisfied by the suffering of the innocent for the guilty," *ibid.*

The position here taken by Mr. Godwin is, that, if the punishment of sin were retributive, or for the wrong done, there would be no scope for the suffering of the innocent for the guilty, or even for forgiveness at all; and his inference, of course, is that the punishment of sin is not retributive. The middle link between these two is, that punishment, as an act of retributive justice, must necessarily fall on the wrong-doer, and on him alone. And the argument is conclusive, *unless* a system has been brought into operation based upon a method of personal substitution, in which case there would manifestly be no difficulty at all. Mr. Godwin evidently does not believe in the existence of such a system; but many of his brethren do, and he has said nothing to invalidate their opinion.

If what Mr. Godwin finds to be difficult thus turns out to be easy, what he finds to be easy proves to me not without difficulty:—

"It is not difficult to see," says he, "that the suffering of the innocent will, in some cases, eusure as much good as the punishment of the guilty, and so may be in its stead. We can see how the obedience of one may be, through its influence, an abundant compensatiou for the disobedience of many, and the righteousness of one for the unrighteousness of many," pp. 146, 147.

Now I confess that I cannot see this at all, unless on the supposition that the innocent suffers as a personal substitute for the guilty, a supposition which Mr. Godwin repudiates. It is to me beyond conception how the obedience of one can make "compensation for the disobedience" of another, unless it is rendered in the name and on behalf of the other.

Mr. Godwin, however, finds a "perfect illustration" of the principle he maintains in what he is pleased to call "the sacrifice of Christ for sinners." He says:—

"Whatever good effects could be gained by their punishment, in showing the evil of sin and the excellence of God's service, in producing submission to his will and reverence for his character—these are obtained for men by the righteousness of Christ, by his obedience unto death," p. 146.

And if anything more than these, Mr. Godwin says nothing of it! Such an utterly impoverished Gospel I could denounce with indignation; a sentiment with which my whole soul glows, although I refrain from the expression of it. I will only ask how it happens that Christ's obedience unto death, if it does no more than this, is able to do so much? If Christ became obedient to death in our stead, and presented himself an expiatory offering for our iniquities, then I can understand how love so marvellous may win a rebellious heart to God; but, apart from this, the merely personal righteousness of Christ seems but in a small degree adapted to produce the effects ascribed to it.

In the next page Mr. Godwin thus defines the relation of the sacrifice of Christ to the law:—

"It [the sacrifice of Christ] reveals what the law could not make known, and it accomplishes what the law could not effect," in showing "the evil nature of sin, and the suffering that should be willingly borne for the sake of righteousness." "It is therefore to be prized, rather as its substitute, than as its support," p. 147.

Thus, to supersede the law is, according to Mr. Godwin, the work of him of whom it was foretold, "He will magnify the law, and make it honourable," Isa. xlii. 21.

"God forgives men," says he, on the same page, "for the sake of Christ. But his sacrifice has this efficacy and value because it is a revelation of the divine character," p. 147.

Not so, Mr. Godwin; not so. "He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and by his stripes we are healed," Isaiah liii. 5. "His own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree" (1 Peter ii. 24); and hence arises the "efficacy and value" of his sacrifice.

As Mr. Godwin assigned "the prevention of further wrong" as the end of the punishment of sin, so he assigns "the prevention of wrong *and the promotion of right*" (he gives no reason, however, for this addition) as the end of its forgiveness. And again I object that the end is not attained. As no anticipation of punishment, so no prospect of pardon,

either promotes right or prevents further wrong; the Gospel is to mankind an instrument of merciful probation—no more. From man it experiences the same entire and universal disregard as the law; and it is only by the superadded influence of the Holy Spirit that even the love of Christ becomes influential on a single heart. Thus again, if this were the end, even the blood of Christ has been shed in vain.

If the question be asked, What, then, is the reason for the forgiveness of sin? I answer, The glory of God's grace. This is the end actually attained, and, by inevitable inference, the end designed. I am almost amused to see, by turning to another passage (p. 140), how nearly Mr. Godwin agrees with me:—

"If it be asked," says he, "Why did God give his Son to be the Saviour of men? the answer of the Bible is, *He so loved the world.* And if it be asked, Why does God forgive the sins of men? the answer is, *He delighteth in mercy.* But, as there is a reason for punishment, so there will be a reason for its removal. In the *end* proposed—the good to be communicated to men—there is *an adequate motive* for the exercise of the divine goodness," pp. 140, 141.

No, Mr. Godwin, I think not; especially as "the end" is not attained. But, more generally, I cannot conceive that the well-being of creatures can ever constitute "an adequate motive" for divine action. It is a motive far too small; and it must in all cases be absorbed in the infinitely greater, and only worthy one—the manifestation of God's character, or the glory of his name.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF FAITH.

To this important subject Mr. Godwin devotes his fifth Lecture. In offering some observations upon it, I may as well set down at once that he entirely discards the doctrine of justification by imputed righteousness. These are his words:—

"The Scriptures do not teach that any are counted by God to be right, except in the relation in which they are right. . . . To be

supposed to be righteous without being righteous, does not appear to be of advantage. . . . We need not suppose any kind of fiction, or any change in the meaning of words," pp. 191, 192.

The view which Mr. Godwin takes is explained in the following passage :—

"It appears, then, to be according to the usage of words in the Sacred Scriptures, that they who have faith in Christ for his salvation should be said to have righteousness because they are really right with God. He judges them to be right, and considers them to be right, and declares them to be right; because, though not right in one relation, they are right in another, having the rightness which is appointed and approved of God, which is the work and gift of God—a human rightness resembling the divine, resulting from it and ever tending towards it," p. 167.

That this doctrine is entirely unsatisfactory to me I need scarcely say; I will apply no hard words to it, however, but rather endeavour to adduce arguments worthy of consideration.

I object then, in chief, that it is neither adequate, nor appropriate, to the lost condition of mankind.

According to the Scriptures, mankind are placed under a system of moral government destined to issue in a future and final judgment, a process of strict, though equitable, retribution. This system is stated at large by the apostle in Romans ii. 5–16. Under this system, mankind, as sinners, are condemned; and from its condemnation their release cannot be effected by personal rightness of any kind. If there be any mode of release from condemnation under such a system, it can be only by the sinner being held judicially righteous.

If the question then be asked, How can this be? in the words of Holy Writ I answer—*Τὸν γὰρ μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτιαν, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν ἵνα ἡμεῖς γινώμεθα δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ*—"For him who knew no sin [God] treated as a sinner in our stead, that we might be treated as righteous before God for his sake," 2 Cor. v. 21. In other words, by a process of sovereign grace (to which God is entirely competent), he has placed his Son in the sinner's place, judicially regarded; so that he is treated as guilty, and the sinner believing in him is treated as righteous. Such is, I believe, the scriptural account of the way in which God is pleased to "justify the ungodly," or to hold them judicially righteous, as set forth in the following passage :—*Νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμου*

δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ πεφανέρωται . . . δικαιοσύνη δὲ Θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας . . . δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι, διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ: "But now, apart from law, God's method of justification is made manifest. . . . God's method of justification by faith in Jesus Christ, extending to all, and availing for all, who believe; . . . they being justified freely by his grace, through the expiation for sin offered by Christ Jesus," Romans iii. 21–24.

In opposition to Mr. Godwin's assertion that the phrase—δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ—does *not* mean God's method of justification, I have here so rendered it, because to me the exigency of the passage seems to demand it. The conception of righteousness as "an attribute of God" (p. 160) is not here applicable at all; neither is that which (pp. 165, 166) he elicits from some passages in the Old Testament (but without any example from the New), the happiness which God gives to men. And these are the only two meanings which he assigns to the phrase. I may add, however, that my rendering is supported by the high critical authority of Schleusner, in his Lexicon. Even the English reader may easily see how indispensable this rendering is in a familiar passage, Romans x. 3.

It is true that, in giving the word δικαιοσύνη this meaning, there is made what Mr. Godwin calls a "change in the use of words;" or, as I should rather say, a word is used in a new sense. I do not see anything to be complained of in this. Such a process is not only frequent, but inevitable, in the combined progress of human thought and language; and, in his phrase "divine persuasion," Mr. Godwin himself supplies us with an example of it.

It is true also, that this conception of justification involves what Mr. Godwin calls a "fiction;" that is to say, in it a man is supposed to be what he really is not. To this he suggests two objections. The first is that such a thing is impossible with God, who always does, and always must, see things and men as they really are (p. 115). Now I deny this altogether. Judicially, God sees, and ought to see, and must see, men, not as they are *really*, but as they are *legally*. It is so in the administration of human law. With an accused person before him, a judge is to hold and declare the

accused to be, not what he is, but what he is proved in evidence to be; and in this method he may be held and declared innocent, although the judge himself, and all the world besides, know him to be guilty. To God *as a Judge* a similar course is, not only possible, but prescribed.

Mr. Godwin's second objection is, that "to be supposed righteous without being righteous *can be of no advantage*." But this obviously depends on the kind of administration which is in progress. If it be a judicial process, one in which a man is on trial—say, for his life—and the issue depends, not on what he has *done*, but on what shall be *proved* against him, to be held and declared innocent will be of the greatest possible advantage. Now, with me, the justification of a sinner—his being held righteous although he is not so—is a part of a judicial process, and it is of advantage unspeakable.

In another place (p. 153) Mr. Godwin objects to this view of justification, that, if taught in the Scriptures at all, it is taught only by Paul, for whom it cannot be supposed to have been reserved to declare the great privilege of Christianity. Now, while, for my part, I should not scruple to receive any doctrine really taught in the writings of Paul because it was taught nowhere else in the Bible, I cannot but call to mind that Paul himself claims no such prerogative of exclusive revelation; on the contrary, in the very passage recently cited, he affirms that his doctrine was "witnessed by the law and the prophets," Rom. iii. 21: exhibited dimly by the Hebrew typical system, and with characteristic obscurity by the ancient seers of Israel, yet in substance the same, the only difference being in the definiteness and distinctness of the verbal expression.

In this respect Mr. Godwin lays a particular stress on the preaching of Christ, in which he thinks the doctrine of justification by imputed righteousness ought to be found, if it be true; and he pretty distinctly infers that, since it is not found there, it cannot be true (p. 154 *seq.*).

In reply to this argument I say two words.

In the first place, the argument is of a kind that is not just. The ministry of our Lord was carried on under very peculiar circumstances, and was materially modified by them. In prospect of "the decease which he was to accomplish at Jerusalem," there were some great and important—some of the greatest and the most important—topics to which he

could make no open reference at all, and others of which he could speak only to his disciples privately, or, if to the multitude, only in terms indefinite and obscure. After his death, resurrection, and ascension, all might be plainly told, and accordingly, the Gospel *was* much more plainly preached by the apostles than ever it had been by their Lord. It is, therefore, not just to argue that what was not explicitly taught by our Lord was no part of Gospel truth.

In the second place, the argument, unjust as it is, is not founded in fact. The term justify, certainly, is not used by our Lord in the apostle's sense of it; but what is the substantial meaning of the following passage?—a passage which, in his summary of our Lord's teaching (pp. 154–156), Mr. Godwin does *not* quote:—*Ἀμὴν, ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὅτι ὁ τὸν λόγον μου ἀκούων, καὶ πιστεύων τῷ πέμψαντί με, ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον· καὶ εἰς κρίσιν οὐκ ἔρχεται, ἀλλὰ μεταβέβηκεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωήν*: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that hearkeneth to my word, and obeyeth him who sent me, hath eternal life: for into condemnation he cometh not, but hath passed from death unto life," John v. 24. This language seems to me to belong to a judicial system, and to describe a judicial process; a process necessarily identical with the "justification" of Paul, only described by the apostle with greater fulness and clearness.

While Mr. Godwin maintains that men are justified by faith, he stumbles at the representation that men are justified by faith *only*, p. 179. His ground of objection, of course, is the language of the apostle James (chap. ii. 24): "You see, therefore, that a man is justified by works, and not by faith only." The reader will doubtless recollect the familiar and important passage from which this verse is taken, and he will perhaps turn to it—James ii. 14 to the end. The apostle's language respecting Abraham Mr. Godwin takes in the strictest sense, and affirms that Abraham was justified by his works. On his own view of justification—that it consists in being judged right—this would be possible, since Abraham's works, as fruits of faith, were right after the manner of faith itself; while, on the forensic view of justification—that it consists in being held judicially righteous—it would be quite impossible, there being nothing even in the fruits of faith to satisfy the demands of the law. To this position, according to Mr. Godwin's own view, however,

there are objections not without weight. In the first place it may be said, that, if a man is judged right because of his works, then he is not judged right because of his faith—or, if so at all, only partially so, a conception altogether novel. It may be said further, that, if a man is judged right because of his works and of his faith, then there are two grounds of justification, his faith on the one hand and his works on the other; which I take to be another novelty in divinity. To this, indeed, Mr. Godwin says No; but I think without any valid reason.

Mr. Godwin insists that faith producing works and works springing from faith are, not only "inseparably combined" (which is true), but that "both are regarded by God" in a sinner's justification. In this case it must surely be wrong to say that men are justified either by faith or by works; the ground of their justification being evidently a compound of both—which I must be permitted to think another novelty in divinity, and not true.

On this view the phrase "the righteousness of faith" must be pronounced, either altogether inapplicable to a sinner's justification before God, or at least equally applicable to a believer's holiness of life, the whole of which consists of fruits of faith. And Mr. Godwin's doctrine of justification by faith comes out to be this—that men are to be justified because of their holiness, which, however, is to be called "the righteousness of faith" because faith is its first act and its germinating principle. Whether this is the doctrine of the Bible I may safely leave the reader to judge.

To return, however, to the forensic view of justification. It is quite true that the passage in James creates an exegetical difficulty; and, without noticing the opinions of others, I shall here give my own solution of it.

From the 14th verse the apostle employs himself in showing that an inoperative faith cannot save; this idea of an operative or inoperative faith I conceive him to carry with him through the whole passage. I render, then, as follows:—

"Canst thou not see, O foolish man, that an inoperative faith is powerless? Abraham our father, was he not justified by an operative faith, when he offered up Isaac his son upon the altar? Dost thou not perceive that faith was the operative principle of his works, and by his works his faith was carried out; so that the Scripture was fulfilled which saith, Abraham trusted in God with an operative faith, and this faith was reckoned to him for his justification? Thou seest,

therefore, that a man is justified by an operative faith, and not by an inoperative one," James ii. 20–24.

That this translation carries out clearly and perfectly the course of thought in the apostle's mind, must, I think, be manifest to all. To the critical reader it will no doubt be a stumbling-block that I have translated the phrase ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, "he was justified by an operative faith," instead of "he was justified by works." I acknowledge the apparent violence of this rendering; but I think, nevertheless, that it is that which the exigency of the passage requires, and that by which the real argument of the apostle is carried out. The idea appears to be fairly and of necessity brought forward from the former part of the passage.

It seems to me impossible to conceive that the apostle should in one verse (verse 23) emphatically declare that Abraham was justified by faith, and in the next verse (verse 24) declare with equal emphasis, and with every mark of merely reiterating his assertion, that he was justified by works. Indeed, in verse 22 this conclusion seems to be expressly guarded against; the works of Abraham being not assigned as the cause of his justification, but as the evidence of the operative power of his faith.

After stating in another place the unavailableness of *ritual* works to justify, Mr. Godwin goes on to say—

"But the Bible does not say this of those works which are the exercise, and expression, and evidence of faith in God. In reference to these works, and to those of a contrary character, our Lord has said that he will render to every man according to his works; and that according to their words and works all will be justified or condemned," p. 181.

Noticing with a passing expression of surprise the slip—quite unusual with such a writer—by which he ascribes to "our Lord" the words of the apostle in Romans ii. 6, I must be allowed to question whether any one of these passages relates to works which are the fruits of *faith*. The entire passage in Romans ii. 6 *seq.* evidently describes the administration, not of the Gospel, but of the moral law, the great commandment of which is not faith, but *love;* while Matt. xii. 36, 37, merely teaches that "in the day of judgment" our words will be brought into account, and Matt. xvi. 37 is referred by nearly all the best critics to the destruction of Jerusalem, and the abolition of the Mosaic dispensation.

What is very remarkable in this extract, however, is the change of the principal term in the whole discussion, which Mr. Godwin here introduces without any pretext or apology. We have all along until now had to do with faith *in Christ*, and with this as the appointed means by which a sinner is to be judged right before God; but now Mr. Godwin speaks of "faith in God," and incorporates it with the general machinery and administration of the moral law. Surely there is "a great gulf" between these two, and one which cannot be overleaped by such a trick of legerdemain as this.

"Whatever is right in the conduct of men," says Mr. Godwin, "is regarded as right by God" (p. 181); that is to say, as a ground of justification. Yet, but a few pages before (p. 167) he expressly restricts this privilege to those "who have faith in Christ for his salvation." "Every exercise of trust in Christ was right," he says; "but not every exercise of trust in him would make a person righteous."

"And the fruits of faith are acceptable as well as faith" (p. 181). Yes: "the fruits of faith are acceptable" to God; but this is not the question, and it is using a scriptural phrase for a purpose to which it is not fairly applicable. The question is, whether "the fruits of faith" constitute a part of the ground on which a sinner is justified; and to the question thus put I answer emphatically, No. The fruits of faith are acceptable to God because he who brings them forth is by faith made "accepted in the beloved" (Ephes. i. 6); but they are no part of the ground of his justification. The reason of our justification is not, as Mr. Godwin says (p. 168), that our faith "is the principle of all righteousness," and that thereby we "become upright, or righteous persons;" but that the righteousness of Christ as our substitute is imputed to us when we trust in him, and with this righteousness no works of ours, neither our faith nor any of its fruits, can ever be incorporated.

CONCLUSION.

I HAVE written solemnly, as in the sight of God, and in view of eternity and the eternal interests of men; and I now commend the preceding strictures to the serious consideration

of all who may deem them worthy of a perusal. I am well aware that the topics to which they relate are not all of equal importance; but, while I do not think any of them are trivial, at least one of them—justification by faith—is of vital moment. I think the view set forth by Mr. Godwin is subversive of the Gospel. Besides this, however, I think that his whole system is feeble, and destitute of those elements of moral power which truly characterize the Gospel of Christ. In his Lectures truth either disappears, or is fearfully attenuated; not a single topic as handled by him retaining its scriptural power, either to rouse the conscience or to kindle the affections. If this be the Gospel, it is to me the Gospel in its dotage and decrepitude.

I cannot but express my deep regret that an advocate of such a theology should hold a position in which he is so likely to influence extensively the rising ministry of the Congregational Dissenters; and more especially, that a kind of public approval should have been attached to the system by his appointment to the Congregational Lecture. May God mercifully preserve his churches and their pastors from the diffusion of so soul-destroying a leaven!

For writing and publishing these Strictures I need not, of course, offer any apology; but I have done so the rather for two reasons. The first is, that the high position held by Mr. Godwin in the Congregational body is adapted to give to his sentiments an unusually wide circulation and powerful influence; and the second, that I am not a member of the Congregational body myself. On the former account I think it highly important—indeed, indispensable—that the Lectures should be controverted, and this in a manner more argumentative and detailed than can be expected in a review; on the latter account, I think I can do this needful work perhaps with less personal feeling, or, at all events, with less liability to suspicion of personal feeling, than a Congregational minister.

I am now no stranger on the arena of theological controversy, and no novice in the handling of theological subjects. I do not doubt that I shall be received on this occasion with the courtesy which has so long and so often been shown me; and I shall be thankful if I have been permitted, and enabled, to do anything towards checking a current—would that I could seal up the fountain!—of fatally poisonous waters.

ON THE SUPPORT OF THE GOSPEL MINISTRY.

A FRAGMENT.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE little piece which is now presented to the public is truly what its title announces,—A Fragment; a fragment, that is to say, of an exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, in which the author is now engaged. That it appears in print is owing solely to the deference he pays to the wishes of beloved brethren, with whom it is his privilege and happiness to co-operate in the faith of Jesus. Well aware, as he is, that this Fragment can have no claim to regard beyond the importance of the subject, and the rarity and difficulty of its treatment, he commends it to the churches of God, as a small but affectionate contribution, under the divine blessing, to their edification and welfare. It has been written, although not verbally, yet substantially as it was delivered from the pulpit.

LONDON, *May* 30, 1846.

A FRAGMENT.

"AM I not an apostle? Am I not free? Have I not seen Jesus Christ our Lord? Are not ye my work in the Lord? If I be not an apostle unto others, yet doubtless I am to you: for the seal of mine apostleship are ye in the Lord. Mine answer to them that do examine me is this, Have we not power to eat and to drink? Have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, as well as other apostles, and as the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas? Or I only and Barnabas, have not we power to forbear working? Who goeth a warfare any time at his own charges? Who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? Or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock? Say I these things as a man, or saith not the law the same also? For it is written in the law of Moses, Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn. Doth God take care for oxen? Or saith he it altogether for our sakes? For our sakes, no doubt, this is written: that he that ploweth should plow in hope;

and he that thresheth in hope should be partaker of his hope. If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we shall reap your carnal things? If others be partakers of this power over you, are not we rather? Nevertheless we have not used this power; but suffer all things, lest we should hinder the Gospel of Christ. Do ye not know that they which minister about holy things live of the things of the temple, and they which wait at the altar are partakers with the altar? Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel," 1 Corinthians ix. 1–14.

I frankly confess, my brethren, that when, contemplating the exposition of this epistle, I glanced my eye over its contents, I regarded the portion now before us as one which I might probably omit, on account of what seemed, on such a glance, its purely personal reference. A closer inspection of the passage, however, has led me to a different conclusion. I see that the apostle introduces into it a general principle as well as a personal reference, and a general principle of great importance in the evangelical system: I bring it, therefore, under your consideration.

It is one of the advantages of an expository course, that it brings up to view in succession the entire contents of the sacred volume, as it is certainly a disadvantage connected with the more ordinary mode of pulpit instruction, preaching, that it presents only selected topics. Pursuing the latter system alone, those topics which may not be deemed suitable for separate discourses lie altogether neglected, and thus a large and important portion of Sacred Writ becomes practically as though it had never been written. Exposition remedies this defect. And, since it is by this consideration that a course of at least occasional exposition is recommended, it is evidently the duty of an expositor to make a point of bringing out the minor topics which lie in his way: to fail of doing so would be to lose one of the special advantages put into his hand.

The minor topics of scriptural instruction can by no means be regarded as unimportant. Less important than some with which they may be compared, they are nevertheless of great moment, and even of necessity, in their place. The smaller parts of an edifice may be less important than its foundation; but they are not less necessary, and they are even much more beautiful. Look at the splendid edifice in course of construction for the British Legislature, and fix your eye on its sculptured niches and its fretted pinnacles.

Why, without all these it would be substantially fit for the purpose for which it is designed. But they are its ornaments, its finish; and to rob it of them would be to despoil it of its beauty. So it is with the minor morals of the Christian character, and with the minor portions of Christian truth. They are like the last touches in a painting; the few but most conspicuous touches to which all else was preparatory, and by which all else is wrought to its perfection.

Nor can it justly be said that to treat these minor matters of Christian instruction is not preaching the Gospel. I protest against so narrow an interpretation of this term. The precept, Be ye holy for I am holy, is surely as much a part of the Gospel as the declaration that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners. And if the injunction of universal holiness be so, so likewise is every precept into which it may be broken up. I turn, then, without further remark, to the passage before us.

Direct your attention in the first place, my brethren, to the third verse, which is the key to the whole passage: "Mine answer to them that do examine me is this." It appears that the party in the church at Corinth of whose malignant hostility to the apostle this letter furnishes so many evidences, denied his claim to be considered an apostle, and, by consequence, his right to the pecuniary support then (as appears by the fifth verse) annexed to this office. To those who thus put to him the question he here answers. And he begins his answer (verse 1) by two interrogations, touching the two points on which he was examined. The first is, "Am I not an apostle?" The second is, "Am I not free?" That is, Am I not entitled to the immunities attached to the apostolic office? He then resumes these questions in their order.

On the first, "Am I not an apostle?" he adduces two facts. The one of these is that he had "seen Jesus Christ our Lord" (verse 1). In this he refers, no doubt, to his view of the Lord Jesus when arrested by him on the road to Damascus, the only occasion on which, before his appointment to office, Paul could have seen Christ after his resurrection. In order to see how this bears as a proof of his apostleship, it is necessary to remark that, although not every one who had seen Christ after his resurrection was made an apostle, no one was made an apostle who had not

enjoyed this privilege. To be witnesses of Christ's resurrection was, as appears from the address of Peter on the choice of Matthias (Acts i.), a special destination of the body; and in order to this it was plainly necessary that they should each of them have seen him subsequently to that event. Paul's reference to this circumstance renders it probable that his not having seen Christ after his resurrection in the same manner as the other brethren, had been adduced as an objection to his being an apostle. Some interesting inquiries respecting the sight which Paul had of the risen Saviour here suggest themselves, but there is no opportunity at present to pursue them.

The second fact which the apostle adduces in relation to his apostleship, is the success of his ministry among the Corinthians themselves. Thus he goes on to say (verse 1): "Are not ye my work in the Lord?" His ministry had been blessed in a manner which, if he were not an apostle, must be deemed altogether extraordinary and unaccountable. If he was not truly an apostle, he was a false pretender to that distinguished honour, and might have expected anything rather than tokens of divine approbation. And this argument, if of weight anywhere, should have been especially conclusive at Corinth, where some of his most signal successes had been gained. "If I am not an apostle to others," says he (verse 2), "yet doubtless I am to you;" that is, if others do not think me an apostle, undoubtedly you ought to do so; "for the seal"—or rather, the proof—"of mine apostleship are ye in the Lord."

Having thus disposed of the first point, the apostle takes up the second, namely, his title to the immunities of the apostolical office. "Have we not power," he asks, "to eat and to drink?" (verse 4), that is, had he not a right to draw his support from his evangelical labours, and to eat and to drink without otherwise working? Had he not a right, even, he goes on to ask, "to lead about a sister, a wife?" (verse 5.) The force of these questions lies in the fact that other persons having no higher claim than himself had done these things with unquestioned propriety, "as the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas," whom he specifically names. By Cephas, of course, we understand Peter, and by "the brethren of the Lord" such persons among the apostles, or the first preachers of the Gospel, as were more or less nearly

related to the Lord Jesus. They, it seems, had both forborne working for their subsistence, and had "led about a sister, a wife." The commentators are generally agreed, that the "sisters" thus stated to have accompanied these primitive teachers of Christianity did so for the purpose of enlarging their means of usefulness, especially by gaining access to the female portion of society, in that age, and in those regions, under restrictions among ourselves unknown. It is generally admitted also, that the sisters were the wives of the parties whom they accompanied, although the word employed is not *necessarily* to be so understood. Paul's appeal to these facts constitutes an *argumentum ad hominem*. You admit the right in these cases, why do you deny it in mine? What is it but sheer malice to say that "I and Barnabas only" (verse 6) may not forbear working? The mention of the name of Barnabas in this interrogation leads to the supposition that the hostility directed against Paul at Corinth was, on some account unknown, directed against Barnabas also. It is, however, important, as incidentally proving that the right of support was not confined to the apostles, but was extended to others, and no doubt to all, who were, with approbation, devoted wholly to the labours of the Gospel.

After thus availing himself of the inconsistency of his opponents for his personal vindication, the apostle takes up the general subject of the title of ministers of the Gospel to subsistence, and he adduces several arguments in its favour.

The first of these is taken from the nature of the case, as one of service rendered. "Who goeth a warfare any time at his own charges? Who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? Or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?" (verse 7.) These instances all suppose an employer, who, having availed himself of the labour of a servant, provides for his wants; a rule so natural, just, and universal, that any one who should depart from it in secular things would cover himself with shame. And shall the Lord Jesus Christ—this is the reasoning—be less equitable than men? Engaging servants to labour for him, will he leave their wants unsupplied?

The second argument adduced by the apostle is from the Jewish law. "Say I these things," he exclaims, "as a man" —as citing merely human example—"or saith not the law

the same also? For it is written in the law of Moses, Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn" (verses 8, 9). This precept of the Mosaic economy is found in Deuteronomy xxv. 4, and is a beautiful expression of the benignity of its Author. In order to separate the grain from the straw, the corn was laid on the floor, and then trodden by oxen. In this process an ox might be so far left at liberty as to be able to eat a portion of the corn, or he might, on the contrary, be muzzled with the view of preventing it. The latter practice was forbidden. You employ the ox in a laborious service, let him feed therefore to the full. The apostle intimates, however, that herein God did not care only for oxen, but that the benignity thus expressed towards the brute creation extended with equal, and indeed with superior force, to his creatures of human kind, and, among them, with the greatest force to his servants in the Gospel of his Son. So much, I think, is the just force of the apostle's language—"Doth God take care for oxen? Or saith he it altogether for our sakes? For our sakes, no doubt, this is written" (verses 9, 10). It would be unwarrantable, I think, to stretch our interpretation further, and to say that, in the giving of this precept, God had either no view at all to the mitigation of the toil of the oxen, or even that he had an eye by anticipation to the ministers of the Gospel. It is enough to argue that he who would not have an ox tread out the corn without a generous supply of his wants, cannot be supposed to engage the toil of his servants in the Gospel on a less benignant system.

The inference is thus fully authorized which the apostle proceeds to draw, namely, that every kind of toil should have its reward; "for he who ploweth should plow in hope" of partaking of the harvest, as well as he that threshes the corn in its ripeness.

From a digression in which the apostle indulges himself in the 11th and 12th verses, and which I shall notice hereafter, he returns in the 13th verse to his immediate subject. And he now draws a further argument from the Jewish economy. "Do ye not know," says he, "that they who minister about holy things live of the temple, and that they who wait at the altar are partakers with the altar?" The fact which he here states is familiar to every reader of the Old Testament. A large portion of the offerings presented were,

by divine command, appropriated to the support of the priests. And the apostle immediately proceeds with the assertion, "Even so hath the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel" (verse 14).

The force of this language should be remarked. The apostle's argument is not that, as the priests under the law lived of the temple, so it is reasonable, or so it may be presumed to be pleasing to God, that the ministers of Christ should live of the Gospel. He speaks now of divine institution and appointment. "GOD HATH ORDAINED"—such is the true import of the term—"that they who preach the Gospel should live"—should be entitled to live—"of the Gospel." This is a regulation not less emanating from divine authority, than that which the apostle had cited from the institutions of Moses.

We come, then, to a serious point. We have here brought out to view a distinct and important element of the evangelical system, as conceived and intended by its great Author. It is one of the primary institutions of his kingdom, and entitled to whatever reverential regard is due to his authority. It is quite true that it transpires incidentally, and is brought out, not in a formal announcement, but in the course of a personal controversy; but this makes no difference in the case. The fact remains the same. Nor is this incidental mode of announcement at all unusual with the New Testament writers. We must take the declaration, therefore, in its unrestricted import, and ponder it accordingly. "GOD HATH ORDAINED THAT THEY WHO PREACH THE GOSPEL SHOULD LIVE OF THE GOSPEL."

1. The first observation which this declaration suggests is, that it implies Christ's sanction of an entire devotedness to the work of the Gospel ministry: for, if it had been contrary to his will that some of his disciples should in this manner engage themselves to his service, he would never have ordained that they should be supported in doing so. Let me not be supposed to say that it is improper to combine the ministry of the Gospel with secular pursuits, or to entertain any feelings of disparagement towards those who, while providing for their own wants, also preach the glad tidings of salvation. On the contrary, as it is the prerogative of every one who understands the Gospel to teach it, so those devoted men who work with their own hands while they preach it

are at once invaluable instruments of good, and worthy of the highest honour. I would that such men were multiplied a thousandfold. My only point is that there is nothing improper in an exclusive consecration to the Gospel ministry; that those who are led to desire such consecration are not necessarily to be regarded as running counter to the will of their Lord; that they are not fairly liable to be told that they are idle, and to be scornfully remanded to secular employments; that, on the contrary, it is possible they may have been anointed by Christ for his work, and may be pursuing his glory in a way perfectly consistent with his design. It is true, they will want support; but Christ has ordained that it shall be given, and they may conclude, therefore, that they do but carry out his intention when they throw themselves on the regard which his people may be expected to render to his will. There is nothing in the idea of such exclusive consecration to the ministry out of harmony with the features of the case. The preaching of the Gospel, with its connected duties, has, from the first day until now, been not only enough, but more than enough, to occupy the whole energy of man. It may well be deemed an employment to any tolerable discharge of which, generally speaking, the whole energy of man is necessary. From the commencement of his kingdom, Christ himself acted upon the plan of requiring an exclusive devotedness to his service. And his ordaining in general terms that they who preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel, indicates in a manner too clear to be mistaken his pleasure that it should be so in every age.

2. Establishing the point, however, that it is the will of Christ that some of his disciples should in every age separate themselves to the work of the ministry, it is fair to allow the questions to be raised, which of them, and how many? Is it the duty of the churches to support all who may please so to employ themselves? Or, if not, by what rule is discrimination to be exercised? In the commencement it would seem that a personal indication took place on the part of Christ himself, by the appointment of the apostles; and beyond this the matter was apparently determined by the judgment of the brethren at large concerning the gifts and qualifications of the parties concerned. The former of these modes is of no avail to us. The latter, however, is available, and every way trustworthy and satisfactory. While no disciple of the Lord

Jesus would presume to dictate to another whether he should preach or not, no one can be deemed under obligation to aid the support of another in that work whose dedication to it he finds reason to disapprove. Among those who show a desire to consecrate themselves to this employment, it may be presumed that all those will be found whom the Lord himself has called to it, and probably some besides, the discrimination and separation of whom may be deemed wisely confided to the serious and affectionate estimate of their brethren. The general obligation resting upon Christians, then, is to be ready to aid the support of all whose consecration to the ministry they do not disapprove. Reduced to particulars, this obligation requires them more especially to see to the support of those whose ministerial services they solicit or enjoy.

3. What amount of support, however, should be rendered? Upon this question, which is undoubtedly just and necessary in the case, the passage before us throws an unequivocal light. What Christ has ordained is "that those who preach the Gospel should LIVE of the Gospel;" a phrase which cannot be understood to mean less than that all their wants should be supplied. They should LIVE—that is, they should derive a subsistence, not of a splendid or even of an affluent kind, but, however moderate, a subsistence for themselves and their families, from the discharge of their office. I here mean to set an entire, in opposition to a partial subsistence. Preachers of the Gospel, according to this passage, should not be so placed as to be obliged to eke out by their own toil a scanty and insufficient provision. The application to secular business necessitated by such a position is evidently adapted to thwart the design of the ministerial institution itself, and to destroy the advantages which must have been contemplated by it. It is not only that business abstracts a certain amount of time and energy from religious study and duty, it impairs the fitness for them. Ministerial pursuits, on the other hand, diminish a man's qualifications for business, so that neither the one nor the other can be carried on with effect. Applying himself to both with divided energy and a divided heart, in both he almost inevitably fails.

4. The subsistence provided for ministers, the words before us further indicate, should be a competency—they "should LIVE of the Gospel." This expression points, not so much to

a specific amount of pecuniary aid, as to a certain state of domestic comfort. Widely different, no doubt, are the wants of different men, and the requirements of different circumstances, and no desire is to be cherished for uniformity of condition. The point to be regarded is that the provision made should in all cases be suitable and sufficient, so as to prevent the existence of anxiety. A mind not at rest about temporal supplies is a serious drawback on ministerial duty; a source of distraction which it is as truly the interest of Christ's people, as it was the design of Christ himself, to prevent or remove.

5. From what source, then, we proceed to ask, should the support of the preachers of the Gospel be derived? To this question also we have a clear answer. "They that preach the Gospel should live OF THE GOSPEL." The meaning of this expression may readily be determined by a reference to the preceding verse, in which the apostle adverts to the divine appointment that those who ministered about holy things should "live OF THE TEMPLE." We know that they lived on the offerings presented in the temple, and when we are told that Christ has in like manner ordained that those who preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel, the meaning no doubt is that they should be supported by the contributions of their brethren. I may go on to say, by the *voluntary* contributions of their brethren, since, in religion, and under the Gospel dispensation, all is voluntary. Ministers of Christ who derive their support from the national resources in the form of royal or parliamentary grants, or from the wealth of the community in the form of tithes, can scarcely be said to live of the Gospel; they live rather of the law—as man has been pleased to contrive, but not as Christ saw fit to ordain. And respect for his ordinance should lead his ministers, it would seem, to the refusal of a kind of aid so contrary to his appointment.

Before we part with this expression now before us, the delicacy of it requires to be observed. The apostle does not say that those who ministered about holy things were to live ON THE OFFERINGS—they were to live OF THE TEMPLE. It is true, they did live on the offerings, but not in a direct manner. There was a step intermediate between the offerers and the priests. The offerings were presented to God, and HE gave them to the attendants at his altar, not the parties

who brought them there. It was not to be said, therefore, that the people supported the priests, or that the priests were supported by the people. The people made their offerings to God, and God supported his priests. They lived "of the temple." This noble delicacy in the institution has been regarded as designed to prevent the priests from feeling themselves humbled on the one hand, and the people from being elated on the other. Now the same form of expression which the apostle applies to the legal institution he applies to the evangelical one. They that preach the Gospel are to live, not on their brethren, but of the GOSPEL. Their brethren, indeed, provide their support, but in a manner circuitous and indirect. They have given themselves and all they have to the Lord, and it is THE LORD who directs a certain portion of his own substance in their hands to be allotted to his ministers.

We ought not to pass by without notice the superior privilege which attaches to this institution of Gospel times, in the purely voluntary character of it. Under the legal dispensation all was specific and prescribed; here everything is left open and discretionary. The general duty is laid down, but the mode of fulfilling it is left to Christian fidelity and love. The Lord has ordained that his ministers should be supported; but by whom, and in what measure, he has left to be determined by the impulses and the dictates of a grateful heart. What an honour is thus conferred by our adorable Redeemer on those who love him! What an immense amount of confidence he reposes in them! How thoroughly he trusts them! But, if this is an honour on the one hand, how solemn a responsibility does it involve on the other! Of what unparalleled importance are the interests which Christ has thus deposited in the care of his people! The preaching of the Gospel is the vital element of the evangelical machinery, the grand instrument for the conversion of the world, and the establishment of Christ's kingdom; yet this he leaves, without a single prescription, to the liberality of his people, quickened and directed solely by their love to him and his cause! How wakeful, how prompt, how energetic, should that affection be to which such issues are entrusted! How earnest should every disciple of the Saviour be to do his duty in this respect, to do it fully, to do it promptly, and to know that he has done it! Of what serious

consequence may a failure in this instance become! And how melancholy a result of either covetousness or thoughtlessness would be the enervation and hindrance of the Gospel ministry which could not fail to result from it!

6. There is yet another point on which the passage before us seems to me to bear. I cannot but think that it leads to a preference of the direct over the indirect mode of contribution towards the support of the ministry. I will not depreciate the custom of letting the sittings in places of worship, as a well-adapted means of raising money; but I cannot without difficulty acquiesce in what I must deem the extinction of one of Christ's institutions by this means. They that preach the Gospel should live OF THE GOSPEL. The support of the ministry is a direct Christian duty, and should, as it seems to me, be directly discharged. To pay a kind of chapel-rate, an assessment for accommodation enjoyed, is one thing, to contribute to the support of a minister of Christ is another; and the principles and affections which they call into exercise are widely different. On the former plan the support of a minister is a matter of accident, and, be it sufficient or insufficient, it is left as it may happen; on the latter plan it is a matter of design, and, if not attained by one effort, an appeal lies for the use of further endeavours. The former merely creates one more occasion for our meeting with the tax-gatherer, the latter awakens our love to Christ, and affords us new pleasure in the promotion of his glory.

If, after the mediations in which we have been engaged, we cast our eyes over the evangelical vineyard, we cannot but be affected with a painful feeling that the design of Christ respecting his ministers is but very imperfectly fulfilled. They who preach the Gospel are in very many cases very far from living of the Gospel. It does not, indeed, follow from this that the disciples of Christ are negligent of their duty, since it is possible that they may have done all that it is in their power to do. Nor do I bring any accusation. I may be permitted, however, to urge it upon every professor of religion—I would that all could hear me!—to inquire whether he has justly appreciated the object confided to him, and exerted himself to the full amount of his ability for its attainment. Are there not cases in which a minister's wants are treated with a painful degree of apathy and disre-

gard, and in which the supply of them is not even made an object of endeavour at all? Are there not cases in which the payment is a mere matter of routine, without any inquiry being made whether the purpose of it is secured? Are there not cases in which the contributions bear no just proportion to the means of the donor, or to the cost at which other objects are attained? Pious persons profess that the enjoyment of Gospel privileges and an edifying ministry is the most important element in their situation—so much so, that they will often change their residence on this account alone. And yet are not the instances without number in which less is expended on this object than is given for the secular education of a single child, or the cultivation of a single accomplishment?

And, why, after all, should a generous contribution to such an object be thought a hardship? Let attention here be directed to what the apostle says in the eleventh verse of the passage before us. "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, IS IT A GREAT THING if we shall reap your carnal things?" Usually labour and remuneration relate to objects of the same class, both alike secular, and capable, consequently, of being measured one against another. But it is not so here. You give a minister of the Gospel carnal things; but he has conveyed to you spiritual things, which are of incomparably greater value. You give him supplies for his bodily wants; but he has conferred on you and yours blessings for the soul. The return, even if generous, must still be disproportionate. Provide for him as you will, you are still his debtor. Should a recompense at the utmost so inadequate be made grudgingly? "Is it A GREAT THING" that he who has been the means of making you rich for eternity should have food and clothing for his pains?

The apostle introduces (ver. 12) another topic not unworthy of notice. "If others have this power over you," says he, "have not we rather?" He had, indeed, a pre-eminent claim, for, although they might have ten thousand instructors in Christ, he was their spiritual father, for he had "begotten them through the Gospel." In how many cases does a similar claim still exist! How often is it that those from whom a minister's support should be derived are the fruits of his own ministry, and indebted instrumentally to him for their everlasting hope! And is it HIS wants of

which they can be unmindful? Is it HE whom they can, without an effort, and almost without compassion, see oppressed with anxiety, or sunk in penury?

Paul, indeed, tells us (ver. 12) that he had not used his right in this matter, and that, "lest he should hinder the Gospel of Christ," he "suffered all things" that might ensue from his refusal. And many have acted, and still are acting, in the same disinterested spirit. But it is one thing voluntarily to relinquish an immunity to which you are entitled, and another to have it denied to you by those from whom it is due. The disinterestedness of the ministers can be no justification of the covetousness or apathy of their people. Even Paul, while most loudly glorying in the independence which he maintained by the labour of his hands, as though taking the occasion which his personal independence afforded him, lays down most explicitly the rule that they who preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel. And wise, happy, and useful, will be the Christians and the churches who make it the theme of their meditation, and the guide of their conduct.

REMARKS ON INFANT BAPTISM,

OCCASIONED BY

"THE EXPLANATORY NOTES"

OF THE

REV. T. GROSER.

IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND.

A LETTER.

Reading, Nov. 18, 1834.

MY DEAR BROTHER:

MR. GROSER'S "Explanatory Notes on Infant Baptism," of which you have sent me a copy, and on which you request my remarks, appear to me but ill-adapted for their professed design. It is true enough, indeed, as the title of this pamphlet implies, that infant baptism requires explanation, and not a little of it, to show its consistency, either with the Word of God or with the nature of Christianity; so that the author cannot be censured as having undertaken a work of supererogation. But, to say nothing at present of his several arguments (of which I shall speak presently), what illumination can be expected from a writer who teaches that "ALL true theology" is contained in "the doctrine of the Trinity,"* not excepting, therefore, the institution of baptism itself? Or from one who *explains* his notion of the Trinity by telling us that "Christ had abode in the community of the Father, in his bosom from eternity, and only in the fulness of time . . . *grew up into the responsibilities of a separate agent*"?† These astounding if intelligible dogmas are, however, pretty nearly a fair specimen of the singularly simple and convincing explanations which the tract before us contains.

It would be unfair to this author not to take an introductory notice, likewise, of the very striking *consistency* of his arguments in relation to the subject of which he treats. The early part of the pamphlet is devoted to proving that infant baptism rests on "the basis of representation;" the child being represented by the parent, and therefore entitled

* Explanatory Notes, p. 12. † *Ibid.*

to be brought into the community of the church by virtue of the parent's faith.* I say nothing at present of the *validity* of this argument, but only beg you to compare it with the following statement from a subsequent page. "The broad ground on which infants are to be received into the community of the church is the universality of the reconciliation. If, indeed, the death of Christ were availing only for the elect, it might then be fitting to defer baptism till there were signs of regeneration; but, when all flesh is reconciled in the body of his flesh through death, the infant partaker of the reconciliation ought not to be denied the token of an interest in it."† Is it credible that one and the same person should have made *both* these statements? First we are told that *the basis* of infant baptism is the representation of the child by the parent; then that *the ground* of the same rite is the universality of Christ's atonement. He does not even say that the one is *a* ground of the ordinance, and the other *a* ground of it; but each is *the* ground, and challenges therefore an exclusive place, leaving no room for another. Nor can the two be blended. If infants are entitled to baptism because they ought not to be denied the token of an interest in the reconciliation of which they are partakers, then they cannot derive their title from being represented by their parents. And the converse is equally true. Why it was that this writer, having laid down one hypothesis as "the basis" of infant baptism, did not confine himself to arguments in its support, but expended his resources on the laying of "another foundation," it is not for me to divine. It could scarcely have been, however, because he felt *perfectly* confident in the security of the first; and if his faith in it did sometimes waver, it would have been as well to have abandoned it altogether, as thus, with his own hand, to have exhibited its shame. But, whatever may be the solution of this problem, the circumstance is destructive of the author's credit as a reasoner. Though it might have required *talent* to make his case good, or even plausible, it wanted only a little common sense and discretion for a man, in stating his own case, *to avoid contradictions.* He that cannot walk in so plain a path can be worthy of very little confidence as a guide through the perplexities of controversy.

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* Pp. 1, 2. † P. 14.

It must be confessed, however, that the author has placed himself in circumstances not a little unfavourable to the clear exercise of his reasoning powers. He conceives that the voice of the Lord "has been once more heard through living men;"* in other words, that various persons now professing to speak by the Spirit *are inspired.* And *they* have borne a "uniform testimony" to infant baptism! This is, in truth, a very startling and confounding affair; and I quite sympathize with him when, with great simplicity, he exclaims, "What is to be said of it?"† What, indeed! Why, it *must* be believed by him and his companions, whether any evidence of it can be found or not; and recourse must be had to all sorts of hypotheses; double foundations must be laid for such a marvellous superstructure, so that, if it cannot stand upon one, it may be shifted to the other; nay, if nothing can be read about it in the Scriptures, we must look elsewhere, though it be to the ends of the earth, or beyond them; and it will do, in such an extremity, to affirm that, "if any one wish to see the principle of Pædobaptism, he has but to open his eyes *anywhere in the whole universe*, and he may read it in every quarter,"‡ even in the signing of Magna Charta! But really this will not do for me. And though I may subject myself, not only to the charge of being "unspiritual,"§ but to the heavier imputation of being what it seems, according to this writer, who was himself once a Baptist, all consistent Baptists are (I shall not repeat the names), ‖ I must pause a little before I surrender altogether the exercise of my understanding. As to "the right of private judgment run mad,"¶ the most melancholy exemplification of this appears to be afforded by the writer and the party to which he belongs, characterized as they seem to be by a helpless prostration of the understanding not at all less remarkable than the other remarkable features by which they are known.

In proceeding to consider the arguments brought forward by our author, it would be but fair to require that he should make choice of one out of the two foundations which he has laid for his edifice. He announces both parental representation and universal atonement. But on which of these does he mean that his case should rest? Since it cannot rest upon

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* P. 16. † P. 17. ‡ P. 3. § P. 13. ‖ P. 16. ¶ *Ibid.*

both, he is in all reason bound to make his selection. We should then know to which point to direct our inquiry, and might dismiss the other without further notice. It may be justly said, indeed, that, having engaged his two principles in mutual and deadly hostility, he has rendered them both nugatory, and destroyed the necessity of refuting either. The double task of refuting both, however, is not so formidable but we will attempt it.

First, then, for the *theory of representation*, which is thus gravely and authoritatively announced. "All revealed religion stands upon the basis of representation."* Now that the principle of representation is introduced into God's treatment of mankind is unquestionable; as appears both in the case of Adam, who "stood the representative of all his posterity," and of Christ, "who stood, and yet stands, the representative of all his church,"† and, according to this writer, of the world too.‡ I am not sure that I understand what he means by saying that "all revealed religion *stands on the basis* of representation;" but when, in the next page, he affirms that this principle "*pervades the whole system* of revealed religion,"§ he utters a sentiment to which I give a most unqualified denial. I maintain, on the contrary, that, while God's treatment of fallen man proceeds *in part* on the principle of representation, it proceeds in part also upon the regard due to personal character. By the representative system he accomplishes all those portions of his work of mercy which do not afford scope for the exercise of personal character; but, wherever personal character can be brought into play, this is done immediately and without exception, and it is obviously his design that it should be so. Hence, notwithstanding the substitution of our Lord Jesus Christ, the innocent for the guilty, it is required of every sinner that he repent and believe the Gospel.‖ It is declared that "every man shall bear his own burden;"¶ and that, before the judgment-seat of Christ, every one of us shall receive according to our works.** Can this writer have forgotten these things? Or the blow aimed at the representative principle, which was as popular among the Jews as it is with some modern professors, by the precursor of our Lord? "Bring

* P. 1. † *Ibid.* ‡ P. 14. § P. 2. ‖ Luke xiii. 3.
¶ Gal. vi. 5. ** Rom. ii. 6; 2 Cor. v. 10.

forth therefore fruits meet for repentance; and think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father; for I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham. And now also the axe is laid to the root of the trees: therefore every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire."*

The principle of representation, then, obviously does *not* "pervade *the whole* of revealed religion." To what extent is it carried? This writer speaks as though it was the ordinary and universal medium of spiritual blessings, and in this respect uses language painfully derogatory, as I conceive, to the glory of the Lord Jesus. Undoubtedly it is by virtue of his representative character that mercy is extended to any, and is attainable by all. But what does our author mean, when, after stating that "the church was to be dealt with according to Christ's success in his great work,"† he adds, "Every individual church is, *in like manner*, represented before God in the person of its pastor"? *In like manner!* And he goes on: "who is held responsible for all its errors in doctrine and irregularities in practice, and who is bound for a part, *as Jesus was bound for the whole*, to see that it shall be presented as a chaste virgin to Christ, in the day of his coming."‡ I have no wish to entertain low ideas of pastoral responsibility; but I will leave you to attach your own epithets to the language I have quoted.

Descending from the church to the family, we are told that "the child is contained in the parent, afflicted through his father's unbelief, or shielded by his father's faith." Again I ask, What does the writer mean by these very singular terms,—"*afflicted* through his father's unbelief"? Does he mean with bodily or with spiritual maladies? If, as I suppose, the latter, does he mean that the child will be saved by his father's faith, and condemned for his father's unbelief? If he does not mean this, he means nothing to his purpose: and if he does mean it, why does he not say so plainly? Doubtless because it is too glaringly unscriptural and false. The truth notoriously is that, as to the spiritual state of infants, whether living or dying, it is not in the least degree affected, either for good or for evil, by the faith or the unbelief of the parents; but, whatever it is, it is by virtue of *their indepen-*

* Matt. iii. 8–10. † P. 2. ‡ *Ibid.*

dent relation to Christ, without any regard to the character or intervention of the parents at all. And as to children who grow up, while, as is manifest and inevitable, the character of a parent may be very influential in forming that of his child, it is in this method only that the spiritual welfare of the child can at all be affected by it. His salvation does not depend upon his parent's faith or unbelief, but exclusively upon his own.

In a word, no spiritual benefit accrues from, or depends upon, any relation whatever, except that which, as fallen creatures, we hold to the Saviour of the world. Now it is only upon the supposition of the child being represented by the parent *in a spiritual sense*, that our author grounds the propriety of infant baptism; and, if the parental relation have no such spiritual or religious character, the conclusion obviously falls.

In confirmation of the alleged religious character of the relation between a believer and his children, we are referred, as usual, to the Abrahamic covenant. "It has been affirmed by God," we are assured, "from the time of his first calling out *a church* in Abraham and his offspring."* And it is subsequently complained of, as "a great error" among "the Baptists," to imagine "that Christianity is an essentially different religion from Judaism;" or that "the Christian church is an essentially different thing from the Jewish."† Whatever affliction it may occasion to the worthy author to think that his quondam brethren are involved in such a grievous heresy, I can happily assure him that I am altogether free from the charge. For I do not believe that Judaism was religion *in any sense*, or that the Jewish state *ever* constituted the church of God. My belief on this point is (and, so far as I know, it is the opinion of the Baptists at large), that the Jewish state was altogether *typical*, and consisted wholly of "*shadows* of things to come,"‡ Christ, and spiritual character and privileges, being the substance. The temple and the holy place were shadows of "the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, and not man;" the high-priest, of "the great high-priest of our profession, Christ Jesus;" and "the blood of bulls and of goats," of that richer blood which "cleanseth from all sin." And the same prin-

* P. 2. † P. 5. ‡ Col. ii. 17.

ciple, I conceive, pervades *the whole* of the Jewish economy. There is *nothing* it it, from first to last, which is not shadowy and emblematical.*

Now the position I have thus laid down is one of much importance in the question before us. It is quite true, as our author intimates, that the view we take of the Jewish economy is adapted very materially to affect our ideas of baptism. If what is stated above be admitted, it will become the ground of important inferences, the validity of which, of course, will be contested if the premises be denied. I should like, then, to know what this writer and his friends think on this point. They may be assured that we are not so insane as to imagine that, *both being religions*, "Christianity is essentially different from Judaism;" or that, *the Jewish and Christian communities both being churches*, "the Christian is essentially different from the Jewish:" nor need they expend their resources for war in the easy exploit of setting fire to such a man of straw. What we do hold is, that *the Jewish nation and economy were typical of the church of God and its economy.* Do they hold the same? Or do they deny the typical character of the former dispensation, and undertake to consolidate its shadows into substance?

This writer has certainly not asserted so much, and it seems difficult to believe that such an assertion should be hazarded by any man in his senses; but yet he writes as though this were his opinion at the bottom. Thus he represents "justification by imputed righteousness," and "regeneration by the Holy Spirit," as the "principles" of the Jewish economy.† That they were doctrines strikingly typified and clearly shadowed out in that economy is true; but, if they were its "principles," then did that economy consist of substances, and not of shadows. Thus also he misapplies the language of the apostles concerning the olive-tree with its natural and engrafted branches, as though every Jew, as such, had been in a state of spiritual privilege. Whereas the same apostle tells us, "He is *not a Jew* who is one outwardly, neither is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh: but he is a Jew who is one inwardly, and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, not in the letter, whose praise is not of men, but of God."‡ The same idea lurks in the very

* Heb. ix. 8–12. † P. 6. ‡ Rom. ii. 28, 29.

phrase, *the Jewish church;* for *the church of God* is not a thing of shadows, but of substances. *There* is not a typical but a real high-priest, not a typical but a real sacrifice, and not typical but real privileges. If, however, all these were in the Jewish economy, so as to constitute it the church of God, then verily all supposition of its shadowy character is at an end.

I put it again, therefore, to our author, whether he holds the typical character of the Jewish economy or not. If he does not hold it, it is but fair to be explicit. If he does, then it is for him to consider whether this sentiment is not totally subversive of what he has written. To me, I confess, it appears to be so. For, if all God's dealings with, and institutions among, the descendants of Abraham were typical, then it follows that Judaism was not religion, and that Christianity is essentially different from it—as much so as the thing typified from the type. It follows also, that the Jewish nation never constituted the church of God, and that the church of God is a new and essentially different institution. And it follows lastly, that, when God admitted infants into the Abrahamic covenant, he did not admit them into his church, nor "affirm" the principle of religious "representation."

Now, if the argument from the old dispensation is invalid, much that this tract contains immediately falls. For example: This writer says, "Inasmuch as God has recognized this [the parental] relation in the church from the beginning, surely those who say it is now recognized no longer are bound to prove deviation from the established course."* Who they are that say a relation once recognized by God in his church ought to be recognized no longer I am sure I do not know, unless it is Mr. Groser and his friends; for, whereas God has founded his church on a regard to *personal* religion, they are for bringing in *representative* religion. And clearly it is *they* who ought to adduce "proof of a change." As for us, all we say is that God *never* recognized the parental relation in his church, and we want to know why it should be recognized now.

These remarks may serve to silence our author's complaint that the Baptists refuse to "go back to the book of Genesis,

* P. 3.

to find the authority for a New Testament ordinance." "God introduces no new principles into his church," says he; and "the principle of baptism" "is to be found, therefore, if it is true, in the earliest records of divine revelation."* It ought, then, clearly to be found, if not in the first chapter of Genesis, at latest in the fourth,† or at all events much earlier than the seventeenth; for the world had existed two thousand years before the time of Abraham. And had God no church in the world all these two thousand years? Or what was the condition of infants during that woful period, in which there was no "appropriate ordinance of initiation" for them into "the covenant of a better life"?‡ The truth obviously is, that, although God had always a church in the world *spiritually*, yet *visibly* he had not. That is to say, there were always godly people, but they were not always brought into organized association. This our author acknowledges to have been the case for two thousand years, namely, till the time of Abraham; we only double this period, and say that no such association was instituted till the time of Christ. Although, therefore, the Old Testament affords a thousand emblematical exhibitions of the church of God in its spiritual aspect, it can furnish no information respecting either the principles or modes of an institution which had no existence during any portion of its history.

It is on the alleged spiritual character of the ancient economy that this writer chiefly relies, to bear him out of the reach of a part of the enemy's fire by which he is plainly much galled. The Baptists, in their simplicity, have been used to call for either precept or example from the New Testament for infant baptism; and he acknowledges that none can be produced, but complains that the demand is *unreasonable*,§ because children had been taken into the church ever since the days of Abraham. But we have shown that infants never were taken into the church at all; and therefore, instead of wanting a "distinct" ordinance for turning them out, one is clearly required for bringing them in.

Our author, however, though he can find no *precept* in the New Testament for infant baptism, is disposed to try whether he cannot find an *example*. "In fact," says he, "we do find in the New Testament the constant operation of the same

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* P. 11. † See Gen. iv. 26. ‡ P. 15. § P. 5.

principles as in the Old, relative to the reception of families as a whole into a new covenant relation to God, in consequence of the father's faith."* This is excellent. Let us see how he proceeds to make good his position. "As the Lord had formerly chosen Aaron and his house, Phinehas and his house, David and his house, for peculiar blessings; so the easy and natural manner in which mention is made of Stephanas and his household, Lydia and her household, obviously points to the continuance of the same system." † But surely there is no analogy here, unless these ancient Israelites and their houses were chosen to spiritual blessings, which I should not admit, and which, on this writer's own principles, they could not be, since, according to him, their title to such privileges was involved in their descent from Abraham. The attainment of *salvation* was a thing essentially different, nor could the method of it, as connected with *personal* character, be at all doubtful under any faithful preaching of the Gospel.

The use made of the New Testament households on this occasion is somewhat singular and new. It has been customary with Pædobaptists to assume the probability that infants were included in them, and with Baptists to reply that this cannot be proved. But this gentleman uses a different tone. "I do not care whether there were infants in these households or not," says he. "The principle is the same. Those who constituted the household were blessed in the blessing of their head."‡ So, then, it appears that he is not advocating the baptism of *infants* merely, on the ground of their parents' faith, but that of adult children likewise; nay, the baptism of servants also, on the faith of one who is not their parent. Really this matter wants a few more "Explanatory Notes." All that he asserted in the beginning was that *the child* was religiously represented by the parent; now he maintains that the same person is the religious representative, not only of his children, but of his servants also. What, then, becomes of the parents of these domestics? Do they not represent their children too? Or is there a double representation? Or is the magisterial relation so much stronger than the parental, that, when a man has a master to represent him before God, his parent is to be ejected from this singular station? But there is such "a beautiful illus-

* P. 8. † *Ibid.* ‡ P. 9.

tration of the principle here insisted upon, in those churches where the Lord has built up his own ordinances afresh, where the believing head of the household brings up his sick infant, incapable of faith, and even his servant who has no faith, but is merely willing to yield to it, and they are healed through the prayer of the elders, simply upon the faith of the master of the family,"* that, whether intelligible or not, it must be true. What! not yield to the evidence of infant baptism, when it is supported by miracles which prove not only this, but much more?

But this writer tells us that the Scriptures reply "in language which it would never occur to a Baptist to use,"† to those who ask what they must do to be saved. What can this marvellous language be? Simply this: "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, *and thy house.*" What difficulty, then, should a Baptist find in telling the master of a family that if he believed he should be saved, and that, if his household believed, they also should be saved? But, if our author means more than this, and would tell the head of a family that his household as well as himself should be saved *by his faith*, I hope such language as this never would occur to a Baptist, as I am sure such a sentiment never occurred either to our Lord or his apostles. I find it difficult to understand what he further says on this subject: "The ardent faith of the jailor received the recognition from heaven, . . . that all who were capable of it should for themselves personally embrace the same salvation."‡ I suppose the meaning of this to be, that, when Paul said to the jailor, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved, and thy house," the idea conveyed was, that all in his household who were capable of personally embracing the same salvation had a warrant and welcome to do so. This is precisely the sense of the language "which would occur to a Baptist," and is unquestionably true. But what does the writer mean by calling this a "recognition from heaven" of the jailor's faith? Does he mean that it was owing to the jailor's faith that his domestics had a warrant to believe the Gospel; and that the same language would not have been true, and might not have been addressed to them, if he had remained in unbelief? Why, to say nothing of the violence

* P. 10. † P. 9. ‡ *Ibid.*

done by such an idea to "the glorious Gospel," the fact is that the jailor was in unbelief at the very moment this language was held; as is evident from its being the reply to his question of ignorance, "What must I do to be saved?" Yet it is strangely called a "recognition of his faith."

What now becomes of "the principle" "of taking the head of the house, and blessing all through him"?* This writer does not pretend that anything was conveyed to the jailor's household by his faith but a warrant to believe the Gospel; and this they were declared to possess before he could have exercised faith, and they would have possessed it equally if he had lived and died in unbelief. As to "the whole household entering into a new relation with God in the conversion of their head,"† and "the whole family being brought within holy enclosures, not to remain as a mere assemblage of human beings attached by no sacred bond, and holding only unsanctified relations to each other,"‡ it is pure fiction, and at utter variance with evangelical truth. The Scripture knows of no gracious relation to God on the part of moral agents, but such as arises out of the exercise of repentance and faith on the part of every one admitted into it; and of no holiness but such as consists in sanctified affections. All who do not possess these are unholy persons, and can have no proper place within "holy enclosures," it being impossible they can hold any "sanctified relations," either to God or man. The apostolic instructions to children and servants to obey both parents and masters "in the Lord,"§ were doubtless addressed to such servants and children as were professors of religion.

In this connexion the writer quotes the favourite but much disputed passage, "The unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband, and the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife; else were your children unclean, but now are they holy."‖ On which I observe, first, that the words are violently torn from their connexion and reference. They were suggested solely by the case of the solitary conversion of either a husband or wife, and have no meaning beyond asserting the conscientious propriety with which the conjugal relation might in such case be retained. The case of the children is brought in by the apostle to illustrate and

* P. 9. † *Ibid.* ‡ *Ibid.* § *Ibid.* ‖ *Ibid.*

strengthen his position: as though he had said, If the conversion of a wife demands that she should renounce her husband, it equally demands that she should renounce her children; but that would be a thing quite impossible, or, if possible, altogether sinful: wherefore, as the parental tie is unbroken by her conversion, so also is the conjugal. Secondly, that the only hypothesis on which the passage can favour the author's views is glaringly anti-evangelical and anti-scriptural. He adduces it in support of the assertion that the family, being at the time infants or unbelievers, are made holy through the piety of the head: this holiness, then, is not personal but relative—a sort of holiness never either recognized by the statutes, or found among the subjects, of the kingdom of Christ. Thirdly, that the passage has not the slightest reference to baptism. None appears in it, none can be found in the context. Yet it is adduced to show, not only that children of pious parents ought to be baptized, but that *by being baptized* they are brought within "holy enclosures." The text speaks of nothing but faith. Fourthly, that, even supposing the passage to refer (which it does not) to the extraordinary operation of one person's faith making another person holy, it relates, not to the parents' faith sanctifying the children, but to *one parent's faith sanctifying the other.* "The unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband." Here is a fresh mystery, of which we have heard nothing hitherto, nor do we learn from any part of this tract whether the theory of "representation" will comprehend this new case. It needs some additional "Explanatory Notes" to tell us whether the husband religiously represents his wife, as well as his children. Nor, indeed, is this the only point which requires illustration. Not only is the wife sanctified by the husband, but "the unbelieving husband is sanctified *by the wife*," who surely is not "*the head*" of the family while the husband is alive, and through whom, therefore, even the theory of representation itself makes no provision for the descent of spiritual blessings. Yet this is adduced in illustration of the principle that the family is blessed *through the head.* If, however, the "testimony of the Spirit" should be borne in favour of this novelty, doubtless some other "principle" will be discovered by which it may be explained, and a method of maintaining that it also has been "recognized" by God "from the beginning."

If our author has signally failed in his reference to the *word* of God, it is plain that he can derive little benefit from an appeal to his *providence*. Upon the alleged but disproved necessity of the Baptists showing *a change* in the church, he is kindly willing to admit that we should make some progress towards such a result, if we could demonstrate an alteration in "the economy of providence;" so that "the offspring is no longer impoverished by the idleness, or diseased through the profligacy," and he might have added, enriched through the industry, of the parent.* On this I observe, first, that, as it has been shown the Baptists are under no obligation to prove a change, the argument has no bearing. Secondly, that, if the argument would prove anything, it would prove too much: since it is notorious that, under the economy of divine providence, we feel the effects, not only of our parents' conduct, but of other people's, without their sustaining to us any other relation than that of our common humanity. Such a state of things, therefore, can never be adduced in favour of a system of parental "representation" merely, or of any one less than mutual and universal. Thirdly, that, while, to a considerable extent, the providence of God permits the conduct of one man to affect the welfare of another, it is not so universally. To a great extent likewise the interests of men are dependent upon themselves; and to an extent quite sufficient to render the economy of providence *generally* a school of personal probation.

I believe I have now noticed all the passages which refer to the theory of "representation," which, in the first instance, this writer lays as "*the basis*" of infant baptism. But, as though he were smitten with a consciousness that the foundation was insufficient for the superstructure he would raise upon it, he proceeds, towards the close of his pamphlet, to lay a second, on which our attention must now be bestowed. "The broad ground," says he, "on which infants are to be received into the community of the church, is the universality of the reconciliation. If indeed the death of Christ were availing only for the elect, it might then be fitting to defer baptism till there were signs of regeneration; but, when all flesh is reconciled in the body of his flesh through death, the infant partaker of the reconciliation ought not to be denied

* P. 3.

the token of an interest in it."* I have already pointed out the inconsistency into which the writer has here fallen, of assigning two different hypotheses, each as *the* ground of the same thing; which may be when a house can stand on two foundations, and not before. To affirm the one of these is to deny the other; so that our notice of the theory of "representation" may be concluded with the declaration that the author himself abandons it. Let us see, in the next place, whether this second foundation is more solid than the first.

I will not controvert the position that Christ died for the whole world—a sentiment which, in a modified sense, I also hold; and which, for the sake of argument, I will grant to be true in the sense here designed. I then say, in the first place, that I challenge the authority on which baptism is called "the token of an interest in" the atonement of Christ. I know of no *scriptural* authority for it. If the writer means, as, from some things he says afterwards, it might almost appear he does, that the baptism of an infant is necessary to realize his interest in the atonement, this contradicts and stultifies the whole doctrine. According to this, it would appear, first, that though Christ died for all, yet none have an interest in his death but those who are baptized; and yet, secondly, that children ought to be baptized because they have an interest in his death. Or, if he disclaims the monstrous notion that baptism is necessary to bring a child within the influence of the atonement, and contents himself with representing it as a sign which may warrantably be applied to such as possess the thing signified, then I say, secondly, that, if this lays any foundation at all for the baptism of infants, it justifies the baptism of *all infants* without exception, and not merely the baptism of those whose parents are believers. Every infant is "partaker of the reconciliation," and no partaker of it, according to this writer, "ought to be denied the token of an interest in it." There is no way to avoid this conclusion, as I conceive, but to affirm that no children are partakers of the reconciliation but children of believers, an assertion at which I do think even the writer before us would hesitate. The baptism of infants at large, however, is not what he has been contending for, but that of believers' children only. Does he mean to alter his ground in this respect?

* P. 14.

He proceeds thus: "The child is in point of fact a portion of the body for which Christ died, a branch of the true vine; it may become hereafter a withered and sapless branch, and as such may be torn away, as Jesus intimates, by the hand of the Father; but it is not so yet. At present it is a branch, and ought not to abide under sentence of excommunication, as if it were otherwise."* Every child in the world, then, since Christ died for all, is a branch in the true vine, "and ought not to abide under sentence of excommunication, as though it were otherwise"! Is this really our author's principle, and will he act upon it? If he has any compassion he ought to do so; for, according to him, this excommunication, or non-baptism, is a tremendous affair. He tells us that "the church has no worse punishment for the most hardened infidel, for the most corrupt apostate, than simply to place them without her pale; and 'without are dogs, and sorcerers, and whoremongers, and idolators, and whosoever loveth and maketh a lie:' yet this is the identical situation in which pious mothers and fathers are to believe their little children universally stand, while they are guilty of no act of sin whatever, and [are] merely the unconscious partakers of that flesh which Jesus reconciled to God."†

Upon reading this terrific passage, the first impression made upon me is one of amazement that the writer should be able to limit his compassion to the "little children" who have "pious fathers and mothers;" seeing that, according to his own showing, all other "little children," however destitute of this privilege, "are guilty of no act of sin whatever, and are merely the unconscious partakers of that flesh which Jesus reconciled to God." I can arrive at no solution of this mystery more prompt than may be afforded by a further issue of "Explanatory Notes."

My amazement, however, is still greater at the most extraordinary sentiment by which these mock heroics are generated. Does he really think, then, that those who are without the pale of the visible church, either by having been expelled from it, or by never having been within it, are in the same spiritual place or condition as the dogs, sorcerers, and idolators, mentioned as being "*without*," in the passage he has quoted?‡ Will he affirm that, not only all excluded

* P. 14. † P. 14. ‡ Rev. xxii. 15.

professors, but all unbaptized persons, comprehending many millions of children, and many children of believers too, are of the character and doom there intended, and that they are so *because* they are not within the pale of the church? Either here is a play upon the word *without* in two dissimilar uses of it, which, if it is not artful, is excessively stupid; or here is the broaching of one of the most unscriptural, anti-evangelical, and monstrous sentiments ever written by the pen of man. Everybody who knows anything of the Gospel or of the Bible knows that, whatever beneficial influence the death of Christ produces on the condition of any persons *without faith*, as in the case of infants, it produces also without any reference to the ordinance of baptism. As to its spiritual condition, if a child is baptized it is none the better, and if it is not baptized it is none the worse. No part of its welfare is dependent upon the administration of this rite; nor will those parents who have not caused their children to be baptized be any more successful in looking for them among the "dogs and sorcerers" of the Revelation than among the mountains of the moon. In whatever sense a child "takes its standing under the second Adam,"* it does so exclusively by virtue of that which the second Adam has done for this end, and not by baptism—most strangely called by this writer, "the appropriate ordinance of initiation into the new covenant,"† when it is obvious that, unless it be performed by the midwife, or a clergyman be in attendance for the purpose, it cannot be administered until some portion, at least, of an infant's life has been spent in the company of those melancholy beings, by an enumeration of whom he has so causelessly attempted to lacerate the feelings of a parent.

Our author finishes his lucubrations on this point by adding: "To suppose that they may be taught that they are the children of God without reference to anything of the kind [any ordinance of initiation], and merely as belonging to the common mass of humanity, is to imply that God has no church upon earth, nor ever intended to have any."‡ He here writes upon the assumption that the Baptists affirm, or desire to affirm, that the children of believers are, as such, the children of God; an assumption altogether unauthorized,

* P. 15. † *Ibid.* ‡ *Ibid.*

and, for a man who has been a Baptist, perfectly extraordinary. Nothing can be more contrary to the fact. We teach our children that, although, if they had died in their infancy, they would have been safe and happy through the Lord Jesus Christ, as children of pious parents they are *not* children of God, and that they can then become such only by receiving him for themselves. None but Pædobaptists inculcate a contrary doctrine, and only some of them; and, if they feel infant baptism to be necessary to their support, they do but consistently maintain an unscriptural sentiment by an unscriptural practice.

Having thus largely treated of the two principal grounds on which this author reposes, I may pass over some minor topics with great brevity.

It is a somewhat astounding assertion that "the command of circumcision was given *as a privilege*,"* although there is no accounting for tastes; but, if it were so, it proves nothing to the point. "The characteristic of the Gospel is an enlargement of privileges," says our author. Very well: then circumcise all nations under the Gospel, as they did one under the law. But what has this to do with baptism? When it is said that circumcision was the initiatory rite in the one dispensation, as baptism is in the other; we reply, not merely that baptism has its own law, but that baptism is *not* the initiatory rite of *the system which the Jewish economy typified.* The ancient dispensation consisted of emblems of *spiritual things;* but baptism is not spiritual, nor does it introduce to any spiritual relations or privileges. It is a natural act, and constitutes only a *profession* of religion. Circumcision typified, not baptism, but "the putting away of the body of the sins of the flesh:" a spiritual process, which takes place upon our introduction to the family of God.

Our author is eminently talented in the art of finding evidence *everywhere.* He discovers it, not only upon opening his eyes "anywhere in the universe,"† but in the dark page of prophecy. "The truth of infant baptism," he assures us, "flows naturally from the right understanding of the second advent of Jesus Christ."‡ It would be singular if it should, since it flows from such an entire misunderstanding of his first. But let us see how this is made out. He comes, we

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* P. 10. † P. 3. ‡ P. 15.

are told, "to visit *apostate* Christendom;" among the kingdoms composing which there is no "bond of connexion" but infant baptism. Therefore infant baptism must be scriptural!* Is not this laughable? If he had shown that infant baptism was the bond which connected the *true* church of Christ together, he would have done something to his purpose; but, since it is the bond of connexion in a church which he himself calls "apostate," what follows, but that it may be, and probably is, as corrupt as other parts of the system with which it is identified?

Near the close of the tract we have an edifying description of the *value* of the system which our author maintains. He informs us that "the true value of infant baptism lies in its tendency to build up godly families."† This is marvellous. He has asserted just before that, by this "appropriate ordinance of initiation," children of pious parents are rescued from the region of "dogs and sorcerers," and made to "take their standing under the second Adam, and to enter into the covenant of another life;"‡ but these particulars, it seems, do not enter into the "true value" of the ordinance. This "lies in its tendency to build up godly families." Now *every* tree, our Saviour says, may be known by its fruits; and, if the *tendency* of infant baptism to build up godly families be estimated by *its results*, it can scarcely be regarded as very powerful. Infant baptism has prevailed almost universally in Christendom for more than a thousand years; and so far from "building up godly families," it has done more to secularize and corrupt the Christian community than all other causes put together. The thing that builds up godly families is laborious and prayerful diligence in parental duty —either with infant baptism, or without it.

There is one sentiment of this writer which, in concluding my remarks, I can quote with entire approbation and concurrence. It is this: "Let us humbly submit ourselves to the teaching of the Spirit of God, resolved to follow truth alone; and let no party attachments be permitted to rival the claims of heaven."§ Having doubtless acted conscientiously, Mr. Groser is to be respected, far more highly respected, than if, with changed views, he had not changed his position. But he is by no means to be taken as a guide.

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* P. 15. † P. 16. ‡ P. 15. § P. 17.

Seldom have been written pages more obscure, more inconclusive, more contradictory; or less adapted to embarrass any Baptists who ever knew the grounds of their persuasion.

I am, dear Brother,

Yours truly,

J. H. HINTON.

NOTE.

The Rev. THOMAS GROSER, brother of the late Rev. WILLIAM GROSER, a man well known and highly esteemed in the Baptist denomination, was for some time pastor of the Baptist church at Wells, in Somersetshire. Having united himself to the body of professing Christians commonly known as Plymouth Brethren, he also adopted Pædobaptist sentiments, and published the "Explanatory Notes" to which the preceding Letter refers.

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